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272-VOL XVII~-!

OPINIONS
OF

HON. CHARLES DEVENS, OF MASSACHUSETTS.
APPOIN'.L'ED MARCH 12, 1877.

STATE PROCESS.
Writs issued by the courts of Minnesota run into and upon the military
reservation of Fort Snelling, in that State.
DEPARTJ\.IENT OF JUSTICE,

January 6, 1881.
SIR : Referring to your inquiry whether service of writs
from courts of the State of Minnesota should be allowed on
the reservation of Fort Snelling, I think the question proposed is fully answered by the opinion of Attorney-General
Williams (14 Opin., 33, and see the cases there cited), in
which it was held that jurisdiction over the lands lying
within the limits of the military reservation of Fort Leavenworth passed from the United States to the State of Kansas
·under the operation of the act of June 29, 1861, chapter 20,.
admitting that State into the Union, and that to restore
exclusive jurisdiction to the United States a cession thereof
by the State would be necessary.
Upon the authority of this opinion (which seems to me
entirely satisfactory) I therefore reply to your question that
writs from the State of Minnesota do run into and upon the
reservation of Fort Snelling.
As General Terry requests immediate ans'\Ver, I have not
thought it necessary to delay by reasoning out the argument
which leads to this conclusion.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
OH.AS. DEVENS.
Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.
272-VOL XVII--1
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RON. CHARLES DEVENS
Inspector- General's Department.

INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.
The act of December 12, 1878, chap. 2, limits the nomination of brigadiergeneral in the Inspector-General's Department to the senior officer
thereof. Provisions of that act compared with those of section 1193,
. Revised Statutes, and distinction between them indicated.
DEPAR'I.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

January 8, 1881.
SIR: I have read the brief submitted to you.
By examining the act of December 1~, 1878, it will be seen
that the language is that '' the rank of the senior InspectorGeneral of the United States Army shall be brigadiergeneral."
The proviso shows that the whole act is limited to the
officers of the Inspector-General's Department.
I am of the opinion that General Sackett, who has now
become the senior Inspector-General, is entitled to the nomination as brigadier-general. The fact that no other officers
could be added to the corps (it being limited by the act of
1874 to :five officers), I think, clearly shows that the senior
officer must be from the Inspector-General's Department itself. By the retirement of General Marcy no vacancy was
created in that department. This construction, of course,
limits the act of 1878 to the right on the part of the President to nominate the senior Inspector-General. That must
certainly be its construction with regard to the :first appoint-·
ment made under that act; and, if the authority is continuing (and I consider that it is), the same limitation subsequently exists.
I see by the papers that since the retirement of General
Marcy an officer junior to General Sackett is to be, or is,
retired.....:General Shriver; but it does not seem to me that
this can affect the matter. The question is as to the construction of the act; and as until that retirement no officer
outside of the Inspector-General's Department could have
been appointed without violation of the provision that the
inspectors-general shall be limited to :five . in number, it is
shown that its true construction is to invest the senior Inspector-General with the rank. General Shriver's retirement
will reduce the number below :five. It should not deprive
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General Sackett of his rights. already acquired by the retirement of General Marcy; and the vacancy which will exist in
the Inspector-General's Department by the retirement of
General Shriver should be filled by an appointment into that
department of an officer who will be the junior officer thereof.
In the papers sent to me reliance seems to be placed on
section 1193, Revised Statut~s,_ which provides for the appointment of the Adjutant-General and certain other chiefs
of corps from the corps to which they belong. It is argued
that because the Inspector-General is not here named, he can
be appointed from the Army generally. It is sufficient anRwer to this, I think, to say that the section 1193, in providing for the appointment of chiefs of certain other staff corps,
gives the President the right to free selection from that corps;
but the act of December 12, 1878, in regard to the InspectorGeneral's Department, limits the President to the senior
officer thereof.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The

PRESIDENT.

BREVET ·COMMISSIONS OF JUDGE-ADVOCATES.
Where a judge-advocate, appointed in the volunteer service under the
act of July 17, 1862, chap. 201, with the rank of major, was afterwards and prior to the act of July 28, 1866, chap. 299, as amended by
the act of February 25, 1867, chap. 79 (by operation of which acts he
became transferred from the volunteer to the regular service), brevetted
a lieutenant-colonel and also a colonel of volunteers: Held that the said
acts of 1866 and 1867 produced no effect upon the brevet commissions
in the volunteer service previously conferred, and that such brevets
can not be treated as brevets in the regular service.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 13, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of December 22, 1880, incloses a com-

munication from Maj. William Winthrop, Judge-Advocate
U. S. Army, dated November 5, 1880, with the indorsements
thereon and the papers accompanying· the same.
Major Winthrop applies to have the entries in the Army
Register as to his brevet rank so amended as that he shall
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appear in the next Register as a brevet colonel in the regular
army.
The question raised is whether Major Winthrop, who was
brevetted lieutenant-colonel and colonel in the "volunteers,"
is now entitled to that brevet rank in the ''regular Army~"
The act of July 17, 1862, authorized the President to appoint, with the advice, etc., of the Senate, "for each army
in the field a judge-advocate, with the rank of a major of
cavalry, who shall perform the duties of judge-advocate for
the army to which they respectively belong, under the direction of the judge-ad vocate general."
Under this law Major Winthrop with other gentlemen
was appointed a judge-advocate. He was nominated and
confirmed by the Senate for appointment in the " volunteer
force." He was afterwards nominated, confirmed, and commissioned for the brevets of lieutenant-colonel and colonel
of volunteers.
The act of July 28, 1866, as amended by act o£ February
25, 1867, retained certain of the judge-advocates (including
Major Winthrop) in the service'" upon the same footing in
respect to tenure of office and otherwise as other officers of
the Army of the United States." The a~t of April10, 1869,.
fixed the number of judge-advocates at eight, and authorized the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to till all vacancies which had occurred or might
thereafter occur in such offices.
It has been held that the operation of this legislation was
to transfer these officers into the regular Army, and that they
did not need any new appointment by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and no new appointment
has been made.
These officers did not belong to the regular Army until
they were made officers thereof by the act of February 25,.
1867. While their commisRions still purport to be in the
"volunteer" force, this legislation operated to extend these
commissions so as to make the officers holding them officers
of the "regular" force.
Without discussion I assume, therefore, in this opinion that
the question submitted to Attorney-General Hoar, and an·
swered by him on June 4, 1869 (13 Opin., 96), namely, that
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the then in~umbents of the office of judge-advocate were officers of the regular Army, lawfully appointed and commissioned, is rightfully decided.
But if the operation of the legislation is to transfer these
officers into the regular Army with the rank held by them
at the time, and upon the same footing in respect to tenure
of office as other officers of the Army, it has no retroactive
effect, and does not make them officers of the regular Army
from the time when the brevets in question were received.
I think there could be no question if these gentlemen had
been nominated and confirmed by the Senate and afterwards
commissioned as officera of the regular Army, that the commissions thus received would not carry therewith any right
to have the brevet commissions held by them in the " volunteer" service treated as brevets in the "regular" service;
and when legislation at a particular date transfers them from
the volunteer to the regular servJce, although such transfer
may operate in spite of the language of their commissions to
make them officers of the regular service, no effect will be
produced upon the brevets held by them in the volunteer
service~

I do not, of course, discuss the question whether Congress
might not have transferred them with their brevet rank as
well as their actual rank; but there is no legislation to that
effect.
The suggestion made is that this ruling would make the
brevet commissions nullities. I do not so consider it. They
would have the same effect as brevet commissions received
by officers of volunteers who were afterward appointed to
lineal rank in the regular Army similar to that held by them
when in the volunteer service. Undoubtedly the brevet commission must have a commission to rest upon when conferred.
When Major Winthrop was brevetted he had a commission
in the volunteer service. When he is transferred to the regular Army by the legislation, although his volunteer commission ceases to exist it only does so in the same way that it
would if he had been commissioned into the regular Army.
The suggestion is made on behalf of Major Winthrop (see
lett,e r of December 6, 1876), that the corps never consisted of
volunteer officers in the proper sense of the term, and that as
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to their brevet commissions those were of the same nature
as the original rank to which they were incident.
In the view I take of the matter the judge-advorJates were
volunteer officers in the proper sense of the term. The brevet
commissions were of the same nature, and they do not change
their nature when the commissions themselves are changed,
whether that change be effected, as in this case, by legislation
or, as ordinarily, by new appointment and confirmation.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.
MARTELLO TOWERS NEAR FORT TAYLOR, .FLA.
In the case of certain martello towers, outworks of Fort Taylor, Fla.,
which were erected during th~ rebellion, on land then in the military
occupation of the United States: Advised, that if the title ·to such
land has not been acquired by the Government, but is held by individuals, and it is deemed expedient to permanently retain possession
thereof for military purposes, application be made to Congress by
the War Department for authority to acquire the same, instead of
forcing'the owners to go there for relief.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 21, 1881.
SIR: I have considered the case presented in your letter
of the 16th of November last in regard to the sites of the
advanced martello towers, outworks of Fort Taylor, on the
island of Key West, Fla.
It appears by your letter that these towers were built at
great cost at an early period in the rebellion, when the
exigencies of the times and certain difficulties in procuring titles prevented, in the judgment of the Chief ·of Engineers and the Secretary of War, the purchase of the sites,
and it is presumed they were occupied by the United States
as an act of war in the seceded State.
The land embracing the sites was recently purchased at a
tax sale by a citizen, who has since been attempting to remove sand therefrom to the endangerment of the towers.
You inquire "if under the circumstances the United States
can hold possession of the sites, exclude jutruders, whether
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they claim to be owners or not, and force the owners to enter
claims for the land, either in Congress or before the Court of
Claims, by which means they can obtain proper compem~a
tion for their lands."
In reply, I have the honor to state that in my opinion the
United States can hold the possession of the sites, and exclude intruders therefrom, whether they claim to be owners
or not; and further, that no proceedings to oust the United
States from the possession of the premises are maintainable
(Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. R., 433). Yet, if the title to
the sites has not been acquired by the United States, but is
held by individuals, and it is deemed advisable that the
United States should permanently retain the possession of
the sites for military purposes, I suggest the propriety of
the Department of War applying to Congress for authority
to acquire the title, either by purchase or condemnation,
instead of forcing the owners themselves to go to Congress
for relief.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.
NOTE.-The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lee (106 U. S., 196),
has since decided that where an officer or agent of the Government,
holding possession of property for public uses, is sued therefor by a person claiming to be the owner thereof or entitled thereto, the lawfulness
of that possession and the right and title of the United States to the
property may, by a court of competent jurisdiction, be inquired into and
adjudged accordingly.

CASE OF COLONEL STONEMAN.
Upon consideration oftbe facts in the case of the retirement of Col. George
Stoneman, U. S. Army: Held, that that officer was not entitled to be
retired as a major-general on account of disability occasioned by
wounds received in battle, under the provisions of section 32 of the
act of July 28, 1866, chap. 299 (it not appearing that his disability was
so occasioned), but that be was properly retired on his rank of colonel·
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 28, 1881.
SIR: By letter of January 23, 1881, Col. George Stoneman, U. S. Army, objects tllat his retirement as a colonel in
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the Army was improperly made by the recent President, and
requests a revocation of the Special Orders, No. 322, of 1871,
and that he may be borne on the retired list of the Army in
accordance with special orders, No. 307, current series, 1878.
By the order of August 16, 1871, General Stoneman, upon
the report of an examining board, having been held incapacitated for active service by reason of wounds or injury received during the time he held the command of major-general
of the United States, it was directed by the President "that
his name be placed on the list of retired officers of that class
in which the disability results from long and faithful service
or from wounds or injury received in the line of duty, in conformity with sections 16 and 17 of the act of August 3,
1861;" and, further, that in accordance with section 32 of
the act of July 28, 1866, Colonel Stoneman be retired with
the full rank of major-general.
Before this order was actually executed, and before it had
reached Colonel Stoneman, it was revoked by Special Orders,
No. 322, August 19, 1871, which recited that the order having l>een based upon a recommendation of the retiring board
which was made under a misconception of the law, the same
was thereby revoked, and Colonel Stoneman was retired on
his rank of colonel, it. not appearing that he was wounded in
battle, and the law r~quiring, in explicit terms, that an offiP,er
shall be disabled by "wounds"-not by disease-to enable
the President to retire him on the rank of the command held
by him when so wounded.
Section 32 of the act of July 28, 1866, is as follows :
''And be it further enacted That officers of the regular army,
.entitled to be retired on account of disability occasioned by
wounds received in battle, may be retired upon the full rank
,o f the command held by them whether in the regular or volunteer ser--;ice at the time such wounds were received."
The claim of General Stoneman is, that as the disease from
which he was suffering, namely, "piles," was aggravated or
occasioned by jolting in the saddle during his active service,
he is therefore entitled to he retired "on account of disability
occasioned by wounds received in battle." He further claims
that, whether erroneously construing the law or not, the construction given it by the medical board is final.
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I am unable to concur in either of these views. The report
clearly shows that the injuries received by Colonel Stoneman were not wounds received in battle, but were the
ordinary series of contusions from the jolting of the saddle
which aggravated the disease from which he was suffering.
Nor can the opinion of the medical board be permitted to
·c ontrol a distinct provision of law which limits the retirement,
under the section 32 referred to, to retirement " on account
{)f disability occasioned by wounds received in battle."
Upon the whole case I am therefore of opinion that no injustice bas been done to Colonel Stoneman; that the original
order was properly recalled, it not having been completely
executed; and that even if it had been executed and delivered to Colonel Stoneman and his name placed on the retired
list as a major-general, it would now be the duty of the President to place him upon the retired list as a colonel, upon exami-nation of the papers in the case.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The PRESIDENT.
CASE OF GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON.
Opinion of November 28, 1874 (14 Opin., 506), upon the claim of General
Schuyler Hamilton to be borne on the retired list of the Army, reaffirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 29, 1881.
SIR : I have carefully examined the case of General Schuyler Hamilton, as exhibited in his papers referred to me by
you and transmitted from the War Department.
General Hamilton, by a memorandum which I inclose,
informs me that he does not now desire to press his request
upon the President for a board of officers upon his case, ,but
desires that the Attorney-General would express his opinion
as to whether he (General Hamilton) is now entitled to be
borne on the army list as a retired officer with the rank of
lien ten aut-colonel.
An examination of the fourteenth volume of the Opinions
()f the Attorney-General (p. 506) will show that the case of
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General Hamilton has once been fully examined and passed
upon by this Department. I do not perceive that any new
facts are suggested to those which were then before the Department. I am of the opinion that such adjudication is
correct, and accordingly that the claim of General Hamilton
to be placed on the retired list, based upon his appointment by Brevet Lieutenant-General Scott on his staff as a
military secretary, is inadmissible under the laws in force,
he not being an officer on the active list by virtue of that
appointment; and, further, that under the act of March 3,
1857, General Scott was eiltitled, when exercising command
according to the rank of brevet lieutenant-general and then
only, to th.e staff to which he had appointed General Hamilton, and that upon the retirement of General Scott from
active service and consequent withdrawal from command,
to wit, November 1, 1861, the appointment of General Ham·
ilton was ipso jure revoked.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The PRESIDENT.
RELATIVE RANK IN PAYMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.
Rela.tive rank in the Paymaster's Department of the Army, as between
officers having the same grade and date of appointment and commission, was regulated by the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 159 (Rev.
Stat., sec. 1219 and 12\12), and was determined by length of service as a
commissioned officer, computed according to the provisions of that act.
Except as between such officers as have the same date of appointment
and commission, the matter of relative rank was left by that act to
be governed by the dates of the commissions under which the officers
are at the time serving.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Februa1·y 9, 1881.
SIR : I have received the letter from your Department of
the 29th of January, inclosing a communication from Maj.
C. M. Terrell, paymaster, U. S. Army, dated January 25,
applying for a reconsideration of the opinion of Acting
Attorney-General B. F. Bristow, dated June 13, 1878 (13
Opin., 441), on the ground that said opinion was based upon
an erroneous statement of facts.
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Neither your letter nor that of Major Terrell gives a statement of what is erroneous in the facts which were before
General Bristow. Apparently there is an error in his opinion
as to the rule of practice existing in the Pay Department, he
understanding that by that rule a senior officer on one day
might become a junior officer on the following day under
the act of May 15, 1820, by which the term of office for which
paymasters in the Army were appointed was limited to four
years. This error (if it be one), or if it be that to which
your letter refers, is obviously unimportant.
It is not the less true that the act of }larch 3, 1847, was
intended to fix definitely the rank in the Pay :pepartment,
between officers having the same grade, in favor of the oldest in service in the Department, without regard to the date
of commission under which they might be acting at the time;
and the only apparent reason for such an act was to prevent
the confusion which would arise from the senior officer of one
day becoming the junior of another.
After the act of March 2, 1849, this provision would have
lost its practical importance, as length of service would
thereafter generally coincide with the date of commission.
It is not, however, necessary to carefully consider these
statutes, as the subject of relative rank in the Pay Department between officers having the same grade and date of
appointment and commission was dealt with by the act of
March 2, 1867. This act, while it disposed of ·the matter of
the relative rank of those officers having the same date of appointment and commission, left the matter of relative rank to
be regulated solely according to the dates of the commissions
of other officers. If, therefore, an officer has a date of appointment and commission earlier than another officer, he is
entitled to take rank over that other, even if the latter officer
should actually have served a longer time as a commissioned
officer of the United States.
On carefully reviewing the whole opinion to which my attention has been called, I can see no error in it as matter of
law nor any as matter of fact which in any way affects the
accuracy of the decision.
The provisions of the first and second sections of the act
of March 2, 1867 (which are the only ones which need b~
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considered in this connection) are re-enacted in the Revised
btatutes, sections 1219 and 1292.
The papers which were with your letter are herewith
returned.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.

CASE OF MAJ. RODNEY SMITH.
This case is controlled by the opinion in Major Terrell's case, ante p. 10.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 9, 1881.
SIR: I have your letter of the 8th instant, transmitting,
at the request of .1\iaJ. Rodney Smith, paymaster, U.S: Army,
certain papers relatiug to rank among Army paymasters,
etc., for consideration in connection with the case presented
by Maj. 0. M. Terrell.
Previous to receiving these papers the case of Major Terrell had been passed upon by me by an opinion of even date
herewith.
I have read the papers of Major Smith, which tend only to
confirm me in the. conclusion which I have heretofore reached
without them. They further seem to show that the erroneous statement of facts claimed to have been the basis of So.
licitor-General Bristow's opinion, and treated by me as unimportant in the result, was not in fact erroneous.
I should have called your attention to my opinion of July
6, 1877 (15 Opiu., 330), in which it was held, in regard to a
case arising in the Quartermaster's Department, that the
right to promotion under existing law would be governed by
seniority of commission, irrespective of the past services of
the officer.
I return the papers which accompanied your letter.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.
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CASE OF WALKER A. NEWTON.
Power of the President under the act of July 15, 1870, chapter 294, to
drop an officer from the rolls of the Army, considered.
Neither the act of March 3, 1865, chapter 79, nor that of July 13, 1866,
chapter 176, applies to cases expressly and specifically provided for by
the act of July 15, 1870, section 17.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 16, 1881.
SIR: In the matter of the application of Walker A. Newton for a rehearing, referred to me by you upon yesterday's request of the Secretary of War, I have the honor to
report that, after a full and careful examination of all the voluminous papers (herewith transmitted, for restoration to
the War Department), including the statements of the petitioner and the briefs of his counsel, I am fully satisfied of
th~ correctness of the conclusion reached by the former
Secretary of War (Mr. McCrary), that, if there is any case
made for relief, there is no relief which the President or any
executive branch of the Government can give.
The facts, as officially stated to you, are as follows:
"Mr. Newton l'eceived an appointment as second lieutenant Thirty-fourth Infantry, August 29, 1867; joined his regiment September 11, 1867 ; and continued in the performance
of actual military duty until December 5, 1868-a little more
than a year. On the last-named date he left his post on
twenty days' leave, which was afterwards extended twenty
days-to January 14, 1869-on which date he should, under
Army Regulations, have been at his post. But it appears
that he remained in Philadelphia, and on February 8 and
March 27, 1869, he sent from that city certificates stating
that he was not fit for duty by reason of a gunshot wound
through the thigh. When, where, or how he received this
wound is not shown by any record in this office.
ln April, 1869, he left Philadelphia to join his regiment in
Mississippi; but meantime his regiment had been consolidated with the Eleventh Infantry and formed the Sixteenth
Infantry, leaving Lieutenant Newton supernumerary, or unassigned. July 14, 1869, an order was issued from the Adjutant-General's office assigning him to the Thirteenth Infantry;
but by another order, issued August 20,1869, upon an official
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report that he had, at New Orleans, La., executed two sets
of pay accounts for the same month-June, 1869-his assignment to the Thirteenth Infantry was revoked, and the
order directed that he report to the commanding-general in
New Orleans, for trial by court-martial for the offense. It
appears that he did not report for trial, and that a copy of
neither of the two last-named orders was sent to him, for
the reason that his whereabouts was not known to the Adjutant-General's office when these orders were issued. The
Army Regulations require officers away from their regiments
on leave or detached duty to report their address monthly
to the Adjutant-General. Without such information it is
impossible for the Adjutant-General to communicate orders
or instructions, however important, to an officer.
No reports had been received from Lieutenant Newton
subsequent to his departure from Philadelphia in April preceding. Under date of September 2, 1869, however, he reported from Holly Springs, Miss., that, having received no
orders, he would "start immediately for Was~ington.'r As
he would naturally reach Washington about as soon as his
report would reach there, his orders were not, as a matter of
course, sent to Holly Springs. It does not appear as a matter of record, or of fact, that he ever did, after September 2,
1869, report either in pm·son or by letter to the AdjutantGeneral of the Army. It is certain, that had he reported his
address to, or communicated with, the Adjutant-General, all
the orders issued in his case would have been promptly
transmitted to him.
By the act approved July 15, 1870, section 17, the President was authorized to drop from the rolls of the Army, for
desertion, any officer who is now, or·who may hereafter be,
absent from duty three months without leave; and any
officer so dropped shall forfeit all pay and allowances due,
or to become due, and shall not be eligible for re-appointment. (16 Stats., 319.)
July 25, 1870, an order was issued by the Adjutant-General. by the direction of the President and by order of the
Secretary of War, directing the dropping of the names of
/ Lieutenant Newton and two other officers from the rolls of
the Army under the provisions of the act cited.
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The gravamen of the petitioner's complaint, and the greater
part of his counsel's argument, are based upon the assumption
that this order was issued '~under a misapprehension of the
facts." If this were so, it is not perceived how it can change
the legal effect of the order; it still remains an authorized and
authoritative act of the Executive, even if prompted by an
erroneous impression.
The President was empowered "to drop from the rolls of
the Army, for desertion, any officer who is now, or who may
hereafter be, absent from duty three months without leave."
To exercise such power the President must necessarily first
ascertain to his own satisfaction what officers are "now" so
absent. To this end the act did not provide for nor contemplate recourse to a court-martial or 'other examination conducted outside of the President's own investigation (which
he was left to make in such manner as he saw fit) to ascertain this fact. The law placed its a~ce~tainment wholly in
the hands of the Chief Executive, who must naturally have
been expected to resort to the official records of the War
Department as one source, at least, of information.
But, however to be solved, this question of fact was placed
within• the President's exclusive jurisdiction. The right to
decide it implied the power to determine it conclusively either
way as to any officer. (Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Placer
County, 43 Cal. Rep. 369.)
His decision as to any officer having been made, the President is, as to the case of that individual, functus officio j the
statute giving him no right to review, annul, affirm, or reverse
his own adjudication.
Even if his action was the mere exercise of discretion, it
would be contrary to the rule laid down in the early days of
the Government for any successor in office to reverse it.
This rule and the urgent reasons for it are clearly and forcibly expressed in opinions given October 1, 1825, to the Secretary of the Navy, and July 28, 1828, to President J. Q.
Adams, by Attorney-General Wirt, (2 Opin., 8, 110). In the
earlier opinion, Mr. Wirt observed, after giving some of the
reasons for the rule: "Hence, I have understood it to be
a rule of action prescribed to itself by each administration to
consider the acts of its predecessors conclusive, as far as
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the Executive is concerned. It is but a decent degree of
respect for each administration to entertain of its predecessor,
to suppose it as well qualified as itself to execute the laws
according to the intention of their makers; and not to set an
example of review and reversal which, in its turn, may be
brought to bear upon itself; and thus keep the acts of the
Executive perpetually unsettled and afloat. In conversing
with President Adams on this subject, I understood him
to concur in the general rule of considering all acts of the
preceding administration final; and although partial injuries
may now and then remain unredressed by the operation of
this, in common with all other general rules, yet it is better
to bear that partial evil, or leave it to legislative redress,
than to introduce the ·more extensive and incalculable evils
which must result from considering all the past acts of all the
past Executives as open to reconsideration, and re-adjudication at the pleasure of the individuals who were interested
in them." (2 Opin., 9, 10.) In the later opinion Mr.
Wirt pursued the same line of thought: "The question
is, whether it be constitutionally competent for you to undo
what your predecessor has done~ If it be, then all the
official acts of all your predecessors are open to review and
reversal, and you may go back to the foundation of the
Government, unsettle all that has been done by those who
have gone before you, and place those transactions on the
basis on which you may think they ought to rest; and your
successors, in their turn, may undo all that you have done,
and restore the state of things which you have changed.
Thus, as long as our Constitution shall endure, executive acts
instead of being done when they are done, will be perpetually
afloat; and the incumbent of the office for the time being,
instead of discharging the current duties which properly
belong to him, will have his time consumed by this retrospective action on the acts of his predecessors. I had supposed the rule to be, that whatever purely executive measure had been adjudged and de~ided and closed during a preceding administration was considered as withdrawn altogether from the action of the succeeding President; and the
rule seems to result, naturally and necessarily, from the
nature of things." (2 Opin., 115).
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Mr. Attorney-General Cushing, after remarking that "the
principle which would allow a matter done to be re-examined
and reversed by a successor in office would equally allow
the' reversal ·tc be reversed by a successor in office, and
so in endless succession of reviews and reversals," quotes
what he considers well said by Mr. Attorney-General Toucey:
"There is no law which authorizes the head of any Department to supervise the acts. of its predecessor. * * * It
might well be asked, which of the two high functionaries,
exercising the same authority, would, in contemplation of
law, be deemed to be in the right, the one who, at a proper
time and on proper occasion, exercised his legitimate authority, according to his best judgment, or the one who undertook to go back into a past stage of administration, and
to revise and reverse the acts of his predecessor, whose
power was equal and identical with his own¥" (6 Opin.,
605, 606.)
In an opinion furnished by me to the Secretary of the Interior on the 20th March, 1877, after referring to the able
presentation of the subject by Mr. Wirt and its frequent restatement with approval by other Attorney-Generals, I concluded th~t this rule of acquiescence in what had been done
by our predecessors must be considered as settled. (1.5
Opin., 208.)
If the act be not merely discretionery, but (as in the pres·
ent instance) quasi judicial, while the above-mentioned objections apply with equal or greater force, it is more obvious
that the right of reversai can not exist.
Congress must have intended that the authority to drop
from the Army rolls any offiGer "now" absent from duty
should be exercised by him who was then President. .It could
not have expected that action as to such officers would be
taken by one succeeding to the Presidential office ten or
twenty years later, or indefinitely thereafter.
At all events, whenever taken, action once had was final.
General Order, No. 95, evidenc~s the taking of such final action by President Grant. He was authorized "to drop from
the. rolls" certain officers. The rolls were not made up by
his hand nor in his personal custody. They were made up
and kept at the War Department. The only way the Presi272- VOL xvn--2
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dent could drop names therefrom was by directing it to be
done at the War Department. This he did. The petitioner
and his advocates treat the order reciting this direction as an
ind·ictment, making ''a charge of desertion," which it is neces- .
sary to support, at this late day, by evidence, and which he
can now refute by his own statemeJ;ttS or otherwise. The
first brief (of Mr. Neill) filed in his behalf, at the bottom of
page twent,y-three, uses this language: "If the charges in the
indictment as recited are not affirmati\ely shown to be true
* * * the ind'ictment falls absolutely,'' etc. The statute'
did not contemplate any formal trial by the President, either ,
through an '"indictment" or a court-martial, before dropping
an absent officer. It was left to the President to ascertain
and determine who ought to be dropped, and then to govern
himself accordingly. No form of procedure was prescribed,
but the means of discovering the facts was left to the sound
judgment of him upon whom was conferred the power to act.
(Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19.)
When we reflect that the purpose was to purge the Army
of those who for three months neglected their military duties
altogether, by being absent without leave, it may well be inferred that it was anticipated that recourse would be had to
the records of the War Department to discover who were
thus delinquent.
But however the facts upon which it was based were ascertained, General Orders, No. 95, issued'' by direction of the
President," did not prefer a charge; it announced a decision, from which there was no appeal. Therefore it is useless to argue either that Mr. Newton was not technically a
deserter, or even that be was not in fact for three months
absent from duty without leave. If any such depositary of
special statutory authority go wrong upon the evidence, it is
the misfortune of the parties. (Birdsall v. Phillips, 17
Wend., 463; G,ibbs v. Co. Commrs., 19 Pick., 299.) It is not
intended by this remark to asRume or concede that there was
any mistake as to the existence of the statutory fact of absence without leave; but to say that if there were, it can
not now be rectified by the President. That Congress intended to make the determination absolute is apparent from
the concluding clause of section 17 of this act of July 15,
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1870, chapter 294, which declares that no officer so dropped
shall be eligible for re-appointment. (16 Stats., 319.)
The petitioner claims that the action of President Grant
was void because not authenticated by his sign-manual.
Neitherthe enabling act nor any ~rrnyregulation applicable
to cases like this expressly required such signature. Nor
was it customary for him to sign similar orders. In those
tribunals, above justices of the peace, in which civil and
~riminal causes are daily litigated and determined, the record
is never verified by the signature of the judge, but by that
-of the clerk. As to military matters, the Secretary of War
has always been recognized as the organ of the President,
promulgating whatever orders he received from the latter.
(Act of August 7, 1789, found in Revised Statutes, section
216.) "The Secretary of War is the regular constitutional
organ of the President for the administration of the military
establishment of the nation, and the rules and orders publicly promulgated through him must be received as the act of
the Executive, and as such be binding upon all within the
.sphere of his legal and constitutional authority." ( U. 8. v.
Eliason, 16 Peters, 302; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Peters, 513;
Hickey v. H use, 56 Maine, 495.)
In the present ca~e, instead of resting upon the implication of authority inferred from their respective official relations, the order expressly recites that it is issued ~'by
direction of the President." This is a sufficient verification
of official action under the act of July 15, 1870, section 17.
Upon the 1st day of December, 1879, Mr. Newton for the
iirst time, makes application, professedly based upon tb,e
provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1230, for a courtmartial, alleging that he was wrongfully dismissed in July,
1870. That section is a reproduct'ion of the act of March 3, '
1865, in somewhat different phraseology. (13 Stats., 489,
§ 12.)
That law was passed while the war was flagrant, and
while the President had authority under the act or July 17,
1862, chapter 200, section 17 (12 Stats., 596), "to dismiss and
discharge from the military service either in the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, or volunteer force, in the United States
..service, any officer for any cause which, in his judgment,
I

•
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Pit her renders such officer unsuitable for, or whose dismission
would' promote, the public service." Neither the act of
March 3, 1865, nor that of July 13, 1866, chapter 176, section 5 (14: Stats., 92), declaring that "no officer in the military or naval s~rvice shall, in time of peace,- be dismissed
from service, except upon and in pursuance of the sentence
of a court-martial," etc. (Rev. Stat., § 1229), apply ·t o cases
expressly and specifically provided for by the act of July
15, 1870, section 17, authorizing the President to drop from
the rolls those officers absent from duty without leave for
three months. (16 Stats., 319.)
Even if he originally came within the purview of the act
of March 3, 1865, section 12, Mr. Newton's application for its
benefits was not seasonable. Though no time is limited in the·
act for making the application, the general rule of law would
require the claim to be made within a reasonable time. It is.
not reasonable to wait until the statute of limitations has
run against the offense, witnesses have disappeared, aJ?.d
memory failed; or until we may naturally expect these·
things to have occurred.
By the printed copy of his petition, filed May 4, 1880, in
the Court of Claims (which I inclose to you, because no·
reference is made to it in any way in any of the other papers}
you will see that Mr. Newton has pending in the Court of
Claims a suit to recover $16,800 compensation as second lieu-tenant, from May 31, 1869, to May, 1880, when his petition
was filed. That suit proceeds upon the same theory as does.
his app ication to you, i.e., that he is still, and has ever been,.
in the Army, because President Grant's sign-manual is not
affixed to the order of dismissal, because he was not a deserter, and because he has asked for a court-martial under·
section 1230 of Revised Statutes. He is thus in a position
· to obtain a judicial construction of these statutes and determination of his cause, and can, upon appeal, obtain that
of the highest tribunal. The facts upon which his claim rests
can be much more satisfactorily established in such a proceeding, with its opportunities for investigation and crossexamination, than they can upon the ex parte statements of
the applicant. He will there have the opportunity to explain,
if he can consistently with the proper aml prompt discharge

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

21

Case of Paymaster Caswell, U. S. Navy.

of his military duties, bow it was that from the 5th day of
December, 1868, up to the date of the order of July 25,
1870, directing his name to be dropped, he had rendered no
service to the Governm~nt; and why, from September 2, 1869,
to the time be was dropped, he sent no communication to the
War Department; or, in short, whether or not he was in fact
absent without leave, if that question is still open for debate
anywhere.
In my opinion~ the present Executive has no right to take
the action requested by Mr. Newton; but if the right existed,
I am convinced it would be better to leave him to the judicial
remedy which he has invoked.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The PRESIDENT.
CASE OF PAYMASTER CASWELL, U. S. NAVY.
Upon the facts of this case, as set forth in the opinion, it is held that
Paymaster Thomas T. Caswell is entitled to a position on the list of
paymasters in the Navy next above that of Paymaster John H. Stevenson; the -position of the latter officer, as borne on the Navy Register,
being affected by the restoration ofthe name of Paymaster Edward
Bellows to said list, from which it had been illegally dropped.

DEP.A.RTMENT OF cJUS'l'ICE,
February 18, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 4th instant submits to me an
application of Paymaster Thomas T. Caswell, U. S. Navy,
for a correction of theNa vy Register, in which he claims that
he is entitled to a position in the list of paymasters next
above that of Paymaster John H. Steven~on, who is now
borne on the Register as the senior officer of that grade, and
to examination for promotion to fill an existing vacancy in
the next higher grade in the Pay Corps.
The following facts in the case are stated to appear by the
records of the Navy Department: ·
On the 6th of April, 1870, Paymaster John H. Stevenson
was nominated by the President ''to be advanced fifteen
numbers in his grade for extraordinary heroism during the
war of the rebellion, as particularly set forth in the accom.
panying report from Captain N. B. Woolsey, U.S. Navy, so
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as to take rank from the 4th of May, 1866, and next afler
Paymaster F. H. Hinman."
This nomination was confirmed by the Senate June 23r
1870, when Pa.ymaster Stevenson was advanced and commissioned accordingly.
Paymaster Stevenson was nominated April 9, 1879, "fol"
advancement :fifteen numbers in his grade, and to take rank
next after Paymaster George Cochran, for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle and extraordinary heroism, in
accordance with the provisions of section 1506, Revised
Statutes."
This nomination was confirmed. by the Senate April 30,.
1879, when a commission was issued to Mr. Stevenson, with
rank as a paymaster from the 13th of June, 1863, next aftel"
Paymaster GP-orge Cochran.
In accordance with his advancement, and with the date of
his commission, Mr. Stevenson's position in the list of paymasters (as registered) is next above that of Thomas T. Caswell, who takes rank as a paymaster from the 17th of September, 1863, as stated in his commission.
On the 22d of January, 1880, about nine months after the
second advancement of Paymaster Stevenson, the following
order was addressed by the Secretary of the Navy to Paymaster Ed ward Bellows, U. S. Navy:
"The order of January 28, 1869, dismissing you from the
naval service, having been issued in consequence of the facts
appearing upon the record of the naval general court-martial
before which yon were tried November 16, 1868, and not in
pursuance of the sentence of a general court-martial, was
illegal, and contrary to the provisions of the fifth section of
the act of Congress approved July 13, 1866 (Rev. Stat.,
§ 1624, art. 36). The said order and dismissal are therefore
declared illegal and void, and the same are, by direction of'
the President of the United States, hereby revoked and annulled."
Mr. Bellows's name was thereupon restored to the list of'
paymasters on the Navy Register next after that of Paymaster George A. Lyon, the original relative position held
by h~m on that list, and to which he is entitled by virtue of
his commission.
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During the time intervening, that is, from January 28,
1869, the date of the order of dismissal of Paymaster Bellows, and January 22, 1880, when his name was restored to
the Navy Register, the following-named paymasters, whose
original rank was below that of Paymaster Bellows in that
grade, were advanced by the President, with the consent
of the Senate, to positions on the list of paymasters above
that hel\l by Mr. Bellows at the time his name was removed
therefrom:
(1) L. G. Billings, February 25, 1871, "fifteen numbers
in his grade, for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle
during the war of the rebellion, to take rank from the 20th
of October, 1864, next after Paymaster James Hoy, jr."
(2) Francis H. I wan, February 25, 1871, ''fifteen numbers in his grade, for extraordinary heroi~m during the war
of the rebellion, to take rank from the 31st of August, 1865,
next after Paymaster Forbes Packer."
(3) Charles F. Guild, April17, 1871, ''ten numbers in his
grade, in accordance with the provisions of the second section of the act of Congress approved January 24, 1865."
(4) James E. Tolfree, February 3, 1875, '• ten numbers in
his grade."
(5) John H. Stevenson, April 30, 1879, "fifteen numbers
in his grade," as above stated.
.
These officers remain (as registered) in the relative positions to which they were thus advanced, in order of rank as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

John H. Stevenson.
Thomas T. Caswell.
James Hoy.
Luther G. Billings.
Arthur J. Pritchard.
Albert S. Kenny.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Francis H. Iwan.
Charles F. Guild.
James E. Tolfree.
George A. Lyon.
Edward Bellows.

You also transmit for my consideration, in connection with
the case of Paymaster Caswell, a similar claim, filed in the
Navy Department by Paymaster George A. Lyon.
There is now a vacancy existing in the grade of payinspector, caused by the retirement of Pay-Inspector George
L. Davis, on the 18th of January last, and under the provisions of section 1458, Revised Statutes, '~the next officer in
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rank shall be promoted to the place of a retired officer, according to the established rules of the service." * * *
Your letter requests my opinion upon the following questions:
(1) Does the restoration of the name of Paymaster Bellows to the list of paymasters in the Navy, from which it
was illegally removed, affect or disturb Paymaster Stevenson -and others in their right to retain tbe relative positions
to which they have been respectively advanced in that
grade~

(2) Is Paymaster Stevenson entitled, as the next officer
in rank, to examination for promotion, and, if found qualified,
to nomination to fill a vacancy in the next higher grade,
caused by the retirement of an officer therefrom~
The answer to the inquiries proposed by you assume that
Paymaster Bellows was not legally dismissed from the service of the United States, and that the order of the President above referred to was simply declaratory of his existing rights. The case of Bellows was made the subject of an
opinion from this Department, dated .April 30, 1879, to the
Secretary of the Na\y (16 Opin., 312), and is there fulJy discussed. The order of the President did not operate to
restore Bellows to the Navy. In a legal sense he was always
there, although by error there was an omission of his name
in the Register, and a failure for some years to recognize him
.as an officer of the Navy.
The practical difficulties which are found in rectifying an
error such as occurred in the case of Bellows, in his relation
to other officers and in the relations which such officers bear
to each other, are undoubtedly considerable; but the only
rule that can be adopted is to treat him as having always
been nominally what be always was actually and really, an
officer of the United States. If positions have been arranged
in regard to the rank of other officers upon the tlleory that
he was not an officer, those positions should, whenever possible, be altered so as to rectify the error committed by
treating him as out of the service. Where an officer is
illegally dropped, he can only find his place again in the
gra>d e from which he was dropped, as it would not be in the
power of the President alone to g·ive Lim the rank of a
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higher grade. It is not necessary to consider here to what
extent it would be possible to rectify such an error, so far as
higher grades are concerned.
When he is returned only to his original grade, and when
. officers still exist there who are superior to him in rank, the
difficulty does not seem to be insuperable. He is to take
rank according to his original position in the grade. If there
have been promotions or advancements above him which
would properly place officers above him had his name been
upon the Register, ~uch officers must be treated as having
been thus advanced.
But if his case were that if his name had actually been
upon the roll there would have been no advancement of an
officer above him, that effect should not be permitted merely
on account of an illegal absence of his name from the list.
The same rule would apply to other officers. Whenever a
difference would have been made by ~eason of the existence
of his name on the roll (on which the case supposes it has
now rightfully found its place), that difference should be
recognized. These principles satisfactorily dispose of the
cases be.fore us.
In regard to the position of Paymast~r Stevenson, it is
argued that it was not within the power, of the President to
advance him fifteen additional numbers on account of the
same act of heroism. It is sufficie.n t for this case to say that
the papers do not show that it was the same act .of heroism.
But I am not prepared to decide, even if we assume that it
was the same act of heroism, that the President and the Senate may not properly make such advancement. So far as the
executive department is concerned, this may {airly be considered as having been decided in the present instance.
The second nomination of Paymaster Stevenson was to be
advanced fifteen numbers, to take rank next to Paymaster
George Cochran. If the name of Bellows is counted, this is
an advance of sixteen numbers. The accidental absence of
Bellows's name from the list can not give authority thus to
advance, as this authority depends entirely upon statute.
It would seem, from the various instances cited in your
letter, that the advancements are sometimes made by a definite number only, and at other times by a definite number
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with the additional statement to take rank after a particularperson named. In either case the controlling word of the
nomination is the number of "numbers" which the officer is
proposed to be advanced. Had the name of Mr. Bellows
been actually upon the list, this would not be doubted in the
case of Mr. Stevenson. Examination would then have clearly
shown that to place him next after Mr. Cochran would be to
advance him sixteen numbers; and if such a nomination bad
been made and confirmed by the Senate, the only way in
which it could have been held valid would have been by re-jecting as surplusage the latter portion of the sentence referring to Mr. Cochran. When it clearly appears that Mr.
Bellows, though not nominally, was actually a paymaster,
the nomination and confirmation must be construed in view
of that fact, and thus construed, Mr. Stevenson has the full
benefit of the fifteen numbers which it was intended to advance him, and which was the extreme limit of the provision
in that regard.
These principles dispose also of the case of PaymasterLyon. The officers whose claims come in conflict with his are
to have their nominations now construed with reference to
the conceded fact that Mr. Bellows was also an officer of the
Navy. They are to have the benefit of the numbers which
they were nominated to be advanced; aud in those cases
where the nomination defined a particular place upon the
Register before au officer named, the matter is io be modified
by the controlling word which had relation to the number of
officers over whom they were to be advanced.
To reply to your questions in direct terms, I am of opinion,
first, that the restoration of the name of Paymaster Bellows
to. the list of paymasters in the Navy, from which it was ill~
gally removed, affects and disturbs Paymaster Stevenson
and others in their present relative positions as arranged by
the Navy Register; and, second, that Paymaster Stevenson
is not entitled, as 'the next officer in rank, to examination for
promotion to the vacancy in the next higher grade.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. NATHANIEL GoFF,
Secrttary of the Navy.
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SWAMP-LAND ACT--INDEMNITY.
The decision of the Secretary of the Interior, in November, 1855, that
those lands which had been reserved by the President under the act
of September 20, 1850, chap. 61, granting lands to the State of Illinois
to aid in the construction of a railroad, did not pass to the State by
virtue of the swamp-land grant of September 28, 1850, chap. 84, is to
be treated as 1·es adjudicata as to all the lands embraced within the
belt of territory to which it specifically relates and refers.
DEP AR~'MENT OF JUSTICE 7

Februa.ry 21, 1881.
SIR: Referring to your letter of July 17, 1880, I would say

that the delay in answering it has been occasioned largely
by the request of parties interested in the questions involved.
By an act of September 20, 1850, lands were granted to
the State of Illinois (which were afterwards granted by it to
the Illinois Central Railroad Company) to aid in the construction of a certain railroad. This grant was of every
alternate section, designated by even numbers, for six sec·
tions in width on each side of said road and branches; and
in cases where the same had been sold, or the right of preemption had attached at the time the line of tile road was
definitely :fixed, indemnity was granted from the most contiguous tier of alternate sections within 15 miles of the line
of the road.
It was further enacted that the sections and pa1 ts of sections which by such grant should remain to the United States
within 6 miles on each side of said road and branches should
not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the
public lands when sold.
By an act of September 28, 1850, Congress granted to the
several States then in the Union all the unsold swamp and
overflowed lands within their respective limits.
By an act approved March 2, 1855, all entries and locations of swamp or overflowed lands theretofore made, either
with cash or land warrants, were confirmed to the pu.rchasers
or locators, ''any decision of the Secretary of the Interior or
other officers of the Government of the United States to the
contrary notw~thstanding;" and by the second section of
said act .indemnity was granted to the several States for the
lands lost to them by such confirmation.
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Upon an application for indemnity for certain lands within
the 6 miles limit of the grant to the State of Illinois for railroad purposes aforesaid, it was held by the Ron. Robert
McClelland, Secretary of the Interior, in November, 1855,
that those lands which had been reserved by the ·President
under the act of September 20, 1850, did not pass to the State
by virtue of the swamp-land act.
Your letter first presents the question whether or not the
matter now before the Department is to be treated as res
adjudicata.

It is contended that the revision of the laws by sections
24 79 and 2482, Revised .Statutes, change the state of the law
as enacted by the act of September 28, 1850, and the indemnity act of March 2, 1855, so as to remove the element of res
adjudicata from the case as now presented.
This position is not tenable, and I adopt the conclusion
stated in your letter of June 28, 1880. The scope and the
descrlptiOn of this grant m-e identical in the two acts. The
revision, by the same terms respecting the thing granted, refers to the same date for the investiture of title and measure
of extent. The grant by the first act was of the entire interest of the United States in the thing granted at that date,
and the second, by reference to the same thing granted and
to its condition at the original date, declares that it is granted
and belongs to the samP. original grantee.
Section 2482, Revised Statutes, in defining the right of indemnity selection, fixes its basis by specific reference to the
act of 1850, and not to the enactment by way of revisionthus clearly indicating an intent to bound the new declaration of the grant by the limitations of the original statute,
and not to modify or enlarge its provisions.
Section 2479, ReviRed Statutes, declares that "the whole
of the swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for
cultivation, and remaining unsold on or after the 28th day
of September, A. D. 1850, are granted and belong to the
several States."
The act of 1850 granted the whole of those swamp and
overflowed lands, unfit for cultivation, which should remain
unsold at the date of its passage.
It is further contended that the decision of Mr. Secretary
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J\icClelland has the force of adjudication only upon those
parcels within the belt of territory to whicl]. it refers, such
as were specifically and for the proper presentation of the
question in dispute 'set out by description in the lists then
claimed as selections; and your second question is as follows:
"Whether or not the decision of Mr. Secretary McClelland
bas the force of adjudication upon all the lands embraced
within the belt of territory to which it specifically relates
and refers, or is only to be considered as binding and effective
upon those parcels within such belt as were specifically and
for the purpose of the argument and the proper presentation
of the question in dispute set out by description in the
lists then claimed as selections~"
It would give to the wise doctrine wp.ich holds that a mat ..
ter once adjudicated is not again to be disputed in a Department an exceedingly limited construction to bold that it
only affected an individual tract of land when precisely the
same question was presented in reference to otller tracts of
land. A decision previously rendered must be binding upon
other tracts of land, even if they have not been specifically
named, which come within the particular class to which the
decision relates. A decision that lands described and in~luded within a grant by boundary or quantity within
boundary (such as railroad grants), by any form of appropriation, are thereby excluded from the operation of a subsequent grant which would ot.herwise appropriate them,
excludes necessarily all claims for specific tracts depending
upon conditions prescribed by the subsequent statute, when
such tracts are found to lie within the territory to which the
law bas been decided to have no application. Whether a
particular tract is or is not swamp land must be decided
in each individual case; but when it is decided that certain
parcels of land do or do not come within the limits of a
grant, all other parcels similarly situated have their legal
status adjudicated by the decision. If this is not so, each
individual tract must become the subject of controversy.
I am therefore of opinion that the decision of Secretary
MeClelland has the force of adjudication upon all the lands
embraced within the territory to which it specially relates
and refers, although there was before him, set out by descrip-
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tion, only certain defined tracts, which are individually but
not legally different from those which are now the subject of
inquiry.
It is exceedingly important, in connection with this question, to observe that the rule laid down by Secretary :rtfcClelland, in November, 1855, has been the rule of adjudication
in the Department for twenty-five years, with but a single
exception, and that apparently an inadvertance.
Under these circumstances, I hav-e no hesitation in advising that the decision of the head of the Departrneut is binding upon yourself in the matter in which application is now
made. In this view it of course becomes unnecessary to
consider whether or not the decision itself was correctly
made. If it has not conformed to the intention of Congress,
that body has had ample time to rectify it by declaratory
legislation.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. CARL SCHURZ,
Secretary of the Interior.

PAY ACCOUNTS OF ARMY OFFICERS.
Where an Army officer assigned his pay accounts in payment of certain
indebtedness, which accounts the Paymaster-General declined to pay,
for the reason that on the maturity thereof the officer was iu arrears
to the United Statet>, held that the refusal of the Paymaster-General
was in accordance with section 1766, Revised Statutes.
The statute does not require that, before payment is withheld, the
officer shall be adjudged in arrears in a suit brought against him.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

FebruaTy ~1, 1881.
SIR: By your letter of December 27, 1880, it appears that
Thomas H. Norton & Co. claim, by assignment, certain pay
accounts of Maj. J. H. Nelson, paymaster, U. S. Army,
which he has transferred to them in payment of certain
debts. The Paymaster-General declines to pay these accounts,
for the reason that, on the maturity thereof, Major Nelson
was and still is in arrears to the United States, and it is
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abundantly proved by official records that Major Nelson was
and is thus in arrears.
The act of January 25, 1828 (sec. 1766, Rev. Stat.),
directs that ''no money shall be paid to any person for his
compensation who is in arrears to the United States, until
such person shall have accounted for and paid into the
Treasury all sums for which he may by liable." The refusal
<>f the Paymaster-General is, therefore, in llirect accordance
with the provision of this section of the Revised Statutes.
The suggestion is made that under this statute money can
not be withheld until by some legal proceedings the officer is
adju<lged to be in default to the United States. But this is
untenable, because the latter clause of the section (1766, Rev.
Stat.), directing proceedings by suit against delinquents,
clearly contemplates that the former clause is to be ma'"de
-effectual upon the determination of the proper Department
that the person claiming compensation is in arrears to the
United States.
Of course any person claiming by assignment can have no
higher rights.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.

SENTENCE OF COURT-MARTIAL-CONTINUING PUNISHMENT.
C., a lieutenant-commander in the Navy, was sentenced by a court-martial to suspension for one year, and to retain his then present number
on the list of lieutenant-commanders for that time. The sentence
having been executed, he applied to be restored to the number on said
list which he thereby lost: Held, that the restoration could not be
effected by the President otherwise than by a pardon.
The punishment imposed (loss of numbers), being a continuing one, is
still subject to the pardoning power, which, when exercised, would·
have the effect to restore the officer to his former rank according to
the date of his commission.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1881.
SIR: I have received the petition of Lieutenant-Commander Joseph B. Coghlan, U. S. Navy, with other papers,
from the Navy Department, referred to me by you.
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The petitioner states that in April, 1876, he was tried by
naval court-martial and sentenced to be suspended for one
year, to retain his (then) present number on the list of lieutenant-commanders for that time, and to be publicly reprimanded by the Secretary of the Navy. He requests the restoration of the numbers which he thus lost, which the petition represents to be thirteen. He makes certain legal objections to the action of the court, which do not seem to me
to be tenable, nor does it appear that he can be restored to
the position upon the Navy Register which he held previously
to the approval of the action of the court-martial unless the
President should deem his case a proper one for pardon.
Where a sentence has been executed, it is not in the power
of the President, from the nature of the ·act, to afterwards
revise the matter; but where a punishment which is continuing is imposed upon a party, it is conversely always subject
to revision by the pardoning power. Degradation from or
diminution of relative rank and position is such a continuing
punishment.
The law of the service assigns to each officer a rank in his
grade and in the line of promotion corresponding with the
date of his commission, and "when this order or disposition
is interrupted, as in the case under consideration, through
the intervention of a court-martial proceeding, it can only
remain so by the continuing operation of the penalty imposed,
which may be said to act as a punishment from day to day
so long as the officer affected is excluded from the enjoyment
of his previous status."
It has therefore been held that a pardon of the President
will restore an officer, whose rank has been reduced by a
court-martial, to his former relative rank according to the
date of his commission, the officer losing, of course, such
opportunities for promotion as might in the mean time have
occurred. (12 Opin., 547.)
Under these circumstances the case is .presented for the
President to determine whether or not it is one in which the
pardoning power is to be exercised. Upon that subject I do
not express an opinion, because it does not fall within the
class of punishments for civil offenses concerning which the
advice of the Attorney-General is often asked by the Presi-
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dent, and also for the reason that the papers themselves do
not afford me sufficient data.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The PRESIDENT.

PURCHASE OF PATENTED ARTICLES.'
When articles are to be bought for the Government, and it is doubtful
whether officers of the United States in using them will or will not Le
exposed to suits for the infringemP.nt of a patent: Advised that a bond
of indemnity to the Government be taken from parties who offer to
furnish such articles, for the protection of the officers.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1881.
SIR : Your letter of January 24, 1881, incloses a letter from
the Chief Signal Officer, and inquires '~whether the property and disbursing officer of the Signal Service is authorized
to purchase from any citizen of the United States, who may
agree to furnish, at the lowest rates, the material (as per
sample herewith), in loose sheets not registered and stitched
in book, tablet, or pack."
An examination of the papers indicates to me that the
inquiry is intended to embrace an examination of whether
such ptuchase would be that of an article covered by m
patent ''Improvement in producing prices-current bulletins,"
etc., and if so, whether such purchase should properly be
made. It necessarily involves the determination of the
validity of the "irqprovement" in question, and also of
whether the purchase in loose sheets of similar material
could be considered as a violation of the patent. Both of
these questions are apparently debatable. I only, therefore,
renew the recommendations I have heretofore made in regard
to a similar subject, viz, that when articles are to be bought
by the United States, and it is doubtful whether officers of
the United States in using such articles will or will not be
exposed to suits for the infringement of patents, a bond of
indemnity to the Gove.r nment be taken from bidders and
272-VOL XVII--3
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others who desire to furnish such articles, in order that the
officers may be protected. (16 Opin., 36.)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. ALEXANDER RAMSEY~
Secretary of War.

RELATIVE RANK IN THE ARMY ON PROMOTION.
Y., B., and S. were second lieutenants in different infantry regiments,
ranking in the order named according to dates of their respective appointments and commissions. They were all pro·motecl to be first lieutenants in their respective regiments as of the same date, June 28,
1878. S., who was the junior second lieutenant, claimed to be the
senior first lieutenant under section 1219, Revised Statutes, because of
the greater length of service a~ a commissioned officer prior to date of
promotion: Held that the rule prescribed by that section for determining relative rank as between officers of the same grade and date
of appointment and commission applies to appointments on promotion as well as to original appointments; and, consequently, that S.
ranked the other first lieutenants referred to.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Feb1·uary 21, 1881.
SIR : Your letter of January 20, 1881, incloses a report of
the Adjutant-General in reference to the claim of George
K. Spencer, first lieutenant Nineteenth Infantry, to take
precedence . in rank over C'ertain other first lieutenants of
infantry promoted to that grade on the same date, June
28, 1878.
Lieutenants Young (second lieutenant March 7, 1867),
Bottsford (second lieutenant, May 29, 1867), Scott (second
lieutenant June 19, 1867) and Spencer (second lieutenant
August 17, 1867) were second lieutenants in different infantry regiments, ranking in the order named according to
dates of their appointments and commissions. They were
all promoted to first lieutenant in their respective regiments as of the same date, viz, June 28, 1878. Lieutenant
Spencer, who was the junior 'second lieutenant of the four,
claims to be now the senior first lieutenant, because of greater
length of service as a commissioned officer prior to date of
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promotion. This claim is based on the act of March 2, 1867
{section 1219, Rev. Stat.). This section provides that, "In
fixing relative rank between officers of the same grade and
date of appointment and commission, the time which each
may have actually served as a commissioned officer of the
United States, whether continuously or at different periods,
shall be taken into account," etc. This provision has always
been considered by the War Department as applying to
·Original appointments in the service as distinguished from
promotions, and it has, therefore, been held that although
{)fficers may be of the same grade and have .the same date
{)f commission and of appointment to the rank of promotion
held by them, yet that this statute is not to have any operation as between them, as it is deemed to have exhausted its
force in the determination of their rank at the time of their
<>riginal appointment. The ground upon which this bas
been held is that there is such a distinction between promotion and appointment, that notwithstanding the operation
of the rule may be to place officers of the same grade and
·commission under and inferior to officers who have rendered
less service, yet that this was contemplated by the statute.
This position does not seem to me tenable. Promotion is
a mode of appointment, and it is not the less an appointment because the person promoted has previously held another appointment in the service. When a second lieutenant
is promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, he is appointed
to such rank by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
The construction adopted by the War Department requires
the interpolation of the word "original" before the word
~'appointment." Such construction is not in accordance
with the spirit of the act towards the officers whom it affects.
By the system of regimental promotion, all officers up to the
•,grade of captain are promoted very irregnlarly, such promotions varying with the casualities in each regiment. The
intention of the statute is to apply a rule which will give the
benefit of their previous services to those 0fficers who are of
the same grade and date of commission whenever it shall. be
necessary to determine relative rank between them. Nor
.does it seem probable tllat any particular difficulty will re-
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sult from the re-arrangement of rank according to the
important principle of length of service when officers of the
sam grade find themselves commissioned of the same date.
While I recognize fully that any construction which has
long been adopted and practiced upon by a Department io.:t
entitled to great consideration, it is to be observed that the
statute in question is of recent date, and such construction
should not be deemed conclusive.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon.

ALEXANDER RAMSEY,

Secretary of War.
PROMOTION ON THE NAVAL RETIRED LIST.
Section 1461, Revised Statutes, gives to naval officers 011 the retired list
a right to promotion on that list as their several dates on the active
list are promoted.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1881.
SIR : The letter of the Secretary of the Navy of the 2d
instant, addressed to you and by you referred to me, incloses
a letter addressed to Hon. Samuel J. Randall, Speaker of
the Hous& of Representatives, from Capt. D. Lynch, U. S.
Navy, in regard to the matter of promotion upon the retired
list.
The promotion of officers on the retired list of the Navy
was authorized by the act of March 2, 1867, which is embodied in section 1461, Revised Statutes, as follows:
. "Officers on the retired list of the Navy ~:;hall be entitled
to promotion as tlteir several dates upon the active list are
promoted: Provided, That uo promotion shall be made to
tlle grade of rear-admiral upon the retired list while there
shall be in that grade nine rear-admirals by promotion on
that list, exclusive of those so promoted by reason of having
commanded squadrons by order of the Secretary of the Navy,
or of having performed other highly meritorious service.
No promotion to the grade of rear-admiral on the retired
list while there shall be in that grade the full number allowed
by law."
r
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And section 1591, Revised Statutes ·(from the same act)
provides that "no officer heretofore or hereafter promoted
upon the retired list shall, in consequence of such promotion,
be entitled to any increase of pay."
It was subsequently held by the Navy Department that
the law authorizing such promotions was. not strictly Imperative, but left the matter, in some degree, subject to the
discretion of the President to select such officers as in hio
opinion might be ''entitled" to promotion on the retired list.
And although a few such officers were afterwards promoted,
no general promotions of retired officers have since been
made.
A number of officers of the staff corps were promoted on
the retired list to the higher grades created in such corps
by the act of March 3,1871 (sees. 1474,1475, and 1476 of the
Revised Statutes), since which time no promotions of retired
staff officer~ have been made.
There are ·about forty-three line officers now on t,h e retired
list who would be entitled to promotion should a general
promotion of the retired officers be made as in 1867. Of
this number it appears that three would be advanced to the
grade of master, seven to lieutenant, two to lieutenant-commander, nine to commander, ei~bt to captain, and fourteen
to commodore. And in the staff corps about sixty-seven
officers would also be entitled to promotion to the grades on
the retired list held by officers of their respective dates on
the active list.
In the ruling made by the Navy Department it appears to
have been influenced by the consideration already mentioned,
that the President was allowed by the law to exercise his dis-c retion in determining who are and who are not entitled to promotion on the retired list. And when, in view of the fact that
there are officers retired from active service by reason of
mental, moral, and professional disqualifications, who in case
of war would be entirely unfitted for any duty, this interpretation seemed to the Department to be justified, inasmuch as the law makes no discrimination, and authorizes no
-examination in the cases of retired officers to determine their
fitness for advancement to higher grades than those in which
they were retired for causes disqualifying them for active
.service.
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In reply to this view, taken by the Navy Department, I
would suggest that the language of section 1461, Revised
Statutes, that B officers on the retired. list of the. Navy shall
be entitled to promotion as their several dates upon the active
list are promoted" is explicit and distinct in its character,
subject, of course, .to the proviso of the same section.
The word "entitled.," which it is thought may be construed
as giving a right of selection to the President, will hardly
bear that interpretation, when the rest of the sentence so
dh;tinctly shows that the title proceeds from the fact that
their several dates on the active list are promoted.
There is undoubtedly force in the argument which is suggested against this system of indiscriminate promotion; but
it is not a question of what the law ought to be, but of what
the law is. A practical effect of the law which would be undesirable cannot be allowed to overcome its express terms.
Such operation presents a question for the legislath·e and
not the executive branch of the Government. ·
It will also be observed that, while this promotion is thus
given, no corresponding increase of pay and allowance is
permitted; and the legislation appears to have sufficiently
guarded against any mischiefs that are suggested as likely
to arise by reason of calling retired officers into active duty.
This can only be done in time of war by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It is not to
be presumed that the President, in connection with the Senate, will exercise the power in regard to such retired officers
unless upon full examination he shall be satisfied that they
are competent for the higher grade on the active list which
they have reached on the retired list. Such investigation
will undobteclly be made, in view of the fact that these prQmotions on the retired list are not accompanied with the careful examinations which attend those upon the active list.
This power of the President, with the consent of the Senate,
is in reality (although not in form) a power to give a new com ·
mission to a retired officer in time of great public emergenc~-.
It is difficult to see why that power is not wisely repOS('(}
with the President, or to understand how any danger can
result from its exercise.
It will be observed also that retired officers thus called
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upon active duty do not return to the active list unless under circumstances of a peculiar character. (Sees. 1462, 1463,
1464, 1465, Rev. Stat.)
In regard to the statement in the letter from the Secretary
of the Navy that officers mentally, morally, and professionally disqualified are often found upon the retired list, I
would suggest that it was never contemplated by the legislation that the retired list would to any extent be occupied
except by those who had performed honorable service and
were retired by reason of disability incurred in that service.
I am therefore of opinion that the :first clause of section
1461, Revised Statues, gives to officers on the retired list a
right to promotion as their several dates upon the active
list !:Lre promoted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The PRESIDENT.
BREVET RANK-ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY ACCORDING TO.
Where an Army officer is placed on duty according to his brevet rank
by special assignment of the President, he is, while thus assigned,
entitled to ,precedence and command according to his brevet commission, even over an officer holding a full commission of the same
rank as the brevet, but of junior date. Thus a colonel who holds a
brevet commission as major-general of the date of March 2, 1867, and
who is by the President specially assigned to duty according to his
brevet rank, takes precedence over an officer who holds a full commission of major-general dated November 25, 1872.

DEP ARTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE,
February 23, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of Ja~uary 3, 1881, submits to me a
memorandum of brevet assignments of department com-manders, with an indorsement ·thereon of the General of the
Army, and invites my attention to the cases stated by him
and proposes the following question: " Does not the full
commission of major-general or brigadier-general exceed the
brevet commission of major-general or brigadier-general even
of older date¥"
The que8tion undoubtedly assumes that the officer holding
a brevet commission is to be deemed to have been assigned
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to duty by the special assignment of the PreRident according to his brevet rank. If he were not thus assigned no
question would arise, as until such assignment the brevet
rank is purely honorary.
The President is authorized, by and with the advice of
the Senate, to confer commissions by brevet upon commissioned officers of tbe Army for distinguished conduct and
public services in the presence of the enemy. These bear
date from the particular occasion or services for which the
officer is breveted; but they entitle the officer to no precedence or command except when specially assigned to duty
according to the brevet rank by the President; nor do they
entitle the officer, on account of being breveted, to wear,
while on duty, a uniform, or to be addressed in orders or official communications by any title other than that of his
actual rank. See sections 1209-1212, Rev. Stat.
These sections seem to state with great clearness the
effect 0f the brevet commission, and, although negative in
its form, the clause which says that brevet rank shall not
entitle an officer to precedence or command except when
assigned to duty according to such brevet rank, necessarily
implies that when thus assigned he is to have precedence
and command according to such rank. The power given by
this provision is one highly proper to be lodged with the
President, as it enables him in times of emergency to avail
himself of the services of officers in a rank higher than
their actual rank where such officers have so distinguished
themselves in action as to have received from the appointing
power brevet commissions.
The words, "by special assignment of the President," indicate that it is not a daily exercise of power that is contemplated on the part of the President in assigning officers
to duty according to brevet rank.
When thus assigned I can see no reason why all the benefits that follow from the rank are :fwt to be enjoyed by the
officer possessing it, and why he is not entitled to precedence
and command according to the date of the commission,
which must bear the date of the services for which he was
breveted.
The case stated by the General of the Army is thus:
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"General McDowell, commancling the Division of the Pacific,
including Arizona, has full commission as dated November
25, 1872, and he holds a brevet commission as major-general
of the date of March 13, 1865, which commission has no
force unless by assignment of the PreRident of the United
States. Colonel Wilcox is colonel of the Twelfth Infantry;
but commands the Department of Arizona by order of the
President according to his brevet rank of major-general,
dated March 2, 1867. ''We thus have," says the General,
"the absurdity of a colonel actualiy ranking a major-general
commanding a division, of which the Department of Arizona
is but a s~all part.
If there be any absurdity in this it is not the fault of the
law, which enables the President to deal readily with the
matter in two ways: either by assigning General McDowell
to duty and command according to his brevet rank, or by
withdrawing the order assigning Colonel Wilcox to duty
according to his brevet rank.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,

Secretary of War.

COMMUTATION OF QUARTERS .
.An officer in the enjoyment of quarters in kind at the commencement of
leave (cumulative) taken nuder the act of July 29, 1876, chapter 239,
does not become entitled to commutation upon the commencement of
the leave.
Nor does he become entitled to commutation if, during such leave, he
voluntarily abandons the use of the quarters in kind; nor if he vacates
his quarters in kind at the command of his superior; nor if there are
unoccupied quarters at the post or station that might properly have
been assigned to him had no leave been granted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~

February 23, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of February 14 refers to me claims of
certain officers for commutation of quarters, and asks my
opinion upon certain questions in connection therewith which
are suggested by the Second Comptroller.
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The matters to which your letter relates have been a subject of consideration in two recent opinions from me, (16
Opin., 577 and 619.)
Without elaborating my reply in consequence of my recent
tnlldiscussion of the subject, I answer yout inquiries direct!~.
The first is as follows: "If an officer is in the enjoyment of
quarters in kind at the· commencement of leave taken by
him under the act of July 29, 1876 (cumulative leave, 19
Stat., 102), does he become entitled to commutation upon the
commencement of the leave~" To this I reply that an officerin the enjo~~ment of quarters in kind in the case proposed
does not become entitled to commutation upon· the com-·
mencement of the leave. Quarters in kind are not an allowance within the meaning of the statute permitting officers on
leave to enjoy the same without deduction of pay or allowance, so as to entitle the officer to commutation. Officers
upon leave in such cases, while entitled to the quarters in
kind, are not entitled to commutation therefor.
(2) "If the leave does not of itself entitle him, does he
become entitled to commutation if during such leave he
voluntarily abandons or surrenders the use of the quarters.
. in kind~"
In my opinion be does not.
(3) "Does he become entitled to commutation if during
such leave he vacates his quarters in kind at the command
of his superior?"
If he vacates his quarters in kind at the command of his
superior, he does so either voluntarily or because such circumstances have arisen as to entitle the superior officer to
direct him to vacate them, but in neither instance is he·
entitled to commutation. His leave does not result in a
deduction of any allowance tllat he previously had.
(4) "In the case last stated, will he be entitled to commutation if there are unoccupied quarters at the post or
station that might properly have been assigned to him bad
no leave been granted~"
In my opinion he would not.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron . .ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of TVar.
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EXTRA PAY.
Where an officer in the ordnance department, in addition to his regular
duties as ordnance store-keeper, acted as assistant commissary at the
Watervliet Arsenal by virtue of post orders: Held that under section
1261, Revised Statutes~ he was entitled to receive $100 per year in addition to the pay of his rank during the time he performed services as
assistant commissary.
DEPARTMENT .,OF JUSTICE,

Februarg 23, 1881.
SIR: It appears from your letter of December 16, 1880,
that Capt. D. J. Young, ordnance store.keeper, acted at
various times, in addition to his regular duties, as assistant
commissary, by virtue of post orders at the Watervliet Arsenal, which assigned him to such duty.
Section 1261, Revised Statutes, provides that an acting assistant commissary shall receive $100 per year in addition to
the pay of his rank for the period during which he was thus
regularly assigned to and on duty and duly performed services as assistant commissary.
Captain Young claims extra pay at the rate of $100 per
year.
In my opinion this claim of Young is properly made.
The opinion in the case of the United States v. Morrison
(96 U. S., 232) seems conclusive of the question.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.

DISMISSAL BY SENTENCE OF COURT-MARTIAL.
Where a paymaster in the Navy was sentenced to dismissal by courtmarUal, and it appeared by the order of the Secretary of the Navy
that the President approved the finding of tbe court and directed the
sentence to be cauied into effect: Held that the officer was legally
dismissed from the naval service.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1881.
SIR : I have carefully examined the papers in the case of
Judson S. Post, referred to me by you upon the 15th instant,
and herewith return them.

.

I
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Thirteen years ago ( i. e., September 15, 1868), Paymaster
Post was, by order of that date, dismissed from the naval
service upon the approval by the President of the finding
of a court-martial.
The only ground that need be diBcussed upon which he
asks you to dir~ct his name to be replaced upon.the .rolls is
that President Johnson's own signature does not appear in·
dorsed upon the approval of the proceedings of the naval
court-martial, or in confirmation thereof.
It distinctly appears by the statements of the Secretary
of the Navy that the then President approved the finding of
the court-martial, confirmed the same, and directed it to be
carried out.
For the reasons set forth in the opinion submitted June
6, 1877 (15 Opin.; 290), I am of the opinion that Paymaster
Post was legally dismissed from the naval service of the
United States.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The PRESIDENT.

STATE TAXES.
Where the title to land in Cincinnati, Ohio, was acquired by the United
States by condemnation, and jurisdiction over the land so acquired
was ceded to the United States by the State: Held that taxes theretofore assessed upon the land by the city authorities, and remaining
unpaid, ceased thereafter to be a lien on the land, and did not become
a proper charge agai~st the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1881.
SIR: The letter from your Department of January 28,1881,
submits for consideration the claim made on behalf of Hamilton County, Ohio, for taxes, amounting to $6,008.63, upon
the custom-house and post-office site in the city of Cincinnati, Ohio.
The title to this property was acquired by proceedings in
condemnation i·n the circuit court of the United States for
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the southern district of Ohio during the last part of the
year 1873, the final decree bearing date December 24, 1873.
By an act of the legislature of Ohio, of April 20, 1872,
jurisdiction over this tract .of land was ceded to the United
States, to vest when the United States should acquire title
to the same. The United States therefore have the title to,
and jurisdiction over, the tract in question.
The claim is that the taxes heretofore assessed by the
municipal authorities of Cincinnati, under the laws of the
State of Ohio, are a lien upon this property which the United
States is bound to discharge.
The question has been distinctly decided by this Department, in an opinion rendered September 13, 1876 (15 Opin.,
167). The United S!ates in 1872 acquired title to a lot of
ground in the city of St. Louis, Mo., by condemnation under
a State statute, by the provisions whereof the jurisdiction of
the State over the premises at the same time passed to the
United States. The;reafter certain bills for unpaid t~txes for
1872 and 1873, and previous years, were presented to the
Treasury Department· for payment, a lien on the premises
being claimed.
It w11s held that the State, in parting with its jurisdiction,
virtually relinquished whatever lien it may have had on the
land for the taxes~ and that they were not a proper subject
for charge against the United States.
The lien depended for its enforcement solely upon the
methods and agencies provided for that purpose by the State
law, which of course ceased to be available after the land
itself, by the transfer of jurisdiction, ceased to be within the
sphere of the operation of that law.
It is not perceived in the present case that any injustice
can have been done the city, which, in proceedings for con.
demnation, had opportunity to assert its claim upon this land.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. JoHN SHERMAN, •

Secretary of the Treasury.
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BREVETS OF MAJOR WINTHROP.
i)n reconsideration, the opinion of January 13, 1831 (ante, p. 3), holding
that the brevets of Major Winthrop, judge-advocate, in the volunteer
force, could not be treated as brevets in the regular Army, re-affirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1881.
SIR: Yours of the 4th instant incloses a letter of the JudgeAdvocate-General of January 21, 1881, and requests reconsideration, in view of that letter, of my opinion heretofore
delivered, in which it was held by me that the 1Jre·vets of
· Major Winthrop in the volunteer force could not be treated
as brevets in the regular Army.
I have reconsidered the question, in deference to the views
of the .Judge-Ad vocate-General and yonrself, but remain of
the opinion which I have heretofore expressed.
lVIajor Winthrop was in distinct terms nominated to and
confirmed by the Senate for appointment in the volunteer
force, and was afterwards commissioned, his commission not
using the words'' in the volunteer force," but using the words
,, in the service of the United States."
He was afterwards nominated and confirmed and so commissioned for the brevets of lieutenant-colonel and colonel
in the volunteer force.
It is claimed now, upon his behalf, that he is entitled to
have these brevets treated as brevets in the regular Army,
and to such brevet rank therein.
Iu my view, this position can not be maintained. If the
form of his original commission assumes to extend or enlarge
the nomination and confirmation, it is erroneous. The power
of the President does not authorize such action, But it
is not thus enlarged. The military serviee of the United
States was composed of what were known familiarly as" volunteers" and "regulars.'' That the judge-advocates were
originally of the volunteer force is shown by all the legislation in the matter, especially by the later legislation, which
transfers them into the permanent force of the United States,
and which entitles Major Winthrop now to be treated as an
officer of the' regular Army.
The argument based upon the contention that his original
commission was a commission in the regular Army, is, that
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such was his commission, his brevets in the volunteer
force mu!it annex themselves to it, as otherwise they would
be inoperative. As I do not view his original commission to
be that of an officer in the regular Army, it is unnecessary to
consider the force of this argument. That neither by the
appointing, confirming, or commissioning him as lieutenantcolonel and colonel by brevet in the volunteers was it contemplated to give him brevet rank in the regular Army is as
clear as words can make it. It certainly was not contemplated by the appointing or confirming power that Major
Winthrop, at the time he received these brevets, was an
officer of the regular Army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.
its

ENLISTMENT IN COLORED REGIMENTS.
Sections 1104 and 1108, Revised Statutes, prohibit, by implication, the
enlistment of white men in the colored regiments 'therein mentioned
and provided for.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of November 26, 1880, inclosing a copy
of a letter from Lieut. Col. N. A. M. Dudley, Ninth Uavalry, requests my opinion on the question as to whether
a white man can legally be enlisted in a colored regiment.
The two sections of the Revised Statutes which need be
considered are section 1104: "The enlisted. men of two regiments of cavalry shall be colored men," and section 1108:
"The enlisted men of two regiments of infantry shall be colored men." These sections seem to be explicit. The enactment that the enlisted men of the regiments in question
shall be colored men is necessarily a prohibition against the
enlistment of white men in those regiments.
It is suggested that this legislation is unconstitutional.
Without deeming it necessary to discuss this point, I would,
however, say that it is a regulation made by Congress for
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the organization of the Army under .its authority as to raising and. suppOl'ting armies; and that until it is pronounced
unconstitutional by the only body which can determine it so·
to be, it is the duty of the recruiting officers of the Army to·
follow it.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

PROMOTION IN THE MEDICAL CORPS OF THE NAVY.
The custom and pract.ice of the Navy Department requiring competitiveexaminations of assistant surgeons, and assigning them positions on
the Navy Register in the order of relative merit as ascertained and
reported by the board of examiners authorized by exist!ng law and
regulations, is not under the present law (section 1480, Revised Statutes; act of February 27, 1877) correct; the effect of such law being
to adopt the rule of seniority in regard to promotions from one grade·
to another in the Medical Corps of the Navy.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
February 25, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of January 25 submits to me the claim
of Howard E. Ames, a passed assistant surgeon in the Navy,
that he has been unlawfully deprived of his original relative
position in the Medical Corps by reason of the action taken
upon the result of his examination for promotion.
The facts in his case are as follows:
Dr. Ames was appointed assistant surgeon in the Na~y
April10, 1875, and assigned a position (No. 8) in the class
of assistant surgons appointed during that year, which class
was arranged according to date of appointment of the·
members thereof.
Under the law and regulations of the Navy, assistant surgeons are entitled to examination for promotion after three
years' service. The class of 1875, having completed three
years' service in the grade of assistant surgeon, in 1878,
were, as required by law, examined as to their qualifications
for promotion to the grade of surgeon.
At the conclusion of the examination of the officers of
that class, Dr. Ames, with others who were found qual-
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ified for promotion, was assigned a position on the list of
passed assistant surgeons, according to the relath·e merit
as ascertained and reported by the board of examiners, and
now occupies the relative position on the list of passed
assistant surgeons, which was assigned him in accordance
with the finding and recommendation of tlie board of examiners upon competitive examination.
The practice of the Department requiring competitive
examinations to determine the relative position of medica
officers of the Navy, preparatory to promotion to the grade
of surgeon, which originated prior to the act of May 24:, 1828
(sections 1370 and 1371 of the Revised Statutes), was recognized and confirmed by a clause in the act of Congress approved March 3, 1835, which is embodied in the Revised
Statutes, as follows :
SECTION 1372. ''When any assistant surgeon was absent
from the United States, on duty, at the time when others of
his date were examined, he shall, if not rejected at a subsequent examination, be entitled to the same rank with them;
and if, from any cause, his relative rank can not be.assigued
to him, he shall retain his original posit ion on the register."
The system of competitive examinations to determine the
relative merit of assistant surgeons preliminary to promotion, and thus to define their rank by· seniority, has, under
this authority of law, been continued to the present time,
and the uniform practice of the Navy Department has been
to assign to the members of each class of assistant surgeons,
examined and found q uali:fied for promotion, positions in accordance with their relative standing, as determined and
reported by the board of medical examiners.
You request my opinion upon the following question:
''Is the custom and practice of this Department requiring
competitive examinations of assistant-surgeons preliminary
to promotion, and assigning them positions on the Navy
Register in the order of relative merit as ascertained and reported by the board of examiners, authorized by existing
law and regulations~"
The construction adopted as to the clause in the act of
Congress approved March 3, 1835, has been so long practiced
upon by the Navy Department, that I do not consider it nec272 VOL xvn--4:
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essary carefully to consider whether or not it was originally
correct. Certainly there is much in the clause to countenance
the system of competitive examination for the grade of passed
assistant surgeon, and great and controlling weight must be
attributed to the fact that those charged with the duty of
executing the statute have given to it their sanction, which
should not be overrulP-d without urgent reasons.
Were this the only statute upon the subject, I should therefore be of opinion that the system as now adopted in the
Navy was in accordance with the provisions of law.
It is necessary, however, to consider some additional legislation.
The acto~ March 3, 1871, chap. 117, sec. 10 (16 Stat., 536),
is as follows:
"That the foregoing grades (the Medical Corps being included) hereby established for the staff corps of the Navy
shall be filled by appointment from the highest numbers in
each corps according to seniority, and that new commissions
shall be issued to the officers so appointed, in which commissions the titles and grades herein established shall be inserted ; and no existing commission shall be vacated in the
said several staff corps except by the issue of new commissions required by the provisions of this act, and no officer
shall be reduced in rank or lose seniority in his own corps
by any change which may be required under the provisions
of this act." * * *
This section contemplated, it seems to me, by the use of
the words ''highest numbers in each corps according to
seniority," that the promotions should be by seniority, and
not by competitive examination; and the. provision that" no
officer shall be reduced in rauk or lose seniority" etc., contemplated also, that unless this provision were inserted
changes would be made in grades or numbers which had
been theretofore fixed, which it was not the intention of
Congress to disturb. This clause did not find its way into
the original edition of the Revised Statutes, but is found iu
the second edition, section 1480. It was, however, re-enacted
in the act of February 27, 1877, chap. 69 (19 Stat. 249), iu
the following terms :
''The grades established in the six preceding sections .for
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the staff corps of the Navy shall be filled by appointment
from the highest members in each corps, according to seniority,
and new commissions shall be issued to the officers so appointed, in which the titles and . grades established in said
sections shall be inserted ; and no exisiting commission shall
be vacated. in the said several staff corps except by the issue ·
of the new commissions required by the provisions of this
section ; and no officer shall be reduced in rank or lose seniority in his own corps by any change which may be
required under the provisions of the said six preceding sections." • * *
It will be observed that this is a substantial re-enactment,
with the exception that the word" members" is used instead
of "numbers," and the words " under the provisions of the
said six preceding sections" are substituted for the words
"under the provisions of this act." These changes apparently have no other object than to adapt the statute to
its place in 1the revision. The effect of it is to adapt the rule
of seniority in regard to promotions from one grade to
another in the staff corps, the section 1480 including, among
other corps referred to, the Medical Corps.
Your letter informs me that the relative positions in the
Medical Corps of the Navy of all the officers of that corps
now on the active list above the grade of assistant surgeon,
were determined after a competitive examination for pro.
motion.
I will observe, however, that the statute last cited is prospective in its character, and is only to take effect from the
date of its enactment. Its language contemplates that the
rule prescribed by it may not have heretofore always been
followed in reference to rank or seniority.
In direct answer to your question, I am of opinion that the
custom and practice of the Navy Department, requiring competitive examination of assistant surgeons and assigning
them positions on the Navy Register, in order of relative
merit as ascertained and reported by the board of examiners
authorized by existing law and regulations, is not correct
under the present law.
Having passed the necessary examination for promotion,
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the claim of Mr. Ames to be promoted according to seniority is in my opinion well founded.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. NATHAN GoFF, Jr.,
Secretary of the lfavy.

RELATIVE RANK IN THE ARMY.
In fixing the relative rank of officers of the same grade and date of
commission, under the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 159 (sec. 1219, Revised Statutes), constructive service as a commissioned officer is not
to be considered.
The terms of the statute, ''actually served," are used ex indust1·ia, and
are intended to prevent any service purely constructive in its character from affecting the relation between officers of the same date.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 25, 1881.
SIR : Your letter of December 16, 1880, incloses the papers,
correspondence, etc., relative to the claim of Capt. Samuel
B. M. Young, Eighth Cavalry, to a place on the lineal list of
captains of cavalry next below Capt. F. W. Ben teen, Seventh
Cavalry.
Captain Young claims that his name should appear above
those of Captains Nolan and Carpenter on the lineal list of
captains of cavalry as published in the Army Register for
1875, and in support of his claim makes the following statement of his service as an officer:
As an officer of volunteers from September 6, 1861, until
muster-out, July 1, 1865, three years nine months and twentyfive days, and as an officer of the regular Army from May 11,
1866, until appointed captain Eighth Cavalry, July 28, 1866,
two months and seventeen days; total service claimed, four
years and twelve days.
The facts as summarized by your letter are as follows:
The service of Captain Young as an officer of volunteers
is correctly stated at three years nine months and twentyfive days.
·
On May 11, 1866, he was nominated to the Senate (he received no letter of appointment) for the appointment of
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second lieutenant Twelfth Infantry. This nomination was
confirmed July 23, 186G; he was commissioned July 27,
1866, to rank from May 11, 1866; his commission was forwarded to his home, Pittsburgh, Pa., September 4, 1866; and
he reported for duty to the commanding officer Twelfth Infantry in this city, ffeptember 15, 1866.
The act of March 2, 1867 (sec. 1219, Rev. Stat.), provides
that, in fixing the relative rank of officers of the same grade
and date of commission, "there shall be taken into account
and credited to such officer whatever time he may have actually
served * * * as a commissioned officer," since April
19, 1861, etc. (This refers to appointments made under the
act of July 28, 1866.)
Captains Nolan and Carpenter (named above) were each
appointed second lieutenant Sixth Cavalry July 17, 1862,
and served continuously in that regiment until appointed
captains in the Tenth Cavalry on . November 8, 1866, with
rank from July 28, 1866, making the service of each of them
as officers up to July 28, 1866, four years and eleven days.
The other officers were therefore commissioned as captains, to rank from the same date; and, in determining their
relative rank, it must be taken in consideration how long
they were continuously or at different periods commissioned
·officers of the United States in actual service.
The claim of Captain Young is, that as Captains Nolan
and Carpenter have served four years and eleven days, he
has served one day longer. In order to make this out, he
is necessarily compelled to claim service for two months and
seventeen days which he did not actually serve, but for which
time he did hold, by commission accepted at a later date,
rank in the .Army.
The only question, therefore, is whether or not th~ constructive service implied by holding a commission accepted
on.September 11, 1866, to rank from May 11, 1866, can aid
him by being placed ·to his credit in fixing the relative rank
between himself and other captains of the same date.
The statement of the case seems to present the only argument that can be made in the matter. The words of the
statute, "actually served," are used ex industria, and are intended to prevent any service purely constructive in its
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character from affecting the relation between officers of the
same date.
I am therefore of opinion that the rulings heretofore
made in Captain Young's case are correct, and that he now
holds his proper position in the Army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
•
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. ALEXANDER Rl\MSEY,
Secretary of War.

COURT-MARTIAL-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENC]!}, ETC.
His not the official duty of the Secretary of War to gi-ve to the judgeadvocate, and thus to the court-martial, an opinion as to the admissibility of certain evidence in the trial of a case before the court, nor
as to the construction of a statute. Such questions should be left
to the decision of the court-martial itself.
•

DEP .A.RTMEN.T OF JUSTICE,

February 25, 1881.
SrR: Your communication of the 18th instant submits to
me a letter from Maj. A. B. Gardner, judge-advocate of the
general court-martial convened by the President for the trial
of Cadet J. C. Whittaker, U. S. Military Academy, dated
the 16th instant, and requests my opinion as to the admissibility at the trial of this case of certain evidence offered by
Whittaker, and in connection therewith as to the construction
to be given to the one hundred and twenty-first Article of _
War and section 860 Revised Statutes.
Although not in terms, your communication necessarily
submits in connection with these questions the preliminary
inquiry, whether ib is the official duty of the Secretary of
War to give to the judge-advocate, and thus to the courtmartial, assembled by authority of the President, the opinion
requested. ·
Unless the questions now proposed by you have occurred
in the administrative course of business in the War Department there is no occasion for any reply by me, and my opinion
would be A"xtra-official. On careful refiecti_on it appears to
me that the judge-advocate is not empowered to call for the
opinion of the Secretary of War as to the admissibility of
evidence to be tendered to the court-martial. He is to con·
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duct the proceedings upon his own responsibility, and un<ler
the direction of the chief of his bureau. An opinion of the
Secre~ry of War, rendered to him in response to his questions, might be treated as mandatory upon the court-martial.
This court, although limited in its jurisdiction, is authorizeu
to decide all questions in relation to the cases properly
before it, and in the first instance its authority is exclusive.
When the court has concluded its labors, its proceedings
may come before the President for appro\al. At that time,
if the President chooses, questions such as are here proposed may properly be submitted for the opinion of the
Attorney-General, as they may be of importance, in the view
of the President, in connection with his revision of the
decision. He may also consult the Secretary of War and
other Cabinet officers upon the same subject. Opinions gi\en
in advance, which it is reasonably to be feared might be
treated by the court-martial as a direction, might become
extremely embarassing.
It is also to be considf'red, that the opinion requested
would be given without hearing the parties concerned, to
whom it may be a vital matter, as cases not unfrequently
turn upon questions of admissibility of evidence.
Another suggestion is important in connection with the
present case. When a court-martial is con\ened, it sustains
toward the convening authority a certain official relation in
regard to many matters of detail. The cmwt in the present
instance sustains no such relation to the War Department.
It is c~mvened by the authority of the President. Certainly
no other officer can intervene to direct the 1riode in which it
shall proceed.
In view of these considerations, I therefore respectfully
advise that the question proposed should be left to the decision of the court-martial summoned by the President, and
that the Bureau of Military Justice should proceed before
that tribunal upon its own official responsibility in offering or
objecting to evidence.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.

Hon.

ALEXANDER RAMSEY,

Secretary of War.
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RELATIVE RANK lN THE N.A..VY.
Under the act of July 25,1866, chap. 231, R., who had entered the naval
service October 5, 1850, and stood No. 77 on the list of lieutenant-commanders, was promoted to the grade of commander; while L., who
had entered the service February 17, 1841, and stood at the date of
said promotion No. 7 on the said list, was not among those advanced
under that act, and after the promotions thereunder were completed
stood No. 2 in his grade (lieutenant-commander). Subsequently, by
promotion in due course, both R. and L. attained the rank of captain,
the former being senior by date of commission. In estimating length
·of service for tho purpose of determining their precedence with officers
of the staff corps holding the relative rauk of captain: Held. that
(under sec. 1486, Rev. Stat.) R. should be coosiderecl as having gained
length of service according to his promotion, bnt that L. should not
be considered as having lost anything in length of service-the effect
of the promotion of the former officer upon the latter being purely an
incidental one.
DEP .A.RT.l\'I:ENT OF JUSTICE,

February 25, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th ultimo submits to me a question which has arisen as to the application of the concluding
clause of section 1486, Revised Statutes, to certain officers
of tlle line in tlle Navy who were promoted by selection under
tlle provisions of the "Act to define the number ami regulate tlle appointment of officers in the Navy, and for other
purposes," approved July 25, 1866. (11 Stat., 222.)
The .first section of this act enlarged the number of line
officers in higher grades of the Navy, created original vacancies in each grade above that of lieutenant, and provided
that appointments to fill such vacancies be made as follows ·
"'That the increase in the grades authorized by this act shall
be made by selection from the grade next below of officers
who have rendered the most efficient and faithful service
during the receut war, and who possess the highest professional qualifications and attainments."
The vacancies thus created were accordingly filled by the
selection and advancement of officers, witllout regard. to
seniority, from the grade below the one to which tlley were
promoted.
As an illustration of the operation of the first section of
this act, your Jetter cites the cases of two officers whose
relative positions on the Navy list were affecteu by the pro-
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motions made by selection, in conformity with its provisions, viz:
Richard L. Law, who entered the service February 17,
1841, and stood, at the date of said promotions, No. 7 on the
list of lieutenant-commanders, was not among those selected
and promoted uader the act.
Francis M. Ramsay, who entered the service October 5,
1850, stood, at the date of said promotions and when selected
for ad van cement under the act referred to, No. 77 on the list
of lieutenant-commanders; and, when said promotions were
·Completed, he stood No. 90 on the list of commanders, while
Lieutenant-Commander Law stood No.2 in his original grade
(lieu tenant-commander).
Since that time, by promotion in due course, these two
officers have attained the rank of captain, Captain Ramsay
being the senior by date of commission.
Your letter requests my opinion upon the question whethP,r,
in estimating the length of service of Captains Ramsay and
Law for the purpose of determining their precedence with
officers of the staff corps holding the relative rank of captain
(nuder the proYisions of sees. 1485-1486, Rev. Stat.), the
former should be considered as having been advanced in
numbers on the Navy .Register and gained length of service
accordingly; or the latter be considered as having lost numbers and length of service accordingly.
The object of the act of 1866 was, by an increase of rank
in connection with an increase of numbers in certain grades
in tlle Navy; to compensate officers who had rendered special
meritoriou_s service. This was not to be done by inflicting
any injury upon officers who had been less fortunate perhaps in their opportunities, but by conferring promotion
upon certain officers which would incidentally, in atmost all
cases, operate also to benefit officers not actually advanced.
Thus, in the case stated in your letter, while LieutenantCommander Law was not nominally advanced, he was actuaily
advanced by the promotions made, so that instead of standing seventh on the list of lieutenant-commanders he stood
second on that list when they were completed. When officers were advanced in numbers it was necessary, in determining their relative rank with other grades of the Navy, that
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they should also be treated as having constructively gained
length of service to a sufficient extent to place them above
the officers over whom they were thus advanced. But in no
case did the officers over whom they were thus advanced lose
anything in the length of service .which he had actually rendered. The proceeding itself was one of, advancement
strictly, and in no case operated to degrade any officer or
deprive him of anything which he had already obtained by
length of service. Cases might be supposed in which it
might do him incidental injury by placing above him an officer who stood below him; but his own position with reference to all grades of the Navy would be that which it originally was. When, ther~fore, by section 1486, Revised Statutes (act of March 3, 1871, chap. 117, sec. 10, 16 Stats.
537), provision was made for regulating the relative rank of
the staff corps and line, no officer in the line would be found
to have lost anything of his actual length of service. A constructive length of service was ne<4essary to be attributed to
the officers who had been advanced to a higher number above
him in the same grade or to a higher grade. It is true the expression of the last clause of section 1486 is that "officers
who have been advanced or lost numbers on the Navy Register shall be considered as having gained or lost length of
service accordingly." Whether this phrase is intended to
use the words "gained" and "lost," as terms whicb are the
converse of each other and refers to such incidental loss as
occurs by change in relative position between two officers, or
whether the expression "lost length of service'; is to be considered as referring to those officers who may have been degraded (as by sentence of court-martial), it is not necessary
now to determine. It seems to me quite clear that this clause
can not receive a meaning in connection with the facts stated
by you that would in any way operate as a degradation of
t4e officer over whom another bad. been promoted, or to deprive him of a right already acquired by honorable length of
service.
In estimating, therefore, length of service for the purpose
of determining. their precedence with officers of the staff
corps, I would say, in direct answer to your inquiry, that the
officer promoted will be considered as having gained length
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of service according to his promotion, but that the other officer will not be considered as having lost anything in length
of service, the' effect of the promotion upon the latter officer
being purely an incidental one.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Hon. NATHAN GoFF, Jr.,
Secretary of the Navy.
SOIL UNDER NAVIGABLE WA'l'ERS.
Semble that the proprietors of land adjacent to Lake Huron, Michigan,
haveno legal right to Rtone taken from the ued ofthatlake, in front of
their property, by other persons, ~nd delivered by the latter on the
GovernmeJit works-the ownership of such bed being apparently in the
State. Under the circumstances presented, the claim of such proprietors for the stone so taken and delivered may properly be resisted by
the United States officer in charge of the works.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 26, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of December 18, 1880, transmits a communication addressed to Maj. G. Weitzel, Corps of Engineers,
by C. P. Gilbert, assistant engineer, stating that severai
times during the past season loads of bowlder-stone, which
have been delivered on the Government works in charge of
Major Weitzel, and credited to the party bringing them, have
been claimed by other parties, on the ground that the stone
bad been picked from the water in front of land belonging to
them, and requests my opinion as to whether t,h e owners ot
land adjacent to Lake Huron have any legal claim on the
stone taken from the lake in front of their property.
This question depends upon the much discussed inquiry
as to who is the owner of the soil under navigable waters,
which include the Great Lakes of the United States.
In Barney v. Keokuk, (4 Otto, 324), it was authoritatively
settled that, in the absence of any special legal rules adopted
by the States~ the title to the land under navigable waters
(whether tidal or not) belonged to the States. The title to
the land in question may, therefore, be regarded as in the
State of Michigan, unless by the law thereof the ownership

60

HON. CHARLES DEVENS
Case of Lieutenant-Colonel Freudenberg.

of the riparian proprietor extends to it. I can find no decision of that State which recognizes the land under the
waters of the Great Lakes on its borders (of which Lake
Huron is one) as belonging to the proprietors of the shore,
although there have been cases affecting the soil under
streams and small interior lakes.
In the absence of any such decision, or any grant by that
State of such lands, or of an exclusive right to the stone
thereon, it may well be presumed that any citizen is priviledged to take .stone therefrom, and, having such right, may
properly sell the stone to the United States. Under the
circumstances, the claim of the owner of the land adjacent to
the part of the lake from which the stone is taken may
properly be resisted by the United States engineer.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.
Ron. ALEXANDER RAMSEY,
Secretary of War.

CASE OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FREUDENBERG.
The President has no power to retire Lieutenant-Colonel Freudenberg
with the rank and pay of colonel of infantry from the date of his
first retirement, December 15, 1870.
Mistakes, if any, made in the execution of an act which is subsequentls
repealed, can not be rectified by executive action after such repeal.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 28, 1881.
SIR: On examining the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Freudenberg, I am of opinion that the President of the United
States has no power to retire this gentleman, as requested
by him, with the rank and pay of colonel of infantry, from
the date of his first retirement, December 15, 1870.
Whether the application of the thirty-second section of
the act of July 28, 1866, was rightly or wrongly made in
Colonel Freudenberg's case, that is not now a matter that can
be corrected by any executive action, as the section itself is repealed by the act of June 20, 1872. (17 Stat., 378.) Mistakes,
if any, made in the execution of an act which is repealed
~an not be rectified by executive action after such repeal,
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and it is impossible in the absence of that section to retire
any officer under it.
Colonel Freudenberg's case was made the subject of a special act (of March 3, 1877), which placed him on the retired list
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, which promotion was
to take effect from and after the passage of that act. This
special act certainly assumes to deal by legislative action
with Colonel Freudenberg's case, and to repair any injustice
that may have been done to him. This legislation contemplates that the construction given by the War Department
to the retirement of Colonel Freuqenberg (viz, that it was
for wounds and disease, and not for wounds alone), was a
correct construction.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
CHAS. DEVENS.

The

PRESIDENT. '

OPINIONS
OF

HON. WAYNE MACVEAGH, OF PENNSYLVANIA.
APPOINTED MARCH 5, 1881.

APPROPRIATION· FOR BUILDING SITE.
The appropriation made by the act of March ::J, 1881, chapter 133, "for the
purchase of a suitable site in the city of Washington for the erection
of a brick building to be used and occupied by t.he Pension Bureau,"
etc., is·to be construed as applying solely to the purchase of a site.
The language of the clause contains no ambiguity necessarily giving
rise to the inference that Congress intended it to embrace more than
its terms express.
DEP ..A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 13, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 17th ult,imo, calling my attentivu
to the clause in the sundry civil appropriation act of Marcn
3, 1881, which provides "fpr the purchase of a suitable site
in the city of Washington for the erection of a brick and
metal fire-proof building, to be used and occupied by the Pen~
sion Bureau," etc., and inclosing a communication from the
Quartermaster-General and ot.her papers relative thereto,
which favor the view that the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate (in which the provision originated) intended to
make the appropriation applicable as well to the erection of
a building as to the purchase of a site, and that the clause
in question should be construed as if it read "for the purchase of a suitable site in the city of Washington and for the
erection of a brick and metal fire-proof building," etc. ' That
it was contemplated by said committee that the appropria63
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tion should apply to both those objects is perhaps truo; and,.
as corroborative of this, certain statements and explanations
appearing in the proceedings of the Senate, made by the Senator (Mr. Beck) who had charge of the bill, may be cited.
(See Cong. Rec .. ~Iar~h 3, 1881, p. 45; ibid. for March 5, 1881,.
p. 32.) But, on the other hand, in tbe proceedings of the
House, a member of that body inquired "whether the act
should be interpreted as providing for the purchase of a site
alone, or whether the sum appropriated may be used for the
erection of the building as well as the purchase of the site."
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that the provision
referred to must be construed to apply solely to the purchase of a site, and that, to authorize the money appropriated
to be also used for the additional object mentioned by you,
the erection of a building, further legislation is necessary.
It is suggested that the word "and" was inadvertently
omitted after the word" Washington" in the act. With the
Committee on .Appropriations of the House, jud-ging from the
explanation made by the member (Mr. Blount) who was one
of the conferees on the bill and had charge of it in that body,
the understanding would seem to have been that the appropriation was to apply to but one of the objects stated above,
namely, the purchase of a site. Thus, in response to an inquiry made pending the consideration of the conference report on the bill, the member referred to, said: "The $250,000 relates alone to the site for the building. There is no
proposition for a building other than that contained in the
purchase of a site. The building is to be a matter for future
cons·( deration." (Cong. Rec. fQr March 4, 1881, p. 53.)
From this diversity of view as to the purpose of the appropriation, which existed between those who were in immediate charge of the bill in the two houses, it is manifest that
what was said by them pending its passage can afford no aid
in ascertaining the meaning of the clause in which the appropriation is contained.
Nor, even if such diversity of opinion had not existed,
should the interpretation which was then 'Placed upon it be
allowed to influence the judgment in this matter. "In construing an act of Congress" says the Supreme Court in 91
U. S. Reports, page 79, "we are not at liberty to recur to the
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views of individual members in debate, nor to consider "the
motives which influence them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is
to be ascertained from the language used."
There does not appear to me to be foundation enough in
the context to warrant the addition of the word "and," as
suggested. The language of the clause, as it now reads, contains no ambiguity necessarily giving rise to the inference
that Congress intended it to embrace more than its terms
express. In the construction of a statute, words can not be
added thereto for the purpose of supplying an omission which,
on merely conjectural grounds, is thought to have been inadvertently made.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

PROMOTION IN THE ARMY.

I

The rule prescribed in paragraph 20, Army Regulations of1863, by which
"promotions to the rank of captain shall be tnade regimentally," is
not in conflict with the provisions of section 1204, Revised Statutes, and
remains in full force.
The regulations and legislation concerning the promotion of subaltern
company officers, from the year 1801 to the present time, reviewed, and
the practice thereunder stated.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 14, 1881.
SIR: I have considered the letter of Second Lieut. George
P. Borden, Fifth Infantry, on the subject of promotion in the
Army, which was referred to me by your direction on the
9th ultimo, and which I have the honor to return herewith.
It is claimed by Lieutenant Borden that paragraph 20,
Army Regulations, in so far as it applies to subaltern officers
of the line of the grades of first and second lieutenant, is in
conflict with section 1204, Revised Statutes, and to that extent has ceased to be legally operative as a rule for promotion-that under said section such officers are entitled to be
272-VOL XVII--5
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promoted lineally in each arm, and not regimentally as the
said paragraph provides.
The rule as stated in paragraph 20, namely, that "promotions to the rank of captain shall be made regimen tally," was
adopted by executive regulation at a very early period. By
an order issued by the Secretary of vVar, May 26, 1801, it is
declared that promotions to the rank of captain shall be made
regimentally, and to the rank of major and lieutenant-colonel in the lines of the artillery and infantry respectively."
Tha,t order was supplemented by another, issued Ma,y 7,
1808, making the above rules for promotion in the infantry
ar;td artillery applicable to the cavalry and riflemen.
The earliest Congressional action on the subject of promotion in the Army is contained in the fifth section of the act
of June 26, 1812, chapter 108, which provided that thereafter
" the promotions shall be made through the lines of artillerists, light artillery, dragoons, riflemen, and infantry respectively, according to established rule." The rule therein referred to is that which was established by executive regulation as above stated, and the effeet of the statute was to
give it a legislative sanction. Subsequently, by section 12
of the act of March 30, 1814, chapter 37, it was provided" that
from and after the passing of this act, promotions may be
made thro'Jgh the whole Army in its several lines of light
artillery, light dragoons, artillery, infantry, a:1d riflemen respectively." Since the enactment of this last provision,
which continued in force down to the revision of the statutes, promotions to the rank of captain have uniformly been
made regimen tally; so that the construction given thereto,
in practice, has been that it made no change or modification
of the previously existing rules. According to this construction (which was acted upon for about sixty years) the act of
1814, while it contemplated that promotions should be made
in the several lines or arms through the whole Army, and
that offi .. ers should be promoted only in their respective lines
or arms, did not pre~cribe how promotions within the arms
or lines should be made, whether regimentall.v or lineally.
As thus undP-rstood-and the language of the act is susceptible of that interpretation-there was no conflict between it
and the rule adverted to.
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Section 1204, Revised Statutes, contains substantially a
re-enactment of the provision above quoted froi:Q the act of
1814. When embodying that provision in the Revised Statutes, it is reasonable to presume that Congress was familiar
with the construction which had been placed thereon and so
long acted upon by the executive department, and that if it
had been the intention of that body to introduce a different
rule on the subject of promotion, different phraseology would
have been chosen to signify such design. By adopting the
language of the previous statue the fair inference is that its
construction was acquiesced in, and that no change in the law
of promotion was intended .
. I am accordingly of opinion that the rule laid down in
paragraph 20, Army Regulations, by which "promotions to
the rank of captain shall be made regimentally," is not inconsistent with the provisions of section 1204, Revised Statutes, and that it remains in full force.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
The PRESIDENT.
DISCHARGE FROM MILITARY ACADEMY-RE-APPOINTMENT.
Where a cadet was, by order of the Secretary of War, on the recommend·
ation of the Academic Board, discharged from the Military Academy
for deficiency in studies: Held, (1) that the order, haviug been completely executed, is beyond the power of revocation; (2) that section
1325, Revised Statutes, prohibits the returning or re-appointing ofthe
cadet to the Academy, excepting upon the recommendation of said
Board; (~) that Congress may thus limit or restrict the authority of
the President to appoint cadets; (4) that accordingly it is not competent to the President to revoke the said order or to restore the cadet
to the Academy, irrespective of the recommendation of said Board.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, _

April 14, 1881.

SIR: Your letter of the 22d ultimo presents for my consideration the following case and question :
A cadet in the first class at the Military Academy was declared deficient by the Academic Board at the examination
in January, 1881, and the Board recommended that he be discharged.· An order for his discharge was thereupon made by
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the Secretary of War; but it was suspended, and the case
referred back to the Board for rconsideration. The Board,
however, adhered to. their former recommendation; and by
order of the War Department, dated February 26, 1881, the
cadet was discharged, and is now out of the service.
The question proposed is, ''Whether it is within the authority of the Executive to revoke the order for his discharge
and restore him to the Academy, to take his place in the next
succeeding first class, notwithstanding the adverse recommendation of the Academic Board and the provisions of section 1325, Revised Statutes.
In regard to so much of this question as relates to the,
order of discharge, I submit, in reply, that that order, having
been completely executed, is now beyond the power of revocation. The discharge, consequent upon its execution, is an
accomplished fact, which can not be annulled and the previous condition of things restored simply by means of an act
of the Executive assuming to revoke the order.
The remainder of the question calls for an examination of
section 1325, Revised Statutes, and the consideration of its
effect upon the authority of the Executive to make appointments to the Military Academy. That section provides: "No
cadet who is reported as deficient, in either conduct or studies,_
and recommended to be discharged from the Academy, shall,
unless upon recommendation of the Academic Board, be returned or re-appointed, or appointed to any place in the Army,
before his class shall have left the Academy and received
their commissions. "
It is plain that the case of the cadet in question is within
the provisions of the section just quoted, and that, the Executive is by those provisions prohibited from returning or reappointing him to the Academy, except upon recommendation of the Academic Board. The only inquiry that suggests
itself in this connection is whether it is competent for Congress thus to limit or restrict the authority of the President
to appoint cadets. In an opinion of one of my predecessors,
dated January 9, 1873 (14 Opin., 164), in which the subject
of appointments in the Army is considered, it is observed~
" It may be regarded as definitely settled by the practice of
the Government, that the regulation and government of the
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Army include, as being properly within their scope, the regulation of the appointment and promotion of officers therein.
And as the Constitution expressly confers upon Congress
authority to make rules for the government and regulation
of the Army, it follows that that body may, by virtue of this
authority, impose such restrictions and limitations upon the
appointing power as it deems proper in regard to making
promotions or appointments to fill any and all vacancies of
whatever kind occurring in the Army; provided, of course1
that the restrictions and limitations be not inconsistent or
incompatible with the exercise of the appointing power by
the department of the Government to which that power constitutionally belongs." The view here taken of the p9wer of
Congress to regulate the appointment of officers in the Army
(in which I fully concur) applies with even greater force to
the power of Congress to regulate the appointment of cadets
to the :Military Academy. The prohibition in section 1325,
adverted to above, which forbids the re-appointment of a
cadet who has been discharged from the Acade~y on the
report and recommendation of the Academic Board for deficiency in conduct or studies, unless such re-appointment is
made upon recommendation of the Board, must accordingly
be deemed to be valid and binding upon the President.
In direct answer to your question, I have therefore the
honor to state, that in the case mentioned it is in my opinion not within the authority of the Executive to revoke the
order for the discharge of the cadet and restore him to the
Academy, to take his place in the next succeeding first class,
notwithstanding the ad verse recommendation of the Aca~
demic Board and the provisions of section 1325, Revised
Statutes.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.·
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MAIL CONTRACT .
.A proposal made by M. to carry the mail over a certain route during
the fiscal year eading June 30, 1882, for $1,140, that being the lowest
bid received, was accepted; but he subsequently asked to be released
therefrom, on the ground that the bid which he intended to make
was $2,140: Held that the proposal and its acceptance constitute one
agreement, of the same force and effect as if a formal contract had been
written out and signed by the parties; that it is the duty of the
Postmaster-General to require the execution of such agreement according to its tertns; and that he is not at liberty to allow the contractor to withdraw from it upon the allegation that a mistake was.
made in the proposal submitted.
DEPAR·.rMENT OF JUSTICE,

April l!, 1881.
SIR: In complying with your oral request for an opinion

upon the subject to which the papers containing the ''bids"
or proposals of B. Magoffin and of Wm. C. Duxbury relate,
I shall, in accordance with the rule laid down and followed
by my predecessors (9 Opin., 82), give no opinion as to any
abstract question of law, but shall confine myself strictly to·
the facts of the cases presented, in determining the legal
rights of the parties and of the Government.
For carrying the mail during the fiscal year ending June
30, 1882, route 33,350, nineteen bids were received, of which
that of B. Magoffin ($1,140) was the lowest, and was accepted
on the 1st ultimo. He asks to be released, upon the ground
that he intended to make his bid $2,140. Uf the nineteen
bids for route 31,710, that of Mr. Duxbury was the lowest,
and was accepted. It was but $22, but upon his affidavit
that it was intended to be $2200 be was released. Thus, as
to him, the question of the right of the bidder to ask to be
released on account of his own mistake ceases to be practical,
and any expression of opinion upon the facts of his particular
case unnecessary. (9 Opin., 421, 422).
I will say, however, that it is difficult to perceive any difference, in legal principle, between the two cases stated, especially in view of the accompanying suggestion, that nominal bids are sometimes put in by proprietors of conveyances
over established routes to exclude competition.
The bid or }>roposal, and its acceptance by the Depart-
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ment, con&titute an obligation "of the same force and effect
as if a formal contract had been written out and signed by
the parties.'' (Garfield v. Un·ited States, 93 U.S., 242.)
The question, .then, resolves itself into the right of a person to withdraw from a contract upon tbe ground that he
made a mistake in stating the terms t6 which he agreeu.
It is quite clear that no such right can be recognized with
safety by an Executive Department of the Government, for
to do so would simply be to invite the commission of grave
frauds upon it.
I have therefore no hesitation whatever in advising you
that it is your duty to require the execution of the contract
in question according to its terms, and that you are not at
liberty to allow the contractor to withdraw from it upon the
allegation that a mistake was maue in the proposal submitted.
I return the papers submitted to me by you upon the
subject.
Very respectfully, your obedient servent,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. THOMAS L. J'AMES,
Postmaster- General.
POSSE COMITATUS.
Troops of the United States can not, without violating the provisions of
section 1!) of the act June 18, 18i8, chapter 263, be employed as a posse
comitatus, to aid the United States marshal or his deputies in arresting certain persons in the State of Kentucky charged with robbing
an officer of the Government.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 16, 1881.

SIR: In reply to the inquiry of the Adjutant-General
this day referred to me by your direction, as to whether it
would be proper, in view of the provisions of section 15 of
the act of June 18, 1878, chapter 263, to furnish a detachment
of troops to aid the civil authorities in arresting certain
persons in the State of Kentucky who are charged with the
recent robbery of the clerk of the engineer officer superintending the Government works on the Tennessee River, I
have the honor to state that in my opinion the civil author-
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ities referred to (the marshal or his deputies) can not, without violating the provisions of that section, be thus aided
by the military forces of the United States as a posse comitatus, and that iL would therefore not be proper to furnish a
detachment of troops to be ernployed by those authorities
as a posse in the case mentioned. In this connection I beg
to refer to an opinion of my predecessor, Attorney-General
Devens, dated October 10, 1878 (16 Opin., 162), wherein,
upon consideration of a case not materially differing from
the present, a similar conclusion was reached.
The papers referred to me are herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
1
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH.

The PRESIDENT.
REMOV.A.L OF NORTH C.A.ROLIN.A. CHEROKEES.
ln the case of certain Cherokee Indians of North Carolina, who left
their homes in that State on the supposition that they would be furnished by the United States with transportation to the lands owned by
their tribe in the Indian Territory: Advised that there is no authority
under existing legislation to effect the removal of these IndianB in the
manner supposed, as above.

DEPARTMEN1'

OF

JUSTICE,

April 16, 1881.

SIR: The memorial of J:ames Taylor, on behalf of certain North Carolina Cherokees, addressed to yourself on the
.'5th instant and subsequently referred to the Attorney-General, by his direction bas been considered by me, and herewith I submit a reply.
The memorial in brief sets forth that about eighty of the
Indians above mentioned have left their homes and are now
"at and near London, Tenn., in a destitute and suffering
condition," having been led to believe that upon reaching
that point they would be furnished by the United States
with transportation to the lands owned by their tribe in the
Indian Territory. Thereupon application is made to you,
under, as is said, the provisions of the treaty of 1835-'36 (7
Stat., 4 78) anu the act of July 29, 1848 (9 Stat., 264).
Upon this case you ask whether, under existing legislation, there be any power to make the removal requested.
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I have examined the matter, and am of opinion there is no
such power~
Mr. Taylor suggests that inasmuch as the above-cited act
-of 1848 authorized the payment of $53.33 and interest to
each one of certain North Carolina Cherokees therein particula:cly described, who should thereafter remove to the country
west of the Mississippi, such statute became operative for
all time thereafter, and therefore is in force now.
Admitting that in general the meaning of tbe act would
be as is thus suggested, it is obser\able that even before the
passage of certain statutes, to which I will call attention further on, Congress seems to have treated the above disposition as obsolete, so far as the principal sum is devoted to
purposes of tram;portation; for the Revised Statutes fail to
make any permanent appropriation for paying out this prin-cipal, at the same time that they contain such an apppropriation for the interest, which by the act of 1848 is payable
thereupon. (Sec. 3698, p. 728, near bottom.)
This presumption is confirmed by the act of 1875, chapter
132 (18 Stat., 447), which directs that the fund created by the
act of 1848 shall be used in paying certain costs and expenses
incident to recent litigation on behalf of the North Carolina
Cherokees, and then ''for the education, improvement, and
civilization of the said Indians." (See also, to same purpose,
the acts of 1876, chap. 289, and 1877, chap. 101, 19 Stat.,
197 and 201.)
It is not necessary in this place to discuss the power of
Congress to give this new direction to the fund in question;
for, whatever may be urged against such power, it is enough
to say here that the acts are effective at all events to prevent any present appropriation for the purposes to which the
principal money was set apart· by the act of 1848.
A waiver of this discussion will be understood as without
prejudice to the assertion of such power.
Mr. Taylor suggests also that the late act of March 3, 1851,
(sec. 4) contains an appropriation applicable to the purpose
of his prayer. But upon an inspection of that section, it is
plain that the sum therein mentioned is to be applied to certain contingent subsistence only, and that, as regards tribes
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and in other respects, wholly unconnected with the matter
in hand.
Another intimation by Mr. Taylor is important in another
aspect of this question, i.e., that such principal is due under
the p'rovisions of the treaty of 1835-'36, above cited-for in
that case an appropriation might be found in section 2094of the Revised Statutes. But this intimation is met lJy decisions to the contrary, made before the passage of the acts of
1848 cited above, by both Commissioner of Indian Affairs and
the Attorney-General (see Report of Commissioner, appended
to President's Message of April13, 1846, and 4 Opin., 435).
The title to the sums in question rests originally upon the
act of 1848, which is remedial, and was passed, as seems
probable, because of a suggestion in the opinion of the Attorney-General just cited.
I have replied to these latter points specifically, although
in the presence of the acts of 1875, 1876, and 1877, mentioned
above, it was hardly required.
Upon the whole, I submit that there is no power under
existing legislation to effect the removal in the manner supposed-:
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. P BILLIPS,
Solicitor General.
The PRESIDENT.

RIGHT OF FISHERY IN LAKE CHAMPLAIN.
The waters of Lake Champlain, within the limits of the United States,.
being partly in New York and partly in Vermont, the right to take
.fish from these waters depends solely upon the laws of the one or of the
other of those States, according as the locus is within the boundaries
of the one or of the other. The General Government has nothing to.
do therewith.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
April 23, 1881.
SIR: I have examined the opinion (herewith inclosed) of
Mr. Henry O'Connor, the law o!'ficer of your Department, in
regard to the right of certain citizens of Benson, Vt., and
Putnam, N.Y., to fish in the waters of Lake Champlain lying
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within the limits of the United States, which was by you
referred to me yesterday.
While I am unable to concur in some of the views expressed therein, I agree with Mr. O'Connor in holding that
the subject is one with which the Government of the United
States has properly nothing to do.
The waters of Lake Champlain, within the limits above
mentioned, are p:utly within the territorial jurisdiction of
the State of Vermont and partly within the terriorial juris.
diction of the State of New York, the boundary line between
the two states being'' through the middle of the deepest channel of Lake Champlain to the eastward of the island called the
Four Brothers, and the westward of the islands called the
Grand Isle and Long Isle, or the Two Heroes, and to the
westward of the Isle La 1\.Iott, to the line in the forty-fifth
degree of north latitude, established by treaty for the boundary line between the United States and the British dominions" (Rev. Stat. of N. Y., chap. 1, title 1), and the right to
take fish in these waters depends solely upon the laws of the
one or of the other of those States, according as the locus is
within the boundaries of the one State or of the other.
If the persons in whose behalf the accompanying application is made claim such right, and are interfered with or hindered by others in its exercise, their remedy is with the local
courts.
The case is not one in which the General Government can
afford relief.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. JAMES G. BLAINE,
Secretary of State.
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ADVANCEMENT IN THE NAVY.
Where, under the provisions of section 1506, Revised Statutes, an officer
was advanced by the President in numbers, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle or
extraordinary heroism: Held that such a•tion of the President and Senate is conclusive upon the executive department of the Government,
and .that the grounds thereof are not subject to re-examination.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 23, 1881.
SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith, in response to
your request, my opinion as to the application of Paymaster
Thomas T. Caswell for such a correction of the Na'y Register as will place him above Paymaster John H. Stevenson.
So far as the application rested on the proposition that the
name of Edward Bellows should have entered into the computation when Paymaster Stevenson was advanced fifteen
numbers, it can not now be successfully urged.
L. A. Frailey was, prior to 1879, appointed successor to
Bellows, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
As Bellows bas not since been appointed paymaster, the
recent decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Blake v.
The United States (103 U. S., 227) is decisive that be is not in
the ser\ice.
Under section 1506 of the Revised Statutes, which reads
as follows: '~Any officer of the Navy may, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, be advanced not exceeding
thirty numbers in rank for eminent and conspicuous conduct
(in battle or extraordinary heroism," Paymaster Stevenson bas
been twice advanced fifteen numbers.
Paymaster C~swell insists that both advancements were
for the same act of heroism, and that the eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle occurred at such a time as would
not entitle Stevenson to the benefits of the law.
A rational interpretation of the section I have quoted is,
that Congress has left to the discretion of the President the
determination of what acts of heroism should be recommended
to the Senate for reward, and, in providing that the Senate
must advise and consent to the advancement, has indicated
the only forum which may inquire into the wisdom with
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which that discretion has been exercised. The nomination
for the advancement of 1879 is regular and in due form, as
are also the resolution of the Senate and the commission.
The ad van cement being an accomplished fact, and within
the terms of section 1506, in my opinion it is not in your
power to inquire what was the act of heroism, or where and
when it was committed, which induced your predecessor and
the Senate, in 1879, to advance Paymaster Stevenson fifteen
numbers.
I am of the opinion that their action in that matter is conclusive upon the Executive Department, and that, therefore,
it is not subject to your re-examination or revision.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE ,1\f.A.cVEAGH.

The PRESIDENT.

EXCLUSION OF LOTTERIES FROM POSTAL FACILITIES.
Where the Postmaster-General finds, upon evidence satisfactory to himself, that a person i~ engaged in conducting a fraudulent lottery, he
may and should forbid the delivery of registered letters and the payment of money-orders to such person. It is not in terms all fraudulent
lotteries, etc., that are excluded from the use of the registry and money
order systems; those only are denied such use which are found to
be fraudulent by the Postmaster-General.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 27, 1881.
SIR: Upon the question of the right of the PostmasterGeneral to prohibit the delivery of registered letters and the
payment of postal money-orders addressed and payable toM.
A. Dauphin, I have the honor to submit the following legal
conclusions, based upon the subjoined statement of the material facts and statutes.
Mr. Dauphin is secretary of the Louisiana State Lottery,
an institution to which the legislature of Louisiana bas, for
a very large moneyed consideration, granted the exclusive
privilege of carrying on the lottery business in that State.
It is the only lottery conducted under the sanction of law in
the United States.
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Originally the larger portions of these registered letters
and money-orders were addressed to "M.A. Dauphin, secretary," etc., but noticing the advertisements found in the
newspapers all over the country, asking that lottery orders
(if sent by mail) be "addressed only to M. A. Dauphin," by
registered letter or money-order, it may safely be assumed
that the bulk of all such corre~pondence, so addressed, relates to the business of the Louisiana State Lottery.
The act of March 3, 1855, chapter 173, section 3 (10 Stat.,
64:2,) reproduced in Revised Statutes, section 3926, authorized the Postmaster-General to establish "a uniform system" for the registration of valuable letters.
Chapter 335 of the laws of 1872, approved June 8, revising,
consolidating, and amending the postal laws, in section 102,
empowered the Postmaster-General to establish "a uniform
money-order system." ( 17 Stats., 297; Rev. Stats.,sec. 4027.)
Section 300 of this revisory statute of June 8, 1872, provided: That the Postmaster-General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person, firm, or corporation is engaged in conducting any fraudulent lottery, gift enterprise,
or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property, by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind,
or in conducting any other scheme or device f-or obtaining
money through the .mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, forbid the payment
by any postmaster to any such person, firm, or corporation of
any postal money-order drawn to the order, or in favor of him
or of them; and may provide by regulations for the return
to the remitters of the sums named in such money-orders.
(Rev. Stat., sec. 40!1.) And the Postmaster-General may
also, upon like evidence, instruct postmasters, at any postoffices at which registered letters shall arrive directed to any
such person, firm, or corporation, to return all such registered
letters to the postmasters at the office at which they were
originally mailed, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside of said letters; and all such
letters so returned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to the writers thereof, under such regulations as the
Postmaster-General may prescribe: Provided, That nothing
in this act contained shall be so construed as to authorize
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any postmaster or other person to open any letter not addressed to himself. (17 Stats., 322, 323.)
On compiling the revision the foregoing section was
.s o divided as to place the latter portion among the provisions relating to registered letters (Rev. Stat., sec. 3929),
and the former, with those relating to the money-order system (Rev. Stat., sec. 4041). Section 149 of the act of June
S, 1872, declared '' 'fhat it sllall not be lawful to convey by
mail, nor to deposit in a post-office to be sent by mail, any
letters or circulars concerning illegal lotteries, so.called gift
concerts, or other similar enterprises o.fl'ering prizes, or concerning schemes devised and intending to deceive and defraud the public, for the purpose of obtaining money under
false pretenses," under a prescribed penalty. (17 Stats.,
302; Rev. Stat., sec. 3~94.)
The act of July 12, 1876, chapter 186, section 2, struck the
word "illegal" out of this section, so that the law now prohibits the deposit or carriage in the mails of any letters concerning lotteries. (19 StatR., 90.)
The power conferred upon Congress by the eighth section
of Article 1 of the Constitution, " to establish post-offices
and post-roa<ls," and to make all laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution that power, gives full, sovereign
control over the whole subject, to be exercised by any appropriate means.
The Supreme Court have held the last-cited section (Rev.
Stat., s.,ec. 3894, amended), excluding from the mails all letters, etc., concerning lotteries, to he constitutional, declaring
that "The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. The r·ight
to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right
to determine what shall be excluded." (Ex parte Jackson, 96
u.s., 732.)
If the right exists to deny to lotteries the benefit of the
means of transportation and methods of distribution existing at the time the Constitution was adopted over mailroutes established by positive statute, a fortiori must it exist
as to those recent systems which Congress permits the Postmaster-General to establish ' (or not) and to regulate at his
pleasure.
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In the absence of statutory provisions upon the subject
it might be inferred that the Postmaster-General could so
exercise his power of regulating the money-order and registry systems as to exclude all morally contaminating as well
as physically dangerous articles by mere rules, though
where the statute expressly excludes anything be can, of
course, make no contravening rule that will admit it.
Those who deny the pow~r of the Postmaster-General to
forbid delivery of money-orders and registered letters to Mr.
Dauphin, rest their denial upon the quali(ving adjective
"fraudulent" in the statutes which permit the PostmasterGeneral to instruct postmasters to withhold such letters and
orders from any person whom he finds upon evidence satisfactory to him to be "engaged in conducting any fra1tdulent
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind," etc. (Rev'. Stat., sec. 3929 and 4041.}
In almost every other State than Louisiana (if not in all)
the transactions of the lottery business, including those pertaining to the operations of this very company, are illegal. Notwithstanding its charter, throughout almost the entire extent
of the country traversed by mail-routes established by Congress, the sale of its tickets is prohibited bylaw. The sphere
of action appropriate to the United States is as far beyond
the reach of the legislative action of the State " as if the line
of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible
to the eye." (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How., 506.) The fact
that a State has legalized certain acts within its limits, no
more prevents the Federal Government denying validity to
those acts as to matters within its sphere, than it precludes
another State from prohibiting them within its territorial limits. In the present case, however, the Government only
denies certain postal facilities to those lotteries, etc., found
by the Postmaster.General to be fraudulent; not to those
which are illegal. What is or is not legal is purely a question of law; . what is fraudulent is either one of pure fact or
of mixed law and fact.
It is fuPther argued that a lottery authoriz~d by a law of
the State in which it has its chiPf office can not be fraudulent.
If we concede that the word "fraudulent" qualifies those
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words succeeding "lottery" in the statutes, it by no means
follows that a legalized lottery " or scheme for the distribution of money by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind" may
not be fraudulent at least as to every body outside the jurisdiction of the State which charters it.
The one hundred and forty-ninth section of the act of
June 8, 1872 (Rev. Stat., sec. 3894), until amended by act
of July 12, 1876, as already noticed, forbade putting into
the mail letters~ etc., relating to " illegal" lotteries.. Don btless prior to the approval of the amendatory act, section 3894,
Revised Statutes, did not apply to the lottery legalized by
Louisiana. But in the other section of the revision (Rev.
Stat., sees. 3926 and 4041) Congress speaks of "fraudulent"
and not of " illegal" lotteries.
But whatever its nature, the question is one solely for the
determination of the Postmaster-General. It is not in terms
all fraudulent lotteries, etc., that are excluded from the use
of the registry and money-order systems; it is those found to
be fraudulent by the Postmaster-General that are denied
these privileges. He is the sole arbiter of law and fact upon
this subject. I conclude that if the Postmaster-General finds
upon evidence satisfactory to him, whatever its probativeforce with other minds, that Mr. Dauphin is engaged in conducting a fraudulent lottery, he may and should forbid the·
delivery of money-orders to him, and instruct postmasters to
return to the senders all registered letters addressed to Mr.
Dauphin.
Very respectfully, yours,
WAYNE MAcV.EAGH ..
Hon. THOMAS L. JAMES,
Postmaster- General.
272-VOL XVII-6
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CLEARANCE OF VESSELS.
A collector of customs may lawfully refuse a clearance to a vessel whose
master is alleged to be amenable to the penalty provided by section
2~09, Revised Statutes 1 for bringing into the United States merchandise not included in the manifest required and described in the preceding sections. Such refusal is not a seizure, and the act of February 8, 1881, chap. 34, is inapplicable.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 28, 18~1.
SIR: Yours of yesterday req nests my opinion as to the
right of a collector of customs, under the provisions of the
Revised Statutes as modified by the act of February 8, 1881,
to refuse a clearance to a vessel whose master is alleged to
be amenable to the penalty declared by Revised Statutes~
section 2809, for bringing into the United States merchandise not included in the manifest required and described in
the two preceding sections.
This inquiry arises upon the application of Messrs. John
E. Ward and others, owners of the steam-ships Santiago and
Niagara, plying between New York and Cuba, for the restoration to them of certain moneys (equal in amount to the value
of non-manifested goods found on board of these vessels
upon recent arrivals in New York) exacted by the collector
as a condition of granting the clearances necessary to enable
the ships to start upon their outward voyages. The course
pursued by the collector was that enjoined upon him by instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury, issued upon a
similar state of facts February 21, 1881, No. 4782, as mentioned in your letter to me. It being conceded in that c.ase
that the master, owner, and agent were not implicated in the
violation of law, it was held that, though under the act of
February 8, 1881, the seizure or forfeiture of the vessel was
forbidden. "there was no prohil:>ition as to the detention
or refusal of clearance to a vessel pending the legal determination of the liability of either the owner or master."
The present petitioners consider the collector's refusal to
clear their vessels as a seizure of the ships, forbidden by
the act of February 8, 1881, unless the masters or owners
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were party or privy to the alleged illegal act. This is an
erroneous view of the la.w. Such refusal is not a seizure.
A seizure implies an actual caption of the thing seized;
"op"en, Yisible possession" taken and maintained. (The Joseja
Segunda, 10 Wheat., 325.)
The act of February 8, 1881, refers to offenses for which
the vessel is liable to be seized and wholly forfeited to the
United States, such as are mentioned in Revised Statutes,
sections 2497, 2868, 287 4, and other like provisions ; it does
not refer to the lien created by Revised Statutes, section
3088, upon vessels to secure payment of penalties incurred.
(The Missouri, 3 Ben., 508, 511, affirmed, 9 Blatch., 434; and
The Queen, 4 Ben., 237). This recent statute having no applicability to the present case, the sole qu,e stion is as to the
right of a collector to withhold a clearance from a vessel
upon which he knows the Government has a lien for a
penalty.
Is he bound to clear the ship, even if the effect be to
defeat the lien, and prevent service of a libel to perfect it,
because proper papers to authorize the departure of the
vessel under ordinary circumstances are presented to him~
The petitioners answer this inquiry affirmatively, because
ReYised Statutes, section 4197, declares that upon the production of the verified outward manifest, "the collector
shall grant a clearance for such vessel and her cargo," etc.
A perusal of this section shows that it is merely meant
to establish the ordinary routine for clearing a ship; not to
declare that extraordinary circumstances shall create no exception. A slaver, or a vessel going out to aid the enemy,
is not entitled to clearance simply because her papers are
regular upon their face. As to this last supposed case,
Washington, J., said: "The collector had two conflicting
duties imposed upon him; one to the individual who asked a
clearance; the other to his country. If the destination of the
vessel was the enemy, he had a right to refuse a clearance; if
not, and he had not circumstances to warrant his suspicion,
he had no such right. iie wa~ to judge upon circumstances,"
etc. (Bas v. Steele, 1 Wash. C. C., 394, 395.) Section 4191
Rev. Stat., so far as the imperative language relied upon is
concerned, is an exact transcript of the act of March 2, 1799,
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chapter 22, section 93 (1 Stat., 698), in force when the abovementioned case was determined.
A like authority to withhold clearance till the libel for a
penalty the collector knows to have accrued is filed is believed to exist in cases like that of the Santiago and Niagara.
To relieve the vessel from this legal liability the penalties
were paid. They were properly received, under the instructions of your circular of the 21st of February last, No. 4782,
which correctly states the law upon this subject. I have
confined this opinion to the cases of the ships named, under
section 2809, because the facts stated all relate to them, and
I prefer not to discuss section 2873 unless some actual caseof dispute or difficulty requires you to present it for my consideration.
The seven papers accompanying your letter are herewith
returned.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WM. WINDoM,
Secretary of the Treasury.

CONTRACT FOR FURNISHING POSTAL GUIDE.
A contract for furnishing the Post-Office Department with copies of th6·
Postal Guide, under the act of March 3, 1881, chap. 130, making an
appropriation for "publication of copies" thereof, does not comewithin the provisions of section 3709, Revised Statutes, and the Postmaster-General is not required to advertise for proposals previously
to making such a contract.
The object of that section, in requiring advertisement for proposals before making purchases and contractsfor supplies, is to invite competition among bidders, an'd it contemplates only those purchases and
contracts where competition as to the article needed is possible, which
is not the case with the Postal Guide.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 13, 1881.
SIR : Your letter of March 26last submitted to me an opinion of the Assistant AttornPy-General for the Post-Office Department, dated the 23d of same month (to the effect that in
purchasing copies of the Official Postal Guide under the pro-
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vision in the act of March 3, 1881, making an appropriation
of $23,000 for ''publication of copies of the Official Postal
Guide," you are not required to advertise for proposals
to furnish the same), and also requested me to advise you
whether or not I concur in the conclusion reaclled by that
officer. A subsequentletter from you, elated April6, inclosed
a communication from the publishers of the Official Postal
·Guide touching the same matter, which you desired to be
considered in connection therewith.
The inquiry involved is, whether a contract for furnishing
the Post-Office Department with copies of the Official Postal
Guide during the fiscal year next ensuing, under the abovementioned provision of the act of March 3, 1881, falls within
section 3709 of the Revised Statutes.
That section provides: "All purchases and contracts for
.supplies or services, in any of the Departments of the Government, except for personal services, shall be made by advertising a sufficient time previously for~proposals respecting
the same, when the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the articles, or performance of the service.
When immediate delivery or performance is required by the
public exigency, the articles or service required may be procured by open purchase or contract, at the places and in the
manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold
or such services engaged between individuals."
You state that the publication of the Official Postal Guide
was originally authorized by the following provision in the
act of June 25, 1874, chapter 455, viz : "To enable the Postmaster-General to pay for not exceeding thirty thousand
-copies quarterly of the Official Postal Guide, to be compiled
and published under contract not to extend more than five
years, to be made with parties doing said work at the lowe.:;t
rate, twenty thousand dollars;" that prior to the passage of
this act, by advice of House Committee on Appropriations,
the Postmaster-General bad, by letter, invited proposals,
accompanied by specimen volumes showing the style of work
to be furnished, from ten or twelve of the leading printers
and publishers in the United States; and that after the
passage of the act, upon the advice of the then Assistant
Attorney-General for the Post-Office Department that no fur-
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ther advertisement was required, immediate performance
being necessary, a contract for furnishing copies of the
Guide was made with H. 0. Houghton & Co., of Cambridge,
Mass., for five years, expiring June 30, 1879.
By the act of June 21, 1879, chapter 34, an appropriation
of $20,000 was made for "publication of copies of the Official
Postal Guide" for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1880; and
by the act of June 15, 1880, chapter 225, an appropriation of
the same amount was made for "publication of copies of the
Official Postal Guide" forthefiscal yearending June 30,1881.
Under these appropriations annual contracts were made with
the publishers of th.e Guide (i. e., with Messrs. Houghton,
Osgood & Co., ~uccessors to H. 0. Houghton & Co., the former contractors, and with Houghton, Mifflin & Co., successors to Houghton, Osgood & Co.), for each of the years ending June 30, 1880, and June 30, 1881, without previous ad vertisement for proposals. But in each of these cases the appropriation was not made until very near the beginning of
the fiscal year for which it was intended, and in each immediate anQ. continuous delivery of the necessary number of
copies was required.
You further state that the Guide is neither edited nor
published by or at the expense of the Post-Office Department; that the contents are made up from the official records
of the Post-Office Department at the expense of the publishers, subject to the approval of the Postmaster-General; that
the publication is copyrighted; that the publishers have a
large subscription list from the public, in addi~ion to the·
copies furnished to the Post-Office Department, as well as an '
extensive advertising patronage; and that the price at which
copies are now furnished to the Department, and at which
they are o.ffered for the next year, is about the cost of manufacture, the expense of editing and the profit of the publishers coming from the subscriptions of the public and from
advertising.
Upon the foregoing facts I am of opinion that a contract.
for furnishing the Post-Office Department with copies of the
Guide, under the act of March 3, 1881, does not come within
the provisions of section 3709, Revised Statutes. The design
of this section, in requiring advertisement for proposals be-
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fore making purchases and contracts for supplies, is to invite
competition among bidders, and it contemplates only those
purchases and contracts where competition as to the article
needed is possible. The Official Postal Guide being a copyrighted publication, edited, printed, and owned by a particular firm, it is manifestly not an article for the furnishing of
which there could be any competition between that firm and
other persons. Nor does this circumstance appear to work
any disadvantage to the Government in the present case, as
the article is supplied by the firm at about the cost of manufacture.
I accordingly concur in the conclusion reached by the Assistant Attorney-General for your Department, namely, that in
purchasing or contracting for copies of the Guide under the
act of March 3, 1881, you are not required to advertise for
proposals.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Bon. THOMAS L. JAMEs,

Postmaster- General.

•

LEASE OF BUILDING FOR GEOLOGICAL SURVEY.
The appropriation made by the act of June 16, 1880, chapter 235, "for the
expenses of the Geological Survey, and the classification of the public
lands, and examination of the geological structures, mineral resources,
and products of the national domain, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior," is nQt applicable to the payment
of rent of the building in Washington, D. C., leased from Dr. J. W.
Bulkley, July 9, 1880, and used as offices for the Geological Survey.
That appropriation not being "in terms" made for the rent of any building or part of any building in the District of Columbia to be used by
the Geological Survey, and no provision therefor being made elsewhere,
the lease of July 9, 1880, was forbidden by the act of March 3, 1877,
chapter 106, and is void.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 13, 1881.
SIR: I have considered the question submitted to me in
your letter of the 16th ultimo, viz: Whether you have authority to pay the rent of building No. 803 G street, in Washington, D. 0. (used as qffices for the Geological Survey),
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under the lease made by your predecessor with Dr. J. W.
Bulkley, July 9, 1880.
It appears that among the appropriations made by the
act of June 21, 1879, chapter 34, for the legislative, executive,
and judicial expenses of the Government for the year ending
June 30, 1880, and for other purposes, was one the object of
which was to enable the Secretary of the Interior ''to provide
offices for the Geological Survey," etc.; and that under this
provision the premises were leased from Dr. Bulkley, to be
used as offices for the Geological Survey, for the term of one
year from July 1, 1879, at a certain yearly rent, payable in
monthly installments. This lease expired June 30, 1880.
The act of June 16, 1880, chapter 235, making appropriations
for the sundry civil expenses of 1881, and for other purposes,
contained an appropriation ''for the expenses of the Geological Sun·ey, and the classification of the public lands, and examination of the geological structures, mineral resources,
and products of the national domain, to be expended under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior."
On tfuly 9, 1880, a new lease of the building (similar to and
for the same purpose as the former lease) was entered into
with Dr. Bulkley for the term of one year from July 1, 1880,
and the Geological Survey is no\v in occupation of the premises thereunder.
The question submittAd relates to payment of rent under
the last-mentioned lease, and the answer thereto depends
upon whether the appropriation made by the act of June 16,
1~80, is applicable to such payment.
By the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 106, it was declared that
thereafter no contract should be made ''for the rent of any
-b uilding or part of any building to be used for the purposes
.of the Government in the District of Columbia until au appropriation therefor shall have been made in terms by Congress, and that this clause be regarded as noticA to all contractors or lessors of any such building or part of building."
This law was in force when that lease was entered into.
The appropriation_in the act of June 16, 1880, is not ''in
terms" made for the rent of any building or part of any
building in the District of Columbia to be used by the Geological Survey; and no such pro\ision therefor being found
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elsewhere, it must be deemed that the lease of July 9, 1880,
was prohibited by the act of March 3, 1877, and that a claim
for rent thereunder is inadmissible.
It seems to me from an examination of previous legislation relating to the Geological Survey that the phrase "expenses of the Geological SurvPy,'' employed in that appropriation, was not used in so broad a sense as to include an
expenditure for the rent of any such building or part of
building. Thus, on referring to the act of March 3, 1879,
chapter 182, making appropriations for the sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June
.30, 1880, etc., it will be observed that a similar appropriation
for the Geological Survey is there made in which the same
phrase occurs. That the words "expenses of the Geological
Survey," in the appropriation made by this act, were not
meant by Congress to include the rent of any building or
part of building for the Survey, is shown by the fact that a
.s eparate provision was made for that object, for the same
fiscal year, by the act of J nne 21, 1879~ cited above, and we
may reasonably presume that when, subsequently, these
words were used in the appropriation made by the act of
June 16, 1880, they were not intended to have a broader or
more comprehensive signification.
The conclusion at which I arrive is, that the lease of tTuly
9, 1880, is void, and that the appropriation in the act of
June 16, 1880, is not applicable to the payment of the rent
of the building referred to. In direct answer to your question I accordingly reply~ that in my opinion you have no
.authority to pay the rent of the premises und€r said lease.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH.
Hon. S. J. KrRKwoon,
Secretary of the Interior.
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CASE OF STEAMBOAT JOSEPH PIERCE.
Upon consideration of the facts submitted in this case, in connection
with section 3483, Revised Statutes: Held that the steamer Josepk
Pierce, at the time of her destruction by fire, Jnly 31, 1865, was not m
the military service of the United States either by contract or impressment, and accordingly that the accounting officers of the Treasury have no jurisdiction under that section to alluw the value thereof
to the owners.
DEP ARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

May 13, 1881.
STR: Yours of the 4th instant asks whether or not, upon
the facts found by the Second Comptroller, whose statement
of them you inclose, the steamer Joseph Pierce, at the time
of her de~truction by fire, July 31, 1865, was so in the military service of the United States as to give to the accounting officers of the Treasury jurisdiction under the Revised
Statutes, section 3483, to allow the value of the boat to her
owners.
That section reads: "Every person who sustains damage
by the capture or destruction by an enemy, or by the abandonment or destruction by the order of the commanding
general, the commanding officer or quartermaster, of any
horse, mule, ox, wagon, cart, sleigh, harness, steamboat or
other vessel, railroad engine or railroad car, while such
property is in the military service, either by impressment
or contract; or who sustains damage by the death or abandonment and loss of any horse, mule, or ox, while in the
service, in consequence of the failure on the part of the
United States to furnish the same with sufficient forage, or
or whose horse, mule, ox, wagon, cart, boat, sleigh, harness,
ves~el, railroad engine, or railroad car is lost or destroyed
by unavoidable accident while such property is in the service, shall be allowed and paid the value thereof at the time
when such property was taken into the service, except in
cases where the risk to which the property would be exposed
was agreed to be incurred by the owner: Provided, It appears that such loss, capture, abandonment, destruction, or
death was without any fault or negligence on tbe part of
the owner of the property, and while the property was
actually employed in the service of the United States."
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The meaning of the phrase '~in the service" of the United
States, if it needs exposition, has been authoritatively determined by the Supreme Court of the United :::;tates, per
Hunt J.: "That the statute of 1849, under which this claim is
made, was intended for the indemnity of those engaged in the
actual military service of the United States-that is, for enlisted men while in the performance of their dutieg as such-is
plain enough." Stuart v. United States, 18 Wall., 89. The
learned judge, in considering the second section of that act,
further observes: ''This military service i13 the same as that
spoken of in the first section, to wit: in battle, or service as
soldiers under the command of officers o£ the Army. * * *
And the same rule is applicable whether the property was
in such actual service by the consent and agreement of the
owner, as by hire, or whether it had been forcibly seized by
the Government; that is to say, either by impressment or
contract, unless the owner had agreed himself to bear the
hazard of the loss." Ibid.
That the boat Joseph Pierce was hired or chartered by the
Government is not pretended. The able counsel who have
presented the claim of her owners to reimbursement under
section 3483, base it upon the assumption that she was "im·
pressed" into the service of the United States.
The law dictionaries of Abbott, Bouvier, and Burrill contain no definition of the word "impressment." The earlier
English dictionaries show that the term is derived from the
compulsive entry of men or consumption or use of property
in the actual military service of the state.
Was the Joseph Pierce impressed in this sense?
Certainly she was not taken as the J. H. Russell was, in
the case relied upon by the claimants, reported in 13 Wallace,
623. The Russell was prohibited from taking private freight,
and her voyage was determined entirely by military authority. This constituted an impressment of that vessel into the
military service of the United States, she having been taken
out of the service of private parties as a common carrier.
The Joseph Pierce, on the contrary, was on her way to
Vicksburg when signaled to stop at Davis Bend. Upon
reaching the landing the master is required to take on board
the men and amm1.1nition of the Sixty-fourth United States

\

92

HON. WAYNE MACVEAGH
Case of Steamboat Joseph Pierce.

Colored Troops for transportation to Vicksburg. They were
to be transported, as were the private persons and property
already on board, to her destination. The captain refused to
take the troops and powder. The reason assigned for the
refusal is not distinctly stated by you, but counsel inform me
that it was because it would make the number of passengers
exceed what she was licensed to carry; and that she had no
license to carry powder, and to take it avoided the policy of
insurance upon the vessel. But whatever his reasons, Captain Richardson refused to take on the men and property.
Colonel Meatyard, the officer then in command at this point,
then said to him : " Unless you take me and my troops on
board I will seize;" to which the master responded, ''I will
be compelled to submit."
This is supposed by the claimants to constitute an impressment. I think it does not. The threat is to seize (or
impress) the vessel, unless a certain thing is done; and to
avoid seizure or impressment the master does the thing required. He selects th~ other offered alternative in preference to au impressment.
Again, if Captain Richardson had, at once and voluntarily,
acceded to the demand for transportation, it could hardly be
said that his steamer-though to that extent serving the
United States-was '~in the service" of the United States
by hire. Every vessel having a military passenger, or large
number of them, is not therefore in the service of the Government to whose establishment these persons may belong.
Then his consenting, reluctantly and under threat, to take
such persons as passengers and their ammunition as freight.
did not put the vessel into the service by impressment.
It is alleged that the owners of the Joseph Pierce have lost
her, and been precluded from recovering any of the insurance upon her, because' of these acts of Colonel Meatyard,
acting under orders of superior military authority, representing the United States. If so, the case would be one of great
hardship, and might furnish the basis of an app~al to Congress; but it does not make out a case under Revised Statutes, section 3483, of which the accounting officers of the
Treasury have jurisdiction.
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The papers in the case, which were forwarded at the request of the claimants, are herewith returned, for restoration
to the files of the Second Comptroller.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Ron. W1\r. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.

LONGEVITY PA.Y.
In computing the longevity pay of officers of the Army, under the provision in the act of February 24, 1881, chap. 79, declaring that "the
actual time of service iu the Army or Navy, or both, shall be allowed
all officers," etc.: Held-(1) That the actual time of an officer's service
as a cadet at the Military Academy should not be allowed. (2) That
where an officer served i '1 the Medical Corps of the Navy the actual
time of his service in that ~orps should be allowed. (3) That where
an officer served as a captain's clerk in the Navy, the actual time of
his service as such clerk should be allowed. ( 4) That where the officer
served as an assistant civil engineer in the employ of the War Department on the Florida coast and elsewhere, the actual time of his
service in that capacity should not be allowed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 14, 1881.
SIR: Your two letters of the 6th instant direct my attention to a clause in the act entitled "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1882, and for other purposes," approved February 24, 1881, whi£h reads as follows: "Additional pay to
officers for length of service, to be paid with their current
monthly pa;y, and the actual time of service in the Army or
Navy, or both, shall be allowed all officers in computing their
pay," and also submit for my consideration whether in certain cases, hereinafter stated, officers of the Army are entitled
to the benefit of that part of the above provision which declares that in computing their length of service or longevity
pay "the actual time of service in the Army or Navy, or both,
shall be allowed."
The cases referred to and the particular inquiries arising
thereon are these:
(1) Where the officer was appointed a cadet at the Military
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Academy, and served as such, whether the actual time of his
service as cadet should be allowed in computing his longevity
pay.
(2) Where the officer was appointed an officer in the Medical Corps of the Navy, and ~erved as such, whether the
actual time of his service as an officer in that corps should
be allowed in computing his longevity pay.
(3) Where the officer served as a captain's clerk in the
Navy, whether the actual time of his service as such clerk
should be allowed in computing his longevity pay.
(4) When the officer served as an assistant civil engineer
in the employ of the War Department on the Florida coast
survey and elsewhere, whether the actual time of his service
in that capacity should be allowed in computing his longevity pay.
Previous to the passage of tlJe act of July 15, 1870, chapter
294, all commissioned officers of the Army were allowed an
additional ration, called "longevity ration," for every five
years of service. This allowance was authorized by the fifteenth section of the act of July 5, 1838, chapter 162, amended
by section 9 of the act of March 2,1867, chapter 145, and (the
ration being commuted in money) it was virtually a periodical
increase of the officer:s compensation. The act of 1838, as
amended, provided that every commissioned offi~er of the line
or staff" shall be entitled to receive an additional ration per
diem for every five years he may have served or shall serve
in the Army of the United States." According to the construction which was given to this provision only service rendered as a commissioned officer in the regular Arrny could be
computed in determining the right of an otficer to the benefit
thereof.
The act of 1870 did away with the longevity ration, but
provided (sec. 24) that there should be "allowed and paid·
to each and every commissioned officer below the rank of
brigadier-general, including captains and others having assimilated rank or pay, ten per centum of their current yearly
pay for each and every term of five years of service: Provided,
That the total amount of such increase for length. of service
shall in no case exceed forty per centum on the yearly pay
of his grade as established by this act."
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This provision is emhodied in sections 1262 and 1263, Revised Statutes, and the construction which it received in
practice corresponded to that placed upon the former pro·
vision giving the longevity ration-that is to say, in allowing the ten per centum increase of pay, length of service as a
commissioned officer in the regular Army only was taken into
account.
Further provision on the subject was made by the seventh
section of the act of June 18, 1878, chapter 263, which declared
that thereafter "all officers of the Army of the United States
who ha\e served as officers in the volunteer forces during
the war of the rebellion, or as enlisted men in the armies of
the United States, regular or volunteer, shall be, and are
hereby, credited with the full time they may have served as
such officers and as such enlisted men, in computing their
service for longevity pay," etc. By this section, service as a
commis8ioned officer in the volunteer army during the war of
the rebellion, and also service as an enlisted man in either the
volunteer or regular army at any period, were brought into
the account, and required to be credited equally with service
as a commissioned officer in the regular Army, in computing
an officer's longevity service; but service as a cadet at the
Military Academy does not come within the section. (16
Opin., 611.)
The act of February 24, 1881, provides that, in computing
the pay of officers for length of service, "the actual time of
service in tbe Army or Navy, or both, shall be allowed."
The question submitted by you is, Whether the period
passed by a cadet at West Point, receiving his military and
other instruction at that Academy, is to be computed as
''actual time of service in the Army;" and I have no difficulty, whatever, in answering this question in the negative.
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Opin., 333) said: "We see
by the statute that the internal military organization of the
Academy is for the purpose of military instruction. It is not
actual service in the Army."
If it had been the intention of Congress to enact that
the period passed by cadets at West Point should be placed
upon the footing of actual service in the Army, it would have
been perfectly easy to have said so by language incapable of
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being misunderstood; and it seems to me _that it is extremely
undesirable to torture the language of Congress in order to
find in it, by relation to some other statute, a technical
effect, when the apt words to express such intention readily
occur to every unbiased mind. It is very true that the corps
of cadets at West Point constitute part of the Army, but it
does not follow that a cadet pursuing his studies at West
Point is in actual service in the Army within the meaning of
the clause in the Army appropriation bill; and if Congress
at any time desires to add this advantage to those already
possessed by the young men who are educated at the public
expense at the Military Academy, it will be very easy for it
to do so, by declaring that the time passed by cadets at the
Military·or Naval Academy shall be computed as "actual
time of service in the Army or Navy;" but, until language
clearly indicative of this meaning is used, it would be, in my
judgment, very unwise to endeavor to extract it from a
clause in the Army appropriation bill, treating only of the
Army as in. actual service in the ordinary meaning of the
phrase.
With respect to naval service, this was not within the legislation referred to which was enacted previously to the act
of 1881, but is first introduced and required to be taken into
account by that act. The terms ''service in the Navy" are
not less general or comprehensive than ''service in the
Army." They include service in the naval forces, whether
regular or volunteer, and whether a commissioned officer
of the line or staff, or as warrant or other officer, or as an enlisted man; and for such service the act of 1881 entitles an
Army officer to credit in computing his longevity pay.
I am, accordingly, of opinion that under the act of February 24, 1881, in each of the second and third cases above
enumerated, the officer should be allowed, in computing his
longevity pay, the actual time of his service in such case described, but that in the remaining case, thefmtrth, the officer
should not be allowed the actual time of his service therein
described in computing his longevity pay. The negative
answer in the latter case rests on the ground that his service
as an assistant civil engineer in the employ of the War De-
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partment in the survey mentioned was not actual service in
the .Army.
The papers which accompanied your letters are herewith
returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
W .AYNE MAcVE.AGH.
Bon. RoBERT T. L NCOLN,
Secretary of War.
NOTE.-Since the foregoing opinion was rendered, the Supreme Court
has held that, in computing an officer's longevit,y pay, the time of his
service as a cadet in the Military Academy at West Point is to be regarded as "actual time of service in the Army," within the meaning of
the act of February 24, 1881 (United States v. Morton, 112 U. S., 1).

, REAPPOINTMENT OF CHAPLAIN BLAKE.
It is not competent to the President, with thA concurrence of the Senate, now (in May, 18tH) to reappoint Rev. Charles -M. Blake a post
chaplain in the Army as of the 28th day of September, 1878, so as to
entitle him to pay from that date.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

•

May 18, 1881.
SIR : The question presented for my opinion by yours of
the 14th instant is, Whether or not it is competent for the
President to nominate a:qd, with the concurrence of the Senate, to appoint Rev. Charles M. Blake a post chaplain in the
Army, the appointment to take effect from September 28,
1878, so as to entitle him to pay from that darte, he having
since then actually performed the duties of tlY.tt position
under the hereinafter-mentioned order of President Hayes.
Prior to and upon the 24th day of December, 1868, Mr.
Blake was a chaplain in the Army. On that day he wrote
a letter tendering his resignation. It was accepted March
17, 1869. His successor was nominated, confirmed, and commissioned in July, 1870, to take rank from July 2, 1870.
When he wrote that letter Mr. Blake was insane. Upon the
28th day of September, 1878, President Hayes issued an order
declaring such resignation void, revoking its acceptance,
directing his assignment to duty, and that he be paid from
May 14, 1873, when the number of .Army chaplains was re272-VOL XVII--7
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duced to that authorized by law (counting 1\fr. Blake in);
leaving his right to pay between March 17, 1869, and May
14, 1878, to be determineu by the Court of Claims, in which
a suit therefor was pending. The decision of that court was
adverse to the claimant (Chaplain Blake's case, 14 C. Cls. R.,
462). Upon appeal the Suvreme Oourt of the United States,
at its last term, affirmed the judgmeut. of the Court ofOlaims,
holding that by the nomination, comfirmaLion, and appointment of his successor Mr. Blake ceased to be an officer of
the Army from and after July 2, 1870, without regard to his
mental condition or his letter of December 24, 186~ (Blake
v. United States, 103 U.S., 227), and that, having thus ceatled
to· be an officer of the Army, lle could not re-enter the Army
as post chaplain otherwise than by a new appoiutment, with
the concurreuce of the Senate (same case, citing Jlfiminuclc '·
U.S., 97 U. S., 437; 4 Opin., 306.) The order of President
Hayes of September 28, 1878, was therefore void and ineffective.
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that it is not competent for the President, with the coucurrence of the Senate,
now to reappoint Mr. Blake to his former position in the
Army as of the 28th day of September, 1878, with pay from
that date.
The President, under section 3J Article II of the Constitution, has the right to "commission all officers of the United
States," and no others. "The acts of appointing to office
and commissioning the person appointed can scarcely be considered as one and the same, since the power to perform
them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the
Constitution" (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 156; 2 Story
on Const., § 1548). The commission is merely evidence of
the appointment. (lb.) It is to show when and to what
office the bearer of it has been appointed. Of itself it confers no right. It merely shows what right a person has by •
virtue of the appointment it evidences. But a man can not
now be appointed to an office three years ago. The Executive and Senate of 1878 alone had the right of determining
the fitness of the appointees of 1878 to offices to be filled by'
Presidential nomination. (4 Opin., 217.)
In 1842 .Mr. Att:orney-General Legare expressed an opinion
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to the effect that ' 4 The President can restore a suspended
naval officer, and can confer rank from and after his appointment; but he can not cause an individual out of service to
be paid from the public Treasury the same as if he were in
it; nothing short of' an act of Congress can have that virtue.
He may, to elevate an officer once out of the service, nominate him to a particular rank in it of the same dignity as
that which he would have held had he not fallen out of it;
and, to effect that result, may issue a commission having relation back to a prior date; yet the pay of such restored and
promoted officer does not attach to the post until the incumbent enters upon its duties. A surgeon put out of the naval
service by the exercise of executive power, and subsequently
restored to the rank he would have had by virtue of his
·commission, is not entitled to pay for the. time he was out of
the service, but only for the time of his restoration." (4 Opin.,
123.)
In 1847 Attorney-General Clifford gave a similar opinion
upon the same case, that of Surgeon Du Barry. (lb., 603.)
Subsequently, in the case of a lieutenant in the Revenue
Service, who had been dismissed in December, 1842, andre-commissio·n ed in April, 1843, to take rank from the date of
his original appointment, Attorney-General Johnson held
that the officer was not entitled to pay during the time he
was out of service, remarking that "pay is never allowed
ex~ept while the officer is in service, unless there be some
act of Congress providing for the particular case." (5 Opin.,
132.)
In 1858 Attorney-General Black gave an opinion in which
he said: "An officer of the Army or Navy who is dismissed,
and afterwards restored to the same rank which he would
have held if not dismissed, can not be paid for the intermediate time, unless by act of Congress." (9 Opin., 137.)
In an opinion of the Solicitor-General, approved by my immediate predecessor, January 27, 1880, it is said: "The fiction familiar to lawyers under the phrase nunc pro tunc has
no application in cases of appointments to office. Such executive action can not in the nature of things act by relation."
(16 Opin., 656, 657.)
The view which I have already expressed upon the ques-
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tion presented is so fully sustained by the opinions of my
predecessors above referred to, that I deem it needless to
cite additional authority on the subject.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

WAYNE MAoVEAGH. '
Ron. HOBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
'COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
The power· given the Commissioners of the District of Columbia by
the sixth section of the act of March 3, 1681, chapter 134, "to sell t(}
the highest bidder at public auction" all the right, title, and interest
of the United States in and to a certain lot of ground situated in the
city of 'Vashington, carries with it authority to make a conveyance.
to such bidder, as an incident to the execution of the power.

DEP.A.R1'MENT OF JUSTICE,
May 18, 1881.
GENTLEMEN : Your communication of the 20th ultimo
directs my attention to the sixth section of the act of 1\tlarch
3, 1881, entitled "An act making appropriations to provide
for the expenses of the government of the District of Columbia," etc., by which the Commissioners of the District of
Columbia are authorized "to sell to the highest bidder at
public auction" all the right, title, an<l interest of the United
States in and to a lot of ground described therein, situated
in the city of Washington, in said District, and to apply the
proceeds of sale to the use mentioned in section 3 of said
act. My attention is also directed to an opinion of the
attorney for the District of Columbia, in which tllat officer
apparently holds that, a1thougll authority "to sell" the premises is by said sixth section conferred upon the Commissioners, they <lerive no authority thereunder to convey the same
to the purchaser. You remark in this connection, that "the
property has been sold, and if there be no way by which the
title of the United States can be conveyed without further
legislation by Congress, the Commissioners will be unable to
avail themselves of the benefits of this sale until the next
Congress shall have organized and passed an amendatory
act." And you request to be advised by me whether, in my
opinion, a conveyance can be made to the purchaser under
the statute as it now exists.
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After careful examination of the su qject, I am led to adopt
a different view from that of the attorney of the District of
Columbia stated above. I think the power ''to sell to the
highest bidder at public auction," which is given to the
Commissioners by the sixth section of said act, carries with
it authority to make a conveyance to such bidder as an incident to the execution of the power.
It is a general and familiar principle of law, that where
power is conferred to do any act, it is to be construed as in·cluding all necessary, or usual, or proper modes and means
-o f accomplishing the act; since to authorize the doing of an
.act, and at the same time to deny the proper means of doing it, would be idle and absurd. (Story on Sales, § 70.)
'This principle has been acted upon by the courts in cases
where powers similar to the one under consideration have
been granted. Thus, in Decker .v. Freeman (3 Greenl. 338)
it was held that a vote of township proprietors, authorizing
.a committee to sell lands, empowered them also to make
deeds in the name of the proprietors, So, in Valentine v.
Piper (22 Pick., 85) where a power of attorney to sell land,
and to dispose of the proceeds according to the future instructions of the constituent, did not in express terms authorize the attorney to execute a deed, it was held that the
attorney had authority to execute tlle proper instrument
required by law to carry the sale into effect. In the latter
.case Chief-Justice Shaw (delivering the opinion of the
court) observes: "When the term 'sale' is used in its ordinary sense, and the general tenor and effect of the instrument are to confer on the attorney a power to dispose of
real estate, the authority to execute the proper instruments
requirPd by law to carry such sale into effect i~ necessarily
incident. It is in pursuance of a general maxim that an
authority to accomplish a definite end carries with it an authority, so far as the constituent can confer it, to execute the
usual legal and appropriate measures proper to accomplish
the object proposed." (See also Yale v. Eames, 1 Mete., 488.)
By section 3749, Revjsed Statutes, the Solicitor of the
·Treasury is authorized, with the approval of the Secretary
·Of the Treasury, "to sell at public sale any unproductive
lands or other property of the United States acquired under
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judicial process or otherwise in the collection of debts," etc ..
Here authority to convey to the purchaser the property pur. chased at such sal~, though not conferred on the Solicitor·
in express terms, is undoubtedly to be implied; and the practice has been in conformity with this view.
Sometimes, where a power to dispose of real estate is conferred by statute, authority to convey is expressly given to
the officer empowered to sell. Thus, by the act of December
15, 1868, chapter 2, the Secretary of War was authorized to·
make sale at public auction of certain lands, etc., belonging
to the United States, and "on receiYing the purchase money
in full to execute all necessary deeds therefor to the purchaser or purchasers thereof on behalf of the United States.'~
The sale here authorized was one on credit; and the force of
the provision giving authority to execute deeds lies mainly
in the restriction as to the time of exet·eising such authority .
(viz, "on receiving the purchase-money in fu11 "). So, in
section 4 of the aforesaid act of March 3, 18~n, authority is
gi,en to the Chief of Engineers '"to sell and convey by good
and sufficient deed" t.o the parties described therein certain
real estate of the United States; but it is provided that " no
conveyance shall be made until all the purchase-money is
paid." In this case the sale was to be partly on credit.
I may here remark that the cir:cumstance that authority
to ''convey" is expressly given the Chief of Engineers by
the section just mentioned does not warrant the construction
that the sixth section of the same act (wherein such authority is not expressly given) confers upon the Commissioners a
more limited power. The sale contemplated by the latter
section is a sale for cash, the proceeds of which are to be
applied by the Commissioners to a particular purpose, and,
in the absence of restrictive words indicating a contrary
intention, it is reasonable to infer that the design of Congress was to confer upon them authority to transfer the
property, this being necessary to accomplish the end in view.
I accordingly answer your inquiry by saying that in my
opinion a conveyance can be made to the purchaser underthe statute as it now exists.
I am, gentlemen, very respectfull.Y,
WAYNE MAcVEA.GH.
The COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
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The heads of the departments of ethics and English studies, of Spanish
and other modern languages, and of drawing, should be commissioned
as "professors of mathematics" (sec. 1528, Rev. Stat.), after passing
the examinations required by the act of January 20, U:l81, chapter 24.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 18, 1881.
SIR: In reply to yours of yesterday I would say that although the title conferred by law is a misnomer, I think the
heads of the departments of ethics and English studies, of
Spanish and other modern languages, and of drawing, should
be· commissioned as professors of mathematics, under section
1528, Revised Statutes, after passing· the examination~ required by the act of January 20, 1881.
Section 1528, Hevised Statutes, provides that " Three professor.~ of mathematics shall be assigned to duty at the Naval
Academy, one as professor of ethics and English studies,
one as professor of the Spanish language, and one as professor of drawing." The purpose that persons known to the
law and the Naval Register as "professors of mathematics"
.should be engaged in teaching these other branches of learning is too obvious for construction. That the name did not
indicate the sole duty of the office is further apparent from
the express declaration of the act of August 3, 11)46, section 12 (now sees. 1399-1401, Rev. Stat.) ~• that the number of professors of mathematics in the Navy shall not
exceed twelve; that they shall be appointed and commissioned by the President of the United States. by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall perform such
duties as may be assigned thmn by order of the Secretary uf
the Navy at tte Naval School, the Obsen·atory, and on
board ships of war in instructing the midshipmen of the
Navy, or otherwise." Section 1528, Revised Statutes, shows
that, certainly as to three of these professors, the duties to
be assigned were not to be mathematical in their nature.
Very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WM. H. HUN'l',
Secretary of tlze Navy.
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INDIAN TRUST FUNDS.
The Secretary of the Interior, as trustee for certain Indian tribes, has
authority, under the act of April 1, 1880, chapter 41, to sell United
States 5 per cent. called bonds, held in trust for such tribes, in order
that the fund may receive the benefit of the premium.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 23, 1881.
SIR: Your verbal inquiry as to your right to sell the

United States 5 per cent. called bonds, held in trust for Indian tribes, in order that the fund may receive the btnefit of
the premium, led me to examine the acts of September 11,
1841; June 10, 1876; and of April 1, 1880. The question
turns upon the intent of the last-named act. This authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to deposit in the Treasury
''all sums now held by him, or which may hereafter be received," as trustee of various Indian tribes," on account of the
redemption of United States bonds," etc., * * * "and
the sales of stocks lately purchased for temporary investment, whenever he is of the opinion that the best interests
of the Indians will be promoted by such deposits, in lieu of
investments." (21 Stats., 70.)
In reporting the bill 1\Ir. Peudleton said: "The Secretary of the Interior would be at liberty to change the investment. The bill provides that this change shall be made
whenever in his judgment it is thought best to do so." (10
Con g. Rec., pt. 1, p. 213, Jan. 7, 1880.)
The Secretary of the Interior acts as trustee. The bonds
are called for redemption; the moneys received will be taken
by him on account of this call and liability to redemption.
It is his duty to realize the most he can for the benefit of his
cestuis qui trust. I think you have the right to sell, as proposed by you.
Very respectfully, yours,
WAYNE MA.cVEAGH.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
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DUTIES ON IMPORTS.
Shellac varnish, composed of a mixture, made iu a Canadian bonded
warehouse, of the gum with alcohol distilled in this country and exported without payment of any internal revenue tax here and no exaction of duty upon it m Canada uecause in bond there, is dutiable
under ScheduleD, of section 2504, Revised Statutes, which declares
that "on all compounds or preparations of which distilled spirits is a
component part of chief value there shall be levied a duty not less
than that imposed upon distilled spirits," namely, $2 per proof gallon.
In determining which is the component of chief value, the value of
each ingredient in the domestic markets of the United States should
be the guide.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

May 28, 1881.

SIR: Yours of the 3d instant requires my opinion as to
the rate of duty properly collectible upon "importation of a
shellac varnish composed of a mixture, made in a Canadian
bonded warehouse, of the gum with alcohol distilled in this
-country and exported without payment of any internal revenue tax here and no exaction of duty upon it in Canada because in bond."
Revised Statutes, section 2504, Schedule M, " Sundries,"
places upon "varnish" eo nomine a specific duty of 50 cents
per gallon and an ad valofl'em duty of 20 or 25 per cent.,
according as it is worth a doHar and a half or over per gallon.
Schedule D, "Liquors," of the same section, declares that
"on all compounds or preparations of which distilled spirits
is a component part of chief value there shall be levied a
duty not less than that imposed upon distilled spirits," which
is $2 per proof gallon.
Your letter presents two inquiries: First. Under which of
these cited clauses is the varnish made as above stated dutiable~ Second. How is the value of the alcoholic ingredient
to be determined (if the last quoted is the applicable provision), the compound not being sold (out of bond) or used in
Canada-all dealings in it being confined to purchases and
.sales of it in bond, for the purposes of exportation 1
Each of these questions is difficult of solution with the absolute certainty of conviction. It is, therefore, a fair consideration, to influence the action of an administrative officer of the
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Government, that an erroneous decision adversely to the
United States would practically be permanent and irremediable, so long as the law remained unchanged; while an importer can easily have a mistaken construction, injurious to
him, corrected by the court.
To support their claim that Schedule M contatns the governing clause, the importers invoke the well-known principle of tariff construction that a specific designation should
prevail over a general descriptive classification. This is
merely one reason for adopting a particular construction, and
while it is persuasive to a certain extent, as applied to different enumerations of the same Ftatute, reflection shows its
inapplicability to the pre~ent case.
The duty upon varnish, in the precise phraseology now
used in the revision, is declared in the alphabetical enumeration of dutiable articles in the fifth section of the act of July
14, 1862, chapter 63. (12 Stats., 549.)
Varnish is defined to be the solution of a resinous substance in some volatile liquid. We know that spirits of ether
and oil are most commonly employed to dissolve the gum in
the manufacture of Yarnish. Alcohol is not the sole, if the
principal, solvent.
Since the close of tLe war tobacco and spirits have become
the chief sources of internal revenue. July 28, 1866, an act
(chap. 298) was passed, entitled "An act to protect the revenue,
and for other purposes.~' Its first section opened by fixing the
import duty on cigars, placed ''on cotton three cents per
pound," and concluded with the before-quoted declaration
that "On all compounds or preparations of which distilled
spirits is a component part of chief value there shall be levied
a duty of not less than that imposed upon distilled spirits" (14
Stats., 328), and a proviso as to the quantity to be contained
in packages of imported brandy. This general declaration
must have been intended to embrace 2>ll such compounds
and preparations-medical. mechanical, or other-irrespective of the alphabetical arrangements or specific designations
of earlier statutes, with the exception that no article of
which alcohol was an ingredient, paying a higher duty than
distilled spirits, should have the benefit of any reduction
through this provision.
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The purpose of the revision being to reproduce, in a consolidated form, the laws in force December 1, 1873, as they
then existed, such a construction must be given to the language of the Revised Statutes, -wherever it can reasonably
be done, as will preserve and continue the effective operatiou
of each statute incorporated therein. The accomplishment
of this design should overrule any theory or distinction
between specific designations and descriptive clauses. Accordingly, I conclu~e that, if the alcohol is the component part
of chief value in this compound, the latter is dutiable under
ScheduleD at the rate imposed upon· distilled spirits, and
not as varnish under Schedule M-or, rather, as a varnish
of which distilled spirits is the component of chief value.
How to ascertain this fact, of the relative value of the
ingredients, is the second question you propound to me.
It is to be noticed that the value to be ascertained is that
of the components, and not the dutia.ble value of the compound. As to the latter, Revised Statutes, section 2906, pro:
vides that it shail be "the actual market value, or wholesale
price thereof, at the period of exportation to the United
States in the principal markets of the country from which
the same has b_een imported." The importers of this varnish
assume that the value of its ingredients is to be determined
in the same way, taking the alcohol at its worth, duty and
tax free, in the Canadian bonded warehouse-say, at about
30 cents per gallon, and the shellac (entitled to free entry in
both countries), at 36 cents a pound-2 pounds being used to
each gallon of spirit.
Thus the alcohol, at the time and in the particular building
of mixture, is not the component of chief value.
But, in the :first place, the wholesale price abroad is taken
as (;be standard of dut·iable value only because the law specially prescribes it, while it makes no such requirement as
to the determination of component value; nor do I understand that, when this inquiry has· come before the courts, it
has been customary to confine it to the comparative value of
the components in the country of exportation. In the absence
of statutory provision, it would seem more proper and pertinent to inquire what is the wholesale price of each ingredient to the purchaser in the domestic markets of the United
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States, in order to ascertain which is to be deemed the component of chief value. I am informed that it is so ruled in
the United States circuit court for the southern district of
New York.
In the second place, to whichever market, foreign or domestic, our attention is directed for this purpose, I t\hould
suppose the value of each material or ingredient was to be
discovered by :finding out what it was worth in the market
overt, as a chattel actually passing from owner to owner, with
the full right to use it for any purpose; and not its value
under peculiar circumstances and narrow conditions, to wit,
in a given building, from which jt can only be removed (at the
price stated) for the single purpose of exportation.
Either in this country or Canada our alcohol can only be
sold and delivered to the consumer after payment of the internal-revenue tax or import duty; which therefore becomes
a pa'r t of the article itself. Jones v. Van B(!nthuysen, 103 U.

s.,s7.

Adding this element of value, as I think it should be added,
and the alcohol becomes the component of chief value in this
varnish, which therefore I conclude to be dutiable under
the clause of ScheduleD as a compound of distilled spirits.
This opinion has been delayed that the importer's counsel
might be heard.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MA.cVEAGH.

Bon.

WM. WINDOM,

Secretary of the Treasury.

..
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IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Under the authority of an act of Congress (river and harbor act of
March 3, 1881) making an appropriation for "improving James River,
Virginia," it was proposed to place wing-dams in the river near Varina,
Va., at which point the river is a tidal water. The riparian owner forbade the construction of the dams in front of his land above the line of
low water: Advised that the United States, with a view to the improvement of navigation, have a right to place a wing-dam in the river in
front of the land referred to without the owner's consent, and that
such right extends even to the limit of high water-i.
the line of the
water at ordinary high tide.

e.,

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 1, 1881.
SIR: Yours of the 21st of April last calls my attention to
a communication, inclosed therewith, from General Parke,
Acting Chief of Engineers, by which it appears that the
owner of land bordering on James River, near Varina, in the
State of Virginia, has forbidden the. construction of wingdams in that river in front of his property (for which work
provision is made in the river and harbor act of March 3,
1881, by an appropriation for "improving James River, Virginia") above the line of low water, and at the suggestion
of that officer you request my opinion upon the following
questions:
(1) Whether the United States have a right to place a
wing-dam in the river in front of the land referred to without the owner's consent.
(2) Whether the United States have a right to place wingdams or jetties in the James River, even to the limit of highwater mark, having in view the improvement of the navigation of the river, as provided for by Congress.
TheRe questions are similar in character to those which
were considered by my predecessor in two opinions addressed to the Secretary of War, dated .A.pril27 and June28,
1880 (16 Opin., 479, 534), and appear to be governed by the
same principles of law which were there applied, namely,
that under the authority given by the Conr;titution to regulate
commerce among the several States Congress has the right
to regulate navigation, and to that end bas power to make im-
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provements in the beds of navigable ri,ers of the United
States: to divert the water from one channel ·t o another, and
to plant or remove obstructions therein at its will, and that
the title of an individual proprietor to any part of the bed of
a navigable river of the UnitfHl States is subject to the right
of Congress thus to regulate, control, and divert the :flow of
the water therein in the interests of navigation. ' These.
principles are fully recognized by the Supreme Court in the
case of South Carolina v. Georgia. (93 U.S., 4.)
. The James River, at the point where it is proposed to
place the wing-dams, is a tidal water; and I presume that
the "limit of high-water mark" mentioned in the second
question above refers to the line of the water at ordinary
high tide. The space between that line and the water's edge
at low tide, commonly called beach or shore, is properly a
part of the alveus or bed of the river, which is defined as including- the space between the banks subjacent to and occupied by the river at its fullest :flow (Houck on Ri_v ers, sec.
9.) It would seem that by the law of Virginia the right of
a riparian proprietor upon tida1 waters extends to ordinary
low-water mark (2 Minor's Inst., 20; Code ofVa., 18731 cLap.
62, sec. 2). But this right, in so far as it touches the bed of
a navigable stream, must bR deemed to be subject to the
public right of naYig·ation, and to the right of the Government to use such bed in erecting works for the improvement
of the navigation of the stream. For this purpose the stream
and the bed thereof are the public property of the nation,
and subject to all the requisite legislation of Congress. (Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 725.)
Upon the foregoing considerations I answer botb the above
questions affirmatively.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,

Secretary of War.
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HAMILTON-BROOKS CIGAR STAMP.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may adopt the device known as the HunterBrooks cigar stamp, and prescribe regulations for its use, cancellation,
and destruction, in accordance with the design of its inventor, if
· deemed expedient.
Any failure to use, cancel, and destroy sueh stamp, as directed by such
regulations, would make the party chargeable with the failure amenable to the penalties existing March 1, 1879, as to the stamps then in
use.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 2, 1881.
SIR: Yours of 20th ultimo requests a reconsideration, upon
its restatement, of the question submitted to my immediate
predecessor (16 Opin., 443) relative to the right of the Commissioner of Internal Re\enue to adopt the de,ice known as
"The Hamilton-Brooks cigar stamp," and (especially) the
amenability to punishment of any dealer who should fail to
use, cancel, and destroy the stamp (if adopted) in the manner intended by the inventor, if that method were prescribed
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The Hamilton-Brooks cigar stamp has attached to the ordinary form of stami;, as heretofore used, as many coupons as
there are cigars in the box to be stamped. The coupons are
to be folded into the box when closed by the cigar manufacturer. When opened for sale, the dealer is to df'tach a coupon for every cigar sold, so that the number of attached coupons shall always correspond with the number of cigars remaining in the box, the last coupon being detached when the
last cigar is sold.
The act of March 1, 1879, chapter 125, section 18 (20 Stats.,
351), amends Revised Statutes, section 3446r so as to read
thus: ''The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of t.he Secretary of the Treasury, may establish, and
from time to time alter or change, the form, style, character,
material, and device of any stamp, mark, or label used under
.any provision of the laws relating to internal revenue. Such
stamps shall be attached, protected, removed, canoe led, obliterated, and destroyed in such manner and by such instruments and other means as he, with the approval of the Sec-
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retary of the Treasury, may prescribe; and he is hereby authorized and empowered to make, with the apprO\'al of the
Secretary of the Treasury, all needful regulations relating
thereto; and all pains, penalties, fines, and forfeitures now provided by law relating to internal revenue stamps shall apply to
and have full force and effect in relat·ion to any and all stampswhich may or shall be so established by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue: Provided, Such stamps, or device, or instrument, or means of removal or obliteration shall entail no
additional expense upon the persons required to affix or use
the same."
The precise inquiry put by you is, ''Whether there is any
fine, penalty, or otuer punishment imposed by existing laws
upon a dealer in tobacco for willful refusal' or n~glect to detach the coupons from the stamp known as the HamiltonBrooks stamp at the time contemplated by the device, should
that device be adopted and duly prescribed by appropriate
regulations." .
The above-quoted statute certainly authorizes the adoption of this (or of any other) peculiar character of stamp, not
entailing any additional expense upon the parties using the
same; the making of all needful regulations relating thereto
which when approved and promulgated have all the force
of law (Gratiot v. U. S., 4 How., 117); especially regulations
as to the manner in which the prescribed stamp shall be
attached, protected, removed, canceled, obliterated, and destroyed. Attorney-General Devens held (ubi supra) that no
liability to punishment was incurred by a failure to remove
a coupon upon taking a cigar from a box, because Congress had fixed by section 3397 the time when the stamp
1-rescribed should be attached to the box, to wit, before its
removal from the factory, and, by Revised Statutes, section
3406, the time when it must be removed or destroyed, viz,
when the box is emptied; hence, that in determining the
manner, means, or implements of attachment, or of removal
and destruction, the Commissioner could not change the time
established by law for doing these acts. His argument
seems to be that, if the Commissioner can alter the date of
removal or destruction, he can that for affixing the stamp,
and thus hasten or delay the payment of the tax, which
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could not have been contemplated by Congress; that the
word "manner," as employed in the act of March 1, 1879,
chapter 125, section 18, could not be intended to include the
"time'' of affixing or destroying whatever stamp is used.
The provisions of law o~her than those already mentioned,
pertaining to the power of the Commissioner and the collection of revenue from cigars by stamps, are these:
Section 321, Revised Statues, gives the Commissioner
''general superintendence" over the assessment and collection of all internal-revenue duties and taxes, and charges
him with the duty of preparing and distributing "all the in. structions, regulations, directions, forms, blanks, stamps, and
other matters pertaining to the assessment and collection of
internal revenue."
Section 3395, after requiring the Commissioner to have
prepared, "for the payment of the tax upon cigar's, suitable
stamps denoting the tax thereon," provides for their distri. bution among those who are requi!ed to use them.
Section 3396. "The Commissioner of Internal-Revenue may
prescribe such regulations for the inspection of cigars, cheroots, and cigarettes, and the collection of the tax thereon,
as he may deem most effective for the prevention of frauds
in the payment of such tax."
Section 3397 denounces penalties for removing from the
place of manufacture unstamped cigars; for using false,
fraudulent, or counterfeit stamps; and for various other
offenses, including the making of a second use " or any other
fraudulent use, of any stamps intended for cigars."
Section 3406 requires that'' whenever any stamped box con
ta.i ning cigars, etc., is emptied, it shall be the duty of the
person in whose hands the same is to destroy utterly the
stamps thereon," and affixes a .penalty to the failure to do so.
Counsel for the owners of the Hamilton-Brooks stamp
called my attention to section 3424, whereby" the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to prescribe such
method for the cancellation of stamps as a substitute for or in
addition to the method prescribed in this chapter as he may
deem expedient and effectual, and he is authorized, in his
discretion, to make the application of such method imperative
272-voL xvn-8
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upon the manufacturers of proprietary article or articles included in schedule A."
I do not consider this applicable to the case in hand, beca-ase the method of cancellation prescribed" in this chapter"
relates to stamps upon bank checks and other written instruments; and the express authority conferred to extend it to
articles mentioned in schedule A (medicines, perfumery, and
playing cards) is a negative of the right to require such additional or substituted method of cancellation to be applied
to cigars and tobacco, or to distilled or fermented liquors.
Sections 34..!5 and 3446 seem to be those most pertinent to
the present inquiry. The full text of each is therefore given;
that of the former below, and that of the latter as amended
by tbe act of March 18, 1879, chapter 125, section 18, at the
commencement of this opinion.
''Section 3445. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue may
make such change in stamps, and may prescribe such instruments or other means for attaching, protecting, and canceling ~tamps for tobacco, snuff, cigars, distilled spirits, and
fermented liquors, or either of them, as he or the Secretary
of the Treasury shall approve; such instruments to be furnished by the United State~ to the persons using the stamps
to be affixed therewith, under such regulations as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may prescribe."
To meet the objection raised, that to anticipate the time
for destroying the stamps by requiring the tearing off of a
coupon to accompany each sale of a cigar would imply the
right to delay the time for purchasing and affixing the stamp
originally, two suggestions offer themselves:
First. That section 344 provides that "whenever the mode
or time of assessing or collecting any tax which is imposed
is not provided for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
may establish the same by regulation;" clearly implying what
would naturally be understood even without this clause, that
where the time is fixed by statute the Commissioner cannot
change it.
Secondly. It is the utter destruction of the stamp that is
required by section 3406 upon the box becoming empty. This
is to prevent it, or the box upon which it is placed, being
again used in fraud of the revenue. This is distinguishable
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from a partial destruction, which may be prescribed as one
method of cancellation, or as a regulation in aid of the inspection of cigars for the purpose of effecting the collection
of the tax thereon, as mentioned in section 3396, hereinbefore
quoted.
The act of March 1, 1879,' chapter 125, section 18, is the
latest expression of legislative will upon this subject. It
allows the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary
()f the Treasury, not only to adopt from time to time such different devices of stamps as to him seems good, but to cause
them to be attached, protected, removed, canceled, obliterated, and destroyed in such manner and by such instruments,
()r other means, as he, with the approval of the Secretary,
may prescribe. The destruction may be gradual and accom_p lished by repeated acts, or the immediate result of a single
act, ex.cept that it must be completed-" utterly" done-when
the box is emptied.
There is this exception, too, that the stamp is necessarily
partially destroyed when first affixed to the box. That is to
say, it then has to receive the cancellation marks prescribed
by law and the reg·ulations, and it th€n ceases to have any
value independently of the commodity to which it is attached, and of which, as an article of commerce, it then
becomes for the first time an indispensable part (Jones v.
Va,n Benthuysen, 103 U. S.~ 87). This case holds that until
stamped the tobacco may be sold (at the factory or in bond)
separately from the stamp, and, of course, the stamps may
be also sold independently of any merchandise, to be subsequently applied to the payment of the tax upon any arti-cle for which it is designed, or rather to evidence that payment,. Its value then becomes completely merged into and
an inseparable part of the value of the merchandise whose
free sale and delivery its presence alone can authorize; it
loses its separate value and transferability; this quality of it
is destroyed by its attachment to the article taxed.
Its legitimate use to indicate the payment of a tax as to
.any other article is then completely gone; but to prevent its
false andfraudttlent use for this purpose, its physical destruction must be Hutterly" accomplished when the article to
which it is attached is consumed. To insure this being done,
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it may be demanded by a properly approved regulation that.
its destruction shall proceed pari passu with that of the taxable commodity of which it has become commercially an integral part. Then, when the last cigar in a box is sold and
the last coupon removed, so far as any fraudulent second
use of the stamp is concerned (which is all this provision.
of law is designed to effect) it is "utterly" destroyed. Anything less than its entire destruction is not in law ·a cancellation, nor is it in fact, since it leaves it susceptible of a
second use. "Cancel," says Abbott's Law Dictionary, "to·
obliterate, nullify, strike out of existence," etc. "The agreement to cancel must be held to include the promise to do·
whatever should be necessary to effect the cancellation'"
(Auburn City Bank v . .Leonard, 40 Barb., 134).
It is apparent, I think, that the use of such a device as is
now presented is an effective "manner" or method of securing an utter destruction of the stamp when the time for it to
be so destroyed has arrived-of compelling the process of its
destruction to keep pace with that of the commodity to·
which it is attached. I conc1ude, therefore, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, may establish this character of
sta~p, and prescribe the manner of its cancellation and destruction, in accordance with the design of its inventor, if
deemed expedient. If legally established, and its manner of
use, cancellation, and destruction properly prescribed and
regulated, any failure to use, cancel, and destroy, as directed
by such regulations, would make the offender amenable to
those penalties existing March 1, 1879, as to the stamps then
in use. Certainly the Commission~r could denounce no new
penalty; but those affixed by Congress to a willful neglect or
refusal to comply with the requirements of law and of existing regulations as to the stamp now established, could be extended and applied to such refusal or neglect as to the Hamilton-Brooks stamp, if a1lopted.
_T he papers and samples which accompanied your letter
are herewith returned.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WM. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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PROMOTION IN THE MARINE CORPS.
'There is no law requiring an officer of the Marine Corps, before promotion, to be examined as to his physical qualification for duty at sea.
A board of naval surgeons, constituted under section 1493, Revised Statutes, is not by law invested with authority to examine and pronounce
upon any other cases than those of officers on the active list of the
Navy.
.Semble that the examination, physical or other, of a retiring board, constituted under section 162:3, Revised Statutes, is the only one to which
an officer of the Marine Corps is by law subjected in order to determine his fitness for active duty; and unless the officer is by thi8 board
found incapacitated for active service, and the finding is approved by
the President, he remains in the line of promotion on the active list as
he previously was, and is entitled to all the rights which belong to his
position.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

•

~

June 11, 1881.
SIR : The case of Capt. George P. Houston, of the marines,
which you were pleased to refer to me on the 19th ultimo,
involves the inquiry, whether an officer of the Marine Corps
is, by the law applicable to this branch of the service, made ·
subject to examination as to his physical qualification for
duty at sea before promotion. I have now the honor to submit to you my opinion thereon.
Previous to the act of July 16, 1862, chapter 183, there was
no law which required officers in any branch of the naval
service, including the Marine Corps, to pass a physical examination as a preliminary to promotion. The fourth section
of that act directed the Secretary of the Navy to appoint an
advisory board of naval officers, whose duty it was to carefully
.scrutinize the active list ofline officers in theN avy, above and
including the grade of master, and report to the Secretary in
writing those found to be worthy of promotion. The board, in
recommending an officer for promotion, was to certify that he
"has the moral, mental, physical, and professional qualifications to perform efficiently all his duties, both at sea and on
shore, of the grade to which he is to be promoted." By the
sixth section of the same act a similar advisory board was to
be appointed at least once in every four years. These provisions, which applied solely to line officers of the Navy, were
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superseued by other provisions on the same subject contained
in the act of April21, 1864, chapter 63. The latter provisions
are embodied in section 1493 et seq. of the Revised Statutes ..
They include both line and stafl' officers, but in terms extend
to those only who are ''on the active list of the Navy." I am
unable to find any statutory provision of this character which
expressly or impliedly includes officers of the Marine Corps.
Section 1493, Revised Statutes, forbids the promotion of au
officer to a higher grade on ~aid list (with the exception
therein mentioned) "until he has been examined by a board
of naval surgeons and pronounced physically qualified toperform all his duties at sea." It is clear, from the language
of this section, that the cases which a board of naval surgeons constituted thereunder is authorized to examine and
pronounce upon are cases of officers in the line of promotion
on the active list of the Navy exclusively, unless the authority
of the board is enlarged by virtue o- some other statutory
provision. The only other provision deemed necessary t(}
notice in this connection is that contained in section 1o21,
Revised Statutes, which declares that '"the Marine Corps
· shall at all times be subject to the laws and regulations established for the government of the Navy, except when detached for service with the .A.rmy by order of the President;,
and wh~ so detached they shall be subject to the rules and _
articles of war prescribed for the government of the Army."
The obvious purpose of the section just quoted is to provide
rules for the discipline of the corps in the different spheres.
of duty (military and naval) in which it is liable to serve.
When serving with the land forces, it is to be subject to the·
rules established for the government of the Army; when
serving With the Baval forces~ to the rules fol' the government
of the Navy. The language of the provision does not warrant the inference that it waill intended thereby to subject
that corps to any other laws and regulations of the Navy
than such as relate to discipline and its maintenauce. Within
this category section 1493 does not fall.
I am accordingly of opinion that a board of naval surgeons,.
constituted under section 1493, Revised Statutes~ is not, by
law, invested with authority to examine and pronounce upon
any other cases than those of officers on the active list of the-
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Navy, and furthermore, that there is no law requiring an officer of the Marine Corps, before promotion, to be examined
as to his physical quali~cation for duty at sea.
As with the Army, so with the Marine Corps, Congress
appears to have thus far regarded the provision made for
retiring officers who are incapable of performing their duties
as sufficient to insure efficiency of the service therein. By
section 1622, Revised Statutes, officers of the Marine Corps
may ''be retired in like cases, in the same manner, and with
the same relative conditions, in ~ll respects, as are pro,ided
for officers of the Army;" and section 1623 makes provision for
the appointment of a retiring board to inquire into the disabilities of officers of that corps who may be ordered to go before it. The examination of such retiring board, physical or
other, seems to be the only one to which an officer of the
corps is by law subjected, in order to determine his fitness
for active duty; and unless the officer is by this board found
incapacitated for active service, and the finding is approved
by the President (in which case he must be retired), he remains in the line of promotion on the active list as be was
before, and is entitled to all the rights which belong to his
position.
It results from the foregoing that the recent nomination
of Captain Houston for promotion, "subject to the required
examination before being commissioned" (which examination is understood to be that provided for by section 14133,
Re\ised Statutes), was irregular; that officer not being
within or subject to the requirements of the section last mentioned. It is true, instances of examinations such as that
here referred to, and perhaps of similar nominations, in the
case of marine officers, have heretofore occurred; but none,
as I learn, date farther back than the latter part of the year
1877, a period too brief to entitle them to any weight in
point of usage; and they doubtless originated in a misconception of the scope and effect of the statutory provisions
already adverted to.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH.
The PRESIDENT.
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TONNAGE DUES.
The "tax of :fifty cents per ton" imposed by section 4219, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February 27, 1877, chapter 69, is not a
penalty capable of being remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury
under sections 5292 and 5293, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 14, 1881.
SIR: Yours of 11th instant (9388, D. L.) directs my attention to Revised Statutes, section 4219, imposing tonnage
dues, the last clause of which, as amended by the act of February 27,1877, chapter 69 (19 Stats.,250), declared that'' any
vessel, any officer of which shall not be a citizen of the United
States, shall pay a tax of fifty cents per ton," and asks whether
the additional duty attaching to a vessel by reason of noncitizenship of an officer is a penalty whic1 can be remitted
by the Secretary of the Treasury under Revised Statutes,
sections 5292 and 5293'
The effect of these last-cited sections is to permit any person who has "incurred any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or
disability, or who may be interested in any vessel or merchandise which has become subject to any seizure, forfeiture,
or disability," to file his petition before the judge of the proper
district, "setting forth the circumstances of his case," and
praying that the same may be mitigated or remitted; upon
which the judge is to ascertain the facts, and report them,
annexed to the petition, to the Secretary of the Treasury, who,
in accordance with general rules by him prescribed under
section 5293, may " mitigate or remit such fine, forfeiture, or
penalty" if" the same was incurred without willful negligence
.o r intention of fraud in the person incurring the same;" and
the Secretary may "direct the prosecution, if any bas been
instituted for the recovery thereof, to cease and be discontinued," etc.
The power of remission is confined to persons who have
incurred a fine, penalty, forfeiture, or disability under specified provisions of law. None of these terms can properly be
construed to include the imposition of a discriminating tax
upon vessels having a f<?reign officer. Such a case is not one
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to .which the power of mitigat-ion could well extend, yet this
power, under section 5292, is co·extensive with that of remission, according to the discretion of the Secretary.
I conclude that the tax accruing under section 4219, as
amended, is not a penalty capable of being remitted or mitigated under sections 5292, 5293.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Bon. WM. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Tteasury.

WITHDRAWAL OF NATIONAL BANK NOTES.
Under section 4 of the act of June 20, 1874, chapter 343, a national banking association, desiring to withdraw its circulating notes and take
up the bonds deposited with the United States Treasurer as security
therefor, may do so by depositing with the Treasurer the required
amount in lawful money, whether this consists of coin or of legaltender notes.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
June 14, 1881.
SIR: Yours of the 6th instant desires my opinion "as to
whether, under the provisions of section 4, act of June 20,
187 4, national banks desiring to withdraw circulating notes
.are required to deposit legal-tender notes with the '11reasurer
-of the United States before the surrender by him of United
States bonds held to secure said circulating notes~"
The act of J nne 20, 187 4, chapter 343, section 4, reads :
" SEc. 4. That any association organized under this act, or
.a ny of the acts of which this is an amendment, desiring to
withdraw its circulating notes, in whole or in part, may, upon
the deposit of lawful money with the Treasurer of the United
States in sums of not less than nine thousand dollars, take
up the bonds which said association has on deposit with the
Treasurer for the security of such circulating notes; which
bonds shall be assigned to the bank in the manner specified
in the nineteenth section of the national bank act; and the
OF
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outstanding notes of said association to an amount equal to
the legal-tender notes deposited shall be redeemed at the
Treasury of the United States, and destroyed as now provided by law." (18 Stats., 124.)
From the papers accompanying your letter I learn that the
query .suggested arises from the fact that, while the first.
clause of section 4, as above quoted, permits the withdrawal
of bank notes upon the deposit of lawjul 'money, the concluding one authorizes the redemption and destruction of such
notes only "to an amount equal to the legal-tender notes deposited;" and that while the United States Treasurer considers his authority to surrender and assign bonds, as well as.
to redeem and destroy bank notes, to be thus limited "to an
amount equal to the legal-tender notes deposited," the Comptroller of the Currency, on the contrary, holds that the banks
may withdraw their bonds upon a deposit of anything that
is ''lawful money to the requibite amount."
The latter appears to me to be the correct view, even if
the result should be that the Treasurer's power to redeem
circulation would be more limited than that of the banks to
withdrf,tw their bonds.
The language of this section is almost too unambiguous
for construction. It expressly confers upon these banking
associations the right to deposit sums of not less than $9,000
in lawful money and take up the bonds deposited as security
for circulating notes. That these words, as here used, possess
their ordinary signification, is apparent from the phraseology
of concomitant and other provisions of law, and from considerations touching the general subject. The first of the
latter to suggest itself is the purpose for which the bonds
are originally deposited with the Treasurer of the United
States. As observed by my predecessor (16 Opin., 666), this
purpose is to secure the bill-holders; to insure performance
by the bank of its promise to redeem its issues in lawful
money; i.e., in coin or legal-tender bills of the United States.
This purpose is accomplished, if the bank desires to take up
its bonds, equally by depositing coin or legal-tender notes,.
which are now equivalent to coin.
Such is the requirement in case any association wishes to.
take up all its bonds and withdraw from business. Revised
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Statutes, section 5222, says that'' within six months from the
date of the vote to go into liquidation the association shall
deposit with the Treasurer of the United States lawful
money of the United States sufficient to redeem all its outstanding circulation." What is "lawful money" is stated in
Revised Statutes, sections 3585, 3586, amended by act of February 28, 1878, chapter 20, and Rev. Stat., sees. 3588, 3589.
Revised Statutes, section 5224, provides that "whenevera.
sufficient .deposit of lawful money to redeem the outstanding
circulation of an association proposing to close its business
has been made, the bonds deposited by the association tosecure payment of its notes shall be reassigned to it."
Section 5226 permits notes which any such ' institution
"fails to redeem in. the lawful money of the United States"
to be 'protested. Under the next section (5227) a special
agent is "to ascertain whether it has refused to pay its circulating notes in the lawful money of the United States when
demanded; " and if he reports such to be the case, its bonds
are forfeited to the United States, and it is prohibited (by
section 5228) from continuing business.
Thereupon, under section 5229, the Comptroller of the
Currency is to notify '" the holders of the circulating notes
of such association to present them for payment at the
Treasury of the United States, and the same shall be paid
as presented in lawful money of the United States."
Of like purport are the other sections of the act of June
20, 1874, chapter 343, of which the fourth section is under
consideration. Section 7 requires the Comptroller of the
Currency to make requisitions upon certain of these banks
to withdraw and return a stated portion of their circulation,
"or, in lieu thereof, to deposit in the Treasury of the United
States lawful money sufficient to redeem such circulation,
and upon the return of the circulation required, or th~
deposit of lauful money," a proportionate amount of their
bonds is to be restored to them ( 18 Stats., 124 ). The following section ( 8) authorizes a sale of the bonds, upon failure to return circulation or deposit lawful money, as required
under the preceding section.
I can come to no other conclusion than that a deposit of
lawful money to the amount mentioned in the act will au-
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thorize the banking association making the deposit to receive
a proportionate amount of its bonds, although the lawful
money so deposited be coin instead of legal-tender notes.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE 1\fAcVEAGH.
Hon. WM. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.
DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY.
Where B., not holding any office under the United States requiring him
to give bond, was appointed an agent to disburse funds appropriated
to build the custom-house and post-office building in the city of Philadelphia, Pa.: Held that, in view of the provisions of sections 3657, 3658,
and 255, Revised Statutes, the appointment of B. was improvidently
made; that he was not lawfully empowered to receive or disburse the
public funds placed in his hands; and that, under existing legislation,
he is not entitled to any compensation for his services as such disbursing agent.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 15, 1881.
SIR : Before I could reply satisfactorily to yours of the 21st
ultimo, relating to the commission to be allowed to Hon. H.
H. Bingham, as disbursing agent of the sums appropriated
to build the custom-house and post-office building at Philadelphia, it became necessary for me to know whether or not
(.May 9, 1873) he held any office under the United States requiring him to give bond. Accordingly I addressed you upon
this subject on the 29th ultimo, and learn from yours of the
6th instant that he held no such office; nor were you able to
direct me to any law, nor can I find any, authorizing the
appointment conferred upon him.
In the margin of the several sections of the Revised Statutes, to which I refer as pertinent to the present inquiry, will
be found noted the earlier statutes in force 1\'Iay 9, 1873, upon
which each such section is based. As the revision adopts
substantially the language of the earlier acts reproduced, I
refer to its sections in this letter, because more readily and
eonveniently consulted, though I have carefully examined
the original statutes.
Revised Statutes, section 3657, requires collectors of customs" toact as disbursing agents for the payment of all mon-
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eys that are or may hereafter be appropriated for the construction of custom-houses," etc., "with such compensation,
not exceeding one-quarter of one per centum, as the Secretary
of the Treasury may deem equitable and just."
''SEC. 3658. Where there is no collector at the place of loca·
tion of any public work specified in the preceding section,
the Secretary of the Treasury may appoint a disbursing
agent for the payment of all moneys appropriated for the construction of any such public work, with such compensation
as he may deem equitable and just."
There was a collector at Philadelphia, so this section can
not apply to the present case.
"SEC. 255. The Secretary of the Treasury may designate
any officer of the United States, who has given bonds for the
faithful performance of his duties, to be disbursing agent for
the payment of all moneys appropriated for the construction
of public buildings authorized by law within the district of
such officer."
Mr. Bingham does not come within the terms of either of
these provisions. I can find no other. I therefore conclude
that his appointment was improvidently mad~; that he was
not entitled to receive or disburse the public funds which
were placed in his hands without warrant of law, to the custody of which another person was entitled by law; and that,
under existing legislation, he is not entitled to any ~ompen
sation for his services as such disbursing agt:'nt.
I regret being constrained to announce this conclusion,
since I ha\e no doubt the appointment was made and accepted in good faith, without knowledge that the expiration
of Mr. Bingham's term as postmaster affected his eligibility,
and that he has well and faithfully performed the duty of receiving and disbursing the funds applied to the construction
of the public building at Philadelphia while he acted as agent
for that purpose. But the law is so clear, that I can give no
different opinion, leaving it to Congress, if it sees fit, to relieve from any hardship which a rigid adherence to the statutes may impose under the facts of this particular case.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WM. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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CIVIL ENGINEERS IN THE NAVY.
Civil engineers in the naval service are officers in the Navy, possessing
defined relative rank with other naval officers.
They may be retired from active - service and placed on the retired list
under the statutory provisions (see sees. 1443 et seq., Rev. Stat.) regulating the retirement of officers in the Navy.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 17, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th of April last, inclosing a com·
munication from B. F. Chandler and others, civil engineers
in the Navy, requests my opinion upon the following questions:
"(1) Are civil engineers of the Navy officers in the Navy
·Or civil officers connected with the Navy~''
" (2) If it be held that ciYil engineers are officers in the
Navy, are they entitled to be retired from active duty and
placed on the retired list under the provisions of law regulating the retirement of officers of the Navy~"
In submitting these questions you state that prior to the
.act of March 2, 1867, civil engineers were appointed by the
Secretary of the Navy, and that since then, under authority
of that act (sec. 1413, Rev. Stat.), they have been commissioned by the President, by and with the ad vice and consent
of the Senate; that they were appropriated for as part of the
civil establishment at the several navy-yards and stations
under the control of the Bureau of Yards and Docks until
1870, when their pay was regulated by the third section of
the act of July 15 of that year (sec. 1556, Rev. Stat.), fixing
the annual pay of officers of the Navy on the active list, and
that appropriations for their pay have been made since 1870
under the head of" Pay of the Navy."
You further state that the authority of the President, under
the act of March 3,1871, chapter 117 (sec. 1478, Rev. Stat.),
''to determine and fix the relative rank of civil engineers,"
was not exercised until the 24th of February last, when their
rank was by him fixed as follows: One with the relative raHk
of captain, two with the relative rank of commander, three
with the relative rank of lieutenant·commander, and four

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

127

Civil Engineers in the Navy.

with the relative rank of lieutenant, which action was promulgated by a general order issued by the Secretary of the
Navy on that day.
The appointment of civil engineers is now regulated by sectiqn 1413, Revised Statutes, which provides that "The Presi·dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, may
.appoint a civil engineer and a naval storekeeper at each of
.t he navy-yards where such officers may be necessary."
Referring to this provision, Attorney-General Devens, in
an opinion dated November 18, 1878 (16 Opin., 203), remarks
that it ''indicates that the appointment is to some extent a
local one, and that the appointee can not be a naval officer in
the full sense of the term." However, on examining section
1480, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February
·27, 1877, chapter 69, I find that civil engineers there appear
to be distinctly recognized by Congress as one of the '' staff
,c orps of the Navy." Thus that section, as amended, declares
that "the grades established in the six preceding sections
for the staff corps of the Navy shall be filled," etc. One of
the "six preceding sections" is section 1478, which provides
for fixing the relative rank of civil engineers. These offi·cers are plainly included among those contemplated by the
amended section 1480 as belonging to the ''staff corps of
the Navy." Viewing, then, this legislation in connection
with that to which ~'OU refer, I am led to the conclusion that
the civil engineers in the naval service must be regarded
.as a staff corps of the Navy; that t'iley ar~ Hofficers in the
Navy," possessing (under the recent order made pursuant to
section 1478, cited above) defined relative rank as such with
other officers in the Navy, and are not merely "civil officers
.connected with the Navy."
The next inquiry is, Are they within the law providing for
the retirement of naval officers from active service~
Originally, under the act of February 28, 1855, chapter 127
.and its supplements, only line officers of the Navy were
authorized to be retired, that is to say, placed on a list called
in that act "the reserved list." By the act of February 21,
1861, chapter 49, authority was given the President to retire
medical officers of the Navy found permanently incapable
<Of further service at sea. The act of August 3, 1861, cha-
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pter 42, made other and more enlarged provision for the retirement of both line and staff officers, which superseded the
previous provisions on the subject; and additional provision was made by the act of December 21,1861, by which any
naval officer in the service, after he "shall have been borne
on the Naval Register forty-five years, or shall be of the ageof sixty-two years," was to be retired. The two last-mentioned acts, as it would seem, were construed to extend generally to the line and staff officers, including among the latter
chaplains, professors of mathematics, and naval constructors.
The law at present in force is contained in section 1443 et
seq., in chapter 3, title 15, Revised Statutes. The language of
that and the following section-" any officer of the Navy,"
" any officer below the rank of vice-admiral "-em braces by
its generality officers in the several staff corps of the Navy
as well as officers in the line. So, likewise, the words "any
officer," in section 1448. The provisions of these sections
(it is deemed unnecessary to particularize others) are not less
comprehensive than those which were previously in force. If
civil engineers constitute, as I think they do, a staff corps
of the Navy, these officers fully come within the terms and
scope of this legislation. I am accordingly of opinion that
they may be retired thereunder from active service and placed
on the retired list of the Navy.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE 1\fAcVEAGH.
Hon. WM. H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.
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AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE LANDS.
Under the act of June 2, 1862, chapter 130 (donating public lands to establish agricultural colleges), the State of Kausas became entitled to a
certain quantity (90,000 acres) of public lands lying within her borders subject to private entry at the minimum price of $1.25 an acre;
and by the same act it was declared that if such lands.are selected from
those which hav.e been raised to double minimum in consequence of
railroad grants, they shall be computed at the maximum price and the
number of acres diminished proportionately. Subsequently the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the provisions oftbe railroad land-grant
act of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, made a withdrawal of lands for 15
mile-s on each side of the general route (as designated) of a certain
railroad within the scope of the act, part of which lands (the evennumbered sections) were afterwards restored to market and raised to
double minimum lands, in accordance with the act of March 3, 1853,
chapter 143. Thereafter, iu September, 1865, 7,682.92 acres of these
double-minimum lands at $2.50 an acre were certified to and accepted
by the State of Kansas, in lieu of 15,::!65.84 acres at the minimum
price of$1.25 an acre, which last completed the quantity to which the
State was originally entitled: Held that the claim of the State under
the said act of July 2, 1862, is fully satisfied, and that it is not entitled
to a further allowance thereunder (as claimed) of 7,682.92 acres.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 17, 1881.
SIR: Upon the 7th instant the Acting Secretary of the Interior asked my opinion whether the State of Kansas has
now the right to select 7,682.92 acres to make ~lp the full quantity of lancl granted to her by the act of July 2, 1862, chapter 130 (donating public lands to establish agricultural colleges), or whether she had already received it, upon the state
of facts and legislation mentioned substantially as follows:
Under the method of apportionment established by that
act (12 Stats., 503) Kansas became entitled to 90,000 acres, in
sections or subdivisions of not less than a quarter section, of
land lying within her borders subject to private entry at the
minimum price of $1.25 an acre. The fifth section stated the
conditions of the grant, among which is the following:
"Fifth. When lands shall be selected from those which
have been raised to double the minimum price, in consequence
of railroad grants, they shall be computed to the States at the
272-VOL XVII--9
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maximum price and the number of acr~s proportionally diminished." (12 Stats., 505, sec. 5, item fifth.)
Thus while the original basis of apportionment is of minimum lands, distributed among the States according to Senatorial and Congressional representation, every State is given
the option of selecting, in lieu of these minimum lands, onehalf as many acres of maximum lands, for the whole or any
portion of her grant. In locating her grant Kansas is assumed at the Lanu Office to ha,·e selected 7,682.92 acres of
maximum lands, charged to her as .e quivalent to 15,365.84 of
the 90,000 acres of minimum lands accruing to her under this
act. The correctness of this assumption is the point in controversy.
On the day before the approval of the principal statute to be
construed, the act of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, was approved,
granting (inter alia) to the corporation of which the Kansas
Pacific Railway Company is now the legitimate successor
and representativ~ the odd-nurn bered sections within 10 miles
on each side of the road it was to build "not sold, reserved,
or otherwise disposed of by the United States, and to which
a .pre-emption or homestead claim may not have attached at
the time the line of said road is definitely fixed." ( 12 Stats., 492,
sec. 3 ; 494, sec. 9.)
By the seventh section of this act, the Union Pacific Railroad Company was required to file an assent to its provision8
with the Secretary of the Interior within one year; and "within two years after the passage of this act said company shall
designate the general route of said road, as near as may be,
and file a map of the same in the Department of the Interior,
whereupon the Secretary of the Interior shall cause the lands
within ,fifteen m-iles of the said designated route or routes to be
withdrawnfrorn pre-ernption, private entry, or sale; and when
any portion of said road shall be finally located, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause the said lands hereinbefore
granted to be surveyed and set ofl', as fast as may be necessary, for the purposes herein named." (12 Stats., 473, sec. 7.)
By the ninth section, the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company-the first predecessor in title of the
present Kansas Pacific Railway Company-was authorized to
construct a railroad between specified points " upon the same
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terms and conditions in all respects as are provided in this
.act for the construction of the railroad and the telegraph line
first mentioned," with the further condition that "the route
in Kansas west of the meridian of Fort Riley to the aforesaid point on the one-hundreth meridian of longitude i,.s to
be subject to the approval of the President of the United
States, and to be determined by him on actual survey." (12
Stats., 493, 494, sec. 9.)
Between the 1st and 17th days of July, 1862, the railroad
company filed in the Interior Department a map of its contemplated route, and thereupon, on the last-named day, the
Secretary of the Interior caused all the public lands (regardless of whether the sections were odd or even numbered)
within 15 miles of said designated route to be withdrawn
from preemption, private entry, and sale, conformably to the
requirements of the seventh section of said act, as then interpreted by him.
But in the following September he approved the action of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office in restoring to
market, as double-minimum lands, the even-numbered sections
within said limits; and thereafter wards these sections were,
fro&. ti'me to time, as they were sought after, pre-empted,
-entered, and sold as double-minimum lands.
Upon the 16th day of September, 1865, the 7,682.92 acres
in question, made tip of even-numbered sections within the
15 miles limit of said railroad, were certified to and accepted
by the State of Kansas as double minimum lands, at $2.50
an acre, and in lieu of 15,365.84 acres at the minimum price
of $1.25 an acre.
Assuming to do so by virtue of the first section of the act
of July 3, 1866, chapter 159 (14 Stats., 79), the railroad company in that year changed the western portion of its line so
as to run up the Smoky Hill Fork instead of the Republican
Fork of the Kansas River; but these 7,682.92 acres were within
15 miles of the later as well as of the earlier location.
The State now contends that no lands should have been
withdrawn from market until the line of the railroad was established by visible marks upon the face of the earth; that
until this was done, the sections selected and certified to her
were all in the market at $1.25 an acre, so that only the
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quantity (7,682.92 acres,) actually certified on the 16th day
of September, 1865, ins,ead of twice that number of acres,
should have been deducted from the balance of the 90,000
acres then due her, leaving her still entitled to another
7,682.92 acres.
The rulings of earlier Land Commissioners and the decisions
of the Supreme Court, to which my attention was invited by
the elaborate printed brief, as well as by the oral argument
of counsel for the State, haye no decisive effect upon the
question now to be determined, because those rulings were
under statutes of different phraseology from that employed
in the railroad act of July 1, 1862 ; or else, like all of the
judicial decisions cited, relate entirely to the determination
of the question when the title to the odd-numbered sections.
granted vested in the grantee (12 U. S., 733, and 97 U. S.,.
491).
.
The opinion in this last case notices that an act like that
of July 1, 1862, chap. 120, operates both as a law and as a .
conveyance. As a law it bestows a present interest, though
as a conveyance it can not vest title in the grantee to any
particular section until by actual designation of the rail way
line it is shown that such section falls within the prescribed
limit of distance.
Upon the designation within two years from July 1, 1862,
of the general route of the road and the filing of a map of
the same, the Secretary of the Interior was bound to cause
to be withdrawn from pre-emption, private entry, and sale
the land within 15 miles of said designated route. It was.
the exclusive right of the functionary upon whom that duty
rested to determine when the contingency had arisen which
demanded its performance (Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19) ;.
and it is of no consequence whether any map can now be
found in the Department certified by him or otherwise authenticated, since no such authentication is required by tLe
statute. The Secretary's ordt>r of withdrawal communicated
July 17, 1862, through the Land Commissioner, the ordinary
and proper medium, is sufficient evidence of the due performance of all requisite preliminaries.
Whatever may have been the rulings or decisions under
other statutes, the seventh section of the act of July 1, 1862,
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chap. 120 (12 Stats., 493), made it imperative upon the Secretary to withdraw from private entry the lands within the
stated distance immediately upon the designation of the
general route and the filing of the map, although such lands
were to be surveyed and set ofl' only as each portion of the
route was finally located, which may be considered e·quivalent
to the other term "definitely fixed." No language could
more clearly show that the withdrawal from private entry of
the odd-numbered sections was to precede the final location
of the road.
By the act of March 3, 1853, chap. 143 (10 Stats., 244), it
was enacted, ''That the pre-emption laws of the United
States, as they now exist, be, and they are hereby, extended
over the alternate reserved sections of public lands along the
lines of all the railroads in the United States wherever pub·
lic lands have been or may be granted by acts of Congress
• • • and provided further that the price to be paid
shall in all cas~s be two dollars and fifty cents per acre,"
etc.
When the odd-numbered sections, for a distance of 15
miles each side of a given line, are withdrawn as granted to
aid a railroad to be built upon the so designated route, the
even-numbered sections should immediately be raised in
price to $2.50 an acre, as being '' the alternate reserved sections" along the line of such road, within the meaning of the
act of March 3, 1853, chap. 143; and when Kansas has selected lands accurately described in the fifth conditional
clause of the fifth section of the donating statute as "those
which have been raised to double the minimum price in consequence of railroad grants," she can not properly complain
that they are computed to her as there directed, ''at the
maximum price, and the number of acres p:..·oportionately
diminished." (12 Stats., 505.)·
She has now no further claim to lands under this act of
July 2, 1862, chap. 130.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
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INTRUDERS ON LANDS OF THE CHOCTAWS AND CHICKASAWS.
The Interior Department has power to remove intruders from lands of
the Choctaws and Chickasaws in the Indian Territory, and it is its duty
to do so under the provisions of the treaty of June 22, 1855 (11 Stats. ,
612-613.)
All persons (other than Choctaws or Chickasaws by birth or adoption)
not comprised within some one of the excepted classes described in art.icle 7 of that treaty, or article 43 of the treaty of April 28, 1866 (14Stats., 779), are intruders.
The permit laws of the Choctaws and Chickasaws are valid; and those
persons who are permitted thereunder to reside within their terr£tory,
or to be employed by their citizens as teachers, mechanics, or skilled
agriculturists, may enter and rf3main on the lands of these tribes;
but the right to remain there ceases when the permit expires.
Teachers, mechanics, and skilled agriculturists, not in the employ of
the Government, and who are on such lands without permits from the
Indian authorities, are intruders, and should be removed therefrom.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 25, 1881.
SIR: Upon the 22d instant you presented for my consider-

ation the following questions:
"First. Has the Department of the Interior the power, and
is it its duty, to remove from the lands of the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Indians in the Indian Territory all intruders~
''Second. In view of article 13, treaty of October 18, 1820,.
(7 Stats., 213), articles 7 and 14, treaty of June 22, 1855 (11
Stats., 612, 613, 614), articles 38 and 43, treaty of April 28,.
1866 (14 Stats., 779), and the laws of the United States relating to the subject, who are to be deemed intruders~
''Third. Are theChoctawandChickasawpermitlaws valid t
''Fourth. What whit.es, other than officers, agents, and employes of the Government and of any internal improvement
company, and persons traveling through or temporarily sojourning in the said nations, are privileged to enter and remain on the said Indian lands ~
" Fifth. Is this Department bound to remove teachers,
mechanics, and skilled agriculturists, not in the employ oi
the United States, who are on the lands of said Indians without permits from the Indian authorities~"
(1) Your first question I answer affirmatively.
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The seventh section of the treaty of June 22, 1855 (11 Stats.,
613-613), stipulates that intruders shall be removed from and
kept out of the Territory by the United States agent (a subordinate of the Interior Department), assisted, if necessary,
by the military. See also article 14 of the same treaty. (Id.,
614, bottom.)
While article 43 of the trP.aty of April 28, 1866 (14 Stats.,
779), defined anew the meaning of the word " intruders," the
forty-fifth section (ib.) preserves to the Indians, as towards
those coming within the existing definitions, ''all the rights,
privileges and immunities heretofore possessed by said nations
or individuals, or to which they were entitled under the treaties and legislation heretofore made and had," which are " declared to be in full force, so far as they are consistent with
the provisions of this treaty." (Id., 779, 780.)
The method of removal provided in the earlier treaty is
strictly in harmony with the provisions of the later. It may
be observed that, on the contrary, article 21 of the treaty
of June 22, 1855 (Statutes 615), expressly declares that it
supersedes all prior negotiations, so that ofOctober 18, 1820,
will not come directly under consideration in answering your
inquiries.
(2) All persons (other than Choctaws or Chickasaws, by
birth or adoption) not comprised within some one of the excepted classes, described in article 7 of the treaty of June
22, 1855 (11 Statutes, 612, 61:-1), or article 43 of the treaty
of April 28, 1866 (14 Statutes, 779), are intruders. Those
excepted are: (1) the employes of the Government and their
families and servants; (2) employes of any internal improvement company; (3) travelers or temporary sojourners; (4)
those holding permits from one of these Indian tribes toreside within their limits, or white persons who (under their
laws) are employed as "teachers, mechanics, or skilled in
agriculture."
Everybody else is an intruder, to be removed as aforesaid.
(3) The permit laws of the Choctaws and Chickasaws are
valid, While the last treaty, artiele 43, is not to be construed .:30 as'' to prevent the employment, temporarily, of white
persons who are teachers, mechanics, or skilled in agriculture," it does not compel their engagement, "nor prevent
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the legislative authorities of the respective nations" from
legislating upon the subject by imposing such terms and conditions upon the employment of whites by their own subjects
as to them seemed good.
The validity of such permits is recognized by the concluding clause of article 7 of the treaty of June 22, 1855 ( l1
Statutes, 613), which is not inconsistent with the terms of
the later treaty.
(4) Replying to your fourth question: it seems from what
bas been already said that, besides those persons or classes
mentioned by you, only those who have been permitted by
the Choctaws or Chicasaws to reside within their limits, or
to be employed by their citizens as teachers, mechanics, or
skilled agriculturists, have a right to enter and remain on
the lands of these tribes; and the right to remain is gone
when the permit has expired.
(5) It is a further corollary, from what has been premised,
that a white person, whose employment by Choctaws or
Chicasaws as a teacher, mechanic, or skilled agriculturist
has not been sanctioned by the legislative authorities of the
respective nations, bas no more right to remain in the Territory without a permit than has a person of a different vocation; consequently, such an one would be an intruder to be
removed in the same manner and by the same means that all
are who· fall into this category.
I am with great respect, your obedient servant,

WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. S. J.

KIRKWOOD,

Secretary of the Interior.
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SOUTH PASS OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
Upon consideration of the statutes relating to the improvement of the
South Pass of the Mississippi: Held (1) that a navigable depth of 26
feet is thereby required to be maintained through the shoal at the
head of the Pass; (2) that a navigable depth of 26 feet is required to
be maintained through the Pass itself; (:~) that, in view of the facts
set forth by the engineer officer charged with the duty of ascertaining
the depth of the channel at these points from time to time, Captain
Eads is lawfully entitled to payment for maintenance of the required
depth there during the quarter ending May 9, 18~:31.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 27, 1881.
SIR : In reply to yours of the 23d of May relating to the
South Pass of the Mississippi, I submit the following opinion:
All questions betwixt the United States and Captain
Eads, in respect to the securing of the depth of water stipulated for under his contract, having happily ended, such as
may arise in future will probably concern only the maintenance for a specified period of what has thus lJeen secured .
.Such in general is the matter under consideration.
Heferring to the statutes upon the subject and certain
inclosed papers containing the measurements by Captain
Heuer, U.S. Army, of the depth of water through the South
Pass and the channel external thereto for the quarter ending May 9, 1881, and an indorsement thereupon by General
Wright, Chief of Engineers, etc., you ask whether it is required(1) That a navigable depth of 26 feet be maintained
through the shoal at the head of the Pass.
(2) That a navigable depth of 26 feet be maintained
through the Pass itself.
(3) In view of the facts set forth on the certified. statement herewith, is Captain Eads lawfully entitled to payment for maintenance during the quarter ended May 9,
1881~

The certificate of Captain Heuer is, " that between the
dates of February 10, 1881, and March 23, 1881, both dates
inclusive, a channel having a navigable· depth of 26 feet
was maintained through the Pass itself, but from March 24,
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188 L, to May 9, 1881, such navigable depth did not exist in
the Pass at a point about 1~ miles below Head of Passes
light-house, when depths are reduced to a plane indicated
by a reading of 1.8 feet on gauge at Head of Passes lighthouse; considering the stage of the river during this latter
period the actual depth would be 1. 7 feet more at high tide 1
1.2 feet more at low tide, and 1.5 feet more at mean tide than
when reduced to the plane above referred to.
If a plane of reference in conformity with the opinion by
Special Orders 229, Headquarters .Acting Adjutant-General's
Office, November 2, 1876, be used, that is, if the measure of
depths be from the level of average tides •occurring during
the stage of the river when the volume is least, then the
depth would be 0.6 feet more than if reduced to a plane indicated by a reading of 1.8 feet on gauge.
'.Fbe following are therefore the results, according to the
above statements, viz:
First. In the first case, that is, when depths are reduced
to a plane indicated by 1.8 feet on gauge, the distance over
which "a navigable depth of 26 feet" did not exist from
March .24, 1881, to May 9, 1881, was 240 feet, and the least
depth over this area was 25 feet.
Second. If the stage of river at the time the soundings.
were made be considered, then '' a navigable depth of 26·
feet" did exist throughout the quarter from February 10
to May 9, 1881, inclusive, for in this case the plane of the:
river surface at low tide was 1.2 feet above t~e plane to
which the depths were reduced (1.80 feet on gauge).
Third. If the depths are reduced to a plane which is the
mean of the high waters of the river at this place, taken
for one or more lunations, when the river is at what is
known as its low stage, then the least depth would be 25.6
feet, and the distance over which "a navigable depth of 26.
feet" did not exist· would be 240 feet.
I need not repeat the general outline of the acts of
Congress (1875, chap. 134, sees. 4, etc. ; 1B78, chap. 313, and
1879, chap. 181, sec. 9) under which the work of deepening
the South Pass of the Mississippi and the channel betwixt
that Pass and deep water in the Gulf bas been done,.
especially as they have already.formed the suhject of several
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communications betwixt the Attorney-General and Secretary
of War. It is enough to say that, in carrying out their
purpose, tlle depth of water to be obtained by Captain
Eads should be a permanent depth. Congress required that
it should be maintained by him during a probationary period
of twenty-five years after completion.
The general question now presented is how far this maintenance was to extend, both as regards distance and depth.
Conceding that the external channel was to be maintained,
Captain Eads insists that no condition as to maintenance
was imposed in regard to the Pass itself, includ~ng the bar
at its bead.
A perusal of the legislation and the transactions, by reports, etc., attending upon this improvement shows that the
principal matter desired and stipulated for was the creation
and maintenance of a channel outside of the mouths of the
Pass. It was as to this matter that anxiety was exhibited,
and conflicting opinions betwixt experts were pronounced.
This entirely overshadowed other particulars in the general
object of Congress, which undoubtedly was to provide a
suitable commercial passway betwixt the deep water
in the Mississippi River and that in the Gulf of Mexico.
The structure of the Act of Concession of 1875, as it is
called, faithfully respects this state of things: so much so,
indeed, that Captain Eads, who had borne a principal part
in the preliminary discussion and in promoting the act of
1875, came to doubt whether he was required to secure a
paRsway anywhere except outside the mouth of the Pass,
and although that doubt, after the ad verse decisions of
Attorneys-General Taft and Devens thereupon, can no longer
be entertained in this Department, it seems still to be held
speculatively, and during the discussion of the questions
now under consideration has been su,ggested as reasonable
by the learned gentleman who has so well conducted Captain
Eads's claim.
This denial, although yielded practically, so far as regards
securing the channel through the Pass, is now urged against
a claim upon behalf of the United States that such channel
shall be also maintained during the twenty years mentioned
in the statute.
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At first blush, perha·ps, it might be considered that Congress must have intended that Captain Eads should guaranty the permanence, as well of one essential part of the
line to be created as of another. T!Jis at least is what seems
to be demanded by the interests of that commerce which authorized the legi:slation.
Still it may be tllat as tlle exceptionally difficult and engrossing engineering problem concerned the outer bar alone,
and as the bar at the Head of the PaHs and any obstruction
that may arise within it were probably regarded as controllable by the ordinary resources of the Government, these
might designedly have been left to be dealt with in the same
way as ordinary obstructions in other parts of the river.
And, even if this had not been in fact concluded, and the
failure to provide for the maintenance of the whole line
of work were by mere inadvertence, still Captain Eads will
be entitled to the benefit of the omission, his contract and
its obligations being determinable, of course, only by what
appears u,ithin the four corners of the different acts : such
four corners being ascertainable, however, in the way prescribed for all statutes which confer conditional privileges
upon particular persons.
Tlle legislation in question, then, has for its general object a
single result-i.e., the securing of a transit which in its nature
was individ·ual, or, in other words, one part of' which was
useless except in connection with the others. That transit,
as conclusively defined by Congres~S, required necessarily a
final depth of 26 feet in some parts and of 30 in others. I think
that it is not unreasonable to conclude that, considering the
class of statutes to which this belongs, provisions. for the
permanence of any substantive fraction of this unit must be
taken as applying to every substantive portion not expressly
·Or by strong implication excepted. In saying this I also bear
in mmd that although it appears on the face of these statutes
that Congress meant to require Captain Eads to secure the
·u·hole line, such was its engrossment with the problem as to
the outer bar that it was with some difficulty that such meaning was to be gathered. A provision, therefore, that in
words exprm~sly applied to the overshadowing part only, where
the conte.x_t or reason of the thing does not contradict, may
well be applied to the whole.
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Again, upon the face of the legislation, Congress regarded
the water which flows through the South Pass as the principal power for securing and maintaining the channel through
the outer bar. That Pass, inclucUng its head as secured, was
to have a navigable depth of 26 feet throughout. In this
conditkn it was to be not only necessarily subsidiary to the
navigation of the outer channel, but also may be considered
as a part of the auxiliary works for maintaining that channd.
The wa,ter passing through is the power, hut the channel
through which it flows, so far as required to be secured, is a
part of the works. As the natural configuration of land may
in a general sense be included in the military" works" which
avail themselves thereof, so wl1-ere a statute requir2s of a
civil engineer that a certain pass shall be 26 feet in depth
throughout, the whole of it may be spoken of as his work,
although the larger part had that depth by nature. In the
present case, Congress having specified the depth necessary,
~tis no longer a question for speculation whether an auxiliary work cf less depth might not have accomplished the
same result upon the outer bar. It is upon this point only that
the discretion · in respect to means, etc., which was so well
intrusted to Captain Eads by Congress, was abridged, and
that probably because here the means was also itself to be
a part of the general substantive end in view.
In this connection it is necesRary to add only that in stipulating expressly for the maintenance of a particular depth
over the outer bar, Uongress bas deliberately required that
depth to continue to be the result of Captain Eads's general
works : the end must be one accomplished at all times by
certain means, for the act of 1875, section 6, provides " That
after said channel of 30 feet in depth, etc., shall have been
secured, $100,000 per annum shall be paid in equal quarterly
payments dttring each and every year that said channel, etc.,
shall have been maintained by said Eads and his associates by
the effect of said jetties and auxiliary works aforesaid in said
Pass for a period of 20 years after said depth shall have been
secured. Although later legislation bas affected some of the
details of this section, the provision underlined remains
intact.
All the works, therefore, necessary to secure the depth over
the outer bar are equally required to maintain that depth.
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I have already said that the South Pass, as defined in the
particular conformation thereof specified by Congress, is to
be reckoned as a part of those works.
As regards the depth of water to be maintained through
the South Pass-specified as a navigable depth of 26 feet-it
will be seen by an opinion of Attorney-General Devens that
the word navigable refers here to the width and practicability
otherwise of the water spoken of rather tha.n to its perpendicular measurement. The question here is as regards the
latter. This, by the statute, is to occur from quarter to
quarter. The payment at the close of any quarter is to be
defined by the state of things during such quarter. Taking,
then, the rule laid down by General Wright, on the indorsement mentioned above as being correct for the depth of a
river in general, it seems to me that when the question is as
to such depth during a specified portion of time, this latter
element must be added to Uw former._ I conclude that the
proper measurement for any quarter is "from the level of
average high tides occurring during the stage of the river
within such quarter" when the volume is least.
Upon the whole, therefore, I hope you willunderstand me
as answering each of the above questions in the affirmative.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney. General.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.
SUITS IN REVENUE CASES.
The remedy by suit against a collector, provided by section 3011, Revised
Statutes, is given to an importer only who has paid the duties to the
collector whom he proposes to make defendant in the snit; it does not
apply to cases in which, by reason of the failure of the importer to
pay the collector, the payment is sought to be enforced by suit against
the former.
There is no statute giving the Secretary of the Treasury any direct control over suits instituted for the collection of unpaid duties.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
June 29, 1881.
SIR : Yours of the 20th instant states that the Union Manufacturing Company imported on March 3, 1867, an invoice
OF
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-of wool. Entry was made in the custom-house within a few
days thereafter, and the collector assessed duties on the wool
under the act approved March 2, 1867. Protest and appeal
a,gainst such assessment were made upon the ground that
said act, although bearing the record that it was signed on
March 2, 1867, was, in fact, not signed until March 4, 186i.
The decision of the collector was affirmed.
A case 1nvolving a like point was tried in court, and it was
decided upon the testimony of Ex-President Johnson, that the
act was really not signed until March 4, 1867. A writ of error
was taken in the case to the Supreme Court, but it was sub·
sequently abandoned by the Attorney-General, and the writ
was dismissed by the court.
The Union Manufacturing Company failed to pay the additional duties due under said original liquidation, and the
matter lay until1878 without action, when a suit was brought
to enforce payment of such duties, which suit is now pending.
Upon the foregoing facts you propound these two questions:
''First, whether the said company still has the right to
pay the duties demanded and recover the amoun~ unjustly
-exacted by suit from the collector.
"Second, whether the Secretary of the Treasury has the
legal right and power to order a nonsuit in this action, or
that the suit be dismissed."
(1) The remedy by suit against a collector, provided by
Revised Statutes, section 3011, is given only to an importer
who pays the duties assessed upon his importations to the
,c ollector whom he proposes to make defendant in the suit to
recover them. It does not apply to cases in which, by reason
of a failure and refusal to pay the collector, the matter has
been transferred to a district attorney for enforcement by
process of the courts.
(2) A careful examination of the statutes fails to discover
:any provision of law giving to the Secretary of the Treasury
any direct co,ntrol over suits instituted for the collection of
unpaid duties.
Revised Statutes, section 379, places these matters in
-charge of the Solicitor of the Treasury, who is there given
"'power to instruct the district-attorneys, marshals, and clerks
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of the circuit and district courts in all matters and proceed-ings appertaining to suits in which the United States is a.
party or interested,'' as he may see cause. As matter of pru-:
dent administration, in my judgment, this discretion of the
Solicitor of the Treasury should be exercised under the supervision and with the approbation of the Secretary or the head
of the Department to which the Solicitor is attached as subordinate. The power to release alleged legal claims of the
Government upon the citizen for revenue is one to be exercised with the utmost caution, and the responsibility for such
action ought not to rest entirely upon any subordinate departmental officer.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.

Bon. WM. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.

REDEMPTION OF NATIONAL BANK NOTES.
A national banking association may, under se<!tion 3 of the act of June
20, 1874, chapter 343, deposit coin in the Treasury for the redemption
of its circulation.
The Treasury, while privileged under sections 3 a·n d 4 of that act to
redeem such circulation in United States notes, has also the right to
redeem the same circulation in coin.
/

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 30, 1881.
SIR: To your inquiry of the 6th I replied on the 14th
instant, that a national bank has the right, under the act
of June 20,1874, chapter 343, sect10n 4, to deposit coin for the
purpose of withdrawing bonds and reducing circulation;.
whereupon, on this latter date, you address to me these tw()
additional questions:
(1) Whether, under section 3 of the act approved June
20, 1874, chapter 343, a national banking association may deposit any lawful money other than United States notes for the
redemption of its circulating notes ~
(2) Whether the holders of the notes of any solvent national banking association may demand of the Treasurer of
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the United States, under the provisions of sections 3 and 4
of that act, redemption of such notes in United States notes~
First. Inasmuch as section 3 of the act of June 20, 187 4,
chapter 343, only requires that the banks "shall at all times
keep and have on deposit in the Treasury of the United
States, in the lawful money of the United States, a sum
equal to 5 per centum of its circulation, to be held and used
for the redemption of such circulation," I think for the reasons indicated in my opinion of the 14th instant, construing
similar language in the next section, that a bank may deposit
coin for the purpose mentioned in the third section, as above
quoted.
Second. I think the Treasury, while having the privilege
under section 3 and 4 of said act to redeem bank circulation in United States notes, bas the r·ight to pay them in coin.
The Government notes are promises to pay dollars; for
such promises the thing promised may properly be substituted by the promissor.
Again, this act of June 20, 1874, chapter 343, was not intended to repeal or affect the general provisions of law (Rev.
Gtat., sees. 3585 et. seq.) making the coins of the United
States a legal tender in all payments. These st1ttutes fix the
medium in which, as well as in United States notes, the
banks may redeem its circulation at its own counter; and it
gives the same privilege to the Treasurer, paying them at the
Treasury of the United States.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Bon.

WM. WINDOM,

Secretary of the Treasnry.
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HTATUS OF Ol<,FICERS AN!J ENLISTED MEN OF THE SIGNAL
CORPS.
Officers and enlisted men of the Signal Corps (other than those who are
detailed for service therein) are a part of the Army only in this sens e~
namely, that in general they are liable to such duties and entitled to
such privileges, appertaining to the Army, as can be performed and
enjoyed without severance from the Signal Service.
They belong to a special service in the Army, and are subject to military
, government; but they are not by law transferable to ordinary mili.t ary duty, and are 'organically separate and distinct from the Army
proper.
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUS~l'ICE.

July 1, 1881.
SIR: Herewith I submit a reply to yours of the 23d of
May, addressed to the Attorney-General, in regard to the
status of certain officers and privates of the Signal Corps.
After referring to a recent communication addressed to
you by the Uhief Signal Officer, recommending that Sergeants Wright and Green, of the Signal Corps, be appointed
"second lieutenants Signal Corps, U. S. Army," you a~k
for an opinion, whether(1) Officers engaged in the performance o~ duties under
sectiop.s 221 to 223 of the Revised Statutes, other than the
Chief Signal Officer and officers detailed from the Army, as
organized by chapter 1, title 14, of the Revised Statutes, are a
part of the Army of the United States¥
(2) The enlisted men engaged in the performance of the
duties under sections 221 to 223 of the Revised Statutes, not
detailed for such duties from any branch of the Army named
in section 1094 of the Revised Statutes, but having indorsed
on their enlistment papers the words "enlisted for the Signal Corps, U. S. Army," are a part of the Army of the
United States V
The conclusion which I have reached is that such officers
and enlisted men form a part of the Army of the United States,
in the sense that in general they are liable to all army duties
and entitled to all army privileges that can be performed or be
enjoyed without severing them. from the Signal Ser1-'ice. In
other words, as regards all such persons there is no such

,
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·circulation, so to say, betwixt this member of the Army and
other membe·rs thereof as exists betwixt those other members
inter se. This state of separation between persons who be ·
long to the same Army may be anomalous, but results, nevertheless, from the legislation upon the subject: legislation
which, concerning as it does a novel department of pubUe
administration, may well be expected to present novel features of detail. At all events, nothing occurs, or has been
suggested, to indicate that such details are unsuitable to the
general purposes of Congress as regards the Signal Service,
or are beyond its legislative competency. The question is
one of statutory interpretation only, and seems not difficult.
It will require a consideration only of certain brief statutes
recently enacted, beginning with the acts of 1866, as found
in sections 1195 and 1196 of the Revised Statutes.
These sections create a signal force, to consist of one chief
signal officer, having the rank of colonel of cavalry (now
brigadier-general, act of 1880, chap. 235), and of six officers
from the Corps of Engineers, and not exceeding one hundred
non-commissioned officers and privates from the Battalion of
Engineers.
By a resolution adopted February 9, 1870 (17 Sta~s., 369),
the Secretary of War was authorized and required to provide
for taking certain meteorological observations and for giving notice of the approach and force of storms. This (or it
may be some other action of Congress which has not been
brought to my attention), was in practice construed as giving
the Secretary authority to enlarge the Signal force, as above
-expressly defined ; and other d13partures perhaps were made
under orders, so that at the time of the passage of the act
of 1874 (below) the force, other than commissioned officers,
consisted, as I gather (although that point is not material
here), of about three hundred men-one hundred and fifty
of them being sergeants-who had been recruited for that
special purpose, under promise by the Secretary that they
should not be transferred to any other part of the Army.
(See papers inclosed with your communication.)
In this state of things the act of 187 4, chapter 285 (18 Stat.,
72), after providing that no money therein appropriated
should be paid for recruiting the Army beyond 25,000 en-
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listed men, added as follows : " Nothing however in this act.
shall be construed to diminish the Signal Service, which
shall be maintained as now organized under the authority
of the Secretary of War."
It seems probable that as regards enlisted men (the only
object of the above restrictive legislation, including the exception thereto) this act substituted the method adopted
by the Secretary for recruiting the Signal Service as above
in place of that specified in the act of 18o6; i. e., that it provided that thereafter there were to be no enlisted men
detailed from the Army into that service, but that special
enlistment therefor was to take the place of detail.
The policy of the act of 1874, in confining the number of
enlisted men in the Army proper to 25,000, coupled with the
exception, as above, in favor of the Signal Service, has been
kept up in all later Army appropriation acts. (See 18·
Stats., 452; 19 id., 97; 20 id., 146, and the Acts of 1880,.
chap. 81, and of February 24, 1881.)
Of these exceptions it will be necessary to quote only that
contained in the act of 1880, chapter 81, as modified by the
act of 1880, chapter 235, and the act of 1878, chapter 359, 20
Stat., 219. After inserting such modifications into its text,
the exception in the statute first cited is as follows: '' Nothing, however, in this act shall be construed to prevent
enlistments for the Signal Service, which shall hereafter be
maintained as now organized and provided by law, with a
force of enlisted men not exceeding five hundred, viz: One
hundred and fifty sergeants, thirty corporals, and three
hundred and twenty privates; and two sergeants may in
each year be appointed to be second lieutenants."
The act of February 24, 1881, is to precisely the same
effect.
(1) Upon a perusal of the above legislation it appears that
under the act of 1866 the enlisted men of the Signal Service
were merely soldiers of the United States Army under a special
detail, that was liable to be revoked at any moment. Subject to
whatever modification the promise by the Secretary that
they should not be transferred to ordinary military duty
could effect, this status continued until after the act of 1874.
Since then it has been plain that by law they can not be SO·
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transferred. But that in other respects they continue to
belong to the United States Army seems equally plain:
Exceptio probat regulam. For, to omit many details that
-concur to the same end, they continue to be enlisted. EnlistmeJ:!t is rendered necessary by all the statutes. The phrase
is, no doubt, "enlisted for the Signal Service." But this
phrase is elliptical, and suggests the question: Enlisted
into what~ Although the statutes express the purpose of
the enlistment, they lea-ve to be implied a portion of the
effect of that ceremony. (Rev. Stat., sees. 111 I, 1112, 1118,
1119; see also sees. 1608, 1610, etc). Therefore the effect ordinarily produced by enlistment is to be implied-the more so
when the history of the legislation upon this subject is considered_; so that the answer to the above question will be,
.enlisted into the United 'States Army.
The practice in enlisting men has been to the same effect.
The same general form is used by the Government for ordinary enlistments into the Army and for those into the Signal
Service; the person enlisted being required in both cases to
acknowledge in terms that thereby he becomes'' a soldier in
the Army of the United States of America."
Upon the whole, it seems that this point needs no further
elaboration.
(2) But that these enlisted men became members of only
a special service in the Army seems equally certain.
The adoption by Congress in 1874 of the Secretary's engagement not to transfer to ordinary military duty persons enlisting for Signal Service did not create a mere personal privilege, which might, as jus pro se introductum, be waived by
such persons with the consent of the Secretary. The statute
gave the consent of the United State8 to the condition required by the enlisted man, viz: that he shcmld not be transfered to ordinary military duty. And thereupon a special
statute was created which could not be gotten rid of by either
party to the enlistrrtent without the consent of the other;
the Secretary, in the mean time, not being empowered, either
impliedly or otherwise, to represent the United States in
giving that consent.
I apprehend that, in the present state of legislation, the
{)nly way in which a person enlisted for the Signal Serv-
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ice can enter the ordinary military service, is by being discharged from the former, and thereupon re-enlisting in the
latter as usual.
That the ordinary military force cannot, without furthe1~
legislation, be recruited by transferring or detailing there
into the signal force, is a proposition which, as it appear,·
to be a proper deduction from the acts themselves, so also is
strongly fortified by recalling the hiswry of the half-dozen
statutes since 1874, which contain the provisions under consideration. It will be recollected by all that the number of
the ordinary force of enlisted men in the Army (25,000) was.
the result of prolonged and heated discussions in Congress,.
turning upon objections made. by one party to any larger number subject to the ordinary duties of soldiers. The contest upon
this point did not involve men enlisted in the Signal Service.
No party seemed to suppose that the force of soldiers, in the
gener'1l sense of the word, was larger either in esse or in posse,
because of the Signal Corps. Indeed, the particular jealousy
of Congress in regard to the Army proper was so far from manifesting itself in regard to the Signal Service, that whilst the
members of the former were diminished, or bs compromise
rigidly held at a certain figure, those of the latter since 187 4
have been once and again increased nern. con., as it were. I
gather from this that Congress was of opinion that the number in the Army proper could not by mere executive action,
and without their consent, be increased beyond the 25,000,
by transfering thereto the 500 or other number of the Signal
Service. In other words, that it was the intention of Congress to create for that service a distinct orrler of soldiersi. e., of persons whom it is best for the public service to be
subject to military rules and government, but who nevertheless are organically separate from the general mass of
enlisted soldiers.
It follows that the second lieutenants spoken of in the act,
of 1880, above, do not belong to the Army proper. The enactment upon this point is in general termR; but Congress
must be taken to have had in view the creation of a higher
rank of the sarne sort as that from which the persm:t appointed;.
was to come.
If I have rightly construed this legislation in other re-
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spects, it is an alteration not so much of rank as of military quality that is required to change a Signal Service
sergeant into a second lieutenant in the Army proper. The
general scope of tlw enactment in which this clause is found
concerns the mgnal Corps, and in the absence of express
qualification to the contrary, that scope must define the
extent of any otherwise indefinite term therein found: noscitur a sociis.
Besides this observatwn, it is noticeable that at the same
time that this act was pending before Congress that body
was maturing another (1880, chap. 263, sees. 3 and 4, 20 Stat.,
150), applying 'in terms to non-commissioned officers and
second lieutenants of the .Army proper, and very much more
restricted in operation. It is hardly supposable that the
legislature intended in both cases to meet and remedy tlte
same evil. This circumstance renders more certain the above
conclusion, that the evil sought to be remedied in the eightyfirst chapter of the act of 1880, by the creation of seco11d
lieutenants, was one affecting the Signal Service alone, and
therefore that the remedy therein devised is to be restrained
in its effect to that.
Upon the whole I have to repeat, as an answer to the
questions stated by you, the qualified language first above
employed.
/
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solic,itor- General.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R .
.Approved:

WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
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PAY OF CHARLES M. BLAKE.
The amount drawn by Charles M. Blake for pay as chaplain in the Army
from May 14, 1878, to the date of his acceptance of appointment as
post chaplain, with advice and consent of the Senate (May 23, 1881),
may be charged against him and withheld from his pay thereafter
accruing.
Sernble, however, that he may be allowed the benefit of his actual service from June 21, 1878, to March 4, 1879, for longevity.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
(

July 5, 1881..
SIR: Yours of the 16th instant, addressed to the AttorneyGeneral, is as follows :
" In a letter addressed to this Department, under date
of the 9th instant, the Second Comptroller of the Treasury
states that' in consequence of · ~pecial Order No. 212, War
Department, Adjutant-General's Office, October 2,1878 (copy
inclosed), Rev. Charles M. Blake drew pas· as post chaplain,
U. S. Army, from May 14, 1878, to a date later than the 1st
of January of the present year,' and "in view of the decision
recently made by the Supreme Court in the suit brought by
said Blake against the United States, and his subsequent
appointment as post chaplain by the .President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate,' requests that the following questions be submitted for his opinion to the honorable the Attorney-General:
"' (1) Should the amount drawn by said Blake as pay for
the period, or any part of the period, from May 14, 1878, to
the date of the acceptance by him of said a,ppointment, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, be charged
against him, and withheld from his pay hereafter to accrue,
or otherwise collected ¥"
" '(2) Is said Blake entitled to be credited with said
period, or any part thereof, in computing his service for
·
longevity pay¥'
"I have the honor to ask that you will please favor this
Department with an opinion upon the questions submitted
by the Second Comptroller, as above quoted."
The order referred to above gives e:fl'ect to certain action
by President Hayes, September 28, 1878, pronouncing Mr.
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Blake's resignation void, forinsanity, and restoring him to
his place as post chaplain, with pay from May 14, 1878, at
which time a vacancy ''not since filled" had occurred in that
·class of officers.
With all due deference to the grave official action by
which President Hayes sought to rectify the miscarriage
which he considered to have taken place in Mr. Blake's case,
since the decision by the Supreme Court, alluded to by you,
that must be assumed to have been a n~tllity, at least for the
special purpose intended. It is true that there is ground-ut res magis veleat, etc.-to consider ~uch action as substantially a reappointment of l\lr. Blake to a vacancy then existing. But legislation has greatly narrowed the effect of such
reappointment. It is probable that both section 1756 and section 1761 of the Revised Statutes will be found to forbid his
:receiving pay thereunder. For, as it must be assumed under
the decision by the court that he was then entirely denuded
-of all official character under his previous appointment, it
was necessary that he should have taken the oath of office
again after his restoration in order to be entitled to pay; and
.so also, inasmuch as the Senate was in session at the time of
the origination of the vacancy so filled, any receipt of salary
under the circumstances, upon that account, was expressly
forbidden.
(1) I therefore answer your :first question in the affirmative, remarking that obviously it can make no difference
that the payments during the period mentioned were by con.s~'nt of the executive department.
That consent was official
laches, and does not affect any otherwise just claim of the
D nited States.
(2) In reply to the second question: I ~m of the opinion
that the more probable conclusion is that the intended restoration was virtually an appointment to fill a vacancy,
which, although it originated while the Senate was in session, still also "happened" to exist during the recess next
ensuing, and therefore was valid, except for the purpose
mentioned above, until the end of the next session of the
Senate-i.
from the 21st of June, 1878, until the 4th of
March. 1879, no relation of the operation of such appointment being admissible for any part of the period during
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which the Senate was in sessio:u. Nothing occurs to me to
prevent Mr. Blake's being allowed the benefit for longevity pay of this period of eight months and eleven days of actual
service under the above action of President Hayes.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General..
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
Approved:

I

WAYNE MAcVEAGH..

RETIRED LIST OF THE NAVY.
Where W., while holding a commission as captain in the Navy, was
appointed to the office of Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, with the
relative rank of commodore: Held that in case of his retirement by
reason of a disability incident to the service, or on his application.
during his incumbency of that office, and whilst he is borne on the
Navy Register as a captain, he should be placed on the retired list,
with the rank of capta,in, and that, on being thus retired, he would
be entitled to 75 per centum of the sea-pay of officers of that rank.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
July 8, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 1st of July submits to me two
questions:
First. In the event of a finding by the retiring board, in
the case of Commodore Whiting, that he is incapacitated
for active service, and that his incapacity is a result of an
incident of the service, or of his application for retirement,.
under the provisions of section ·1443, Revised Statutes, f~an
be be placed on the retired list, with the ra.nk which he·
now holds, that of commodore o~
Second. If Commodore Whiting should be retired under
either of the conditions stated in the preceding question,.
would he be entitled to 75 per centum of the sea-pay of
officers of the rank which he now holds, that of commodore?:
(Sec. 1588~ Rev. Stat.)
In my opinion both questions must be answered in the:
negative.
It is stated in your communication that on the 11th of'
June, 1878, William D. Whitiug was appointed Chief of the
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Bureau of Navigation, and it appears from the Navy Register that he is borne on the list of captains by virtue of a
commission dated 19th August, 1872.
The appointment by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate (under sees. 421 and 422, Rev.
Stat.), of Captain Whiting to be Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was an in vesture of him with an additional office.
While Chief of the Bureau of Navigation he remains a
captain in the Navy (10 Opin., 378). By virtue of the former
office, his orders have the force and effect of an order emanating from the Secretary of the Navy (sec. 420), and while he
continues to hold said office he bas the relative rank of commodore (sec. 1472.) The first question you suggest is as
to the meaning of the words" grades to which they belonged
respectively at the time of their retirement and continue to
b8 borne on the Navy Register" in section 1457. The real
question is, if Captain Whiting should be retired while holding the office of captain of the United States Navy and the
office of Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, does he belong
to the grade of commodore or of captain~
The discussion by my predecessor (16 Opin., 414) of the
words "grade" and "relative rank" leave little to be said
on the difference in their meaning. While this case is not
in strict analogy with the one then under consideration, the
principles controlllng in that opinion seem applicable here,
and I am of opinion that the grade to which Mr. Whiting
belongs for the purposes ,of section 14:57 is that of captain,
and not that of the relative· rank incidental to his temporary
occupation of another and distinct office. For it is by virtue
of his office of captain, and not of chief of a bureau, that he is
entitled to examination for promotion and that he is entitled
or subject to retirement. It may further be remarked that
within the language of section 1457 he "continues to be
borne on the Navy Register" as captain, and that the
moment he ceases to be chief of the bureau he loses his relative rank of commodore.
Congress bas expressly provided (sec. 1473) that the chiefs
of four bureaus shall on retirement retain their relative rank
of commodore. Expressio 'ltnius exclusio alterius.
This difference between the relative rank of the chief of
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the bureau and his actual grade is still further recognized in
the provision for his compensation.
The pay of chiefs of bureaus in the Navy Department shall
be the highest pay of the grade to which they belong, but
not below that of commodore. (Sec. 1565.)
It is under section 1583 that your second question arises;
that section provides that the pay of officers retired under
certain circumstances "shall be equal to 7:5 per centum of the
sea-pay provided by this chapter for the grade or rank which
they held re~pectively at the time of their retirement." The
answer to the former question goes far to solve this; for in
the absence of express provision it would be an imputation
of inconsistency to hold that Congress meant to retire an
officer as captain with the pay of commodore.
The retirement of .C ommodore Whiting will find him holding the actual grade .of captain and the relative rank of
com mod ore.
The selection of a line officer for the chiefship of a bureau
is not limited to commodores and those lower in rank, and
if (sec. 1472) the office is filled by a line officer above the
rank of commodore, he acquires no relative rank. Similarly
he is to be paid (sec. 1565) according to the highest pay of
his grade, and when retired, will receive (sec. 1588) 75 per
centum of the sea-pay for the grade or rank which be held.
The intercbaugeability of the words rank and grade throughout the statutes leads me to the conclusion that whatever
may have been their original differences in meaning, they
are now to a great extent used synonymously-especially
when we find them, as in section 1588, connected by a disjunctive, and with no indication that either shall control.
Of course the words "relative rank" bear an entirely different meaning, as pointed out by Attorney-General Devens,
(sup1·a), and it seems to me that if relative rank was meant
instead of actual rank or actual grade, it would have been
so expressed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
The SECRETARY of the NAVY.
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SOLDIERS' HOME.
The Soldiers' Home is not entitled to bounty land-warrants belonging
to the estates of deceased soldiers which remain unclaimed for the
period of three years after their decease.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,
J~tly

9, 1881.
SIR: Your communication of the 28th June, 18-,1, requests my opinion as to the right of the Soldiers' Home to
certain bounty land-warrants which have been turned over
as part of the effects of deceased soldiers. An examination
of the warrants (furnished me by the Second ..Auditor) shows
them to have been issued in the years 1848, 1851, and 1852,
under the act of 11th February, 1847, sec. 9, (11 Stat., 125.)
Section 7 of the act of March 3, 1850, (9 Stat., 596) provided "That for the support of the said institution [the Military Asylum, now the Soldier ' Home], the following funds
shall be set apart, and the same are hereby appropriated,
* • • all moneys belonging to the estates of deceased
~oldiers which now are or may he hereafter unclaimed," etc.
An examiuation of the other sources of revenue enumerated in that s'e ction shows them all to be, as indicated in
the opening sentence, "funds." The act of 1847 provides
(sec. 9) that the certificate or warr;1nt may be located by the
warrantee or his heirs at law, and it was not until 1852 that
they were made assignable, and not until 1858 that they
were declared to be personal chattels. It is clear, therefore,
that when the act of 1851 was passed these certificates were
not meant to be included in the word "moneys." Subsequent legislatJon, while it bas ~banged their character somewhat, still leaves them chattels personal, assignable by an
instrument in writing, but has not made them money.
It is suggested by the commissioners of the Soldiers'
Home that the certificate might be converted into money
and the proceeds held by them until demanded by the heirs
or legal representatives of the deceased. Apart from the
absence of any express enactment authorizing the transfer
by the commissioners of such warrants, it seems to me that
section 4818, Revised Statutes, does not contemplate the
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transfer to the commissioners of any part of the estates of
deceased soldiers ex<?ept money. The certificate is not even
a right to demand money; it is merely a "right to locate said
warrant on any quarter section ofland subject to private entry." The personal effects which would perish with the using
are not "transfered" to the Soldiers' Home, but money, having no ear-marks, can at any time be returned in kind. Land
warrants, or any other species of personal property which, to
become available, would have to be sold, might or might not
be replaced in kind, and, when demanded, might command
in the market a very different price from that obtained by
the commissioners.
I am of opinion that the Soldiers' Home is not entitled to
bounty land-warrants belonging to the estates of deceased
soldiers and which remain unclaimed for the period of three
years subsequent to the death of such soldiers.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

COMMISSIONER OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Under the act of June 11, 1878, chapter 180, with the exception of the
:first two, all appointments to the office of Commissioner of the District of Columbia are to be for the term of three years.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
J~tly 11, 1881.
SIR: The commission of Hon. Thomas P. Morgan, Commissioner of this District, was issued December 16, 1879, and
·e xpires in three years from that <la,y.
The act of June 11, 1878, chapter 180, section 1, concluding paragraph (20 Stats., 103) declares that "The offidal term
of said Commissioners appointed from ciYillife shall be three
years, and until their successors shall be appointed and qualified, but the first appointment shall be one Commissioner for
one year and one for two years and at the expiration of
their respective terms their successors shall be appointed
for three years."
OF
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It is seen that neither of the first appointments were to be
for three years; but all subsequent ones are to be for that
term.
The word '' term," or "terms,'~ in this statute, was construed by my predecessor to mean "term of service," and by
his direction a letter from this to the State Department was
written December 22, 1879, to the effect that Mr. Morgan's
-commission should be made to run for three years from date,
and it was accordingly so framed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
The PRESIDENT.

DUTIABLE MATTER TRANSMITTED BY MAIL.
J!'oreign magazines and newspapers transported by mail from Canada
into the United States, addressed to dealers, for the purpose of sale by
them, or of being by them distributed among subscribers, are dutiable.
The postal convention with Canada and the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 180, section 15, were not intended to affect existing tariff laws.
DEPAR1'MENT OF JUS1'ICE,

July 11, 1881.
SIR: Yours of the 1st instant, with accompanying papers,
states, substantially, that tons of foreign English magazines
.and newspapers are constantly being shipped by mail over
the Grand Trunk Hail way from Toronto, Canada, into this
country, addressed to dealers, for the purpose of sale by them,
·Or of being by them distributed among individual subscribers
in the United States. The collector at Detroit wishes to
know from you whether these magazines and newspapers are
.subject to duty, or are entitled to free entry, if received here
by mail, they being clearly dutiable if otherwise brought into
this country.
In my opinion, such matter, so addressed and forwarded,
is subject to the established rate of duty. The postal convention with Canada and the act of March 3, 1879, chapter
180, section 15 (20 Stats., 359), in stipulating for the transmission and delivery of such matter through the mails "at
the same rate as if published in the United States/' were not
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intended to affect existing tariff legislation, but simply to.
say that the postage should be the same whereYer published,.
leaving other charges to be determined by other statutes.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Bon. WM. WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treas-ury.

RESERVATION OF LAND FOR PUBLIC USES.
Where public land subject to homestead settlement has been duly en~
tered under the homestead law, it thenceforth ceases to be at the disposal of the Government PO long as the entry of the settler subsists.
Hence it cannot, whilst such entry stands, be set apart by the President for a military reservation.
Where, however, a pre-emption filing has been made of public lands, theland covered thereby may be set apart by the President for such reservation at any time previous to payment and entry by the settler
under the pre-emption law.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

J'UJy 15, 1881.
Sm : By a letter received from the chief clerk of your De-·
partment, dated the 27th of May last, inclosing papers relative to the proposed withdrawal of lands for a military reservation on the Rio de la Plata, in Colorado, I am informed that.
you desire my opinion upon this question, "Where public
lands have been surveyed, and pre-emption filings or bornestead entries have been made in accordance with law, may
the Executive, prior to the completion of full title in the settler, set apart and declare a military reservation embracing
the lands of said settler ~" I have now the honor to state to
you my views thereon.
That the President has power to reserve from sale and to set
apart for public uses such portions of the public domain as arerequired by the exigencies of the public service to be appropriated to those uses is too well established to admit of doubt. In
the case of Grisarv.McDowell (6 Wall.,381) the Supreme Court
remark: ·"From an early period in the history of the Government it has been the practice of the President to order from
time to time, as the exigencies of the public service required,.
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parcels of land belonging to the United States to be reserved
form sale and set apart for public uses. The authority of the
President in this respect is recognized in numerousactsofCongress." The question submitted indeed assumes the existence
of the power, and suggests that there is doubt only as to
whether it can be exercised with respect to lands which at the
time are included in a pre-emption filing or homestead entry,
and to which steps have thus already been taken by an individual to acquire title under the general land laws.
The power of the President above adverted to extends to
lands which belong to the public domain of the United States,
and are subject to sale or other disposal under the general
land laws. It is capable of being exercised with respect to
such lands so long as they remain unappropriated and unsevered from the public domain, but no longer. When an
entry thereof is made under those laws (whether pre-emption,
homestead, or other) the particular land entered thus becomes
segregated from the mass of public lands and takes the character of private property. "In no just sense," observe the
Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Duncan (4 Wall., 218) "can
lands be s~:dd to be public lands after they have been entered.
at the ]and office and a certificate of entry obtained. If public lands before the entry, after it they are private property."
In regard to the case of a homestead settlement, the claim
of a settler is initiated by an entry of the land. This is effected
by making an application at the proper land office, filing the·
affidavit and paying the amount required by section 2290, Revised Statutes, and also paying the commissions as required
by section 2238, Revised Statutes. It is true a certificate of
entry is not then given, the certificate being, under section
2291, Revised Statutes, withheld "until the expiration of five
years from the date of such entry," at the end of which period,
or within two years thereafter, upon proof of settlement and
.cultivation during that period and payment of the commissions remaining to be paid, it is issued. But upon the entry
a right in favor of the settler would seem to attach to the
land, which is liable to be defeated only by failure on his part
to comply with the requirements of the homestead law in regard to settlement and cultivationr This right amounts to an
equitable interest in the land, subject to the future perform272-VOL XVII--11
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ance by the settler of certain conditions (in the event of which
· he becomes invested with full and complete ownership), and
until forfeited by failure to perform the conditions, it must, I
think, prevail not only ag·ainst individuals, but against the
Government. That, in contemplation of the homestead law~
the settler acquires by his entry an immediate interest in the
land, which (for the time being, at least) thereby becomes
severed from the public domain, appears from the language
of section 2297, Revised Statutes, wherein it is provided that
in certain contingencies "the land so entered shall revert to
the Government."
The result to whieh this leads is, that where public land
subject to homestead settlement has been duly entered under
the homestead law, it thenceforth ceases to be at the disposal
of the Government so long as the claim or entry of the settler
subsists.
The case of a settlement on public Jand with a view to
acquire a right of pre-emption, where a declaratory statement has been filed, and other preliminary steps taken by the
settler, but by whom payment for and entry of the land ba\·e
not yet been made, which remains to be considered, is re·
lieved of much of its difficulty by the do.c trine laiu down by
the Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Whitney (19 Wall., 187), and in
the Yosemite Valley case (15 Wall., 77), respecting the right
of the settler in such case as against the Government. It
was there held that under the pre-emption laws mere occupation and improvement of any portion of the public lands of
the United States, with a view to pre-emptiou, do not confer
upon the settler any right in the land occupied as against the
United States, or impair in any respect the power of Congress
to dispose of the land in any way it may deem proper; that
the power of regulation and disposition, conferred upon Con·
gress by the Constitution, only ceases when all the preliminary acts prescribed by those laws for the acquisition of the
title, including the payment of the price of the land, have
been performed by the settler; that until such payment and
entry the acts of Congress give to the settler only a privilege of pre·emption in case the lands are offered for sale
in the usual manner-that is, the privilege to purchase them
in that event in preference to others; aud that the legi:slation
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thus adopted for the benefit of settlers was not intended to
deprive Congress of the power to make any other dispos~
tion of the lands before they are offered for sale or to appropriate them to any public use. ''It seems to us little less
than absurd," remark the court in the case last cited, '' to
say that a settler or any other person by acquiring a right
to be preferred in the purchase of property, provided a sale
is made by the owner, thereby acquires a right to compel
the owner to sell, or such an iuterest in the property as to
deprive the owner of the power to control its disposition."
Thus it is no longer au open question that public land,
covered by a pre-emption filing, but as to which there has
been no payment and entry by the settler, may be appropriated by Congrt>ss to public purposes or otherwise disposed
of without thereby involving a collision with, or invasion of,
any right or interest of the settler in and to the land.
The inquiry now is, can the President in such case, under
his power to reser\e and set apart lands of the United States
for public uses, make a similar disposition of the land for
such uses. It should be borne in mind that the power of the
President here referred to is recognized by Congress ( Grisar
v. McDowell, supc;·a). Such recogmtion is equivalent to a
grant. Hence, in reserving and setting apart a particular
piece of land for a special public use, the President must be
regarded as acting by authority of Congress, and unless this
authority is so restricted as not to extend to land covered by
a pre-emption filing (and I am not aware of any restriction
of that sort), I do not see why such land may not be as effectually reserved and set apart by the President thereunder as
by the direct action of Congress. Land so covered, where
payment and entry have not been made, is subject to appropriation or disposal by Congress simply because, although
occupied with a view to pre-emption, the settler has not by
virtue of his occupancy acquired any interest whatever
therein as against the Governrpent, and it still remains a
part of the public domain, over the disposition of which
Congress has full control. Upon the same ground (namely,
the absence of any right in the settler to the land as ·against
the Government, and the fact that it continues in the absolute ownership of the latter) such land would seem to be sub-
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ject to reservation for public uses by the President when
acting by authority of Congress.
I am therefore of opinion that where a homestead entry of
public lands has been made by a settler, the land so entered
cannot, whilst such entry stands, be set apart by the President for a military reservation, even "prior to the completion of full title in thA settler;" but that where a pre-emption
filing has been made of public lands, the land covered thereby
may be set apart by the President for s~ch reservation at
any time previous to payment and entry by the settler underthe pre-emption law.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
llon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of TVar.

POSTAGE ON NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS.
Where there is a letter-carrier office at the place of publication of a
newspaper or periodical, and at another place, within another postal
district, a news-dealer is employed by the publisher to mail at the lattAr place copies of the newspaper or periodical intended for distribution to subscribers at the former place, such copies are not entitled to
transmission through the mail at pound rates.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 19, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 7th ultimo, directing attention to·
!the opinion of my predecessor, dated December 19, 1878, in
regard to the rate of postage chargeable on the Missionary
Herald in the case there stated (16 Opin., 232), requests my
views upon a point not considered. in tllat opinion.
It was there held that the Herald, a paper issued less often
than once a week, the publication office whereof is in Boston,
Mass., but its subscription list as to Boston and the adjacent
towns was owned by a news-dealer in Brookline, Mass., from
whence all copies intended for subscribers in Boston were
mailed by him, was chargeable only with pound rates on the
copies so mailed. It was also observed in that connection
that there was no suggestion that the ownership of the subscription list by the news-dealer was a mere pretense, or that.
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he was simply an agent of the publishers of the paper; and
as to what the law might be in such case (this is the point
above referred to) no opinion was expressed.
In the case just adverted to, i. e., where there is a letter~arrier office at the place of publication of a paper, and a
news-dealer at another place, within another postal district,
is employed by the publishers to mail at the latter place
-copies of the paper intended for distribution to subscribers
at the former place,. I am of opinion that under the existing
law the copies would not be entitled· to transmission through
the mail at the pound rates.
Under section 11 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 180,
.such copies would be entitled to transmission at pound rates
if "sent from a news agency to actual subscribers t.hereto, or
to other news agents." But by "actual subscribers thereto,"
.as there used, is meant those who have in fact subscribed for
the paper, and who, in subscribing, have dealt directly with
the agency, or whose subscriptions have been obtained for or
in behalf of the agency, the subscription list being in all
cases owned by the news-dealer. To give this provision a
more enlarged construction, and hold that it entitles a newsdealer to mail from his agency, at the pound rate~, to actual
.subscribers to a paper where the subscription list does not
belong to him, and where he acts merely as an employe or
agent of the publishers, would open the door to an evasion
of the proviso in section 25 of same act, by which special
rates are prescribed for newspapers (excepting weeklies) and
periodicals, when the same are deposited in a letter-carrier
()ffice for delivery by its carriers. It would enable publishers of newspapers and periodicals, where the office of
publication is at a place at which there is a letter-carrier
-office, to obtain delivery to their subscribers in such place
by the letter-carriers without payment of the special rates,
simply by employing a news-dealer in some adjacent town
.or village to do the mailing there.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

WAYNE M.AcVEAGH.
Ron. THOMAS L. JAMEs,
Postmast~r- General.
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COMPENSATION FOR EXPEDITED POSTAL SERVICE.
The proviso in the second section of the act of April 7, 1880, chapter 78r
limits the power of the Postmaster-General to allow increased pay for
expedited service to :fifty per centum of the compensation expressed in
the original contract. The original letting, and not any subsequent increase of service and pay, under section 3960, Revised Statutes, is made
the standard of limitation.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

·
July 20, 1881.
SIR : Referring me to sections 3960 and 3961 of the Revised Statutes, yours of the 6th ultimo asks whether the act
of April 7, 1880, limits an allowance for expedition in carrying
the mail to an amount not exceeding fifty per cent. upon the·
original compensation expressed in the contract, or to such
contract price as increased by any additional allowance for
increased service ordered under Revised Statutes, section
3960.
I understand increase of service mentioned in Revised Statutes, section 3960, to mean an additional number of trips above
that originally contracted for, and expedited service to mean
a speedier performance of each trip than was originally stip- ,
ulated for.
Revised Statutes, section 3960, relating to increase of service, reads as follows:
"Compensation for additional service in carrying the mail
shall not be in excess of the exact proportion which the original compensation bears to the original service, and when
any such additional service is ordered, the sum to be allowed
therefor shall be expressed in the order, and entered upon
the books of the Department; and no compensation shall
be paid for additional regular sen·ice rendered before the
issue of such order."
The next section (3961 ), as to expediting service, reads
thus:
"No extra allowance shall be made for any increase of expedition in carrying the mail unless thereby the employment
of additional stock and carriers is made necessary, and in
such case the additional compensation shall bear no greater
proportion to the additional stock and carriers necessarily
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employed than the compensation in the original contract
bears to the stock and carriers necessarily employed in its
execution."
The second section o~ the act approved April 7, 1880, chapter 48, contains this proviso:
"Provided, That the Postmaster-General shall not hereafter
have the power to expedite the service under any contract
either now existing or hereafter given, to a rate of pay exceeding fifty per centum upon the contract as originally let."
(20 Stats., 72.)
The language of the proviso to the act of April 7, 1880, is
entirely unambiguous. It limits the power of the Postmaster-General to pay for expedition to "fifty per centum of the
contract as originally let."
The original letting, and not any subsequent increase of
service and pay, is made the standard of limitation. To set
up any subsequent increase of the original letting as such
limitation would defeat the very purpose of the statute.
For instance, under this provision not more than $500 additional compensation can be paid to expedite the service
under contracts originally let for weekly trips at $1,000 per
annum. If this service should be increased to daily trips, with
a proportionate increase of compensation, such compensation
would be $7,000per annum. If, then, such increased service
could be expedited to tbe extent of 50 per cfmt. of the increased sum, the sum allowed for expedition would be 350
per cent. of the rate of pay upon the contract as originally
let, instead of 50 per cent. of that sum, the limit declared in
the proviso to the act of Congress of April 7, 1&80.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Bon. THOMAS L. JAMES,
Postmaster- General.
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MILITARY RESERVATION AT FORT FETTERMAN.
Where a part of the public domain has once been reserved by tbe President for military or other public purposes, and subsequently the land
so reserved becomes unnecessary for such purposes, it can not be restored to the public domain without authority from Congress.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 20, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 11th of May last, inclosing a communication from the General of the Army and other papers
in relation to the" hay reservation" at Fort Fetterman, vVyoming Territory, propounds the following question: "vVhen
a reservation of public lands is made by the President for
military purposes, and at some subs~quent period such lands
become no longer necessary for the purposes for which they
were reserved, may the President by a revocation of his
order restore the lands to the public domain~ "
This question, it is presumed, has especial reference to
the above-mentioned reservation at Fort Fetterman, which
your letter states'' was duly declared and formally set apart
by the PresideJ)t August 29, 1872."
Upon consideration I am of the opinion that the question
propounded must be answered in the negative. In an opinion
dated August 10, 1878, Attorney-General Devens observes
that "if lands have been once set apart by the President in an order for military purposes, they can not again
be restored to the condition of public lands or sold as such
except by an. authority of Congress" (16 Opin., 123). And a
similar view of the subject is taken by Attorney-General
Bates in an opinion dated November 8, 1862. (10 Opin., 360.)
The power of the President to reserve and set apart lands
for public uses is recognized by Congress ( Grisar '· MeDowell,
6 Wall, 381). When, therefore, in the exercise of that power,
the President creates a military reservation, he is to be regarded as acting by authority of Congress. The land included in the reservation thus becomes severed from the mass
of public lands and appropriated to a particular public use
by authority of Congress, which alone can authorize such dispositio~ of the public domain.
H cannot, therefore, be di-
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verted from that use or be reunited to the public domain and
made subject to disposal under the general land laws except
by the same authority.. With this view accords the practice
of Congress (indicating its adoption by that body, which is
.a controlling circumstance) as shown by numerous acts,
passed from time to time, providing for the disposal of
parti9ular reservations which were abandoned or deemed no
longer needed for the public service. The following are
:s ome of the more recent of these acts: Act of May 18,
1874, chapter 182; act of June 9, 1874, chapter 261; act of
.June 19, 187 4, chapter 323 ; act of June 22, 187 4, chapter
415; act of July 21, 1876, chapter 220; act of August 14,
1876, chapter 266; act of February 28, 1877, chapter 74; act
-of March 3, 1877, chapter 129; act of January 30, 1879,
-chapter 36; act of l\f arch 3, 1879, chapter 189; act of Apr·il
1, 1880, chapter 40; act of June 10, 1880, chapter 187; act
of June 15, 1880, chapter 221.
In the case presented by your question, I am accordingly
·Of the opinion (concurring in the views of my predecessors
above referred to) that the lands cannot be restored to the
public domftin by the Executive without authority from
Congress.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

W A.YNE MAcVEA.GH.
Ron. ROBERT T, LINCOLN,
Secretar'lj of War.

COMMUTATION OF QUARTERS .
.An officer of the Army placed on waiting orders is not entitled to commutation for quarters under the proviso in section 9 of the act of June
18, 1878, chapter 263.
The word "places," as used in that proviso, comprehends only military
posts and stations.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1881.
SIR: I have examined the opinion of the Judge-Advocate-General, which was submitted to me under cover of
your letter of the 17th ultimo, upon the question whether
General Schofield (who was" placed on waiting orders" by an
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order issued from the Headquarters of the Army, dated May
6, 1881) is entitled to commutation for quarters while waiting orders, and I concur in the view. there taken, namely,.
that General S. is not entitled to such commutation.
By section 24 of the act of July 15, 1870, chapter 294~.
commutation for quarters was abolished. Previous to that
act the right to this allowance depended upon paragraph
1080 of the Army Regulations of 1863, which provided:
''When public quarters can not be furnished to officers at
stations without troops, * * * quarters will be commuted at a rate fixed by the Secretary of War," etc. In
the case of United States v. Phisterer (94 U. S., 219), it was
held that an officer at his own home awaiting orders, and
having no public duty to perform, was not entitled to commutation under that regulation, his borne not being a
"station" within the meaning thereof. But in the subsequent case of United States v. Lippitt (100 U. S., 663),.
where an officer on duty with his regiment was ordered
away from his regiment to report in person to t!J.e headquarters of a department at another place, there to await furtherorders, it was held that (quarters, etc., in kind not having·
been furnished the officer at such headquarters), be was
entitled to commutation. The latter case is distinguished
from the former in this, that the place to which the officer
was ordered was a military station, where it was his duty to
go and remain, being subject to assignment to duty there,
until ordered back to his regiment or otherwise relieved.
Commutation for quarters was afterwards restored by section 9 of the act of June 18, 1S78, chapter 263, and it is now
regulated by that section and by the first proviso in section 1
of the act of June 23, 1879, chapter 35. Section 9 of the act
of 1878 provides '"that atall posts and stations where there
are public quarters belonging to the United States, officers
may be furnished with quarters in kind in such public quarters, and not elsewhere, by the Quartermaster's Department,.
assigning to the officers of each grade, respectively, such
number of rooms as is now alloweu to such grade by the·
rules and regulations of the Army : Provided, That at places
where there are no public quarters, commutation therefor·
may be paid by the Pay Department to the officer entitled
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to the same at a rate not exceeding $10 per room per
month," etc. The proviso in the act of 1879 declares that
''no allowance shall be made for claims for quarters for servants," and makes the rate of commutation per room per
month for officers' quarters $12, instead of $10, as provided
by the act of 1878.
Whilst-the rate is fixed l>y the proviso in the act of 1879,
the allowance of commutation for officers' quarters is in every
other respect governed by the ninth section of the act of
1878. In determining the meaning of the word '' places, " as
used in the pro'I.Jiso in that section, the phrase in which that
word occurs, viz, "that at places where the reare no public
quarters," etc., should be viewed in connection with the language of the first clause of the section, viz, ''that at all posts
and stations where there are public quarters," etc.; and when
thus viewed, it is obvious that military "posts" and "stations" are alone meant to be comprehended by the word
'' places." So that the proviso in said section, on which
commutation for officers' quarters now depends, is to be construed as if it read, " that at posts and stations where there
are no public quarters," etc.
As thus construed, the law under which commutation for
quarters is at present allowable does not materially differ
from the regulation under which such commutation was
allowable previous to the act of 1870; and the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Phisterer,
cited above, which arose under the regulation, seems to me
to apply to the case of General Schofield now under consideration, which arises under the statute, and which is essentially the same as the other. The ground upon which the
officer in the former case was held not to be entitled to commutation also exists here, and it, in my opinion, forms a
sufficient bar to an allowance of commutation to General S.
while on waiting orders.
I am, sir, Yery respectfully,
WAYNE M.A.cVEA<ftl.
Hon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
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PENSION FOR DISABILITY INCURRED IN LINE OF DUTY.
Consideration oflegal principles applicable to the case of a claim for
pension, where the injury followed the use of abusive language of the
claimant towards his assailant.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 22, 1881.
SIR: ·Your letter of the 22d of June states that HenryS.
Wetmore, formally volunteer lieutenant, U.S. Navy, on the
4th of August, 1864, while in the service of the United States,
and under orders to proceed to Columbus, Ohio, on public
business, went to the depot of the Little Miami Railroad, at
Cincinnati, and while expediting the checking of his baggage was struck by the baggage-master (Halpin) on the head
with a hatchet, from the results of which he was, and has continued to be, seriously disabled.
You add, "While the assault was altogether unjustifiable,
thA evidence tends to show that the conduct of Mr. Wetmore
may have led to the difficulty between himself and the baggage-master, and that before the blow was struck by Halpin
Wetmore used towards him abusive language.'' My opinion is requested as to whether the injury was connected with
Wetmore's service in such a manner as to justify the allowance of his claim for a pension.
I have refrained from an examination of the evidence to
ascertain what is established by the preponderance of testimony, because my advisory powers do not extend so far. At
the same time, your statement that the evidence tends to
show that the conduct of Mr. Wetmore may have led to the
difficulty is too indefinite to form the basis for a legal opinion. Instead of directly answering your inquiry, I will confine myself to an exposition of what I conceive to be the legal
principles applicable to a claim for pension where the injury
followed the use of abusive language by the claimant towards
the :Ssailant.
The subject of disability in the line of duty has received
the attention of two of my predecessors. In the case of
Eaton, the claimant alleged that he was assaulted without
any prot'ocation by an officer of the guard, while attempting
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to pass the guard under the sanction of a }Vritten permit
granted him by the commanding officer. Attorney-General
Butler (2 Opin., 590) was of opinion that such an assault might
justly be considered as coming within the terms of the law,
provided that the War Department shall be satisfied '• that
the wounds were given without sufficient justification; for if
the assault was brought on the claimant by his own misconduct, he cannot be said to have been disabled while in the
line of duty."
The phrase,'' in the line of duty," has been uniformly used
in the statutes from 1799 to the present time in defining the
right to pensions. It received elaborate discussion from 1\ir.
Attorney-General Cushing in 1855 (7 Opin., 149), and as Congress, since the . publication of that opinion, has not seen
proper to substitute any other expression, we are justified in
concluding that it stands in the statutes invested with the
meaning expressed by Mr. Cushing.
Mr. Cushing says (p. 161): ''In fine, the phrase 'line of
duty' is an apt one to denote that an act of duty performed
must have relation of causation mediate or immediate to the
wound, the casualty, the injury, or the disease producing disabiiity or death." Again he says: " Was the cause of disability or death a cause within the line of duty or outside of
it' Was that cause appertaining to, dependent upon, or
otherwise necessarily and essentially connected with, duty
within the line, or was it unappurtenant, independent, and
not of necessary and essential connection~ That, in my
judgment, is the true test-criterion in the class of pension
cases under consideration." This criterion, he says, will
"bestow disability or death pensions only in those cases, but
in all those cases, where the cause of disability or death is
the logical incident or probable effect of duty in the service."
It is thus seen that the real question in the case is as to the
cause mediate or immediate of the injury.
·The question of remote and proximate cause, although frequently treated as a question of law, is in reality one of fact,
and which, in an individual case, can receive but little light
from the numerous adjudications. In every chain of circumstances each step is, to a greater or less degree, the consequence. of its predecessor. Mr. Wetmore's assumption of the
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duties of his office caused him to be subject to orders; the
order caused him to come in contact with the baggage-master.
If there did not intervene between this contact and the injury an adequate and sufficient cause for which Mr. Wetmore
was responsible, he is entitled to his pension. If while in
the performance of his duty he had been injured by the fall
of a carelessly piled lot of baggage, the performance of his
duty would have been the mediate cause, for no responsibility
would rest on him for the intervening cause. Otherwise, if
in interference with the baggage-master's province and duties he had seized a trunk and brought it down on his head.
But it seems that while expediting the checking of his
baggage he useu almsi~e language; as he was responsible
for this, the question arises whether it was an adequate efficient cause of the injury. If he attempted or threatened violence, or if, after an altercation, he used such gestures, or
placed his hands in such a position as to lead his opponent
to apprehend immediate personal danger, his conduct would
be the immediate adequate cause of the injury, and perform.a nce of duty could not be treated as the cause, either mediatA or immediate. It is impossible to lay down a general
rule which will be applicable to cases of this kind, or to the
different aspects which the present claim might present as
the facts shall be developed by the evidence. It cannot be
said on the one hand that a soldier is entitleu to a pension
unless the provocation he gave was such as to acquit the
assailant in a court of law, nor on the ot,her that the slightest departure from the rules of proper conduct, followed by
an injury, shall preclude allowance of his claim. Between the
two are an infinite variety of supposable cases involving different degrees of provocation, which cannot be measured so
'as to determine as a matter of law their adequacy to produce
the result. It is in determining not the legal justification
of Halpin, but the adequacy of the provocation, that, in view
of the benevolent purposes of the law, a wise and liberal
discretion is to be exercised. The scene, the nature and difficulty of Halpin's labors, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of Wetmore's request, his sobriety, the pressure for
time as it affected each, whether Wetmore's abusive language was brief and separated from the blow by an interval
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·of time, or whether, having excited Halpin's anger &nd arousing it, he persisted, only to be stop pea by a blow of the hatchet,
whether he aggravated by further and more violent language
an anger which he bad already enkh1dled, whether he invaded the space reserved for performance of the baggagemaster's duties or unduly interfered therewith, are all cir-cumstances to be considered in determining what, in my
judgment, is the 1eal question, whether Wetmore's conduct
jn the baggage-room was reasonably calculated to lead to violence dangerous to himself. If it was so calculated, his mis-conduct brought its own punishment, and if the punishment
was greater than he deserved, legal proceedings against
Halpin would furnish him his remedy. If his misconduct
~aused the injury, he is not entitled to a pension.
You are to determine whether the assault was the natural
oand reasonable consequence of Wetmore's actions or language,
natural in view of the infirmities of human nature, reasonable in view of what a reasonable man woul<l anticipate from
manifestations of Halpin's anger to be the consequence of
Wetmore's course. Did the latter continue the controversy
after ordinary prudence should ha,·e warned him to desist 1
Certainly a wound from a hatchet in the hands of a baggagemaster, at a depot remote from the scene of war, where passengers were peaceably making preparations for travel, is .so
improbable an effect of duty in the service as to throw upon
the applicant the burden of showing that his misconduct was
not the cause of the injury, but if he has done so to a rea.s onable certainty his claim should be allowed.
As I haYe stated, I have not examined the evidence transmitted by you, conceidng that it would be a usurpation of
your powers for me to pass upon the weight and credibility
of the testimony; but if you desire it I will examine the evidence and unofficially express the conclusions I arrive at as
to the merits of the case.
I return herewith the papers transmittted.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Ron. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the 1 nterior.
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APOLLL.~ARIS

MINERAL WATERS.

In the light of the information presented, Apollinaris mineral water is
regarded as an artificial mineral water, and dutiable as such.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

July 26, 1881.
SIR: I return herewith the papers submitted to me with
the letter of Acting Secretary French, requesting my opinion whether Apollinaris mineral water is entitled to admission free of duty.
In reply thereto I have the honor to state that I have carefully investigated the subject, and have been greatly aided
in such investigation by oral arguments and very full printed
briefs, submitted on the one side by Mr. Webster, and on
the other side by Mr. Ashton and Mr. Saville. The question
at issue, in my judgment, is wholly a question of fact, and
the evidence upon it is so contradictory and conflicting, that
it appears to me to be indispensable that it should be submitted to a court and jury.
I entertain no doubt whatever that mineral waters '• not
artificial," in the meaning of the act of Congress, are natural
mineral waters, bottled substantially as is stated in the affidavit of :Mr. Shehan, included in the papers submitted to me,
to be the method employed at Congress Spring, Saratoga,
N.Y. He says that "the water from the natural mineral
spring fountain known as Congress Spring is taken directly
from the spring as it flows from its veins in the earth and
immediately bottled, without adding any substance thereto,
and without any change, alteration, or modification whatever." The Apollinaris water, on the contrary, is not bottled as it flows from the spring, but it is in the first place
heavily surcharged with carbonic acid gas and ten parts of
salt are added to ten thousand parts of water. It is alleged,.
on behalf of the importers, that not only is the carbonic acid
gas such as escapes from the spring itself or from fissures in
the rock immediately around the spring, but that this water
when being bottled is charged with no greater portion of
such gas than it possesses at a depth of 50 feet below the sur-
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face, and that the process is merely to rest~re to it the gas
which has thereafter escaped. This contention is, however,
vehemently denied, and it is insisted that not only is the~:e
no evidence that the quantity of gas is the same, but that
the evidence clearly establishes that the water as bottled contains a very considerable excess over the water in the spring.
As to the salt, the importers allege that it is simply added
to preserve the water in its natural state, and to prevent
contact with the cork from altering it. This, however, is
also as earnestly denied; and it is insisted that the salt is
added, like the alleged excess of carbonic acid gas, for the
sole purpose of altering the natural character of the water
as it flows from the spring and of enhancing its value as a
sparkling and palatable beverage.
In view of this conflict of testimony, and of the fact that
Special Agent Adams, of your Department, Mr. Sharer, the
chemist selected by him, as well as Appraiser Howard and
Collector Merritt, of the port of New York, have, after
thorough consideration, concurred in finding that the water
in question is subjected to such alterations after it leaves
the spring as to render it an artificial mineral water, I am
of the opinion that it ought to be so regarded and held to
be liable to duty.
I can not say that the question is free from doubt ; but I
have less hesitation in reaching the conclusion I have stated,
because it will be subject to review, if the importers desire
it, and the question will then reach the only tribunal which,
. in my judgment, is entirely competent to decide it.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH.

Hon.

WILLIAM WINDOM,

Secretary of the Treasury.
172-voL xvn--12
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CASE OF SURGEON THOMLE\r.
Surgeon T., having been examined by a board of medical officers, and
found totally clisqualifiecl for the performance of his duties, was retired
under section 8 of the act of February ~1, 1tl61, chapter 49. Subsequently, in November, 1878, a board of me'dical' officers was convened,
by order of the Secretary of the Navy, to examine and report whether,
in their opinion, Surgeon T.'s disability did, or did not, originate in
the line of duty; and the finding of this board was that his disability
bad its origin in the line of duty. Such finding was approved by the
Secretary of the Navy January 1, 1879, who directed that thereafter
Surgeon T. be regarded on the records of the Department. as retired on
account of disability occasioned while in the line of duty. Held, that
the Secretary of the Navy was not authorized by law to submit the
case of Surgeon T. to a medical bo rd for re-examination as to the
origin of the disability for which he was retired, and that the Secretary's action, based on the report of such board, is without any legal
effect as regards the cause for retirement in the case of that officer or
his right of pay.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 29th ultimo requests my opinion

upon certain questions suggested by the Second Comptroller
in his communication to you of the 7th ultimo (which accompanied that letter), arising in the matter of a claim made by
Surgeon John Thomley, U. S. Navy, retired, for the difference between one-half of sea-pay and 75 per centum thereof,
from March 3, 1873, to the present time.
It appears that Surgeon Thomley was retired under section 3 of the act of February 21, 1861, chapter 49. Previous
thereto he was examined by a board of medical officers, convened pursuant to an order of the Secretary of the Navy
dated May 24, 1861, and found totally disqualified for the
performance of his duties; the board stating in their report,
which bears date Ma.r 29, 1861, that in their opinion "hi~:)
disability did not occur in the line of his duty."
By section 5 of the act of July 15, 1870, chapter 295, it
was provided: ''That from and after the thirtieth day of June,
eigbteenbuudredandseveuty, tbepayofallofficersoftheNavy
now on or hereafter placed on the retired list shall, when not
on active dut,y, be equal to one-half of the highest pay (i.e., seapay) prescribed by this act for officers on the active list whose
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grade corresponds to the grade held by such officers respectively at the tirg.e of such retirement," etc. Subsequently,
by the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 230, it was provided:
"That those officers on the retired list, and those hereafter
retired, who were, or who may be, retired after forty years'
service, or on attaining the age of sixty-two years, in conformity with section one of the act December 21, eighteen
hundred and sixty-one, and its amendments, dated June
·twenty-five, eighteen hundred and sixty four, or those who
were, or may be, retired from incapacity resulting from long
and faithful service, from wounds or injuries received in the
line of duty, from sickness or exposure therein, shall, after
the passage of this act, be entitled to seventy-five per centum
of the present sea-pay of the grade or rank which they held
at the time of their retirement." These provisions (the former
as modified by the latter) are embodied in section 1588, Revised Statutes.
Early in November, 1878, Surgeon Thomley made application for a further examination of his case, based on new
evidence, tending, as he alleged, to show that the opinion of
the board of medical officers in 1861, that his disability did
not occur in the line of duty, was erroneous. Thereupon the
Secretary of the Navy ordered a board of medical officers to
·convene at the Navy Department on the 12th of the same
month, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and "examine
such documentary evidence as may be offered by Dr. Thomley, and after a careful examination of all the evidence in the
-case to report to the Department whether, in their opinion,
his disability did, or did not, originate in the line of duty."
The finding of the board, which convened pursuant to this
{)rder, was that "the disability causing the retirement of
Medical Director John Thomley, U. S. Navy, had its origin
in the line of duty," etc. This finding was on January 1,
1879, approved by the Secretary of the Navy in the following terms: ''In accordance with the within proceedings
.and finding it is the opinion of the Department that l\fedical
Director John Thomley was, at the time of his retirement,
incapacitate(! on account of causes occasioned while in the
line of dut~, and he will be so regarded on the r6cords of the
Department from this date."

180

BON. WAYNE MACVEAGH
Case of Surgeon Thomley.

Surgeon Thomley has never received the higher rate of
pay (i.
75 per centum of sea-pay) provided by the act of
March 3, 1873, also by section 1588, Revised Statutes.
The questions suggested by the Second Comptroller are
these: ''Whether the action of the Secretary of" the Navy
last above q noted is a valid decision in favor of Dr. Thomley, and if it is such, from what date the claimant is entitled
to receive the higher rate of pay."
The answer to the questions depends upon the result of a,
preliminary inquiry which arises here, namely, whether the
action of the Secretary of the Navy in 1878, in ordering a
board to reinvestigate the case of Surgeon Thomley, then on
the retired list, and to report upon the origin of his disability, was authorized by law.
As already stated, Surgeon Thomley was retired under
section 3 of the act of February 21, 1861, chapter 49, which
authorized the President " to place on a retired list any
medical officer of the Navy who is now, or may hereafter be,
proved to be permanently incapable from physical or mental
infirmity of further service at sea,'' etc. Under this provision
it was immaterial whether the infirmity of the officer originated in the line of duty or not. Whatever the origin of the
infirmity might be, if he was thereby rendered permanently
incapable of further service at sea, that was sufficient.
Hence, so far as the cause for retirement thereunder is concerned, the statement in the report of the board of medical
officers of May 29, 1861, that Surgeon Thomley's disability
"did not occur in the line of duty," must be deemed to be
mere surplusage. An allegation of error in such statement,
therefore, furnished no ground for re-examination of his.
case, if indeed a re-examination could ha\e been had on any
ground after his retirement.
Subsequently to the retirement of Surgeon Thomley, Congress, by the twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-third
. sections of the act of August 3, 1861, chapter 42, made new
and enlarged provisions for the retirement of naval officers,
both of the line and staff. These provisions superseded all
others previously in force ; but they had no application to·
officers already retired under former laws, except (in section
22) as to the pay of captains, commodores, and lieutenants.

e.,
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then on the retired list. Section· 23 provided for the con.s titution of a retiring board, which, on finding an officer
incapacitated for active service, was required to "report
whether, in its judgment, the incapacity resulted from long
and faithful service, from wounds, or injury received in the
line of duty, from sickness or exposure therein, or from any
·other incident of service; if so, and tlle President approve of
such judgment, the disabled officer shall thereupon be placed
upon the list of retired officers, according to the provision (in
section 22) of the act; but if such disability or incompetency
proceeded from other causes, and the President concur in
opinion with the board, the officer may be retired on furlough pay, or be shall be wholly retired from the service,
with one year's pay, at the discretion of the President."
Here the statute divides the causes for retirement into two'
classes, making separate provision for each class. These
classes are (1) where the incapacity re ults "from long and
faithful service, from wounds or injuries received in the line
of duty, from sickness or exposure therein, or from any
other incident of service;" (2) where the disability or incompetency proceeds ''from other causes.''
The provisions of the act of August 3, 1861, just adverted
to, are reproduced in the Revised Statutes in sections 1448
to 1455, inclusive.
It is to be observed that officers who had been already put
on the retired list under previous laws do not come within
those provisions; that the retiring board constituted under
the latter is not authorized to inquire into the nature and
disabilities of such officers, but only into cases of officers on
the active list which are referred thereto for ex~mination.
Nor am I able to find any provision of law which authorizes
the case of an officer who was I:etired under the act of Feburary 2.1, 1861, by reason of being "permanently incapable,
from physical or mental infirmity, of further service at sea,"
and who remains on the retired list by virtue of such retirement, to be investigated by a board with a view to determine
whether his incapacity resulted " from long and faithful
.s ervice, from wounds or injury received in the line of duty,
from sickness or exposure therein, or from any other incident of service," etc. A reinvestigation in such case, with·
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out authority of Congress, even if the fact found tl.tereby
were that the infirmity resulted from some one or more of
the last-mentioned causes, could not be made the basis of
any change in regard to the cause of the officer's retirement,.
nor confer upon him any rights to which he would not other-wise be entitled.
By the acts of July 15, 1870, and March 3, 1873, cited
above, regulating the pay of retired officers, the provision::;.
of which, as hereinbefore stated', are embodied in section
1588, Revised Statutes, two rates of pay are established,
viz: 75 per centum sea-pay, and one-half of sea-pay. The former
rate applies to (see ·sec. 1588) all officers of the Navy (1)'
"who.have been retired after forty-five years' service after
reaching the age of sixty-two years''-these officers were·
retired under section 1 of the act of December 21, 1861,.
chapter 1, amended by the act of June 25, 1864, chapter 15~ ;
(2) "or who have been or may be retired after forty years"
service upon their own application to the President "-retirement in such case was formerlY. provided for by section 21 of
the act of AugGst 3, 1861, and is now by Rection 1443,
Revised Statutes; (3) "or on attaining the age of sixty-two,
years "-retirement in this case was formerly provided for
by section 1 of the act of December 21, 1861, and is now by
section 1444, Revised Statutes; (4) " or on account of
incapacity resulting from long anct. faithful service, from
wounds or injuries received in the line of duty, or from sickness or exposure therein "-under section 23 of the act of
August 3, 1861, section 1453, Revised Statutes. The latter
rate is applicable to " all other officers on the retired list"terms which are, undoubtedly, broad enough to comprehend
those who were retired under the act of February 21, 1861,
as being "permanently incapable, from physical or mental
infirmity, of further service at sea."
·
In reference to the last-mentioned act, I have already
remarked that it was not material to inquire whether the
infirmity of the officer originated in the line of duty or not.
Such inquiry cannot now be deemed material in tl.te case of
an officer retired thereunder, from the fact that, by subsequent legislation, provision bas been made for the different
rates of pay, of which the higher rate applies to officers wh()
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were retired under later acts for specific causeR, including
(inter alia) wounds or injnries received in the line of duty,

while the lower rate applies to all other retired officers not
embraced in that class. If the cause for retirement under
the act of February :n, 186t (i.
permanent incapability,
from physical or mental infirmity, of further service at sea),
does not place the officer among those who are entitled to
the higher rate, nothing can be done by executive action to
put him there without the aid of further legislation.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the Secretary of tbe
Navy, in 1878, was not authorized by law to submit the case
of Surgeon Thomley to a medical board for re-examination
as to the origin of the disahility for which he was retired, and
that the Secretary's decision, based on the report of that
board, is without any legal effect as regards the cause for
retirement in the ca~e of that officer or his right to pay.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.

e.,

Bon.

WM.

H.

HUN'l',

Secretary of the Navy.

PENALTY-ENVELOPE.
'United States commissioners are "officers of the United States," within
the meaning of section 29 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 180, and
as such are entitled to use the penalty-envelope provided for by sections 5 and 6 of the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 103, in the transmission to th~ Departments at 'Vashington of mail matter relating to
their accounts for fees payable by the Government and other official
business.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 29, 1881.
SIR: I have considered the inquiry proposed by United
States Commissioner James C. Strong, of Buffalo, N.Y., and
by you sometime since referred to me, viz, whether he is
entitled to use the penalty-envelope for tbe transmission of
lett,ers to the Department at Washington relating to his
accounts for fees payable by the United States.
The commissioners appointed by the circuit courts of the
United State~, commonly called United. States commission-
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ers, are "officers of the United States," within the meaning of section 29 of the act of 1\Iarch 3, 1879, chapter 180,
and consequently are thereby given the privilege of using
the peualty-envelope provided for by sections 5 and 6 of the
act of March 3, 1877, chapter 103, in the transmission of
official mail matter between them and "either of the Executi,·e Departments or officers of the Government." By official
mail matter is meant that which relates to the business of
the Government. The accounts of such eommissioners for
fees payable by the United States are required to be forwarded to, and settled at, the Treasury Department. This
is business of the Government, and for correspondence between the commissioner and the Department concerning the
same the penalty.envelope may be used.
The inquiry proposed I accordingly answer in the affirmative.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE M.A.cVEA.GH.
Hon. THOMAS L. JAMES,
Postmaster- General.

EXTRADITION.
Under section 5272, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of State has power
to review the proceedings in an extradition case certified to him, and
this power extends to the review of every question therein presented.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

~

August 3, 1881.
SIR: Yours of the 26th ultimo, addressed to the AttorneyGeneral, transmits the record and evidence in the extradition case of one Ormay, certified to you by Judge Nelson,
of the district court for Massachusetts, together with a
letter from Godfrey Moore, esq., of Boston, who acted as
counsel for Ormay before Judge Nelson, and who now desires
to be heard again by you upon several matters, amongst
others, in order to show "that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant any finding by the court for the further
detention of Ormay."
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In this connection you say that you " incline to the belief
that the powers conferred upon you by section 5272 of the
Revised Statutes (although not expressly mandatory in its
terms), taken in conjunction with the provisions of the
extradition treaty with Austria-Hungary of July 3, 1856,
make the examining tribunal the ultimate resource for
determining as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant
extradition, and that your action thereafter is executive
merely under the treaty itself."
In distributing the duti.es arising from extradition treaties
amongst the officers of the Government, Congress has
assigned the judicial duties of arrest and hearing upon the
charge of crime to certain officers of the courts, leaving the
· further execution of the treaty, in case the party upon such
hearing be deemed guilty under its provisions, to the Secretary of State.
This partition of duties at once suggests the question
which you state.
There can be no doubt that the treatment of such cases i~
intended to be merely judicial up to a certain point, and
after that merely executive. Executive duties, however, as
you suggest, require the exercise of discretion, and are generally not merely mandatory. In some cases it is not easy
to say that this discretion differs substantially from the dis·cretion which is confided to courts. The question here is,
how far executive discretion extends in reviewing the judgment and testimony directed by the statute (Rev. Stats.,
sec. 5270) to be certified before you by the judicial officer
who hears the charge in the first instance.
I am of the opinion tb at the proceedings below come before
you upon a quasi certiorari, and that your discretion extends
to a review of every question therein presented.
The due execution of the treaty, including its not being
.abused so as to include persons who a.re not within its terms, is
after all an executive question, and after attentive consideration I am unable to restrain your powers within any narrower bonds.
It is difficult to see why the judicial officer should certify
the testimony before him as well as his j'ndgment thereon,
unless for the purpose of affording an opportunity for a recon-
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sideration of the effect of that testimony. It is the testimony alone which shows whether the crime charged is an
extradition crime. I suppose that a Secretary would not
surrendAr the person in case he were of opinion that the
crime given in evidence was not within the treaty. Ought
he then to do so in case the evidence, in his judgment, shows.
a clear miscarriage as regards the person's presumed guilt of
such crime' It may be said this is to beg the question,
which is, whether the Secretary can look into the evidence:
for the purpose of passing upon such question; i. e., whether
such inquiry be not coram non judice as to him. It is upon.
this point that the express statutory requirement, that thetestimony shall be certified to the Secretary, together with
the judgment below, is to my mind significant.
It seems to me that in sending the person charged before·
a judicial officer for hearing the legislature means only that
he shall not be extradited without such an examination as in
other criminal charges is .required before holding for trial;
but that the dis.cretion of the executive (distinguishing this
from mere ministerial functions) usual in dealing with interests of persons or property, remains unaffected.
Upon the requisition being made for extradition, the whole
matter comes before the Secretary, with the advantage that
in a matter of local law, concerned in the case, he h~s had
tJ1e assistance of a magistrate more or less expert therein.
The treaty requires that "the evidence of criminality'"
shall be such as, " accm·ding to the laws of the place where the:
fugitive or person charged shall be found, would justify his.
apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or
offense had there been committed."
In a country like ours, where crimes in general are the
subject of State and not Federal cognizance, the above provision for their hearing will render the conclusions thereupo11
by the magistrate of great value to the Secretary, who is.
hardly to be expected, even after an argument before him,.
to be as capable of administering the questions therein as
accurately as has already been done. At least this would be
so where the hearing below, as in the present case, was
before a judge of superior jurisdiction.
Cases might occur in which the hearing had been before
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some officer not so well versed in law; and in these a power
to review the whole matter might even be desired by the
Secretary.
You will have noticed in this opinion I concur with the
views of Judges Blatchford and Woodruff in Stupp's case
(12 Blatchf., 501).
Stupp had been before a commissioner, and thereupon
sued out a writ of habeas corpus and a certiorari, returnable
before the circuit court for the southern district of New
York. In the course of an argument to show that it could
not review questions upon the effect of evidence, etc., decided by the commissioner, the court said repeatedly that the
power to do this was vested by the statute in the Secretary
of State.
Upon the whole, repeating that very great respect is due
to the decisions of the tribunal which hears theca~ in the
first instance, especially under such circumstances as this
presents, I am of opinion that the law gives to the party
charged the double protection of a concurrence of views
upon all questions affecting his gnilt under the treaty by the
magistrate and the Secretary before he is to be surrendered.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

PRINTED MATTER MAILED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
By section 17 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 180, printed matter~
other than books, received by mail from foreign countries, under the
provisions of postal treaties or conventions, is declared free of duty;
and no distinction is there made between such as is mailed to subscribers for their own use and such as is mailed to dealers for sale.
Books which are admitted to the international mails, exchanged under
the provisions of the Universal Postal Union Convention, Illay be
delivered to addresses upon the payment of the duty thereon.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 6, 1881.
SIR: In reply to your favor of July 28, in reference to
the duties upon printed matter shipped by mail to the United
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;

States for sale from foreign countries in large qu~tities, I
beg to say that your previous letter upon the same subject
was referred to Mr. Smith, Assistant Attorney-General, for
examination and reply.
I regret to say that he seems to have entirely overloo~ed
the seventeenth section of the act of March 3, 1879, which
specifically provides that printed matter other than books
l~eceived in the mails from foreign countries, under the provisions of postal treaties or conventions, shall be free of customs duty. No distinction is made by this provision between
such printed matter when mailed to subscribers for their own
use, or when mailed to dealers for sale.
The whole question seems, therefore, to be one of administration for the Postal Department. If the printed matter
in question is properly carried in the mails under the provisions•of the postal treaties or conventions, it is free of customs duty. If it is not within ,the terms of such treaties o·r
conventions, it should be excluded from the mails; but in
nothing do I discover any warrant in the law for inquiry by
your Department as to whether such printed matter is received as merchandise, nor for the imposition upon it of any
customs duty.
In reply to your second question, I beg to say that such
books as ar..e admitted to the international mails, exchanged
under the provisions of the UniverRal Postal Union Convention, may be delivered to addresses upon the payment of the
duty thereon.
In this answer I have, indeed, used the very terms of the
statute, for it is singularly clear and unambiguous. It
authorizes the Postmaster-General and yourself to agree
upon proper regulations for the collection of such duties,
and it limits the books which may be thus carried and delivered to such books as are admitted to the international
mails, exchanged as already stated.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.

Hon.

WILLIAM WINDOM,

Secretary of the Treasury.
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CASE OE' PAYMASTER BARTON.
Construction of sflction 1412, Revised Statutes, as given in 14 Opin.,
192, 358, and 15 Opin., 45, namely, that it gives to transferred officers
the full benefit of their former sea-service only in so far as this may
go to complete the period of such service required in their respective
grades previous to examination for promotion, and in so far as it
ought properly to be taken into account in the matter of assignment
to duty-reaffirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 11, 1881.
SIR: I have the honor to reply to the question submitted
to me in your favor of August 6, 1881, as to the claim of
Passed Assistant Paymaster Jonathan R. Barton, U. S.
Navy, for advancement on the list of officers of the Pay
Corps, under the provisions of section 1412 of the Revised
Statutes.
In deference to your wishes I have reconsidered the question submitted by Mr. Barton, and have carefully examined
the argument enclosed by you in support of the position
assumed by him; but I can not forbear saying that if any
question ought to be considered settled, as between the
Executive Departments of the Government, the proper construction of section 1412 of the Revised Statutes is certainly
within that category.
The true meaning of the provision in question was first
considered by Attorney-General Williams in the case of
Lieutenant-Commander Dyer, and his opinion was rendered
March 3, 1873, in a letter to your predecessor, Secretary
Robeson. It was again considered by Attorney-General
Williams at the instance of the Treasury Department, and
an opinion upon it rendered January 24, 1874. It was again
brought for review before my immediate predecessor, and an
elaborate opinion upon the subject was rendered by him
June 12, 18'78.
These several opinions are in entire agreement upon the
question raised in your communication to me. They declare
that the provision in question was designed to give the
transferred officers the free benefit of their former seaservice, in so far as it might , go to complete the period of

190

HON. WAYNE MACVEAGH
Payment of Accrued Pension.

such service required in their respective grades previous to
examination for promotion, and in so far as it ought properly to be taken into account in the matter of assignment to
duty, and that it conferred no advantages beyond these.
It necessarily follows, as Attorney-General Devens decided, that a volunteer officer transferred to the regular
Navy is not entitled to hold a commission dated as of the
date of his volunteer commission, but tllat he must take his
place upon the Register according to tlle rank given him by
his commission as an officer of the regular Navy.
In this construction of the pr·ovision in question I entirely
concur, and I therefore advise you that Mr. Barton's claim
of a position in the regular Pay Corps above all officers in
that corps who entered the regular service after .Tune 2,
1864, is invalid, and should not be allowed.
I return herewith the papers which you enclosed to me.
Very respectfully, your obedient serYant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Ron. WILLIAM H. HuNT,
Secretary of the Navy.

PAYMENT OF ACCRUED PENSION.
T. died while his application for pension was pending, leaving a widow
and a daughter under sixteen years of age ; the mother died after the
daughter attained the age of sixteen years; and subsequently the pension was allowed and a certificate therefor issued: Held, that under
section 4718, Revised Statutes, the daughter is entitled to the pension
which had accrued up to the death cf the father.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 12, 1881. ..

SIR: You have asked my opinion upon the following
case:
Francis Thierry died while his claim for pension was pending, leaving a daughter under sixteen years of age and a
widow. After the child attained the age of sixteen years
the mother died, and still later the pension was allowed and
certificate therefor was issued.
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Your inquiry, whether tbe pension which bad accrued up

to the death of the father can now be paid to his daughter,
!~ranees

B. Thierry, I answer in the affirmative.
Section 4718 of the Revised Statutes provides that when
~my person entitled to a pension shall die while his application is pending " his widow, or if there is no widow, the
.ehild or children of such person under the age of sixteen
_years, shall be entitled to receive the accrued pension to the
date of the death of such person, * * * and if no widow
,o r child survive, no payment whatsoever of the accrued pen·~ion shall be made or allowed."
·
'
Section 25 of the act of March 3, 1873, chap. 234 (17 Stats.,
574), of which this is a substantial re-enactment, provided
that ~ "If any person entitled to a pension shall die during
the pendency of his application therefor, his widow, or if no
widow, his child or children under sixteen years of age at the
time of his death, shall be entitled to receive the accrued
pension to the date of death," etc. The verbal change made
by the revisers was the omission of the words ''at the time
<>f his death."
The efl'ect of this is not to fix some other period as the one
.at which the child is to be under sixteen years of age and
thus preclude reference to the original statute, but is to
leave it a matter of some doubt as to whether the date of
the death of the father or the time of the allowance of the
pension is to determine the rights of the child. A careful
reading of section 4718, Revised Statutes, affords little
.a ssistance in solving this doubt, and the section may be as
fairly construed to mean that the child shall not be over sixteen when the father dies as when the pension is allowed.
In the case of the United States v. B01.cen (100 U. S., 513),
it was held that resort might he had to the law which was
the subject of revision to interpret anything left in doubt
by the language of the revisers, and that where there is a
;Substantial doubt as to the meaning of the language used in
the revision, the old law is a valuable source of information.
Mr. Justice :\I iller, delivering the opinion, said: "If, then,
in the case before us the language of section 4820 was fairly
;Susceptible of the construction claimed by the Government,
as well as of the opposite one, the argument from the pro·
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vision of the statute as it stood. before the revision would be
conclusive."
Applying this rule, it is clear that the attainment of sixteen years of age by :Frances B. Thierry prior to the death
of her mother, and prior to the allowance of the pension, iu
no way militates against her right to the accrued pension.
If the mother bad died before the father, there would be·
no question as to the child's rights; if the widow had survived until the time came for payment, there would be no
question as to her right. The peculiarity of the case is that
there was a widow at the time of the death of the claimant,
and there is none now when payment is to be made. In
determining whether this fact should prevent payment of
the pension to the child no aid is obtainable from the
original statute, and as the revision is not explicit, we are
left to the reason and spirit of the law for its interpretation.
I can not imagine any reason why the child should. receive
the accrued pension where the claimant survived the motherthat would not apply with equal force to a case where the·
death of the mother intervened between that of the claimant
and the allowance of the pension. The prohibitory clause·
of the statute is limited to where "no widow or child survive," meaning, of course, "no widow or child under sixteen years of age." Here a child who was under sixteen
years of age at the death of the claimant has survived until
the allowance of the pension.
The purpose of the statute was to give the accrued pension to the widow or the child ; and in my opinion, at the
death of the father, each acquired a distinct contingent
interest; the widow's being contingent on her survival until
allowance and payment, the child's being contingent on the
death of the mother prior to, and its own survival until, payment.
In your communication of the lOth instant you request
that, in connection with the case of Frances B. Thierry, I
give my opinion as to how far the jurisdiction of the accounting officers of the Treasury extends in the matter of the
revision of allowances made by the Commissioner of Pensions.
As this case was referred by you to me at the request of
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the Second Comptroller, no question of the jurisdiction of
the accounting officers of the Tr'easury arises. How far
they may revise the deci~ions of the heads of Departments
and of other officers in whom discretion is vested by law, is
a qnestion of great gravity and of long standing. I trust, on
reflection you will agree with me that it is more desirable to
have my opinion on specific cases which directly present the
question than a general opinion ou tbe whole subject.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Ron. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
I

GRADUATES OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY-RELATIVE RANK.
Opinions of August 7, 1877 (15 Opin., 637), and March 31, H!79 (16
Opin., 296), referred to, and suggested that copies thereof be sent by
the Secretary of the Navy to the Senate in response to a resolution of
that body in regard to the subject of relative rank of graduates of t,he
Naval Academy.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 12, 1881.
SIR: I beg to acknowledge your favor asking my opinion
. upon the legal question involved in the resolution of the
Senate directing you to inform that body ''what alteration,
if any, has been made in the relative rank of graduates of
the Naval Academy, as originally established at graduation,.
under the provisions of sections 1483 and 1521 of the Revised
Statutes, in any classes graduating since the year 1870, and
if so, under the provisions of what act the said alteration or
r~-arrangement of rank was made~"
In reply I beg to say that I have carefully considered the
facts stated in your letter, and in that connection the
opinion of Solicitor-General Phillips of August 7., 1877't
approved by Attorney-General Devens, and the opinion of
Attorney-General Devens himself of March 31, 1879, reaffirming the former opinion.
In these two opinions the entire subject of your letter is
elaborately considered and clearly and distinctly decided,
and I am sure you will agree with me that it is not com182-VOL xvn--13
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patible with the proper admiuistratiou of this Departmeut
that a third opinion upon the legal questions involved should
be rendered unless very exceptional circumstances should
exist requiriug so unusual a course to be pursued.
Iu the present case I am unable to discover any circumstances which would justify me in considering the question
in these opinions, twice considered and twice decided in the
same way, as open questions for my examination and decision; and I feel constrained, therefore, to advise you that
the only answer you can prope~ly make to that portion of
the resolution of the Senate which asks for the legal authority for the changes which were made is in the submission
to that body of copies of the two opinions already mentioned.
I return the papers forwarded to me by you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WILLIAM H. HUN'l',
Secretary of the Navy.

CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS.
The joint resolution of March 3, 1865 (sec. 1754, Rev. Stat.), considered
in connection with the act of March 3, ltl71, chapter 114, and held
that honorably discharged soldiers and sailors are not exempt from
liability to examination for admission into the civil service, but t.h at
they are entitled to a preference for appointment as against· other
persons of equal qualifications for the place.
f

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 13, 1881.
SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of a letter of Collector Merritt, forwarded to me by you, inclosing a petition
from John Collins, who was honorably discharged from the
milit,a ry service by reason of disability from wounds incurred in the line of duty.
The letter of the collector states that Mr. Collins has been
serving as night inspector in the- New York custom-house
during the past six months, and bas shown himself a capable
and competent man for the position.
Mr. Collins claims to be appointed a permanent night
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,i nspector without reference to the civil service rules now in
force in the New York custom-house by virtue of the orders
<Of the President of March 6, 1879, and of June 30, 1880,
which orders prescribe regulations for the admission of persons into the public service in that custom-house.
You desire my opinion upon the law governing this subject.
I have the honor to state that in my opinion Congress has
very plainly expressed its will upon the question you submit to me. The joint r(>.solution of March 3, 1865 (Hev. Stat.,
sec. 1754), is as fo]lows:
"Persons honorably discharged from the military or naval
service by reason of disability resulting from wounds or
.s ickness incurred in the line of duty shall be preferred for
.appointments to civil offices, provided they are found to
possess the business capacity necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of such offices."
The act of March 3, 1871, provides as follows: "The
President is authorized to prescribe such regulations for the
.admission of persons into the civil service of the United
States as will best promote the efficiency thereof, and ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health,
character, knowledge, and ability for the branch of service
into which he seeks to enter; and for this purpose he may
.employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, and may
· prescribe their duties, and establish regulations for the con.
duct of persons who may receive appointments in the civil
service."
These two expressions of the' legislative will form one
harmonious system. They do not exempt honorably discharged soldiers and sailors from liability to examination,
bnt they do prescribe that of two or more applicants found to
be equally qualified by such examination for appointment
the preference shall be given to any such applicant who has
been honorably discharged from the military or naval service
by reason of disability resulting from wounds or sickness
incurred in the line of duty.
In direct reply to your question, I therefore advise you
that Mr. Collins is not exempted from the operatjon of the
regulations prescribed by the President, but that he is
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entitled to a preference as against any civilian of equal qualifications for the place he seeks.
I return you the papers you inclosed to me.
I need hardly say that I have not thought it necessary in
this instance to consider the extent of the power conferred
upon the President by the Constitution in the matter of
appointments to office.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEA.GH.
Ron. WILLIAM WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.

RELATIVE RANK IN THE ARMY.
The word "appointment," as used in section 1219, Revised Statntesr
comprehends only the appointment of an officer on his original entry
into the regular service, and does not include his appoiutment on promotion thereafter made. Opinion of Attorney-General Devens, of
February 21, 1881 (ante, p. 34), dissented from.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 17, 1881.
SIR: Your favor returning to me the opinion of Attorney-

General Devens, of February 21, 1881, on ' the question of
relative rank between officers of the same grade and date of
appointment and commission, has been received; and in
deference to the urgency of your request, and the importance attaching to the matter in the proper administration of
your Department, I have felt constrained to reconsider the
question therein decided.
I find less difficulty, in the present instance, in departing·
from the rule of this Department to decline to reconsiderquestions once formally decided, because it concerns e·xclusively a question of administration in your Department,
and adherence to the opinion of my predecessor will require
the reversal of the practice of your Department ever since
the passage of the law in question, covering the very considerable period of fourteen years.
The act of March 2, 1867, section 1219, Revised StatuteR,
provides that in fixing relative rank between officers of ~ the-
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same grade and date of appointment and commission the
time which each may have actually served as a commissioned officer of the United States, whether continuously or
at different periods, shall be taken into account ; and in computing such time no distinction shall be made between
service as a commissioned officer in the regular Army and
service since the 19th day of April, 1861, in the volunteer force, whether under appointment or commission
from the President oi· from the Governor of a State. The
act also contains these words, which are not found in the
Revised Statutes: "And the provisions herein contained as
to relative rank shall apply to all appointments that have
.already been made under the 'act to fix the military peace
establishment of the United States,' approved July 28,
1866."
The act of July 28, 1886, was an act reorganizing and
'increasing the regular Army; and the provisions quoted
from the act of March 2, 1867, have been construed, as I
understand, in your Department, from the passage · of the
law until now, as applying to all appointments that had
already been made under the act of July 28, 1866, as well as
to all appointments made subsequently thereto, giving to
each appointee at the date of hi8 commi8sion as an officer of
the regular Army the full benefit of any service he might
have rendered in the volunteer forees.
The contention is as to whether the provisions quoted
apply not only to the original appointment of such officer,
but to all subsequent promotions in the regular Army.
In the opinion of my immediate predecessor, which you
have returned for my reconsideration, it is held that the
words "appointment" and ''commission" in this act of Congress include not only the original appointment and commission as an officer of tbe regular .Army, but all subsequent
promotions in that service. After most careful and respect~
fu1 consideration, I am unable to concur in this conclusion.
As I understand it, a clear and well-defined distinction
between appointment and promotion has existed and been
recognized in the War Department continuously since the
,estab1ishment of the Army. Appointment is the selection
·of persons, not now in the Army, as officers of it, or the
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designation by selection of an officer already in the Army to.a vacancy which is not required by the law or the regulations to be filled by promotion according to seniority. Promotion is the advancement of officers already in the Army;.
according to seniority, to vacancies happening in the different arms of the service, and according to rules prescribed
by law or by regulations having the force of Jaw.
I understand also that since the passage of the act of
March 2, 1867, ~t has been the uniform practice of your
Department to fix the relative rank of officers receiving
appointments, within the meaning of that term as herein
defined, at the time of such appointment; and that their
relative rank, thus fixed, is not thereafter disturbed by any;
subsequent promotion; but that subsequent promotion and
rank is by seniority in the regular service.
In the construction of statutes which have been practicall,y administered by one of the great Departments of the·
Government for a considerable period, I know of no safer·
rul e than that prescribed. by the Supreme Court in the case
of the United States v. 1l1oore (95 U. S. R., 763): "The construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty
of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful
consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent
reasons. * * * The officers concerned are usually able
men and masters of the subject. and frequently they are the
draughtsmen of the laws they are afterwards called upon to.
interpret."
There are not wanting instances of recognition by Congres~ also of the distinction between appointment and promotion upon which the regulations and practice of your
Department rests.
The Revised Statutes, section 1132, provides that all
appointments in the Quarter~aster's Department shall be
made from the Army. while it is well kuown that promotions.
in that department are made according to seniority in the
department itself; and section 1194 provides that until.
otherwise directed by law there shall be no new appointments and no promotions in the Department of AdjutantGeneral, or of Inspector-General, or in the Paymaster's,.
Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Ordnance, or ~Iedical Depart1
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ments; and section 1204 providt>s that promotions in the line
shall be made through the whole Army in its several lines
of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, respectively. Promotions
in the staff of the Army shall be made in the several departments and corps respectively; and as recently as March 3,
1877, Congress, in restoring a lieutenant to the Army, provided: ''And the law of promotion in the line is hereby suspended in this case for the purpose of allowing such restoration."
The Committee on Military Affairs of the SenatP, reportin·g May 21, 1880, adversely upon a bill to change the method
of promotion among lieutenants of the line, say: "The terms
'appointment' and 'promotion,' as used in the laws and in
the Army, are arbitrary and technical. Literally, 'appointment' is authority conferred b;y virtue of which the duties of
an officer may be performed; ' promotion' is advancement
by seniority to a higher office. Ad van cement to a higher
office confers new author1ty necessarily, and hence every
promotion is an appointment. From long usage promotion
is often used in a sense which largely excludes the idea of
the appointment that accompanies it."
I have also examined the Congressional debates at the
time the law in question was upon its passage, and I discover nothing in them to support the view that it was intended that the benefit of previous service in the volunteer forces should recur to an officer upon each occasion of
his promotion in the regular service.
I am constrained, therefore, to advise you that the word
"appointment" in section 1219 of the Revised Statutes
applies ouly to the original entry of the officer into the
regular service, or subsequent ~ppointment b;y selection;
but that it does not apply to promotions by seniority as
defined in the Regulations of the Army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Bon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

,
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TREATY WITH THE KANSAS INDIANS.
Authority to issue certificates of indebtedness under the treaty with the
Kansas Indians is to be considered as conferred upon the date of the
proclamation of the treaty, March 16, 1863, and not before.
Such certificates were of two classes, viz : First, those issued to persons
who h-ad settled and improved lands within the reservation to an
amount not exceeding $29,4:ll in thE\ aggregate; second, those issued
to persons having claims against the Indians to an amount not exceeding in the aggregate $36,394.47.
;
The Secretary of the Interior is not at liberty to accept in payment of
lauds any certificates of the first cla~s issued after the limitation upon
the amount of such certificates prescribed in the treaty had been
reached, nor any certificates of the second class issued in advance of
the ratification and proclamation of the treaty.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Au,gust 18, 1881.
SIR : In reply to your letter asking my opinion as to the
exc~ssi ve issue of certificates of i~1debtedness under the treaty
with the Kansas Indians, I beg to state the facts, as I understand them, are as follows:
The treaty was proclaimed March 16, 1863, and any autho ity conferred by its provisions upon the officers of the Government to issue certificates of indebtedness must be considered as conferred upon that date, and not before. The negotiation of the treaty by the agent of the Indian Bureau could
certainly confer no such authority. The insertion by the
Senate of amendments in the treaty thus negotiated could
certainly confer no such authority, for those amendments required the assent of the Indians, and it is indeed entirely
clear that the earliest date at which certificates of indebtedness could be lawfully issued was the date of the proclamation already mentioned.
The certificates were of two classes. Those of the first
were to be issued to persons who had settled and improved
lands within the reservation to an amount not exceeding in
the aggregate $29,421. Those of the second class were to be
issued to persons having claims against the Indians to an
amount not exceeding in the aggregate $36,394.47. There is
not the slightest ambiguity either as to the date when the
power to issue the certificates in question was conferred or
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as to the character and extent of the authority itself. After
the ratification of the treaty, and not before, certificates might
lawfully be issued, and the certificates of each class might
"lawfully aggregate, but could not exceed, the respective
.amounts designated in the treaty itself.
.As matter of fact, however, certificates of the second class
were issued not only before the proclamation of the treaty,
but even betore the amendments inserted by the Senate had
received the assent of the Indians; and not only to the entire
amount allowed by such amendments but considerably in
.excess thereof. As there was no authority to issue them on
the part of anybody when they were issued, I am obliged to
advise you that they were absolutely null and void, and, as I
am unable to discover any subsequent aetion which acknowl€dges or ratifies them, they continue so to be.
No certificates of the first class were issued until after the
proclamation of the treaty, March 16, 1863; but after that
date such certificates were issued to the amount of $42,901.03,
being an excess of $13,480.03 over the amount limited by the
treaty. As there was not even a pretense of authority for the
issue of the certificates representing such excess, and as I can
-discover no subsequent action acknowledging or ratifying
them, they also are null and void.
You inform me, however, that a practical difficulty may
arise in distinguishing between the certificates so issued and
those issued within the limitation prescribed by the treaty,
:and that difficulty is probably increased by the following
provision in the treaty itself:
"That all such certificates shall be receivable as cash to
the amount for which they may be issued in payments for
lands purchased or entered on that part of the first assigned
reservation outside of said diminished reservation."
Under this provision, certificates issued in settlements of
claims of the first class to the amount of $27,533.48 have been
actually redeemed in lands, leaving outstanding certificates
of this class to the amount of $15,367.55.
In dealing with the certificates of this class it has occurred
to me that it will be pos~ible to distinguish between the certificates lawfuJly issued and those issued without authority
by their respective dates; that is, beginning with the date <!f
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the treaty, all certificates of this class thereafter issued would·
be lawful and valid to the amount limited by the treaty itself,
to wit, $29,421. Certificates issued after that limit had been
reached would be unlawful and invalid. If, however, as has
probably happened, you discover that a portion of the certificates already redeemed in lands were issued after the limit
prescribed in the treat.y had been reached, and a portion of
those now outstanding were issued before that limit was.
reached, such fact would not alter the character of the cer-·
tificates themselves, and it would still be your duty to recognize as lawful and valid such certificates of the first class as:
had been issued within the limitation mentioned.
In reaching these conclusions, I have not been unmindful
of the hardship, real or apparent, which may be inflicted upon
the present holders of unredeemed certificates. If, however,
the hardship is real, relief will doubtless be afforded by thRlegislative department of the Government, and it would be
dangerous to the last degree and subversive of all the settled'
principles of law applicable in such cases to protect even in·
nocent holders for value of such certificates from loss by holding that an Executive Department of the Government may
create obligations binding upon the Government in advance
of any authority conferred upon it to do so~ or in disregard
of plainly expressed limitations upon the extent of such authority.
I am constrained, therefore, to advise you, that you are not
at liberty to accept, in payment of the lands mentioned in
your letter, any certificates of the first class, issued after the
limitation upon the amount of such certificates prescribed in
the treaty had been reached, nor any certificate of the second
class, issued in advance of the ratification and proclamatio:u
of the treaty, to wit, March 16, 1863.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE M.A.oVEAGH.
· BON. 8. J. KIRKWOOD,

Secretary of the Interior.
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IMPORTATION OF FRUIT.
The terms "quantity" and "whole quantity," as employed in Schedule
M (Rev. Stat., 2d ed., p. 476), are not to be understood as covering al1
the fruit imported in any one vessel shipped to one consignee, if corning from different consignors. Each consignment, not only from one·
party, but of each separate kind of fruit specified in the statute, is to be
considered as the "quantity," and as the "whole quantity," therein
specified.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A ugwtt 19, 1881.
SIR : I have carefully considered the question raised by
your letter, calling my attention to such portion of Schedule
M, of the law imposing duties upon imports, as imposes certain rates of duty on oranges and other fruits therein men~
tioned. It provides that no allowance shall be made for loss
by decay on the voyage, unless the loss shall exceed 25 per
centum of the quantity, and that the allowance then made
shall be only for the amount of loss in excess of 25 per centum
of the whole quantity.
This provision was inserted as an amendment, and it does,
not seem to me probable that its draughtsman considered
the change in the mode of expression. I have not been able
to rliscover any reason for changing the expresRion from
"quantity" to "whole quantity;" nor is there any reasonable effect which can be given to the word "whole" by attaching any special emphasis or import to it. It seems tome that as used in this proviso "quantity" and '~whole quantity" meaH precisely the same thing.
Possibly a clearer view of the meaning of the section in
question will be had by extending the paragmph to its proper
legal form. It would then read: Oranges, 20 per centum
ad valorem; lemons, 20 per centum ad valorem ; pine-apples,
20 per centum ad valorem; grapes, 20 per centum ad valorem. .And the same extension ~hould be applied to the
fruits liable to a duty of 10 per centum ad valorem. When
thus read, it will be apparent, I think, that each fruit is to.
be considered alone in estimating the proportion of injury to·
it, for each fruit is, in itself, a separate object of duty; and.
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the allowance for the percentage of injury should be as separate as the duty itself.
It seems to me also equally clear that even in the same
kind of fruit, each separate invoice, in which a loss occurs, is
to be considerPd in estimating the allowance to be made. If
the provision is construed otherwise, it would present the
practical anomaly that the allowance upon a shipment by
one consignor at one port would depend not at all upon the
sta:e of preservation in which the fruit shipped by him arrived, but upon the accident whether some other consignor
at some other port shipped to the same consignee a particular quantity of fruit, and it arrived in a particular condition.
It must also be remembered that if the words" quantity"
and "whole quantity" in this section blend together all fruit
in one cargo, or even in one invoice, they must be held to do
so without reft->rence to the uifference of duty upon the difl'erent kinds of fruit mentioned in it. If they blend all the fruit
in one cargo into one quantity for the purpose of estimating
the allowance, certainly Yery great practical confusion would
arise in applying the different rates of duty and ascertaining
the proper per centum of allowance; and the same would be
true if they put together the different kinds of fruit in a
single invoice. If, for instance, lemons, oranges, limes, and
bananas are imported either in the same invoice or in the
same cargo, and they are to be considered as a common fruit
an(l a cOmi;llOU quantity for the purpose of the ~llowance,
provided by this se~tiou; if 25 per centum of the limes should
be lost by decay, it would be necessary to bold that the
oranges should be benefited by such decay, not at the rate
of the duty upon the limes injured, but at the rate of the duty
upon the oranges uninjured. If a like percentage of the
lemons was lo.st by decay, the bananas which were uninjured
would only receiye benefit at the lower rate of duty imposed
upon them.
Such consequences can not have been intended; nor do
they, in my judgment, result from the natural reading of the
provision itself.
I have, therefore, to advise you, in direct answer to your
question, that these terms "quantity" and'' whole quantity"
at'e not to be accepted as covering all the fruit imported in
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any one vessel shipped to onec onsignee if coming from different consignors; but that each consignment, not only from
one party but of each separate kind of fruit ~pecified in t.he
statute, is to be considered as ''the quantity" and as the
"whole quantity" therein specified.
· Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WILLIAM WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.

PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS.
By virtue of the supervisory power conferred on him by section 441,
Revised Statutes, over the public business relating to patents for
inventions (see also section 481, Revised Statutes), it is within the
competency of the Secretary of· the Interior to review a decision of
the Commissioner of Patents made m an interference case under
Rule 110, Rules and Practice of the Patent Office, upon a motion to
amend a preliminary statement.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 20, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 3d instant states that you have before you on appeal, or on petition in the action of appeal from
the decisions of the Commissioner of Patents, the cases of
Henry 0. Nicholson v. Thomas A. Edison (duplex telegraph),
and of F. V. LeRoy v. D. A. Hopkins (journal bearings).
From the papers transmitted by you I learn that the status
of the cases is as follows:
In March, 1879, an interference was declared between Edison and Nicholson, and during that month Edison filed a preliminary statement under oath showing the date of the original conception of his invention, of its illustration by model
or dmwing, of its disclosurP. to others, of its completion, and
of the extent of its use.
In September, 1880, testimony in the case was commenced.
In the following November Edison moved for leave to amend
his preliminary statement by adding a reference to a certain
caveat, accompanying his motion with affidavits explanatory
of its omission from the preliminary statement and of his
delay in making the motion.
I
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This motion was successively refused by the examiner in
-charge of the interferences and by the Commissioner. From
the decision of the latter Edison has appealed or petitioned
in the nature of an appeal. The case of LeRoy v. Hopkins
is not materially different so far as it gives rise to the questions upon which you request my opinion.
Your first inquiQ· is whet,her you have the power to allow
this amendment.
This question of how far the Secretary of the Interior has
·controlling or appel1ate power over the Commissioner of Pat-ents is· one which has assumed greater importance and
received more and more attention as the expansion of the
business of that office and of the other bureaus of the Department bas rendered less and less practical the personal
·e xercise by the bead of the Department of the powers vested
in him by law. Secretary Chandler (9 Official Gazette, 403)
disclaimed any appellate power~; Secretary Schurz (13 ibid.,
771; 16 ibid., 220) concurred in this view, but ~he latter
directed the Commissioner to prepare for issue (12 ibid., 478)
-certain letters patent which the Commissioner had decided
should not be issued until a bill in equity then pending in
the supreme court of the Distnct should be disposed of.
I shall not attempt to distinguiAh the cases before me from
the ones considered by these eminent Secretaries, but will
state my opinion and the reasons therefor.
I think that the key to the whole question i~ found in sections 441 and 481 of the Revised Statutes. By the former
the Secretary of the Interior is chargeQ. with the supervision
{)f the public business relating to (inter alia) patents for inventions, and by the latter it is provided that "the Commis·~ioner of Patents, under the direction ofthe Secretary of the
Interior, shall superintend or perform all duties respecting
the granting and issuing of patents directed by law." To
my mind every section- imposing a duty or conferring a
power on the Commissioner of Patents should be read as if
the words "under the direction-of the Secretary of the Interior" were inserted.
It is not necessary to the validity of all the acts of the Commissioner that the direction of the Secretary should be expressed. That will always be presumed except in the cases
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which require his express approval, to wit, the adoption of
regulations (sec. 483, Rev. Stat.), the refusal to recognize a
person as patent agent (sec. 487), and the actual granting of
.a patent (sec. 4883).
The latter section requires the patent to be signed by the
.Secretary of the Interior, while the name of the Commissioner
.:appears only by way of counter-signature.
Lexicographers unite in defining countersign to mean "to
.sign what has already been signed by a superior, to authenticate by an additional signature."
This distinction between the duties of the two officers palpably means that the Secretary's signature is not for mere
purposes of authentication. It would be absurd in face of
.s ections 441, 481, and 4883 to say that the act of the Secretary
in issuing the patent is purely ministerial, the act of a clerk
·Of a court registering the decree delivered by some tribunal.
I find no clause or section relieving the Commissioner from
the directing powers of the Secretary, and I am irresistibly
led to the conclusion that the final discretion in all matters
Telating to the granting of patents is lodged in the Secretary
{)f the Interior. In thAcase of a collision between himself and
the Commissioner (as in Sargent's case, 12 Official Gazette, 475)
he may direct the latter to prepare letters patent for his signature and may further direct him to attach his counter-signature.
From the right and power of the Secretary to withhold
bis signature from the patent, unless be is satisfied of the
-claimant's title thereto, plainly follows an equal right to
direct the Commissioner while the proceedings are pending
to receive an amendroent which will open up a line of evi·dence that may throw light on that title.
Considerable confusion has arisen from the use of the.
word "appeal" in describing the applications made to the
;Secretary by persons dissatisfied with the acts of the Commissioner, and because Congress has expressly provided in
-sections ±909, 4910, and 4911 for appeals to the board of examiners-in-chief, to the Commissioner, and to the supreme court
of the District ofColumhia, it is argued that there are no rights
of appeal except those given by statute, and no power of review except by appeal. The latter proposition came before
the supreme court of the District on the application of Hull
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for a mandamus to compel the Commissioner to grant him
a patent (2 McArthur, 90). The board of examiners-inchief decided in favor of his claim, but the Commissioner
refused to issue the patent, contending that there rested in
him a discretion iu determining whether the patent Rhould
issue, and that in his judgment it should not. The relator
insisted that the only right to appeal from the examiners-inchief was in him, and that he was satisfied with their decision. The court held that the Commis_sioner by virtue of
his supervisory power might refuse to issue a patent although the. examiners-in-chief decided that it should be
granted. The principles there laid down seem especially applicable to the supervisory powers of the Secrc·tary over the
whole business of patents for inventions, his directory power
over the Commissioner of Patents, and his right to withhold his signature from the letters patent. The language
of Judge Olin (page 10d), if f, r "Commissioner" be substituted "Secretary of the Interior," and for examiners-inchief" be substituted "Commissioner of Patents," I adopt as
my own. He says: '~I think the right of appeal was omitted
because it was unnecessary to confer it; for the Commis8ioner's supervisory power over acts of the subordinates in
the office is such as to preclude any necessity of his 'appealing' from the examiners-in-chief. He can refuse to grant
the patent."
Edison, therefore, is not appealing to you from a decision
of the Commissioner, but is invoking the exercise of your
directory and supervisory powers.
It is also argued that a dual right of appeal should not
exist; that because an appea) from the Commissioner tothe supreme court of the District of Columbia (in cases not
of interference) is provided by statute (Sec. 4911), the Secretary of the Interior has no control over the Commissioner
and his subordinates. I have already shown that an application for your interference is not an appeal in the sense in
which the word is used in the laws pro·dding for the Patent
Office. The right of appeal to the supreme court of the District in no way coflicts with the directory and supervisory
powers of the Secretary, and sections 481 and 4911 may
easily be read together without any inconsistency.
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.As I have already observed, every act of the Commissioner is presumed to be dune with the knowledge and by'
the direction of the Secretary until or unless the contrary
appears.. By the decision of the Commissioner in section
.4911 is meant not his personal opinion, but the act of deciding in accordance with the direction of the Secretary. It
would not be the entertainment or expression by the Commissioner of views hostile to the issue of a patent that would
furnish grounds for an appeal to the court, but it would be the
act of deciding, which, theoretically, is the act of the Secretary.
Two supposed cases will illustrate my meaning. The Commis~ioner is of opinion that A should not have a patent, and
declines to prepare letters patent, until the Secretary, entertaining a different view, directs him to do so. The Secretary affixes his signature, and directs the Commissioner to
authenticate them by his co~nter-signature. His refusaL to
do this would not entitle A to an appeal to the court, whatever might be A's rights to a mandamus.
On the other band the Commissioner considers B entitled
to a patent, prepares and countersigns the letters, but the
Secretary manifests his disapproval of the Commissioner's.
act by refusing to sign. Persistence in this refusal would be
tantamount to a direction to the Commissioner to cancel the
counter-signature. 'No mandamus would lie against the Secretary, and B would be entitled to appeal to the supreme
-court of the District of Columbia, although as a matter 'Of
fact·be would be appealing from a decision of the Secretary
and asking the court to maintain that of the Commissioner.
It is admitted that the responsibility of seeing that the
work is properly done by the Commissioner of Patents is with
the Secretary of the Interior, but an efl'ort is made to draw a
line between the ministerial or administerial or administrative duties of the Commissioner and those requiring the exer({ise of discretion, and to confine the directory and supervisory power of the Secretary to the former class. But the
directory power of the Secretary by statute comprehends all
duties of the Commissioner; and, to say the least, the Secretary is vested with powers of discretion equal to those of the
Commissioner.
272-VOL XVII--14
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The Commi sioner of the General Land Office (sec. 455),
of Indian Affairs (sec. 463), of Pensions (sec. 471), and of
Patents (sec. 481) perform thmr respective duties "under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior," while the
Superintendent of Public Documents (sec. 508), whose duties
are mainly mechanical, is '• subject to the general direction
of the Secretary of the Interior."
I do not see why if the directory power of the Secretary
oYer patents is to be confined to the ministerial or administratiYe duties of the Commissioner, it should not by a parity
of rea-..oi;iug bf> equally circumscribed in the Land, Indian,
.md Pension Offices, and the Secretary become only nominally the head of the Interior Department.
It is true that within the bounds of the dism:;etion reposed in
these se\eral commissioners their decisions are accepted as
final bjT the courts, ami they will not interfere by mandamus
to direct how that discretion shall be exercised. This, howe\er, is because the act of the Commissioner is constructively
the act of the Secretary, and not because the Commissioner
may exercise his discretion independent and in defiance of
the head of the Department.
These observations I think sufficiently answer your first
inquiry, which is as follows:
"Has the Secretary of the Interior jurisdiction to review
decisions of the Commissioner of Patents, rendered under
rule 110, Rules of Practice of the Patent Office, oYerruling
motions to amend preliminary statements in interference
-cases'"
I am not unaware of the vast amount of labor which must
result if you personally review all the acts and decisions, discretionary as well as administrative, of the Commissioner of
Patents. Indeed it would be physically impossible for you
to do this. The argument ab inconvenienti,however, addresses
itself rather to yon when you prescribe regulations under
section 161, Revised Statutes, for the performance of the
business of the Department.
It by no means follows that you are required to exercise
in every case the directory power invested in you, and from
the nature of thmgs you must sign many papers and do many
acts in confidence that your subordinates have acted honestly
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and wisely. In order that the business of the Department
may be accomplished, and that it may be conducted in an
-orderly manner, it will be perfectly proper for you by regulations to define the class of cases or disputes in which you
will specially exercise your directory powers, leaving all
others to your general directions; you may also prescribe the
stage of the proceedings at which they may be invoked.
I have confined myself in this opinion to your first inquiry;
the other three will form the subject of a subsequent communication.
I return herewith all inclosures except the pamphlets con)aining the Patent Laws of the United States and the Rules of
Practice of the Patent Office.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
GOVERNMENT HOSPITAL FOR THE INSANE.
'The provision in section 4851, Revised Statutes, that "if any person
charged with crime be found in the court before which he is charged to
be an insane person, such court shall certify the same to the Secretary of
the Interior, who may order such person to be confined in the hospital for
the insane,'' etc., applies only to persons charged with crime before the
courts in the District of Columbia; it does not extend to persons indicted in United States courts elsewhere.

•

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 22, 1881.
SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of
the 18th instant, inclosing a certificate of the district court
of the United States for the northern dist.rict of Texas, setting forth that Buford Kennett, who was indicted in said court
for violation of the laws of the United States, was found to be
insane; and asking whether the facts stated in such transcript
authorized the issue by you of an order that Kennett be confined in the hospital for the insane in this District.
Section 4851 of the Revised Statutes provides: "If any person charged with crime be found in the court before which
he is charged to be an insane person, such court shall certify
the same to the Secretary of the Interior, who may order such
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person to be confined in the Los pi tal for the insane; and if
he be not indigent, he and his estate shall be charged with
expenses of his support in the hospital."
This provision is found under Chapter IV of title 69, which
chapter is headed'' The Government Hospital for the Insane,"
. and the first section under this title provides that "there shall
be in the District o(Columbia a Government hospital for the
insane, and its objects shall be the most humane care and enlightened curative treatment of the insane of the Army and
Navy of the United States and of the .District of Columbia."
This chapter is in substance a condensation of the provisions of the acts of Congress of March 3, 1855, and of the supplement thereto of February '7, 1857, and, like those acts, is.
clearly intended to apply to the insane of the Army and Navy
and of the District of Columbia. Neither in the Revised
Statutes nor in the acts already mentioned is there to be
found the slightest indication of any purpose on the part of
Congress to authorize the reception into the hospital of this
District of insane persons resident in any State. The language of the section in question is general, inasmuch as it
speaks of any person charged with crime being found in the
court before which be is so charged to be an insane person,
but I have no doubt that the generality of this language is,
by the force of the title and the accompanying provisions,
limited to courts in this District. Sufficient reasons will suggest themselves to every mind why Congress should make
such provision for theinsaneoftheArmy and Navy and oftbis
District, as the States are expected to make for the insane
persons residing within their borders; but no reason can be
suggested why au insane resident of Texas shoultl be brought
and maintained here.
In the case you have submitted it is evidently supposed
that the mere fact that an insane resident of Texas has been
indicted for an offense in a court of the United States ren ders him a proper subject for the issue of an order by you for
his maintenance in the hospital under your charge. I am
unable to concur in that view.
I am strengthened in the conclusion I have reached by the
provisions of the act of June 23, 187 4, 18 Statutes at Large,
251. That act recognizes the duty of the United States to
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take care of convicts who may become insane while in her mtstody. It authorizes the Attorney-General to apply to the Secretary of the Interior for the transfer of such insane convict
to the hospital of tbis District, or if there shall not be accommodation for such person in said hospital, or if for other reasons the Attorney-General is of opinion that such insane person should be placed at a State insane asylum rather than at
said District asylum, then he is empowered to contract with
any State insane as~lum within the State in which such convict
is imprisoned for his care. and custody while remaining so
insane.
;I:he express legislation upon the subject is found, therefore,
to be in accordance with reasonable expectation. The Government provides for the insane of its military and naval services, the insane of this District~ and such persons as may become insane while in its custody and undergoing imprisonment under its authority; but it does not authorize the main- .
tenance here of residents of States who have become insane
after indictment but before conv-iction and imprisonment.
I have therefore to ad vise you that you are not at liberty
in this case to issue the order provided in section 4851 of the
Revised Statutes.
I return herewith the papers forwarded to me.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY TO COMPROMISE CASES.
In passing upon cases submitted to him for compromise, under sections
3229 and 3469, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of the Treasury, while
he is not at liberty to act from motives merely of compassion or
charity, may consider not only the pecuniary interests of the Government, but take into view general considerations of justice and equity
and of public policy.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 26, 1881.
SIR: In accordance with our verbal understanding, I have
·delayed until this time an answer to your note of May 9,
last, inclosing a memorandum from Assistant Secretary
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French upon the extent of your authority to compromise
cases, and asking my opinion thereon.
I beg now to state that I have very carefully considered
the subject, and I regret to say that I do not find myself able·
to ageee ~ntirely with the former opinions of this Department referred to in the m!3morandum of Judge French.
Those opinions appear to hold that the only consideration
that th~ Secretary of the Treasury is at liberty to take into
account in deciding upon the advisability of any proposed
compromise, either of a claim not in suit, or of a suit pending, is whether the Government can realize more money by
its prosecution than by accepting the settlement proposed.
While the language of the Revised Statutes is general, using
only the word "compromise," it is supposed tha.t the language of the original act incorporated in to section 3229 of
the Revised Statutes affords support for this opinion in using
these words: "All cases where it may appear to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to be for the interest of the
United States to compromise the same." But I have not been
able to satisfy myself that, even if these words bad been incorporated into the Revised Statutes, they would change
what seems to me to be the natural meaning of the language
used; nor am I able to discover sufficient basis for such
construction in section 3469 of the Revised Statutes, providing that a report by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent, having charge of any claim in favor of the
United States, recommending that such a claim should be
compromised, shall state in detail ~'the condition of such
claim," and the terms upon which the same may be compromised. I do not see that any special import is to be attached
to either of the expressions I have quoted, and I think they
leave the question you ask to be decided upon general considerations. The grant of authority is, as has already been
stated, general and comprehensive in its language. In the
one case the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the
advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, may
compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws instead of commencing suit thereon. and.
with the advice and consent of the said Secretary, and with
the recommendation of the Attorney General, he may compromise any such case after a suit thereon bas been com-
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menced. Upon such report, as has already been mentioned,
by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent,
having charge of any claim in favor of the United States,
recommending a compromise, and upon the recommendation
of the Solicitor of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to compromise such claim upon the terms
recommended. In both cases it h&s been required that detailed statements of the claim and• of the compromise made
shall be placed upon file.
In construing these provisions, the first thought which
naturally occurs to the mind is that Congress has placed
amvle safeguards around the exercise of this authority. It
not only requires that the grounds of the action of each officer in each case shall be placed upon file and left open to inspection, but that, in cases in wbich suits are not pending,
the Solicitor of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall all
concur before the compromise can be made. Where a suit
is pendiug or the claim is in charge of counsel, such counsel
or the Attorney General of the United States must also. concur before such compromise can be effected.
The second thought which naturally occurs upon reading
the provisions is, that if Congress had desired to impose any
limit upon the considerations which the Secretary of the
Treasury was at liberty to entertain in reaching his conclusion, it was very easy to do so. Congress having provided
these safeguards with the greatest care, and not having imposed the limitation mentioned, I do not feel at liberty to do
so by construction.
I do not fail to see that such discretion as I believe is
lodged in the Secretary may be abused; but I do not think
that any probable abuse of the discretion in que~tion could
be as serious to the public interests as the abuse of discretion lodged in him with reference to other and graver matters. Confidence must be reposed somewhere, and Congress
has in many most important respects reposed almost unlimited confidence in the proper exercise of the discretion confided to the head of the Treasury Department.
I am also unable to imply from the provisious of the law
under review any intention ou the pa1 t of Congress that the
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Secretary of the Treasury shoulu be compelled to pursue lit·
igations out of which the Unite<l Sta,tes might undoubtedly
realize smaller or greater sums of money. but which in his
judgment ought not to be further prosecuted. As an illustration, if a person has been guilty of a technical violation
of the internal revenue laws, and upon being informed of it,
oft'ers to compromise the case by the payment of the costs
and of any other sum justly due the Government, I see no
evidence in these sections of the Revised Statutes, or in the
laws from which they weredraughted, that Congress intended
to require that a suit shall be commenced and prosecuted to
extort the penalty intended only for willful violators of the
law, and the same considerations would apply to a great
variety of cases, some of which must be of frequent occurrence in the administration of the Treasury Department,
where the rigid enforcement of the technical legal rights of
the Government would work manifest and plain injustice by
taking from citizens money which, in the forum of conscience
and good morals, they did not owe to it. It is not necessary
to hold that the Secretary of the Treasury is in the matter
of compromise a fountain of the compassion of the Government or an almoner of its charity. Those are considerations
which do not belong to the administration of a business department. But, on the other band, it is to my mind as clearly
unnecessary to hold that the Secretary is bound to be an il.\strument of manifest injustice, and to ask himself only in
every case this question, Will the prosecution of the claim in
question probably bring to the Treasury more money than
its compromise upon the terms proposed~
I have, therefore, to advi5e you that while, in considering
any compromise submitted to your judgment,' you are not at
liberty to act from motives merely of compassion or charity,
you are at liberty, until Congress sees fit to limit your
authority, to consider not only the pecuniary interests of the
Treasury, but also general considerations of justice and
equity and of public policy.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ·
TN A YN E 1\iAcVEAGH.
Ron. Wn,LAM WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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PROCEEDS OF SCHOOL-FARM LANDS.
The investment of trust funds (money derived from the sale of schoolfarm landsj made by the Secretary of the Treasury, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 260, and section :l of the act
of May 7, 1678, chapter 96, in 5 per cent. bonds of the United States,
which have since been called for payment, may be continued by him
iu the same bonds at 3t per centum, in accordance with the circular of
the Treasury Department of May 12, 1881, or he is at liberty to pay off
such bonds and invest, the proceelis in any other bonds of the United
States for the benefit of the trusts mentioned in the provisions aforesaid.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Septernber 2, 1881.
SIR: In your letter of August 26 you call my attention
to section 6, act of March 3, 1873, chapter 260, providing
that certain money.., should be turned over to the Secretary
of the Treasury, to be by him invested in bonds of the United
States, and the interest to be applied to the support of certain schools therein mentioned. You also refer me to section
3 of the act of May 7, 1878, chapter 96, for the establishment
.of a sinking fund in the Treasury, the inves~ments to be
made by the Secretary in the bonds of the United States,
preference to be given to 5 per centum bonds, unless for
good reasons appearing to him, and which he shall report to
Congress, he shall at any time deem it ad visa.ble to make
t-~aid investments in other bonds of the United States. You
then state that both the funds in question have heretofore
been invested in registered 5 per centum bonds which have
been called for payment, but on which yon have reserved a
right of continuance at 31 per centum 'in accordance with the
circular of your Department of May 12, 1881. You then ask
my opinion whether you ha\'"e the right to pa.v off the bonds
in question at maturity and to invest the proceeds in any
other bonds of the United States for the benefit of the re·
spective trusts mentioned, and also whether you have a right
to continue the. bonds at 31- per centum per annum as provided in the circular already mentioned.
In reply to these questions I beg to state that the difficulty
.about them is only apparent, and is due to the fact that you
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are actiQg in the dual capacity of Secretary of the Treasury
and of trustee for certain investments.
As Secretary of the Treasury, you have undoubted authority to call and pay the bonds in question precisely as if they
were held by otller parties. As trustee of the investment,.
you have undoubted authority to invest the moneys you receive upon their payment in such other bonds of the United
States as may seem to you advisable. So far as the investments for the·sinking fund are concerned, it would be your·
duty to report the change made and the reason~ therefor to·
Congress at its next session.
As in your capacity of trustee you may be compelled to·
take the money for the called bonds, and will then be at.
liberty to buy in open market the bonds now bearing interest
at the rate of 3~ per centum, I can not see any difficulty iu
advising )~ou that you have also the right to aceept bonds
bearing interest at the rate of 32- per centum; or, in other
words, to agree·, as other holders of like bonds have done, to·
a reduction of the interest, so as to save to the tr·usts you
represent the premium those bonds are now bringing in tbe
open market. I need hardly say that if you think it would
be more to the pecuniary advantage of the trusts you represent to accept the money for the bonds now held for them,.
and to reinvest it in the 4 per centum or 4~ per centum bonds.
of the United States, it would be your duty to do so. But
if, as a matter of fact, you believe the most advantageous
arrangement you can make of the trust moneys~ in your care·
is to agree to the reduction of the interest upon the bonds
nc w held to 3~ per centum, then in my opinion you are at,
liberty, and it is your duty, to do so.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE M.A.cVEAGH•

..iion.

WILLIAM WINDOM,

Secretary of the Treasury.
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COMPENSATION FOR DISBURSING PUBLIC MONEYS.
In March, 1873, J., a postmaster, was appointed by the Secretary of the
Treasury an agent to disburse money appropriated for the erection of
a public building. The compensation for such service was then regulated by the act of March 3, 1869, chapter 123, which limited it to not
exceeding one-eighth of 1 per centum, and by the terms of his appointment J. was to receive the maximum compensation allowed by
law. Subsequently, by the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 131, it was
declared that the provision in the act of March 3, 1873, above referred
to, should be held to limit the compensation to be allowed for such
services to three-eighths of 1 per centum. Thereupon the Secretary
of the Treasury increased J.'s compensation to one-fourth of 1 per
centum; but the latter claims that he is entitled, under the terms of
his appointment, to three-eighths of 1 per centum from the date of
the act of 1875: Held that one-fourth of one per centum, as allowed
by the Secretary under the provision of the act of 1875, is all that J. is
entitled to for his services.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 15, 1881.
SIR : In your letter of the 5th ultimo you state that
"under the provisions of section 255, Revised Statutes, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint any
bonded officer of the United States to disburse moneys appropriated for the construction of public buildings, the Hon.
Thosmas L. James was appointed disbursing agent for the·
funds appropriated for the construction of the United States
court-house and post-office building at New York, with tlle
maximum compensation allowed by law, he at that time, and
during the whole period of his service as such disbursing
agent, holding the office of postmaster at New York City."
The letter of appointment is dated March 23, 1873, at
which time the law authorized a compensation not exceeding
one-eighth of 1 per centum to be allowed such agent for disbursing moneys. (See .Act of March 3, 1869, chap. 123; sec..
3654, Rev. Stat.)
By the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 131, it was declared
that the provision in the above-cited ant of March 3, 1869,
limiting the compensation to be allowed for the disbursement of moneys, ''shall be deemed and held to limit the

•
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compensation to be allowed to any disbursing officer who
disburses moneys appropriated for aud expended in the construction of any public building, as aforesaid, to three-eighths
of 1 per centum for said services."
You further state: "In this case Secretary Sherman decided upon an allowance of one-fourth of 1 per centum, but
Mr. James claims that the discretionary action contemplated
by law was exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury in his
letter of appointment, granting the maximum compensation
allowed by law, and that under it he is entitled to threeeighths of 1 per centum upon disbursements made by him
during his period of service."
Upon the foregoing facts you request my opinion ''as to
what allowance, if any, Mr. James is legally entitled to."
I have now the honor to submit to you my views upon the
subject of your request.
TLe act of March 3, 1869' (sec. 3654, Rev.. Stat.,) while
limiting the compensation to be allowed for the disbursement of moneys to an amount not exceeding one-eighth of
1 per centum, left it discretionary with the Secretary to
allow any amount within that limit. The act of March 3,
1875, extended the limit to three-eighths of 1 per centum.
Its effect is not to fix the amount of compensation to be
allowed for disbursing moneys, but to "limit" it. It enlarges the discretion of the Secretary, ·by enabling him to
allow as compensation for such services any amount not exceeding the increased per centum therein designated. He
may under this act, as he might have done under the former
act, allow a less per centum than that specified in the statute, but not a greater.
At the time Mr. James received his appointment as disbursing agent, the maximum compensation allowable by
Jaw for his services in that capacity was one-eighth of 1 per
centum; and his letter of appointment must be deemed to
·Contemplate that (viz, one-eighth of 1 per centum) as the
measure of his compensation. When, afterwards, the maximum was increased, it was discretionary with the Secretary
to a11ow an increase of compensation either up to the new
limit imposed or at any intermediate rate. Secretary Sherman, aR it seems from your statement, allowed Mr. James

•
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one-fourth of 1 per centum under the act of 1875. In my
opinion this allowance is all that Lhe latter is legally entitled to.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Hon. WILLIAM WINDOM,
Secretary of the Treasury.

HALF-PAY PENSIONS.
The provision in section 4713, Revised Statutes, declaring that where an
application for pension shall not have been filed "within three years
of the termination of a pension previously granted on account of the
service and death of the same person, the pension shall commence
from the date of filing, by the party prosecuting the claim, the last
paper requisite to establish the same," is applicable to half-pay pensions allowable under section 4725, Revised Statutes.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

October 17, 1881.

SIR: I have considered the inquiry contained in your letter of the 1st ultimo, touching the claim of 1\lrs. Savilla
Athey. The case as stated by you is as follows:
"Mrs. Athey is pensioned as the widow of Joseph Athey,
who was a soldier in the war with Mexico. Said Joseph
Athey died on the lOth of December, 1847, and his widow was
granted a half-pay pension under the act of July 21, 1848,
for five years from the date of his death. In November, 1853,
sbe filed a claim for an additional five years' half-pay under
the act of February 3, 1853, which was allowed and paid.
Her pension under this act terminated on the lOth of December 1857. In April1870, she :filed a claim'under the act
of June 3, 1858, for renewal or continuance of the half-pay
pension. Under this act the Pension Office granted her
pension from the 20th of April, 1870, the date of fili11g the
claim for continuance. She then (in 1875) made a claim for
arrears of half-pay for the period from the lOth of December,
1857, the date to which she had been paid under the act of
1853, to the 20th of April, J 870, the date from which she was
paid under the act of 1858. This claim was rejected by the
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Pension Office because of the limitation as to filing contained
in section 4713 of the Revised Statutes."
Your inquiry is,'' Whether sections 4713 and 4725, Revised
Statutes, are in conflict on the question involved; and if so,
which should govern the case ~ ''
The ''question involved" seems to be, whether the provisions of section 4713, which limit the commencement of
pensions when the cause of disability or death originated in
the service prior to 1\-Iarch -1, 1861, apply to half-pay pensions
allowable nuder section 4725. By the latter section, surviving widows and minor children, who have been allowed five
sears' half-pay, under the provisions of any general laws
passed prior to June 3, 1858, are granted a continuance of
such half-pay, "to commence from the date of last payment,
under the respective acts of Congress granting tile same,"
etc. The former section, on the other hand, declares that
''in all cases" in which the cause of disability or death originated as aforesaid, and "an application for pension shall
not have been filed within three years from the discharge or
death of the person on whose account the .claim is made, or
within three years of the term,ination of a pension previously
granted on account of the ser'nice and death of the same person,
the pension shall commence from the date of filing, by the
party prosecuting the claim, the last paper requisite to establish the same."
The clause in section 4713, underscored above, is by its
terms especially applicable to claims for renewed pensions,
within which class is comprised the half-pay granted by section 4725. Pensions of that sort allowed by special acts are
not within the scope cf tlJis clause (see sec. 4720, Revised
Statutes), anrl, so far as I am advised, the general pension
laws make no proYision for the renewal of pensions, other
than that contained in section 4725, to which it might be
referred. Unless, then, the clause applie~ to applications for
half-pay pensions under that section, it would have nothing to
<>perate upon iu the existing state of the law. But we can
not regard it as having been embodied in the statute without a purpose, and, under all the circumstances, the inference
seems fair and reasonable, if not a necessary one, that Congress thereby intended to subject such pensions to the limita-
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tion prescribed by section 4713. I am accordingly of opinion that the limitation just mentioned applies to pensions
allowable under section 4725.
No conflict really arises between sections 4713 and 4 725
.as thus construed. The half-pay pensions continued by the
latter section commence at the period indicated therein, ex-cepting in cases where the application tllerefor has not been
filed within three years of the termination of the previously
granted half-pay pension; in such cases, by the former section,
the pension must commence from the date of filing the last
paper requisite to establish the same.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Sem·etnry of the Interior.

STATUARY AND OTHER WORKS OF ART.
The tariff on statuary and other works of art considered in connection
with the treaty of 1871 between the United States and Italy.
That t.reaty makes no provision, in letter or spirit, as regards the importation, exportation, or prohibition of articles, the produP-e or manufacture of Italy, where dealt in by Italian citizens residing in Italy,
excepting that such importations, etc., shall be upon as favorable a
footing as like commerce by English, French, German, or other foreign
citizens whatsoever.
In the administration of the tariff there has been due observance of the
legal rights of Italian citizens, arising either under said treaty or under
statute provisions of Congress.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS1.'ICE,

October 17, 1881.
Yours of the 26th of July last, with its several in·Closures, was duly received and had immediate attention.
However, as after some reflection it seemed probable that
the question raised by the Government of His Majesty the
King of Italy could not receive a solution in the sense there
-desired witlwut an intervention of Congress, it was thought
better not to reply at once, but to retain the papers for further
.consideration.
SIR:
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That consideration has been given, and I have now to submit my opinion, that the only redress for the matter complained. of is with Congress.
That matter concerns the operation of the tariff laws of
this country upon "statuary," "works of art," aud '"manufactures of marble."
It is said that, as between American citizens residing in
Italy and Italian citizens also residing there, an improper difference as regards the duties upon the above articles is enforced-a difference greatly to the disadvantage of the latter..
This administration of duties is suggested to be as well (1) in
• violation of the treaty of 1871 betwixt the United States and
Italy, as (2) questionable under the statute law of this country considered alone.
Allow me to ask your attention to what has occurred to
me upon each of these suggestions.
I. As regards the treaty of 1871:
It will be borne in mind that the present reclamation is on
behalf of Italian citizens residing in Italy.
The correspondence which you have inclosed in your communication makes reference to the first and sixth articles of
the treaty as those which bear upon this matter.
But the only citizens in behalf of whom 8tipulation is made
in the first article are expressly defiued therein as "Italian
-citizens in the United 8tates and citizens of the United States.
in Italy." Such of the Bubsequent sentences of t.h at article
as l>egin with "they," plainly refer only to citizens limited
and defined as abo\e; that is, to citizens of Italy who reside
in the United States and citizens of the United States wh()
reside in Italy; and, therefore, to those only is to be applied
the clause providing against "paying other or higher duties
or charges than are paid by the natives."
The general provision in the :first sentence of that article,
for H a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation 'between the territories of the high contracting parties'" is not
to be relied upon, as I understand, in this connection, and
certainly does not concern the question before me, as appears, amongst other considerations, from the circumstance
that immediately afterward in the same article, as has just
been said, an express provision against "paying other an<l
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higher duties," etc., is confined to a minute fraction of the
citizens of each country, viz, such as may be found residing
within the territory of the other; a context which of course
suggests the pregnant question, Why sbould the treaty contain a plain and express stipulation for this privilege on behalf of a minute .fraction of citizens, cleaily defined, if it be true
that other parts thereof confer the same privilege upon all citizens~ Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The same observation applies to the language of the second article of the
treaty, which also has not been referred to in this connection,
but which contains like general language as to trading" upon
the same terms as the natives of the country." Whatever
this "liberty" and these "terms" may be, they do not con·
cern the tariff laws, inasmuch as that topic is at another
place, as above, specifically introduced with its own express
limitations, that exclude the parties now in question.
The sixth article of the treaty, which is also cited in confirmation of the immunity from taxation now claimed, forbids each of the high contracting parties to impose upon the
importation or exportation of articles that are "the produce
or manufactures" of the other party any higher duties or
charges than are payable in like case upon similar articles
coming from any other foreign country; and such also is its
operation as regards the prohibition of such articles.
There is in the papers which you have submitted no statement that any part of the produce or manufactures of Italy
has been subjected to duties or prohibitions that have not been
equally extended to the produce or manufactures of other
foreign countries. The only statement therein is that a discrimination is made between certain and certain other articles
manufactured within the territory of Italy, a discrimination
turning upon the circumstance that one class of these manufactures has been produced by American citizens residing in
that kingdom. No stipulations of the treaty forbid this.
I may add that it is a difference intended to encourage
artistic excellence amongst our own citizens, and so falls
under a policy which in one way or other is generally recognized amongst nations. I add this remark merely to
show that a reason exists beyond that of the bare words of
the treaty to indicate that (ex. gr.) Italy may have wished
272-VOL. XVII--15
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to remain free to encourage by peculiar bounties or immunities such of her citizens residing in the United States as
might establish factories here as a basis of profitable commerce to be carried on by themselves with their native country, and equally that the United States did not intend to
debar t!Jemseh·es from like encouragement of theu citizens
to resort to Italy, and avail themselves of the long.known
and unrivaled advantages there enjoyed for developing
genius within the circle of the fine arts. It may be that
upon reconsideration both parties may be willing to surrender or to suspend the exercise of this right. As to the
propriety of that, of course I am not, in this connection, to
express an opinion. As regards the United States, it is a
matter within the competency of Congress or of the treatymaking power alone.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the treaty of 1871 makes
no provision in letter or spirit as regards the importation,
exportation, or prohibition of articles, the produce or manufacture of the Kingdom of Italy, where dealt in by Italian
citizens residing in Italy, except that such importation, etc.,
shall be upon as favorable a footing as like commerce by
English, French, German, or other foreign citizens whatsoever. Consequently, with all proper deference, I conclude
that that treaty affords no ground for the reclamation made
in the correspondence before me.
II. It remains to inquire whether the tariff statutes of the
United States have been improperly construed in this con·
nection. I say improperly construed, inasmuch as no doubt,
under the free constitutional government of Italy, the principle that executive officers must carry out the law as they :find
it is as well understood and obeyed as here, and. that therefore the full extent of the complaint under this head is as to
the administration of the statutes; any suggestion as to the
policy of such legislation being suspended for consideration
by Congress.
The statutory provisions in question are as follows:
(1) "All manufactures of marble, not otherwise provided
for, fifty per centum ad valorem. (Rev. Stat., p. 478, top.)
(2) "Paintings and statuary, not otherwise provided for,
ten per centum ad valorem." (Id., p. 478, bottom.)
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(3) "Paintings, statuary, fountains, and other works of
art, the production of American artists," "shall be exempt
from duty." (Id., comparing pp. 489, near bottom, and 482,
beginning of section 2505.)
There is some <li~crepancy in the statements contained in
the papers inclosed by you as to the manner in which these
provisions have actually been administered by the 'l'reasury
Department. Your predecessor, Mr. Evarts, seems to have
understood that the Treasury had held that copies of original
statuary, no matter of what merit, had been held at the
Treasury to be mere " manufactures of marble" and not
"statuary." However, Mr. Sherman, the late Secretary of the
Treasury, states explicitly that this is not so. In such state
of the case I shall assume that M.r. Evarts was misinformed.
I believe that it will be admitted that, taken together, the
provisions above quoted recognize a distinction betwixt" statuary" and "works of art," and "manufactures of marble."
The term last mentioned is a generic term, and includes the
other two; whilst the second, in turn, includes the first. All
statuary is a work of art, but there are works of art in marble
that are not statuary; so, again, all works of art in marble
are manufactures of rnarble, but there are manufactures of
.marble that are not works of art.
So far as regards an imposition of duties by the above
paragraph, only t1co of the classes of manufactures of marble
are recognized, viz, such as are "statuary" and such as are
not. Upon the former, tbe duty is ten per centum; upon the
latter, fifty. It follows, as matter of course, that all works
of art that are not statuary are by such paragraph confounded
into the general class of the "manufactures of marble" at a
duty of fifty per centum.
As regards exemption from dnty also only two of those
classes are recognized; but these are such 1corks of art of
.Americans as are statuary, and such as are not. There is no
exemption, whether on behalf of Americans or others, for such
manufactures of marble as are not works of art. But it is
plain by inspection that the terms of exemption do include
some of the articles, which, when produced by foreigners, are
dutiable at fifty per centum, as well as of such as are dutiable
at ten.
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It therefore affords no just cause for complaint against
the manner in which the statutes have been administered,
that citizens of Italy find that not only such productions of
theirs as are taxed at 10, but also other sthat are taxed at 5()
per centum, are in favor of American citizens residing in
Italy admitted into this country free. For the statutes are
plainly to that effeclt.
And here again I have to say that whether the principle
which, ·as regards American products, draws the distinction
between exemption and duty at the boundary that separates
art from operations merely mechanical might not properly be
recognized as well in imposing the less and greater duties
which affect productions by foreigners, is a question exclusively
for the legislature. Possibly, upon further consideration,
Congress may conclude that the same principle which excludes statuary from the operation of the policy of protection.
applies as well to other works of art in marble, often equally
indicative of highly cultivated and extraordinary powers.
That at this point there may be some ground of complaint
by Italy, I have no occasion either to affirm or to deny.
In the meantime, however, it appears that there has been
due observance at the Treasury of the legal rights of Italian
citizens in this connection, arising either under the treaty
of 1871, or under statutory provisions of the United States.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
Approved:
WAYNE MAoVEAGH.
STATE OF KANSAS AND THE DIRECT TAX .
.4dvised that the amount claimed to be due from the State of Kansas to·
the United States on account of the direct tax be retained out ofthe
amount appropriated for payment to that State by the act of March 3,
1881, chapter 132.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTIOE,
October 21, 1881.
SIR : I have the honor to return herewith the communication of the First Comptrollm··, dated the 6th of August last,.
OF
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and the accompanying papers, relative to the application in
behalf of the State of Kansas for payment of the full sum of
$190,268.27 appropriated by the act of March 3, 1881. ·
It appears that as far back as 1S68 the First Comptroller,
having decided that the State of Kansas had assumed the
direct tax apportioned to that State by the direct tax act of
August 5, 1861, and was indebted to the United 8tates for the
amount thus apportioned ($71,743.33), stated an account in
favor of the United States and against the State, in which
that amount was found due from the State to the United
States, and it was accordingly charged to the State on the
books of the Treasury.
Subsequently, certain indebtedness on the part of the
United States to the State of Kansas, on account of ·war expenses, was credited to the State against the amount charged
as aforesaid. And recently, in stating an account for the
amount appropriated by the act of 1881, above mentioned, the
sum of $62,382.51; which is the balance remaining charged
against the State on account of the direct tax, was directed
by the Comptroller to be retained out of that amount, and to
be applied to the credit of the State on account of such tax.
It is claimed by the attorneys acting in behalf of the State
of Kansas that the State never assumed the tax, and was
never indebted therefor to the United States, and they declare that the State does not consent to have the same set off
against her claims against the United States. They accordingly ask that, in view of all the facts, and also of the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 149, the Secretary
·Of the Treasury cause suit to be brought against the State
under that act to establish the validity of the indebtedness
·Of the State for the direct tax.
At the suggestion of the Comptroller you, on the 5th instant, referred his communication, with the other papers, to
this Department for such action in regard to the question of
bringing suit as may be thought proper.
·
Without expressing any opinion upon the general question
whether the United States can sue a State (as to which the
Comptroller entertains'' serious doubts"), I am inclined to the
view that such a p'roceeding is not contemplated by the act
·of March 3, 1815, and that consequently no duty devolves upon

230

HON. WAYNE MACVEAGH
Reservation of Land for Public Purposes.

you uuder that act to institute a suit in .this case against tile·
State of Kansas. In tllis connection I would suggest that
the State may have a remedy in the Court of Claims. There
are two instances, I understand, wherein suits have been
brought in that court by a State against the United States;
ann although neither of them proceeded to judgment (eacL
being dismissed for want of prosecution), yet in neither was
any point raised as to tbe jurisdiction.
I deem it proper, under the circumstances, to recommend
that no suit be brought by the United States, but that the
amount claimed to be due from the State to the United States
on a·ccount of the direct tax be retained, leaving the State
to its remedy in the Court of Claims should it deem that course
advisable.
·I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAoVEAGH.
Hon. WILLIAM WINDOM,

Secretary of the Treasury.

RESERVATION OF LAND FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES.
Mineral lands belonging to the public domain, which are reserved from
sale nuder section 2318, Revised Statutes, may be reserved for military
or other public purposes by the President.
Where such lands are included in a military reservation, they are not open
to exploration and purchase under section 2319, Revised Statutes.
It is otherwise wherA a right bas once attached to mineral land, under
the laws relating thereto, in favor of the locator of a mining claim.
Here the land, during the existence of such right, is not subject to ~es
ervation by the President; and if it be subseq1.1ently reserved, the
locator may nevertheless perfect his title.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 21, 1881.
SIR: By your letter of the 30th of August, 1881, and the
inclosures received therewith, relating to t.he military reservation of Fort Maginnis, in Montana Territory, it appears
that this reservation was Ret apart by an executive order,
dated the 8th of April last; that certain miners of Parker,
Meagher County, 1\Iont., now allege that mineral was discovered and a ·mining camp established by them on land

TO THE SECRETARY O:t, WAR.

231

Reservation of Land for Public Purposes.

included in the reservation several months previous to the
location of the post by the military authorities; and that
inquiry is made by them whether they can "hold the mines
and the surface ground connected therewith, though they be
on the reservation," and wbether mineral land can be located
and patented on a mi:itary reservation after the establishment of the reservation.
Agreeably to a suggestion of the Secretary of the Interior,
contained in his letter to you of the 16th of August, 1881
(one of the inclosures above mentioned), you request an
opinion upon the following questions:
"(1) Whether or not mineral lands reserved from sale
under section 2318, Revised Statutes of the United States,
can be reserved for military purposes by order of the President!
"(2) Where mineral lands are included within the limits
of a military reservation, are such lands open to exploration
and purchase under section 2319, Revised Statutes 1
"(3.) Where an inchoate title to mineral lands has been
acquired, as shown in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior and the accompanying report of the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, and such lands have subsequently
been included within a military reservation, can the title to
said mineral lands be perfected by the private owner~"
For convenience the first and second questions will be
considered together.
In an opinion heretofore given by this Department, addressed to you on the 15th of July last, wherein the subject
of the authority of the President to reserve lands for public
purpm~es came under consideration, it was observed that the
power of the President to set apart, for those purpobes, such
portions of the public domain as are required by the exigencies of the public service to be thus appropriated, is too
well established to admit of doubt, citing in this connection
the case of Grisar v. JYicDowell (6 V\'all., 381), in which the
Supreme Court remarks: "From an early period in the history
of the Government it bas been the practice of the President to
order from time to time, as the exigencies of the public service required, parcels of land belonging to the United States
to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses. The
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authority of the President in this respect is recognized in
numerous acts of Congress." This power is in the abovementioned opinion regarded as extending to any lands
which belong to the public domain, and capable of being exercised with respect to such lands so long as they remain
unappropriated. As thus defined the power is broad enough
to include mineral lands belonging to the public domain, at
least whilst they remain unaffected by any private right acquired under the laws relating thereto. I am satisfied with
that view of the subject, and accordingly answer the first
question in the affirmative. This necessarily involves a negative answer to the second question; since, after public lands
have once been lawfully reserved by the President for public
uses, the lands so appropriated become severed from the
public domain, and are. thenceforth not subject to occupation
and purchase under the general law.
The answer to the third question depends upon whether
land covered by a mining claim? where the locator of the
claim has taken no steps to obtain a patent and the premises
still constitute a part of the public domain, may be lawfully
reserved and set apart by the President for public uses.
' Under the laws providing for the exploration, occupation,
and disposal of the mineral lands, the locator, so long as he
complies with the conditions imposed by those laws, is
clothed with a possessory right, which entitles him to the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface
included within the lines of his location. (Sees. 2320, 2322,
2324, Rev. Stat.)
The object of those laws is to promote the development of
our mining resources rather than the sale of the mineral
lands, and to that end "Congress has by statute and by tacit
consent," as is remarked by the Supreme Court in Forbes v.
Gracey, (94 U.S. R., 762), permitted individuals and corporations to dig out and convert to their own use the ores containing the precious metals which are found in the lands belonging to the Government, without exacting or receiving
any compensation for these ores, and without requiring the
miner to buy or pay for the land. It bas gone further, add the
court, "and recognized the possessory rights of these miners,
as ascertained among themselves by the rules which have
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become the laws of the mining districts as regards mining
claims." The rights thus recognized by Congress are property of great value. Very large amounts are invested in
mines, the ownership of which rests solely upon the possessory right referred to.
It seems to me that where such right has attached to mineralland in favor of the locator of a mining claim, the land
during the continuance of the claim (i. e., so long as it is
maintained in accordance with law) becomes by force of the
mining laws appropriated to a specific plupose, namely, the
development and working of the mine located; and, unless
Congress otherwise provides, it can not while that right ex.
ists, notwithstanding the title thereto remains in the Government, be set apart by the Executive for public uses.
If, then, the possessory right of the miners in the case under
~onsideration was full and complete previous to the establishment of the military reservation of Fort Maginnis, I am
<lf opinion that the inclusion of their claim within the limits
Qf the reservation was without authority of law and could
not legally divest them of such right, or of the further
right (on compliance with the requirements of the statute
concerning the issue of patents for mining claims) to acquire
title to the land.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH.
Ron. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

APPROPRIATION FOR ARTIFICIAL LIMBS.
The appropriation of $175,000 for artificial limbs, etc., made by the act
of March 3, 1881, chapter 133, should be expended under the direction
of the War Department.
'T he First Comptroller has no revisory power over the decisions of the
Secretary of the Treasury respecting the issue of warrants; such decisions are binding upon the former officer.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 22, 1881.
SIR: In your Jetter of the 11th instant, you request my

opinion on the following questions : " First, Whether the
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appropriation of $175,000 for artificial limbs, etc., under the
act of March 3, 1881, should legally be expended under the·
authority of the Department of War or the Department of
the Interior." "Second, Whether the requisition for $20,000, authorized and granted in the manner above stated [in
your letter], can be legally rescinded upon the opinion of the
First Comptroller." "Third, Whether, as claimed by the·
First Comptroller, the question of the legality of warrants
or requisitions is wholly within his jurisdiction, he being the·
only officer who countersigns warrants; and whether the Secretary of the Treasury is legally bound by the opinion of the
First Comptroller upon this point."
Although the first question is not entirely free from doubt,
I am of the opinion that the $175,000 appropriated by act of
March 3,1881, chapter 133 (making appropriation for sundry
civil expenses), for furnishing artificial limbs and appliances,.
or commutation therefor, and transportation, should be expended under the direction of the War Department.
An examination at the Department of State shows that the
words'' miscellaneous obiects under War Department," which
precede, and the words "under the Department of the Interior," which succeed this appropriation in the printed volume
of the statutes, are found in the enrolle(l bill in the same juxtaposition. In addition to this, we have the fact that the appropriation in question was asked for by the Secretary of
War in his annual estimates, and not by the Secretary of the·Interior.
The Book of Estimates submitted to Congress at each session is provided for by law (sees. 3660-3672, Rev. Stat.), and
in this particular estimate the Secretary of vVar, in compli ance with section 3660, referred to sections 4787 and 4791,..
Revised Statutes, and the act of August 15, 1876 (19 Stat.,.
203), as the laws authorizing the expenditure.
The attention of Congress was thus called to the very acts.
which have given rise to this controversy.
It is not necessary to express any opinion as to how far
such arrangement in the statute, based upon such an estimate,
would supersede or override the plain meaning of a general
statute, but taken by itself it certainly is persuasive evidence
of the intention of the law.makers.
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By section 2 of the act of 17th June, 1870 (16 Stat., p. 153),
the money commutation was to be paid by the Commissionerof Pensions in the same manner as pensions were paid.
Until June 30, 1876, the commutations were p-a,id in accordance with that law (sec. 4789, Rev. Stat.), and the appropriations therefor were invariably found in the acts appropriating for the payment of pensions. But the appropriation
for the fiscal year ending 1877 was expended by the War
Department under the act of March 23, 1876, providing for
the payment of pensions (vol. 19, p. 8), as follows: "Also
for furnishing artificial limbs or apparatus for resection, with
transportation or commutation therefor, fifty thousand dollars:
Provided, That the same shall be expended and disbursed
under the direction of the Surgeon-General of the Army, and
in accordance with existing laws." No question can arise as
to the propriety of the expenditure of that appropriation
under the War Department. Before another annual appro-priation was made for furnishing artificial limbs the act of
August 15, 1876, was passed, which provides that every
officer, soldier, etc .., shall receive an artificial limb or appliance, or commutation therefor, as provided and limited by
existing laws," under such regulations as the Surgeon-General
of the Army may prescribe." Since which act the appropriations for artificial limbs, or commutation therefor, have been
in the sundry civil bill under the head of ''War Department,"
instead of, as theretofore, in the appropriation for payment
of pensions, and have been called for each year by estimates
from the Secretary of War. In fact, under estimates and
legislation identical with those for the current year, the appropriations for this purpose for the fiscal years ending June
30, 1878, 1879, 1880, and 1881 have been expended under t he
War Department.
The repeal of section 4 789 (''the Commissioner of Pensions
shall cause the same to be paid to such soldiers in the same
manner that pensions are paid") by the act of August 15,
1876 (the limbs shall be furnh3hed or commutation paid "under such regulations as the Surgeon General of the Army may
prescribe''), is not as clear as it might be; but the interpretation put upon it, not only by executive officers (see Moore
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v. The United States, U5 U. S. R., 763), but by Congress
itself, leads me to the conclusion that the purpose of that
act was to unite under the Surgeon-General the payment
of commutation with the issue of the artificial limbs, and to
discontinue the anomaly of the Surgeon General expending so
much of the appropriation as was necessary to pay for the
limbs and appliances required, and. the Commissioner of
Pensions disbursing so much as was needed for those who
elected to receive commutation.
It might, of course, be consisten.t with the regulations prescribed by the Surgeon-General· that he should furnish to the
Commissioner of Pensions a list of those who elect to receive
commutation; but the better view-the one more consistent
with subsequent legislation-is, that the a~t of1876 gave him
plenary powers in making the regulations.
Should you adopt the foregoing opinion, your second question becomes unimportant. I learn from your letter and inclosures that the following action has been taken by the vari-ous officers with reference to the. appropriation in question:
The Secretary of the Treasury signed an appropriation
warrant, which the First Comptroller countersigned, crediting the whole appropriation for expenditure under the War
. Department. Thereupon (sec. 367:3) the Secretary of War
made an accountable requisition for $20,000, which was countersigned by the Second Comptroller (sec. 273) and registered
by the Second Auditor. Upon this the Secretary of the
Treasury granted a warrant for $20,000 (sec. 248), which was
countersigned by the First Comptroller (sec. 269). This
warrant, in substance, directed the Treasurer of the United
States to place that sum to the credit of Lieutenant-Colonel
Swift, to be charged to the appropriation in question, and the
money has been placed to his credit on the books of the
Treasurer.
But the First Comptroller, being of the opinion that the
.appropriation should be expended under the Secretary of the
Interior, advises that all these proceedings be invalidated,
and that a new requisition be made by the Secretary of the
Interior, which shall pursue the same course as that of the
Secretary of War.
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Should you adopt his opinion, I think, in an~er to your
second question, that if the Secretary of the Interior will
make the proper requisition, you may grant a warrant thereon,
and request from the Treasurer a return of the former warrant for cancellation.
Your third inquiry, "whether, as claimed by the First
Comptroller, the question of the legality of warrants or requisitions is wholly within his jurisdiction, he being the only
officer who countersigns warrants, and whether the Secretary
of the Treasury is legally bound b;y the opinion of the First
Comptroller upon this point," I answer in the negative .
The Secretary of War, by making a requisition for the
$20,000; the Secretary of the Interior, by omitting to make
such requisition; the Second Comptroller, by countersigning
the requisition; and the Secretary of the Treasury, by granting the warrant, have all passed upon the legal point presented by your first inquiry. The First Comptroller, by requesting the return of the warrant, seeks to restore the case
to the position which it had reached before he countersigned
the warrant. Among the duties of the ~...,irst Comptroller,
prescribed by section 269, Revised Statutes, are: "First, To
examine all accounts settled by the First Auditor except
* * * and to certify the balances thereon to the Register."
* * * ''Third, To countersign all warrants drawn by the
Secretary of the Treasury, which shall be warranted by law."
He contends, I understand, that the clause requires him to
examine into the legality of warrants granted by the Secretary, and by his counter signature to certify to that legality;
in other words, that his duties are the same as to matters
which have already received the decision of the Secretary of
·the Treasury as they are to accounts which pass through him
from the Auditor to the Secretary. And, furthermore, he
contends that, by implication of the third clause, his decisions under it are as binding upon the bead of the Department as are, by expression of section 191, Revised Statutes,
his decisions under the first clause.
By Section 23 , Revised Statutes, the Secretary of the
Treasury is made the head of an Executh~e Department, to
be known as the Department of the Treasury, and section
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268 provides that there shall be in the Department of the
Treasury a First Comptroller and a Second Comptroller.
Heads of Departments, if not created by the Constitution,
are in two instances expressly recognized. Tlle President
may require their opinion in writing upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective Departments. In view
of this, the care the President shall exercise in having the
laws faithfully executed and his investiture with the whole
executive power of the Go,·erument, 1 cannot assent to the
proposition tllat a subordinate officer, created by statute,
can do any act binding upon the head of his Department until
that force is expressly given to his decisions by plain an<l unambiguous law. It is suggested that the expression "which
shall be warranted by law" is pregnant with all that is expressed as to the binding eftect of the balances certified by
him. In the present instance, I think that language may be
satisfied by his inquiry whether any warrant for payment for
artificial limbs is warranted by law, and that he should accept
the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury as to the
proper party in whose favor the warrant Hhould be drawn.
In a recent opinion concerning the relations of the Secretary
of the Interior and the Commissioner of Patents, I ha"Ve considered the force of the words signature and counter-signature.
The latter term, so far as I have discovered, conveys only the
sense of attestation, and by countersigning the present warrant the First Comptroller attests to the Treasurer that an
accountable requisition had been issued by the Secretary of
War; that it had been duly countersigned by the Second
Comptroller and registered by the Second Auditor; that the
signature of the Secretary is genuine (see Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, title Counter-signature); that the proper charges
ha"Ve been made under section 3675 in the books of the Recretary, First Comptroller, and Hegister (or Auditor); and
that the appropriation therefor has not. been exhausted-so
that the Treasurer will be authorized, under section 305, to .
disburse the amount of the warrant without other evidence
of the legality of the payment than the signature of the
Secretary and the counter-signature of a Comptroller, and
will not be required to inquire into the condition of the ap-
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propriation, or whether the forms required by law antecedent
to the signature, and counter-signature have been complied
with.
The present controversy would be fairly presented if there
were before the Secretary of the Treasury two requisitions,
.one from the Secretary of War and the other from the Secretary of the Interior, for this appropriation. Now, if the
law meant that the First Comptroller were to decide between
the two, and the Secretary of the Treasury was to have no
discretion, but simply register the decrees of the First Comptroller, the language of the law would. be more apt if it
directed the First Comptroller to sign and the Secretary of
the Treasury to countersign; and it would contribute greatly
to the expedition of business if the law required the requisition to go to the Comptroller first (as in the case of accounts),
instead of having the Secretary sign a warrant, which, upon
<the refusal of the Comptroller to countersign, must be
·r eturned to the Secretary for cancellation and reissue.
The language of the Supreme Court in the case of United
.States v. Jones (18 Howard, 95) seems to me applicable to
the present question:
"The Secretary of the Navy represents the President, and
,e xercises his power on the subjects confided to his Department. He is responsible to the people and the law for any
.abuse of the powers intrusted to him. His acts and decisions on subjects submitted to his jurisdiction and control by
the Constitution and the laws do not require the approval
-of any officer of another Department to make them valid
.and conclusive. The accounting officers of the Treasury
have not the burden of responsibility cast upon them of
revising the judgments, correcting the supposed mistakes, or
annulling the orders of the heads of Departments."
In the Real Estate Savings Bank of Pittsburgh v. The United
States (16 Ct. Cis. R.J Richardson, J., in delivering the opinion
-o f the court, quotes section 191, Revised Statutes, and adds:
"In other respects the Comptrollers are as much subject to
the rules, regulations, and general directions of the Secretary
of the Treasury, and as much bound to obey and be governed
by them, as are all other subordinate officers in the Treasury
.Department."

', l
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In conclusion, I would say that, upon the matter in controversy, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury is binding upon the First Comptroller.
I return herewith all inclosures-.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WAYNE MAcVEAGH•.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
N OTE.-The purpose of the counter-signature is best told
by Hamilton (page 77, vol. v, Works of Hamilton): ''The
spirit of the constitution of the Department iE~, that the
officer who is to settle the accounts by countersigning the
warrants for receipts and payments shall have an opportunity to observe their conformity with the course of business.
as it appears in the accounts; and shall have notice, in the
first instance, of all payments and receipts, in order to the
bringing all persons to account for public moneys. This
reason operates to make the Auditor, who is the coadjutor
of the Comptroller in settlements, his most fit substitute in
this particular view."

MAIL TRANSPORTATION.
The case submitted being one in which it is proposed not to expedite the
service, but to reduce the speed thereof as fixed by the now existing
contract: Advised that the act of April 7, 1880, chap. 48, has no application thereto, and imposes no restriction upon the Postmaster-General
in dealing therewith.
When a reduction of speed is proposed, he is left at liberty to act as in
his judgment the good of the service and the interests of the public
may demand, without any limitation upon tbe exercise of his authority~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
November 2, 1881.
SIR: I have considered the question presented in your
letter to the Attorney-General of the 26th ultimo, which appears to arise upon the following facts :
Mail-route 46213 was originally let for service six trips a.
week, according to a schedule of seventy-two hours in summer and ninety-six hours in winter, at $11,000 per annum.
Subsequently, October 1, 1879, one more trip per week was
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added, at an additional cost of $1,833.33 per annum, and the
service was at the same time expedited by reducing the
schedule to thirty-six hours in summer and seventy hours in
winter; at a further additional cost of $30,581.55 per annnm,
making the present cost of the service $13,414.88 per anur:.nt.
The contractor now proposes to ·perform the service according to a schedule of forty-eight hours in summer and eighty
hours in winter for $23,5oo·per annum, which is a reduction
of $19,914.88 upon present cost.
The question is iWhether you are authorized to accept the
contractor's proposition without requiring evidence as to the
additional stock and carriers that would be required in excess of the number required under the original contract; or
whether you are restricted by the act of April 7, 1880, to an
allowance for expedition in this case to a sum not exceeding
50 per centum of the original contract rate.
In regard to the act of April 7, 1880, I submit that the
present case does not fall within its provisions under the now
existing contract. The service schedule is thirty-six hours in
summer and seventy hours in winter. What is proposed is
not to expedite the service, but to reduce the speed thereof
by changing the schedule so as to make it forty-eight hours
in summer and eighty hours in winter. The act of 1870 does
not apply to a case of this kind; it comes into play only
where the modification of an existing contract involves increased expedition of the service. I am therefore of opinion ·
that it places no restriction upon the Postmaster-General in
the present case.
With respect to the other branch of the question, I think
the proposition of the contractor may be accepted by the
Postmaster.General without requiring the evidence referred
to, if he is satisfied that the public interests will be benefited
thereby. Section 3961, Revised Statutes, prohibits any additional compensation for increase of expedition, unless such
increase makes it necessary to employ additional stock and
carriers; in which case the additional compensation is to bear
no greater proportion to the additional stock and carriers so
employed thau the compensation in the original contract
bears to the stock and carrriers necessarily employed in its
execution. And by a regulation of the Post-Office Depart272-VOL XVII--16
I
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went the contractor, in a case where the speed is increased,
i:s required to state under oath "the number of horses and

men required to perform the service according to the contract
schedule and the number required to perform it witlr the increase of speed." Both the statutory provision and the regulation just referred to appear to co\er by their terms only
cases where the speed js to be increased beyond that required
by the exiRting contract, and no1 to include cases like the
present, where a reduction of speed is proposed. The latter
seem to be left to be dealt ~ith by the Postmaster-General
as in his judgment the good of the service and the interests
of the public may demand without any limitation upon the
exercise of his authority.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
Ron. THOMAS L. JAMES,
Postmaster- General.
SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONS IN ARIZONA
Section 15 of the act of June 18, 1878, chapter 263, renders unavailable
the aid of the military forces of the United States for the suppression of
unlawful organizations, unless the state of facts be such as to enable
these forces to be used under the provisions of section 5287 or of sections 5298 and 5300, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 10, 1881.
SIR: Your communication of the 1st instant, in relation
to bands of outlaws in Arizona Territory known as " Cow
Boys," which was accompanied by a copy of a letter dated
the 20th ultimo from the Secretary of :-;tate, together with a
copy of a letter addressed to the latter' by the Mexican minister, under date of the lOth ultimo, and also a copy of a letter
from the General of the Army, dated the 26th ultimo, requests information as to wbat action has thus far been had
and the results accomplished under the instructions already
issued by this Department to the United States attorney
and the United States marshal of that Territory respecting
the arrest of said outlaws and the bringing them to justice;
and, in view of the facts disclosed by the pai•ers above men-
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tioned, a further request is made for an opi~ion "whether it
would be lawful, and to what extent lawful, to use tee military
forces of the United States for the suppression of the unlawful organizations referred to,"
In reply, I have the honor to state that this Department is
not officially advised that any action resulting in the arrest
of the parties complained of has thus far been taken under
the instructions mentioned. Recently, a report was received
from the marshal of the Territory, presenting an estimate
of the expense which would necessarily be incurred by the
employment of a sufficient force (a posse composed of residents
of the Territory) to effect and secure the arrest of the outlaws. This was found to greatly exceed the amount available
for that purpose under the control of this Department, and
·he was so informed. Nothing further in that direction bas
since transpired so far as I know.
In regard to the use of the military forces of the United
States, the act of June 18, 1878, chapter 263, section 15, prohibits the employment of any part of the Army " as a posse
comitatus,, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, •
except in such cases and under such circumstances as such
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the
Constitution or by act of Congress."
This legislation renders unavailable the aid of the military
forces of the United States for the "suppression of the unlawful organizations" referred to, unless the state of facts be
such as to enable these forces to be used under the provisions
of section 5287 or of sections 5298 and 5300 Revised Statutes.
By section 5287, in every case in which any military expe.
clition or enterprise is begun or set on foot contrary to the
provisions of the statute (see sec. 5286), the President may
lawfully employ the military forces "for the purpose of preventing the carrying on of any such expedition or enterprise
from the Territories or jurisdiction of the United States
against the territories or domains of any foreign prince or
state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the
United States are at peace." An armed body of men, organized with a view to invade the territory of a neighboring
people with whom we are at peace, and forcibly resist the
public authorities there if opposed, may well be deemed a
military enterprise in contemplation of the statute, though
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the ultimate object IS plunder. If the organizations referred
to are of this character, I think the troops may be lawfully
employed to prevent them making predatory raids into the
territory of Mexico, and in this way to suppress them.
The other sections cited (5298 and 5300) provide for a state
of things in which it is impracticable, in the judgment of the
President, to enforce the laws through the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings, by reason of '' unlawfhl obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages of persons, or rebellion against
the authority of the Government of the United States."
Here the President may lawfully employ the military forces
in enforcing the laws, after having first issued a proclamation
as required by section 5300. Whether such a state of things
exists in the Territory of Arizona as would justify advising
the President to proceed under these provisions, I am,unable
to gather from the information before me, and express no
opinion thereon.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
.Acting .Attorney-General.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
MAIL CONTRACTS-WITHHOLDING PAY.
A. and B. had each a separate contract for transporting the mails, and
the latter was also a surety for the former. A. incurred indebtedness to
the Government by reason of fines, penalties, and forfeitures beyond
the amount due hi1\l; and the pay of B., his surety, was withheld for the
protection of the Government against loss. Prior to the performance of
the service by B., for which his pay was withheld, he gave a pay
draft to C., which was placed on :file in the Auditor's office" subject to
fines, etc., in accordance with the act of Congress approved May 17,
1878, and any claim or demand the Post-Office Department may have
against the contractor:" Held, that payment of an amount due B.
under his contract, sufficient to meet his liability as surety on the contract of A., might lawfully be withheld; and that the draft given by
the former on his pay conferred upon the holder thereof no right
which prevents s~ch pay being thus withheld.
DEP AR1'MENT OF ,JUSTICE,

November 17, 1881.
SIR: I have considered the case presented in the accompanying letter of the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-
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Office Department, dated the 1st instant, which was referred
to the Attorney-General by the Ron. H. F. French, Acting
Secretary of the Treasury, on the 3d instant, with a request
·for an opinion upon the question suggested therein.
The letter states:
''In a case pending in this office [i.e., office of the Auditor],
the pay of a contractor is held to be applied to indebtedness
incurred by reason of fines, forfeitures, and penalties certified to the Auditor by the Postmaster-General, in accordance
with the law and a contract entered into with J. E. Reeside
for the transportation of the mails, for the proper performance
of which contract Ed win Reeside was one of the sureties.
Edwin Reeside is also a contractor for the transportation of
the mails, and there not being enough due J. E. Reeside to
·cover the indebtedness, the pay of Ed win Reeside, surety,
has also been withheld, with the view to protecting the Government from loss on account of the principal.
''Before the service was performed by Edwin Reeside,
for which payment is withheld, he gave a pay draft to Joseph
Lockey for money had and received by Reeside to his use,
as has long been a custom and usa-g e with contractors for the
transportation of the mails, and ~fr. Lockey feels aggrieved,
and protests against the action of the Auditor in withholding the payment of this draft with a view to meeting Ed win
Reeside's liability to fhe Government as the surety of J. E.
Reeside. As no appeal from the action of the Auditor can
be taken to the Comptroller in this case, I desire that you
-obtain the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the right
·of the Auditor to withhold payment to a surety to protect
the Government from loss and the rights of the parties inter·
ested upon the facts as herewith submitted."
The draft given by Edwin Reeside, contractor, is dated
February 17, 1881. It is drawn upon the Auditor in favor
.-of Joseph Lockey, or order, and calls for the payment of
$987.50 out of any moneys due the drawer on route 11093
''for the quarter ending 30th J nne, 1881." By the regulations
of the Auditor's office, drafts of mail contractors on their
quarterly pay are not" accepted,'' but are simply received and
placed on file; and they are moreover filed "subject to fines,
.deductions, collections, the amount due the sub-contractor, in
.accordance with the act of Congress approved May 17, 1878,
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and any claim or demand the Post-Office Department may have
against the contractor." These regulations are printed on
'the blank form of draft furnished by the .Auditor, which was.
made use of in preparing the draft above mentioned, so that
1\Ir. Lockey must be presumed to have had notice of their
purport when he took the draft.
At the time said draft was drawn by Edwin Reeside he
was a surety on the contract of J. E. Reeside for transporting
the mail on route 13095. In adjusting the account of J. E.
Reeside for service performed under that contract for the
quarter ending March 31, 1881, the .Auditor bas found a
balance of $1,750.64: due the United States, al'ising from fines 1
penalties, and forfeitures incurred by the contractor under
the same contract, and certified to the .Auditor by the Postmaster-General. For this balance, assuming it to be a valid
claim against the contractor, Ed win Reeside is liable as his .
surety.
I am of opinion that the Auditor may lawfully withhold
payment of an amount due Ed win Reeside under his contract
sufficient to meet his liability for indebtedness to the Government as surety on the contract of J. E. Reeside (see McKnight
v. United States, 98 U.S., 179), and that the draft given by
the former upon his quarterly pay confers upon the holder
thereof no right which prevents such pay being thus withheld.
In the first place, the draft is void as "an assignment of the
fund upon which it was drawn (Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S.,
484:); and, secondly, the regulations of the .Auditor's office
under which the draft was received and placed on file there
and of which the holder had notice, preclude any obligation
thence arising that would bind the Government to appls' the
fund to the payment thereof, in preference to retaining the
same as a measure for its own protection, to offset a liability
of the drawer. There was not only no acceptance of the draft
by the Auditor, but it was rec-eived and filed by him, subject
to ''any claim or demand" of the Post-office Department.
against the drawer.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. P. PHILLIPS,
Act-ing A. ttorney- General •.
Hon. C. J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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FEES OF WITNESSES IN PENSION CASES.
The fees of witnesses subpmnaed under section 184, Revised Statutes, on
application of the Pension Bureau, to testify before a United States
commissioner, and also the fees of the commissioner by whom their
testimony is taken, may properly be allowed out of the j uuiciary fund.
The former should be pa1d by the United States marshal of the district on .the certificate or order of the commissioner; the latter, as in
ordinary course, on settlement of the commissioner's accounts at the
Treasury.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 7, 1881.
SIR: Your letter of the 19th ultimo submits the following
inquiry: From what fund and by whom are the expenses in
obtaining testimony in pension cases under section 184, Revised Statutes, to be paid¥ This inquiry, as appears by the
accompanying papers, has reference to payment of the fees
of witnesses subpmnaed under that section on application of
the Pension Bureau to testify before a United States commissioner in such cases, and also the fees of the commissioner by whom their testimony is taken.
By section 185, Revised Statute~, it is provided that witnesses thus subpamaed ''shall be allowed the same compensation as is allowed witnesses in the courts of the United
States." The compensation of the commissioner before whom
they are subpmnaed to appear is regulated by section 847.
I do not find any statutory provision specially applicable to
the payment of expenses incurred as above. The appropriation at the disposal of the Pension Bureau ''for actual and
necessary expenses of clerks detailed to investigate suspected
frauds and attempts at fraud'' is apparently intended to ~over
only the personal expenses of the officers so detailed, among
which witness fees and the like are not included. I gather
from the papers accompanying your letter tllat such fees are
not deemed by the Pension Bureau to be within that appropriation, and in this view I concur.
There being no special provision for defraying the expenses in question, I am of opinion that they may properly be
allowed out of the judiciary fund, that is to say, out of the
appropriations respectively "for fees of witnesses" and "for
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fees of United States commissioners~" belonging to that fund
(see 21 Stat., 454). In regard to the mode of payment, the
witnesses' fees should be paid by the United States marshal
of the district on the certificate or order of the commissioner,
while the fees of the commissioner should be paid, as in ordinary course, on settling his accounts at the Treasury.
(Sees. 855 and 856, Rev. Stat.)
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General. ·
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

PATENTS FOR MINING CLAIMS.
No legal objection exists to the practice of the Land Department, in issuing patents for mining claims upon veins or lodes, to insert in the
patent a clause excepting from the grant all town-site rights in the
premises, where it appears that the surface ground of any such claim
lies wholly or partly within the limits of a preYiously located, entered,
or patented town site.
DEr ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 24, 1881.
I have considered the application of James H. Mandeville, esq., made in behalf of the Vizina Consolidated Mining
Oompany of Arizona relative to the patenting of a mining
claim to that company, which was on the 9th instant, by your
direction, referred to the Attorney-General for an opinion
thereon.
The applicant states in his communication to you of that
date, that a patent to said company for the Vizina mining
claim has been prepared against his protest, with a reservation in favor of the city of Tombstone, Ariz., and now lies on
the table of the Commissioner of the General Land Office
ready for delivery. He claims that the insertion of such
reservation in the patent is contrary to law; and he asks the
President to direct that another patent to said company be
prepared without the reservation.
In issuing patents for mining claims upon veins or lodes,
it is the practice of the Land Department, where it appears
SIR:
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that the surface ground of any such claim lies wholly or
partially within the limits of a previously located, entered,
·Or patented town site, to insert in the patent a clause (as has
been done in the present case) excepting from the grant al1
town-site rights in the premises. The clause is in these words:
"ExceJ?ting and excluding, however, from these presents all
town property rights upon the surface, and there are hereby
expressly excepted and excluded from the same all houses,
buildings, and structures, lots, blocks, streets, alleys, or other
municipal improvements on the surface of the above-described
premises not belonging to the grantees herein, ana all rights
necessary or proper to the occupation, possession, and enjoyment of the same." The insertion of this clause does not rest
upon any express statutory requirement, but is founded upon
the view that the previous location, entry, or patent of the
town site, while not conferring any right to the underlying
viens or lodes (sec. 2392, Rev. Stat.), gives, nevertheless, to
the town-site occupants surface rights, to which those of the
subsequent mineral claimant are necessarily subject, and that
. by giving the latter a patent, with a reservation saving the
rights of the town site, all that the law contemplates to be
granted by the patent in such case is expressed therein.
I perceive no legal objection to the practice of the Land
Department as above. There are instances, dating as far
back as' 1838, of similar reservations inserted in patents issued under the pre-emption laws, where a part of the lands
patented was found to be subject to rights claimed under
<>ther acts of Congress (see Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 How., 334;
Meehan v. Forsyth, 24 How:, 175.) In the latter case the court
remarks that the saving clause in these patents "was designed to exonerate the United States from any claim of the
patentee in the event of his ouster by persons claiming under the acts referred to." This would be sufficient ground
for the insertion of a reservation in patents for lode claims in
cases where prior rights to the surface are found to exist in
favor of town sites.
In the case under consideration a town site entry in favor
·o fthecityofTombstone was patented in September, 1880, the
patent containing a proviso that no title shall be thereby ac·
.quired to any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, or to
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any valid mining claim or poss.ession held under existing laws
(sec. 2392, Rev. Stat.), etc. Part of the Vizina mining claim,
which I understand to be a vein lode claim, and for which a
patent is now sought to be obtained without a reservation,.
lies within the limits of the town site so patented. Unless it
should be established to the satisfaction of the Land Department that this claim existed and was possessed throughout.
its entire extent prior to the town-site location, and that thepossessory right of the mineral claimant bas since been continuously held and maintained in accordance with the mineral
land laws, the fact that a patent has already been issued for
suoh town site, covering a part of such claim, must be deemed
sufficient to warrant the insertion of a reservation (like that
above described) in a subsequent patent for the claim.
The papers referred to me do not show that priority of
right in favor of the mineral claim, as against the town-site,.
has been established, and my opinion is that they present nocase calling for any special directions from the President to
the Land Department, and that the application in behalf of
the mining company should be denied.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The PRESIDENT.

OPINIONS
OF

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER, OF PENNSYLVANIA.
*APPOINTED DECEMBER 19, 1881.

ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC RAILROAD.
The recommendations o±: the Secretary of the Interior as to the acceptance of certain sections of the railroad and telegraph lines of the
Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company should be approved by the
President .

•

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 4, 1882.
SIR: I have examined the letter and accompanying paper
of the Secretary of the Interior of the 3d instant, recommending the acceptance of eertain sections of railroad and
telegraph lines of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, and the patenting of lands earned by this road, for
the reason that such action by you would be in accordance
with the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the opinion of the Attorney- General, and the action of the
Interior Department heretofore.
My predecessor, Mr. Attorney-General Devens, when the
same question involving the right of the same company to
lands along the line of the road was submitted to him, gave
it as his opinion, '' 'l'hat it would be within the power and
duty of the Executive to appoint commissioners to examine
* NoTE.-The commission of Mr. Brewster, as Attorney-General, is
dated December 19, 1881; but he did not qualify and enter upon the
duties of the office until January 2, 1882. His predecessor, Mr. Mac Veagh,
ceased, by resignation, to be an incumbent of the office on November
12, 1881, from which date up to January 2, 1882, it remained vacant, the
duties thereof being discharged by the Solicitor-General, Mr. Samuel F.
Phillips, under the provisions of the statute (section 347, Rev. Stat.).
251
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the section of road submitted by the Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad Company, to accept the same if completed in all
respects as required by the act of July 27, 1886, and to cause
patents to be issued to said company for lands situated opposite to and coterminous with the section of the road if
completed."
His opinion, in Volume XVI of Opinions, page 573, discusses the legal proposition involved, and I see no good
reason why it shonld.not be acceiJted as controlling your
action on the sections of railroad submitted at this time for
your approval, not only because oftlle views of Mr. AttorneyGenera] Devens referred to, but because of the decisions of
the Supreme Court and the action of the Interior Department with regard to this road and other roads similarly
situated. I deem the matter to be res adjudicata, and am of
the opinion that the recommendations of the Secretary of
the Interior should be approved.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRE SIDEN T.

EXPENSES OF BOARD OF HEAVY ORDNANCE, ETC.
The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1881, chapter 135, in
the provision authorizing the creation of a board of Army officers to
make examinations ofimjrovements of heavy ordnance and projectiles,
is applicable to expenses necessarily incurred by the board in performing the duties devolved thereon, among which the actual and necessary
expenses of its members for board and lodging and for traveling while
so engaged can be fairly included.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 6, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 16th ultimo, inclosing a communication from General Getty, president of the Board of Heavy
Ordnance and Projectiles, constituted under the act of March
3, 1881, chapter 135, and assembled in 1he city of New York,
.s ubmits for consideration the following inquiries:
(1) "May the members of said Board who are not stationed
in New York City be reimbursed for their actual expenses
of board and lodging while in said city attending the sessions
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of the Board, the said expenses to be paid from the appropdation of $25,000 made in the act of March 3, 1881, (21 Stat.,
468)"?
l2) ''May the actual cost of journeys made by said Board
to such places as may be deemed expedient be paid from such
appropriation ? "
The provision in the act of 1881, upon which these inquiries arise, reads as Jollows: "And the President is ~lu
thorized to select a board, to consist of one engineer officer,
two ordnance officers, and two officers of artillery, whose
duty it shall be to make examinations of all inventions of
heavy ordnance and improvements of heavy ordnance and
projectiles that may be presented to them, including guns
now being constructed or converted under direction of the
Ordnance Bureau; and said board shall make detailed report to the Secretary of War, for transmission to Congress,
of such examination, with recommendation as to what inventions are worthy of actual test, and the estimated cost of
such test; and the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, or
so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated
for such purpose."
Obviously, the purpose of this appropriation is to meet the
expenses necessarily incurred by the Board in performing the
duty devolved thereon, among which the actual and necessary
expenses of the members thereof for board and lodging and
for traveling, while engaged in the performance of such
duty, can be fairly included. The expense of the "actual
test" which the Board may recommend in their report, and
of which the "estimated cost" is to be stated therein, is
clearly contemplated to be provideu tor by further legislation, should Congress (for whose information such report is intended) deem it advisable to direct the test to be made; and,
unless the present appropriation is applicable to Lhe expenses
of the Board, as above, it would remain without au object.
I accordingly answer both your inquiries in the affirmative.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,

Secretary of War.
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COMMUNICATIONS TO CONGRESS.
Requests made on heads of Departments by Congressional committees,
or by either House of Congress, for information on matters relating
to ordinary and current legislation, may with propriety be answered
directly, without passing through the executive office; otherwise as
to communications which concern radical changes in existing laws
affecting public policy.
Subordinate officers of the several Departments should communicate
with Congress through the heads of their Departments respectively.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 7, 1882.
SIR: On the question suggested by the Secretary of the
Interior I have the honor to submit the following:
Requests made on the heads of Departments by committees
of Congress, or by either House, for information on matters
relating to ordinary and current legislation, might with propriety be answered directly, without passing through the executive office. But it would seem proper that communications involving radical changes in existing general statutes,
affecting public policy, should be submitted through the
President for his information and opportunity for expression
of his views ifdesired, the head of each Department to determine the necessity of such manner of transmission.
Subordinate officers of the several Departments ought not
to communicate directly with Congress, its committees or
members, on matters involving legislation, except through
the heads of the Departments.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
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PENALTY-ENVELOPE-OFFICIAL POSTAGE-STAMPS.
Indjan agents and registers and receivers of land offices are (by virtue of section 29 of the act of March 3, 1879, chap. 180) entitled
to use the penalty-envelope for the transmission of o:Eacial mail matter
between themselves and other officers of the United States or between
themselves and the Executive Departments, but not for the transmission of such matter to private persons.
These officers are not " departmental in their character" within the
meaning of sections 5 and 6 of the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 108.
'W hen supplied with official postage-stamps by tile D.epartment.s, they
may use them for the transmission of official mail matter as well to
private persons as to other officers of the Government.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

J anuar.lJ 10, 1882.

SIR: Your letter of the 22d ultimo, ctirecting attention to
~ertain papers therewith inclosea and also to section 3915,

Revised Statute.s; sections 5 and 6 of the act of March 3,
1877, chapter 108; and section 29 of the act of March 3, 1879,
-chapter 180, requests an opinion upon the following questions:
''First. Whether officers of the Government suborrlinate to
this [the Interior] Department, appointed not by the Secretary but by the President, whose offices are located without
the District of Columbia, of which Indian agents and registers and receivers of land-offices may serve as examples, are
.departmental in the·i r character, and therefore entitled to use
the penalty-envelopes in transmitting official mail matter
both to other offices or officers of the Government and to private persons.
'' Second. If not departmental in their character, whether
they are entitled to use the penalty-env-elope for the same
purpose and to the same extent, or, if not thus entitled, what
.p recisely are the restrictions upon their use imposed by the
Jaw.
HThird. If the penalty-envelope may not be used by such
officers of the Government for transmission of a~l official
mail matter, both to other officers of the Government and
to private parties, whether said officers are authorized to use
.official postage-stamps ftlr such purpose."
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The provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the act of 1877, re..
lating to the transmission of official mail matter, were examined by one of my predecessors soon after the passage of
that act, with reference to the question whether the use of
the penalty-e:nvelope, thereby authorized, was limited to the
Executive Departments and the bureaus or offices therein
at the seat of Government, or extended to officers throughout the country, such as postmasters, collectors of internal
revenue, registers of land-offices, etc., between whom and
these Departments an official relation exists. In the opinion
then given it was held that the use of the envelope was by
those provisions restricted to the Executive Departments
and the bureaus or offices therein at the seat of Government. (15, Opin., 262.)
Afterwards, by section 29 of the act of 1879, the same provisions were "extended to all officers of the United States
Government, and made applicable to all official mail matter
transmitted between any of the officers of the United States,
or between any such officer and either of the Executive Departments or officers of the Government, the envelopes . of
such matter in aU cases io bear appropriate indorsements
containing the proper designation of the office from which
the same is transmitted, with a statement of the penalty for
their misuse." This section, while impliedly confirming the
construction pbced on sections 5 and 6 of the act of l877, as
above, in effect confers upon all officers of the United States
the right to use the penalty-envelope, but to a more limited
extent than that given by those sections. Thus the rightS(}
conferred is explicity confined to the transmission of official
mdlil matter between such officers, or between any such officer and either of the Executive Departments or offi.cers of
the Government; whereas under the act of 1877 the Executive Departments and the bureaus or offices therein may use
the penalty-envelope in transmitting- to private persons, as
well as to officials; any letter or package relating exclusively
to the business of the Government.
Coming now to the questions submitted; the result at
which I arrive as regards the use of the penalty-envelope is.
that the officers described in your first que~tion are not
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within the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the act of 1877,
viewing these sections alone, that is to say, irrespective of
the act of 1879, but that they are brought within those provisions by section 29 of the latter act, their right to use the
penalty-envelope depending upon and being controlled by
this section.
To your first and second questions, which for convenience
are taken together, I accordingly reply that, in my opinion,
the officers referred to therein are entitled to use the penaltyenvelope for the transmission of official mail matter between
themselves and other officers of the United States or between themselves and the Executive Departments, but are
not entitled to use such envelope for the transmission of
mail matter to private persons. These officers, as already
intimated, are not "departmental in their character;" i.e.,
officers of the Executive Departments, or of the bureaus or
offices therein; as comprehended by sections 5 and 6 of the
act of 1877. Their right to use the penalty-envelope resting,
as it does, upon section 29 of the act of 1879, cannot be extended beyond the limits thereby imposed.
The remaining question relates to the use of official postage-stamps. Upon examination of section 3915, Revised
Statutes, as amended by the act of February 27, 1877, chapter 69, I find no restrictions such as those contained in section 29 of the act of 1879.
Any officer who is supplied with these stamps by the Department may use them for the transmission of official mail
matter, as well to private parties as to other officers of the
Government.
Assuming, then, that the officers referred to in the question
are t.hus supplied with official postage-stamps, I answer the
same in the affimative.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
272-voL xvn-~17
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INDIAN HESERV ATIONS.
Snnble that the President has power to make a reservation for occupation by Indians from public domain lying within the limits of a State.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

January 17, 1882.
SrR: I have examined the question which seems to arise
upon the papers placed in my bands by you a f'ew days since
in relation to a proposed order by the President to reserve a
body of land situate in the State of Nebraska as an addition
to the great Sioux Reserve, the southern limit of which is the
northern boundary of Nebraska.
The question may be thus stated:
Has the President authority to make reservations for the
occupation of Indians from the public lands lying within the
boundaries of States~
•
The Constitution bas not conferred this power upon the
President, but to Congress is given the power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory belonging to the United States.
From an early period, however, it has been the practice of
t lle President to order from time to time, as the exigencies
of the public service required, parcels of land belonging to
the United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for
public uses. (Grisar v. ~McDowell, 6 Wall., 363, see page
:1s1)

This practice doubtless has sprung from the authority given
by
Congress to. the President early in the history of this Gov1
ernment to appropriate lands for purposes more or less
general. As in the act of may 3, 1798, in which an appro·
priation was made for the purpose of enabling the President
to erect fortifications in such place or places as the public
safety should, in his opinion, require (1 Stat., 554). So, by
the act of 21st of April, 1806 (2 Stat., 402), the President
was authorized to establish trading houses at such posts and
places on tl.le frontiers or in the Indian country, on either
or both sides of the MissisRippi R:ver, as be should judge
most convenient for carrying on trade with the Indians, and
by act of June 14, 1819 (1 Stat., 547), he was authorized to
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,e rect such fortifications as might, in his opinion, be necessary
for the protection of the northern and western frontiers.
'These instances are taken from the opinion of the court in
Wilcox v. Jackson (13 Peters, 498).
Moreover, the authority of the President in this regard bas
been recognized in several acts of Congress. Thus in the
fourth section of the pre-emption act of May 29,1830 (4 Stat.,
421), it is provided that "the right of pre-emption contemvlated by the act shall not extend to any land whieh is re~served from sale by Congress, or by order of the President," etc.
~o also in the act of September 4, 1841 (5 Stat., 456), lands included in any reservation by treaty, law, or proclamation of
the President, are exempted from entry under the act.
In Wilcox v. Jackson (13 Peters, p. 512, 513), the court
.says: '' .A.t the request of the Secretary of War, the Commis.sioner of the General Land Office, in 1824, colored and marked
upon the map this very section as reserved for military purposes, and directed it to be reserved from sale for those purposes. We consider this, too, as having been done by authority of law; tor amongst other provisions in the act of 1830 all
lands are exempted from pre-emption which are reserved
from sale by order of the President. Now, although the
immediate agent in requiring the reservation was the Secretary of War, yet we feel justified in presuming that it was
done by the approbation and direction of the President. The
President speaks and act.s through the heads of the several
Departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their
respective duties." See also 15 Peters, 430, where an order
·of the President is spoken of as a valid reservation.
It appears from these authorities that not only has the
President the power to make reservations of public lands for
public uses, but if the reservations are made by the heads of
Departments it will be presumed that the President has acted
through them.
In 5 Wallace, page 68, where the reservation in question
was for the improvement of the Des Moines River in Iowa,
the court says that the President was competent through the
Secretary· of the Interior to make the reser\ation, and that
he had this power ever since the establishment of the Land
Department.
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It has be,en shown above that the President bas the power
generally to reserve lands from the public domain for public
uses.
In the cases cited the reservation bas been for military purposes or for public improvements. Is a reservation for occupation by Indians a reservation for a public use 1
By the acts of July 9, 1832 (4 Stat., 5G4), and 30th of June,
1834 (4 Stat., 738), a bureau of Indian affairs was establishedt
and extensive powers were given to the President in the control and management of the Indians, and our statute-book
abounds with legislation concerning the Indian and Indian
tribes. The regulation of the relations of the Government
with these tribes is a great public interest, and their settlement upon reservations has been considered a matter of great
importance. Indeed it has been the settled policy of the·
Government for many years.
A reservation from the public lands therefore for Indian
occupation may well be regarded as a measure in the public
interest and as for a public use. Congress has in numerous.
acts of legislation recognized it as such. These statutes
need not be particularly referred to; they are scattered
through the statute-book; indeed the annujj,l Indian bill is.
full of such recognitions.
But, again, may the President reserve lands within the
limits of a State for Indian occupation ~
My answer to this is that it has been done; it bas been the
practice for many years. I have found no case where the objection has been raised that a reservation could not be made
within the boundaries of a State without the consent of the
State.
I think there is no such case, and I say this the more confidently, because recently in the case of the United States.
against John Leathers, tried and decided by Hillyer, district
judge for the district of Nevada, an order of reservation made
March 23, 1874, oflands in the State of Nevada for Indian
occupation was pa.ssed upon.
·
It was a criminal case, in which the indictment charges that
the defendant attempted to introduce goods and to trade in
the Indian country witbotlt a license, contrary to section
2133, Revised Statutes, and that he introduced liquor into'
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·the Indian country contrary to section 2139, Revised Statutes.
The Indian country in this case was "Pyramid Lake Res«ervation."
The order of reservation is as follows:
''EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 23, 1874.
"It is -hereby ordered that tbe tract of country known and
·Occupied as the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation in Nevada,
:as surveyed by Eugene Monroe inJanuary,1865, and indicated
by red lines, according to courses and distances given in tabular form on accompanying diagram, be withdrawn from sale
or other disposition, and set apart for the use of the Pah-Ute
and other Indians residing thereon.
"U. s. GRANT."
This case was thoroughly and vigorously contested, but the
argument derived from the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the
State is not noticed in the decision of the judge. It makes
no figure in the case.
He does decide that the reservation was legally and rightfully made by the President, and this after a thorough examination of the authorities.
I will close this paper by citing some instances of reservations by the President for the use of Indians of lands lying
within State limits.
In Ualifornia. The Yule River Reserve, January 9, 1873,
and October 3, 1873, by President Grant.
In Michigan. The Ontonagon Reservation, by President
Pierce, September 25, 1855.
. Reservation of lands in Isabella county, Michigan, for In-dians, by President Pierce, May 14, 1855.
In Nebraska. The Niobrara Reserve, by President John.son, February 27, 1866; also July 20, 1866.
In Nevada. Carlin Farms Reserve, by President Hayes,
l\fay 10, 1877.
Duck Valley Reserve, by President Hayes, May 16, 1877.
In Oregon. Grand Ranche Reserve, by President Buchanan,
.January 30, 1857.
The Malheur Indian Reservation, by President Grant,
J"anuary 28, 187(),
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These instances I have taken from the annual report of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1878, in which there
are many more of like character. This statement of" Executive orders relating to Indian reserves," occupies pages 230279 of said report. '
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

UTE INDIAN RESERVATION.
The lands of the Ute Indian reservation in Utah Territory can not be·
declared open for settlement and disposal, under the act of June 15,.
1880, chapter 223, before allotments provided for in that act are made.
If, previous to such allotments, it is thought advisable that any land
within the reservation should be opened to settlement and disposal,.
additional legislation will be necessary to enable this to be done.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

January 17, 1882.
Your letter of the 12th instant presents for my consideration the following case and questions:
"By section 3 of the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 203), it
is prescribed that whenever the report and proceedings of
the Ute commissioners therein provided for are approved
by the President of the United Stat;es, he shall cause patents.
to be issued to each and every allottee for the lands so·
allotted, * * * and all the lands not so allotted, the title
to which is by the said agreement, etc., released and conveyed to the United States, shall be held and deemed to b~
public lands of the United States, and subject to disposal
under the laws providing for the disposal of the public lands
at the same price and on the same terms as other lands of
like character, except as provided in this act, etc.
"By the agreement in question it was contemplated that
two of the three classes of Indians named, viz, the Southern
Utes and the Uncompahgre Utes, would be provided for and
receive allotments within the bounds of Colorado if suitable·
lands could be found therein, and the White River Utes.
were to remove to the Uintah Reservation in Utah, and that.
SIR :
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the residue of lands in the old reservation not required for
such allotment would be left for release to and disposal by
the United States, in which event, according to the terms of
the statute just recited, I understand that the condition that
the same shall be deemed public lands would only take effect
from the date of the completion and approval of the allotments and the direction to issue patents· thereon.
'' In the work of the Commission, recently reported, it was
found impracticable to locate the Uncompahgre Utes upon
the proposed lands on Grand River, and they were accordingly removed to a new reservation in Utah, which bas by
executive order of the 15th--- been set apart for their
use with the purpose of making allotments to them in
severalty therein.
''The White River Utes have also been removed to the
Uintah Reservation in Utah, but no allotments have yet
been made to them.
"The Southern Utes yet retain a separate portion of the
original reservation.
·
"By resolution of the Senate of the United States on the
lOth instant I am directed to transmit to the Senate any information in my possession touching the opening for settlement under the .pre-emption laws of the United States of that
part of the late reservation in the State of Colorado not
assigned to the Southern Ute Indians by the provisions of
the act of June 15, 1880.
''To enable me to give intelligent answer to the request, I
desire an authoritative opinion whether or not, the Indian-s
having been entirely removed therefrom as stated, said lands
can by executive authority be declared open for settlement
and disposal under the act prior to the making and approval
of the allotments in severalty contemplated in the agreement
as confirmed thereby; or whether, in case it be deemed advisable to open the lands to immediate settlement and disposal, it will not be necessary to invoke further legislative
action."
In reply, I have the honor to state that the lands of the
Indian reservation in Colorado, to which your inquiries refer, can not, in my opinion, be declared open for settlement
and disposal, under the act of June 15, 1880, before the allot-
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ments in severalty are made, as provided by that act. The
language of the act is, " And all the lands not so allotted
"" * "" shall be held and deemed to be public lands of the
United States, and subject to disposal under the laws providing for the disposal of the public lands," etc. As the lands not
allotted can not be precisely known until after the allotments are made-which take place in contemplation of the
statute when the report and proceedings of the commissioners are approved by the President and not before-it results ex necessitate that previous to that period the provision
just quoted can have no effect upon the lands within the
reservation. In accordance with these views I am further
of opinion that if1 under the circumstances stated in your
letter, it is thought advisable that any lands within the
reservation be opened to immediate settlement and disposal,
additional legislation will be necessary to enable this to be
done.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.

USE OF PENALTY-ENVELOPES.
Opinion of May 25, 1880 (16 Opin., 501), as to the use of the penalty'llnvelope, reaffirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 19, 1882.
SIR : In compliance with your oral request of Tuesday, I
have examined the accompanying letter, addressed to the
Commissioner of Pensions, dated the 16th instant (which,
though not signed, appears to be intended for your signature), and also the copy of a circular inclosed therewith,
which was issued by Secretary Schurz, under date of April
8, 1880. I assume that the object of your request is to obtain an expression of my views as to whether the use of the
penalty-envelope, in the manner and for the purpose stated
in the circular, is in accordance with law. On investigation
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I find that substantially the same question has already been
considered by one of my predecessors, who, in an opinion
dated L\-Iay 25, 1880 (16 Opin., 501), held that where a member of Congress has addressed an inquiry about official business to a Department or any bureau thereof, the reply may
properly be addressed to the person concerned in a penalty
envelope and sent unsealed to the membPr (that he may
take cognizance of its contents) to be by him forwarded to
its destination; but that in such ca.se the use of the envelope
must be strictly limited to the communication between the Department or bureau and the applicant or person coneet·ned.
PrPsuming that this opinion, in which I concur fully, meets
the object of your request, I deem it unnecessary to do more
than call your attention to it.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Ron. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.

MISSOURI, KANSAS AND TEXAS RAILWAY.
The President bas power to direct, by an executive order, the manner
in which shall be ascertained and determined the compensation for
property taken or destroyed in the construction of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railw{ty through the reservation of the Chickasaw and
Choctaw tribes of Indians.
DEP ARTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE,

January 21, 1882.
SIR: I have the honor to state that the letter of the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 7th instant, addressed to
,you, together with the executive order proposed and recommended by him, and all the accompanying papers, have
been carefully read and considered.
The question upon which my advice is requested in your
reference of the Secretary's letter is "as to the propriety of
issuing-" the said order.
The proposed order is supplementary to former executive
{)rders by the President directing the manner in which full ·
compensation to the parties injured for property taken or
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destroyed in the construction of the Missourj, Kansas ::tnd
Texas Railway through the reservations of the Chickasaw
and Choctaw tribes of Indians shall be ascertained and determined.
The eighteenth article of the treaty of J nne 22, 1855, and
the sixth article of the treaty of April 28, 18G6, with these
tribes, provided that the President shall direct as to the manner, etc., as above.
Without rehearsing the facts in the case, which are fully
set forth in a communication of the 5th instant from theCommissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the In-terior, I am of opinion that the order is necessary in order
to the settlement of the differences between the railway com-pany and the Indians, that it is within the authority given
to the President by the treaties above cited, and I advise
that it be issued.
1 have the honor to return herewith the papers referred
to me.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

EMPLOYES OF CENSUS BUREAU.
An order may be made by the Secretary of the Interior directing payment of the certificates given by the Superintendent of the Census in
cases where such certificates are assigned in strict conformity to section 3477, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 26, 1882.
SIR: Concerning the order addressed to Richard Joseph,.
disbursing clerk, directing him to make payment to the holders of certificates given by the Superintendent of the Census
to certain employes of the Census Bureau who, by assignment or letter of attorney, had transferred their certificates,.
which order has been presented to you for signature, my
advice is that an order so drawn as to direct payment, when
the certificates are assigned in strict conformity to section
3477, Revised Statutes, may be signed by you.
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This statute, it has been held, does not apply to cases litigated in the courts; but in transactions before the Treasury,
not coming Within the jurisdiction Of COUrts, its proYiSiOnS
must be complied with. (See Lawrence and Crowell's case,
8 C. Cis. R.,. 252; and Cavender's case, id., 281.)
I have been informed that a ruling has recently been made
by the present Secretary of the Treasury relative to assignments by Government employes of their claims upon the
Treasury.
Upon application to the clerk of that Department I am
not able to obtain a copy of the order referred to and do not
know its scope, or, indeed, if such an order has actually been
issued.
I should very much regret if any advice given by me in
this matter should be in conflict with the views of the Secretary, desirous as I am that there should be perfect agreement
between the Departments upon the subject.
Upon the policy of generally disregarding assignments of
such claims, my views are, I think, in harmony with those
reported to have been expressed by the Secretary of the
Treasury. I do not intend that the case in hand shall be
considered hereafter as a precedent. It is a peculiar case.
The appropriation for the work of the census was exhausted,
but the services of the persons employed to carry on that work
were indispensable. They labored on upon the faith that
Congress would compensate them. But meanwhile they must
have the means of support. They could obtain them only by
assigning their certificates, and now that Congress has passed
a law for their compensation, it is a hard case, indeed, if the
device by which alone they were enabled to obtain their daily
bread can not be recognized by the Government.
I am of opinion that an order such as I have indicated above
shoulrl be issued by you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
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CUSTOMS LAWS-ADDITIONAL DUTY UNDER.
The additional duty of 20 per centum ad valorem in section 2900, Revised Statutes, can not be legally exacted on costs, charges, anu commissions, but should. be levied only on the "appraised value" of the
merchandise imported, exclusive of such charges.
The additional duty of 20 per centum in section 2908, Revised Statutes,
is a separate and distinct penalty, which can legally be exacted on the
charges as entered, and only on this element of the dutiable value of the
merchandise.
The legislation on the subject reviewed, and those sections construed.
Djj;PARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

January 27, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 26th of November last, addressed
to the tben Acting Attorney-General (the Ron. S. F. Pbillips,
Solicitor-General), in which attention is c.tlled to some recent
correspondence between the United States attorney at New
York and your Department touching the additional assessment of 20 per cent. ad valorem under sections 2900 and 2908,
Revised Statutes, states that it is the practice of your Department, where the appraised value of imported merchandise is
more than 10 per cent. greater than the entered value (when
entry is made by certified invoice), to assess such duty "as
well upon the value of the merchandise as on the costs,
charges, and commissions." This practice, in so far as it relates to costs, charges, and commissions, being claimed to be
erroneous by the United States attorney, you request an
opinion upon the question presented. The duty of responding to this request having devoh·ed upon me, I now have the
honor to communicate to you my views upon the inquiry submitted, which I understand to be whether the additional duty
of 20 per centum ad valorem imposed by sections 2900 and
2908, Revised Statutes, can be legally exacted on costs,
charges, and commissions.
After careful examination of the subject, I arrive at the
-conclusion that the additional duty of 20 per cent." ad valorem
contained in section 2900, Revised Statutes, can not legally
be exacted on costs, charges, and commissions, but should
be levied only on the '~ appraised value" of the merchandise
jmported exclushTe of such charges, and that the additional
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duty of 20 per centum contained in section 2908, Revised Statutes, is a separate and distinct penalty, which can legally be
exacted on the charges as entered, and only on this element of
the dutiable value of the merchandise. And herein I agree
with the view of the United States attorney, as expressed in
his letter to you of November 19.
I am led to the above conclusions upon consideration of
those sections in connection with others in the Revised
Statutes, and also in connection with previous legislation relating to the same subject. By reference to this legislation it
will be found that an additional duty, such as that provided
by section 2900, was imposed by section 8 of the act of July
30, 1846, chapter 74, in substantially the same terms. This
section authorized the importer of merchandise actually purchased, on entry of the same, "to make such addition in the
entry to the cost or value given in the invoice as, in his
opinion, may raise the same to the true market value of such
imports ·in the principal markets of the country whence the
importation shall have been made, or in which the goods imported shall have been originally manufactured and produced,
as the case may be, and to add thereto all costs and charges
which, under existing laws, would form part of the true value
at the port where the same may he entered upon which the
duties shall be assessed. And it shall be the duty of the
collector, within whose district the same may be imported or
entered, to cause the dutiable value of such imports to be appraised, estimated, and ascertained in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws; and if the appraised 1;alue thereof
shall exceed by 10 per centum or more the value so declared
on the entry, then, in addition to the duties imposed by law
on the same, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty
of 20 per centum .ad valorem on such appraised value," etc.
(9 Stat., 43). In the case of Sampson v. Peaslee (20 How., 571),
the Supreme Court heid that under this statute the additional
duty of 2o per cent. ad valorem could be levied on the appraised value only, and not upon the charge~ and commissions added.
It will be observed that the act of 1846 uses the words
H dutiable value" as well as the words '~appraised value,"
and also employs phraseology signifying entered value. Each
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.of these expressions has a different meaning. That act provided no mode for ascertaining the dutiable value of articles
upon which an ad valorem duty was imposed, but left such
value to be ascertained under the proviHions of other laws.
'T he provisions on the subject then in force were contained in
section 16 of the act of AtJgust 30, 1842, chapter 270, as
to imports procured by purchase, and in section 5 of
the act of March 1, 1823, chapter 21, as to imports
otherwise procured; and they required that, in determining the clutiable value of merchandise (or, in the language
·Of the act of 184:2, "the true value at the port where the
same may be entered upon which duties shall be assessed"),
certain costs, charges, and commissions should be added to
its appraised value. So that '' appraised value," as used in
.section 8 of the act of 1846, means the value ascertained by
the appraisers, exclusive of costs, charges, etc.; while" dutiable value," as there used, means the valu e ascertained by
the appraisers, together with the costs, charges, etc., required to be added thereto by the provisions of other statutes.
According to the ruling of the Supreme Court, already referred to, the additional duty of 20 per cent. provided by
that section was liable only on the '' appraised value" as
thus distinguished from the ''dutiable value."
Some amendments were subsequently introduced by the
acts of March 3, 1851, chapter 38, and March 3, 1857, chapter
101, the latter being amendatory of section 8 of the act of
1846. Yet the law as regards the assessment of 20 per cent.
additional duty was left unchanged. Thus, by the act of
1857, the collector within whose district the articles were
imported or entered was required to cause the "dutiable
value" thereof to be "appraised, estimated: and ascertained
in accordance with provisions of existing laws," and if the
"appraised value exceeded by 10 per cent. or more the entered value, an adtlitional duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem
was to be levied, collected, and paid on such appraised value."
But by section 23 of the act of June 30, 1864, chapter 171,
both the eighth :section of the act of 1846 and the amendatory act of 1857 were expressly repealed. Provisions similar
to those then repealed were, however, contained in section
23 of the act of 1864, ~nd section 24 of the same act declared
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what should be deemed the dutiable value of imports, with
·certain exceptions, and provided how ~uch value should be
ascertained. Under the former section the importer was authorized when he entered his goods, etc., "to make such ad{iition in the entry to the cost or value given in the invoice
.a s in his opinion may raise the same to the true market value
of such goods, etc., in the principal markets of the country
whence they shall have been imported, and to add thereto
.all costs and charges which, under existiug laws, would form
part of th~ true value at the port where the same may be
entered, upon which the duty shall be assessed." It is then
made the duty of the collector to " cause the dutiab}e value
.of such goods, etc., to be appraised, estimated, and ascertained in accordance with the provisions of existing laws;
and if the appraised value thereof shall exceed by ten per
cen~um or more the value so declared on the entry, then, in ad-dition to the duties imposed by law on the same, there shall
be levied, collected, and paid a duty of twenty per centum ad
valorem on s1.wh appraised value," etc. Thus the act of 1864,
tn re-enacting the 20 per cent. additional duty provided by
the acts of 1846 and 1857, made ·no change with respect to
-its assessment. As under the two last-mentioned acts, so
under the act of 1864, the duty was to be a~sessed not on
the dutiable value, but on the appraised value.
By section 7 of the act of March 3, 1865, chapter 80, sections 23 and 24 of the act of 1864, above mentioned, were
repealed, and also " all acts and parts of acts requiring
duties to be assessed upon commissions, brokerage, costs of
transportation, shipment, transshipment, and other like co.sts
-and charges incurred in placing any goods, wares, or merchandise on ship-board," etc.
The same section made it the duty of the collector, in cases
where an ad valorem duty is imposed on imported merchandise, and also where the duty is ba~.ed upon the value of the
square yard or of any specified quantity or parcel of such
merchandise, to cause ''the actual market value or wholesale
price thereof, at the period of the exportation to the United
States, in the principal markets of the country from which
the same shall have been imported into the United States,
to be appraised, and such appraised value shall be consid-
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ered the value upon which duty shall be assessed." Here,
for the first time (but only for a brief period, as will hereafter
appear), the appraised value becomes the dutiable value, the
former being made the sole basis for the assessment of duties.
The provision just quoted is em bodied in section 2906, Revised Statutes.
Section 7 of the act of 1865 further {>rovided: ''That it shall
be lawful for the owner, consignee, or agent of any goods,.
wares, or merchandise which shall have been actually purchased, or procured otherwise than by purchase, at the tiwe,
and not afterwards, when he shall produce his original invoice or invoices to the collector, and make and verify his
written entry of his goods, etc., to makP such addition in the
entry to the cost or value given in the invoice as in his opinion may raise the same to the actual market value or wholesale price of such goods, etc., at the period of exportation to
the United States in the principal markets of the comitrs=from which the same shall have been imported; and it shall
be the duty of the collector within whose district the same
may be imported or entered to cause such actual market
value or wholesale price to be appraised in accordance with
the provisions of existing laws, and if such appraised value
shall exceed by ten per centum or more the value as declar.ed
in the entry, then, in addition to the duties imposed by law
on the same, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty
of twenty per centum ad valorem on such appraised value,"
etc. This provision is reproduced in section 2900, Revised
Statutes.
Thus, under the act of 1865, the dutiable value of imported
merchandise was the actual market value or wholesale pricethereof at the period of exportation to the United States in
the principal markets of the country from which the same
was imported into the United States, without any addition
for costs, charges, and commissions, such actual market value
or wholesale priee being ascertained by appraisement. The
20 per cent. additional duty was leviable on the value so ascertained, that is, on the appraised value, which, as already
stated, was also the dutiable value.
But by section 9 of the act of July 28, 1866, chapter 298~
costs, charges, and commissions were again made an element
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of value for the assessment of duties. That section declared,
H That in determining the dutiable value of merchandise hereafter imported, there shall be added to the cost or to the actual wholesale price, or general market value at the time of
exportation in the principal markets of the country from
whence the same shall have been imported into the United
States, the cost of transportation, shipment, and transshipment, with1 all the expenses included, from the place of
growth, production, or manufacture, whether by land or
water, to the vessel in which shipment is made to the United
States, the value of the sack, box, or covering of any kind
in which such goods are contained; commission at the usual
rates, but in no case less than two and a half per centum ;
brokerage, export duty, and all other actual or usual charges
for putting up, preparing, and packing for transportation or
shipment: * 11 * Provided, That all additions made to
the entered value of merchandise for charges shall be regarded as part of the actual value of such merchandise, and
if such addition shall exceed by ten per centum the value so
declared in the entry, in addition to the duties imposed by
law, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of twenty
per centum on such value," etc. This provision is embodied
in sections 2907 and 2908, Revised Statutes.
It is to be observed that tb.e above provision of the act of
J 866 made no change in the law of 1865, excepting as regards the dut,i able value of imported merchandise. This
value, under the act of 1865, was the actual market value or
wholesale price in the principal markets of the country whence
thP; merchandise was imported as appraised. Under the act
of 1866 the dutiable value was, in substance, the appraised
value as required by tbe act of 1865, with certain costs,
charges, etc., added thereto. The act of 1866, besides requiring such costs, charges, etc., to be added in determining the
dutiable value, provided for levying an addition"al duty of
20 per centum where ''additions made to the entered value
of merchandise for cha1;ges should exceed by ten per centum
the value so declared in the entry."
This additional duty does not appear to have been intendeu
as a substitute for that provided by the act of 1865, but rather
as cumulative therewith. Both have accordingly been repro272-VOL
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duced in the Revised Statutes (sees. 2900 and 2908). Obviously the adflitional duty of the act of 1865 was a penal
duty, designed to enforce the entry of imports by the importer according to the actual market value or wholesale
price thereof at the time of exportation in the principal markets of the country from which the same were imported. On
the other hand, it would seem that the purpose of the additional duty of the act of 1866, which was also Jpenal duty,
was to enforce a true statement by the importer on entry of his
merchandise of the ~osts, charges, etc., thereon, which by the
last-mentioned act were required to be added to the actual
1
market value or wholesale price thereof in the foreign market in determining the dutiable value of the merchandise.
The latter penal duty was leviable on the 'ralue of the costs,
ch~trges, etc.~ as entered by the importer, in case an addition
was made thereto by the customs officer which exceeiled by
10 per cent. or more such entered value; while the former
penal duty was leviable ou the value of the merchandise as
appraised (exclusive of costs, charges, etc.), in case such
appraised value exceeded by 10 per cent. or more the value
of the merchandise as entered by the importer.
These provisions of the act of 1865 and 1866, as before
observecl, have been em bodied in sections 2900, 2906, 2907,
and 2908, Revised Statutes, and they remain substantially unchanged.
.
By section 2906, when an ad valorem rate of duty is imposed on imported merchandise, etc., the collector is required
to cause "the actual market value or wholesale price thereof,
at the period of the exportation to the United States, in the
principal markets of the country from which the same has
been imported, to be appraised." To this is added, ''And
such appraised value shall be con.sidered the value upon
which duty shall be assessed." Such ''appraised value,"
however, is not (in view of the provisions of the next following section) to be understood as constituting the whole dutiable value of the imports. What shall constitute this value
is declared in section 2907, which provides that ''in determining the dutiable value of merchandise, there shall be
added to the cost, or to the actual wholesale price or general
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market value at the time of exportation in the principal
markets of the country from whence the same has been im·
ported," certain charges therein described. These charges
are not contemplated to be appraised, but to be ~scertained
.and added to the appraisement of the merchandise required
, to be made by section 2906. In the "appraised value"
charges are not included. The "dutiable value" includes
both the appraised value and the charges.
Section 2900 permits the importer at the time of entry,
and not afterward, to make such addition to the cost or
value given in the invoice as, in his opinion, may raise the
same to the actual market value or wholesale price of the
merchandise at the period of exportation. Such actual
market value is then to be appraised, and if the appraised
value exceeds by 10 per centum or more the "value so dedared in the entry," it is provided that there shall be collected an additional duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem "on
such appraised value." By the terms of this section the additional duty must be exa.~ted on the "appraised value,''
which value, as shown above, does not em brace charges .
. Section 2908 declares that "all additions made to the entered value of merchandise for charges shall be regarded as
part of the actual value of such merchandise, and if such addition shall exceed by ten per centum the value declared .in
the entry, in adrlition to the duties imposed by law, there
.shall be collected a duty of twenty ·per centum on such value."
By the preceding section (2907), in determining the dutiable
value of merchandise, certain charges are to be computed.
'These charges are required to be included by the importer
in his entry (see Rev. Stat., sees., 2785, 2841, 2843, 2845,
2849, 2853, 2854; compare also sec. 14 of the act of June 22,
1874, chap. 391); and when thus included they constitute
what is described in section 2908 as "the entered v-alue of
merchandise for charges." The "additions" thereto mentioned in the same section signify those which are made by
the collector; and it is declared that where any such addition exceeds by 10 per centum "the value declared in the
entry" (meaning, as I take it, the entered 'l.:alue for charges),
"an additional duty of twenty per cent. shall be collected on
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such value." According to this construction the additional
duty provided by section 2908 is applicable solely to the
charges, and can be exacted on these only at their entered
value.
I return herewith the papers which accompanied yourletter.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJ.AMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Bon.

J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

CHARLES

DEDUCTION FROM PAY OF MAIL CONTRACTORS.
Section 3962,Revised Statutes, makes it imperative upon the PostmasterGeneral to deduct from the pay of mail contractors the price of the
trip where, without fault on their part, the trip is not performed.
And semble that the sectiOn has the same effect as regards the pay of
companies performing "recognized service" in the case of trips not
performed by such companies.
DEP A.R'I'MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 4,1882.
SIR: Upon the 28th of June last a note was received here
from your predecessor, asking for an opinion upon two questions which had occurred in his Department. Those questions
were at once considered, and a reply was prepared upon the
11th of July last. At the instance, however, of the gentleman who had argued the matter here on behalf of the parties
who had applied for certain remissions at the Post-Office Department, as the matter did not seem pressing otherwise than
at their instance, I deferred submitting such reply until an.
other argument might be presented in support of the application in question. That occurred in November last. Siuce
then other engagements have prevented its consideration until
during the present week.
With this explanation of the delay that has occurred, I
submit the following reply to the note above referred to.
Connecting the note with statements in an opinion of the
Assistant Attorney-General for the Post-Office Department.
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·therewith inclosed, it appears that the questions to be answered
.are substantially as follows:
(1) Whether section 3962,Revised Statutes, is imperative or
merely directory, so far as it defines the action to be taken by
the Postmaster-General in cases where without fault mail con·tractors fail to perform trips; and,
(2) Whether, if imperative as to ordinary contractors, it is
.so as to companies performing what is called recognized service.
The note requests that the opinion therewith transmitted
may be "reviewed."
The established practice in this Department is not to review
opinions of the kind submitted. It bas been thought that to
take such a course might lead to secondary discussions and
other incidental complications, and that the most satjsfactory
way is to take up the principal questions themselves, without embarrassment by tbe manner in which they have already been treated. I shall ~herefore ask leave to follow this
method, having at the same time had the benefit of reading
·the iearned opinion iu question.
•
(1) Section 3962 is as follows:
"The Postmaster-General may make deductions from the
pay of contractors for failure to perform service according
to contract, and impose fines upon them for other delinquencies.
" He may deduct the price of the trip in all cases where the
·trip is not performed.
" And not exceeding- three time~ the price, if the failure be
-occasioned by the fault of the contractor or carrier."
I have divided the section into three paragraphs, answering to the three different topics into which, upon inspection,
it appears to be divided; the first being that of failures and
delinquencies in general; the second of simple non-perform.ance of trip; and the third of failure occasioned by fault in the
---contractor or carrier.
I submit then that the element of fault or innocence does
not enter into a question whether the penalty spoken of in
the second paragraph is to be exacted, but only that of performance or non-performance. Also, it seems that the existence of fault is important only upon a question whether a
:penalty greater than that imposed by the second paragraph,

'
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or not exceeding three times the price of the trip, is to beexacted.
The use of the word may does not affect any color which
the section mar otherwise have. That word is often employed
to impose a duty upon public officers, a resort to the context
being necessary to determine the existence and the limit of"
any discretion thereabouts. That context in the present connection has already been somewhat discussed. But it may
be added that the phrase, " prices of a trip," which occurs in
the section, is also important to the same purpose. .fi'~or thissuggests an understanding by Congress that each trip has its
price, and therefore that when a trip is not performed, nomatter for what reason, it should not be paid for. Even in
the case of perfect innocence on the part of the non-performing contractor, inasmuch as the other party to the contract
(The United States) is equally innocent, there is no reason
why an unperformed trip should be reckoned as if performed;
for upon the theory that each trip has its price, there is so·
far a total failur~ of consideration.
In this connection it is plain that it makes no difference·
that the pay of each trip is not exactly apportioned to the
amount of transportation done upon that trip, i.
that themails left over upon one day are carried on the next, for the·
question is as to the understanding of Congress apparent
from the provision before us; and as to that, it is evident that
for the purposes of section 3962 Congress assumed that each
trip had -its own ascertainable price, to withhold which for
an unperformed trip was therefore not punishment but mere,
equity.
Concluding, as I do, that section 3962 makes it imperative.
upon the Postmaster-General to deduct the price of the tripwhen not performed, I am further of opinion that the provisions of section 409 have no application here. That section
authorize~ certain modes of proceeding by which the Sixth
Auditor is to enable the Postmaster-General the better to.
"exercise his powers over fines, penalties, forfeitures, and
liabilities under any provision oflaw in relation to the officers,
employes, operations, or business of the postal service." This.
expression of course leaves the question of the existence of
such powers at large. That he has extensive powers over

e.,
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various cases of fines and forfeitures under section 3962 is
readily admitted, but not in the case before me. As ha!:-1
already been suggested, it is difficult to see by wllat considerations the Postmaster-General could make a difference
betwixt parties who come under the second paragraph abo,~e,
all of them being innocent parties.
In this connection my attention has been called to the opinions of the Attorney-General contained in Volume XIV of
Opinions, page 179, and XV, page 441.
Entertaining a very high respect for the judgment of the
distinguished gentleman who gave the opinion first cited, I
confess that I am unable to concur in the argument and conclusion there announced. The second opinion was confined
of course to the question which had been asked. It does
not conflict with that now submitted. Upon the contrary, it
goes a little out of its way to suggest that the word· may
in section 3!)62 is imperative.
(2) The question remal.ns whether, supposing section 3962
to be imperative as to ordinary contractors, it be so as to
companies performing what is called recognized service.
As a general rule it seems to me that companies performing recognized service must be regarded as contractors, The
correspondence under which they came into the postal service
of the United States ascertains their obligations. (Railroad
Company vs. The United States, 101 U. S. R., 543; see p. 549,
par. 2.)
Very respectfu1Iy, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
HARBOR IMPROVEMENT AT CHICAGO.
The United States may avail itself of the remedy by injunction to protect
from injury improvements in navigable waters made under authority
of Congress.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
February 6, 1882.
SIR: Referring to your letter of the 20th ultimo, and the
papers transmitted therewith, in rrlatioh to the propoaed
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construction by the Illinois Central Railroad Company, within
the outer harbor at Chicago, of "a dock line about 100 feet
eastward of the present shore-protection and filling the inclosed area,'' I have the honor to state that the question
whether the ownership of the soil is in the company, or in
the State, or elsewhere (the United States asserting no title
thereto), appears to me to be unimportant in so far as the
General Government is concerned, and that the only inquiry
which need be entertained by your Department is whether
the construction of the '' dock line" will obstruct, encroach
upon, or interfere with the harbor improvement, and thus
injuriousll affect its usefulness in the interest of navigation.
If so, it would not only be your duty to withhold your assent
to the prosecution of the work, but to direct that proceedings be taken in the proper court to enjoin the proposed encroachment, should the company p~rsist in going on therewith. That the United States may avail itself ofthe remedy
by injunction to protect from injury improvements in navigable waters made undar the authority of Congress is not at
all doubtful. (United States v. Duluth, 4 Dill., 469.)
The inquiry suggested above, however, being one of fact,
I can afford you no aid in determini11g it. In its consideration the views of the officers of the Engineer Department,
who have immediate charge of the harbor improvement, are
entitled to very great weight, and will, I doubt not, enable you
to reach a correct conclusion.
The papers above referred to are returned herewith.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
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RELEASE OF MORTGAGE.
It is competent to the Secretary of the Navy, under the circumstances
stated, to release a certain mortgage given by Robert L. Stevens on the
9th of September, 1848, as security for the performance of a certain
contract theretofore entered into by him for the construction of a war
vessel since known as the "Stevens Battery."

DEPART ME NT OF JUSTICE,

February 13, 1882.
SIR: I have examined the papers which accompanied your
letter of the 7th instant, relating to an application made to
you for a release of the mortgage given by the late Robert
L. Stevens on the 9th of September, 184~, as security for the
performance of a certain contract theretofore entered into by
him for the construction of a war vessel since known as the
" Stevens Battery."
The contract, to secure the performance of which the
mortgage was given, was made by the Secretary of the Navy
with Mr. Stevens under authority granted by the act of
.April14, 1842, chapter 22. It contained a stipulation providing for the execution of the mortgage which is recited in the
1atter, and also a further stipulation "that when the said
Stevens shall have fully completed the said war steamer,
with the engines, boilers, and their dependencies, her armament and equipment in all respects, and when she shall have
been duly delivered to and received by the agent of the
United States according to the terms of this contract and
that of which this is explanatory, there shall then be paid to
the said Stevens, etc., * * * and the Secretary of the
Navy shall at the sarne tirne cancel and return to the said Stevens
the rnortgage deed hereinbefore specified to be given as security for the faithful performance of this contract on the part
of the said Stevens."
By later legislation of Congress (see resolution of July 17,
1862, 12 Stat., 628, and resolution of July 1, 1870, 16
Stat., 383), all interest of the United States in the construction of the said war vessel has been relinquisherl, and
the contract referred to virtually rescinded. The mortgage,
however, still appears of record as unsatisfied, though it no
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longer possesses any vitality, and you request to be advised
as to your power to grant the application for its release. '
Had the contractor been required to go on and perform
the contract, it is very clear that upon performance thereof
he would have been entitled to a release of the mortgage
from the Secretary of the Navy. But performance of the·
contract having been waived by the United States, and the
contractor released from his obligations thereunder, I
submit that the matter now stands, in so far as the mortgage
is concerned, precisely as it would have stood if the contract.
had been performed. And as.in that event it would have·
been competent to the Secretary of the Navy, and moreover·
his duty, to cancel the mortgage, so in the actual state of the·
case now under consideration it is in my opinion within his
competency and duty to do the same act.
I will add that the mode of performing this act is not.
material, provided it be effective under the Jocallaw . .Accompanying the papers herewith is a ''satisfaction'~ pieae, which
when executed and acknowledged will be sufficient for the
purpose.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Act·ing Attorney- General.
Hon. W. H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.

MITIGATION OF FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.
Under section4751, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of the Navy bas power
to mitigate, before trial and conviction of the offender, any fiue, penalty,
or forfeiture incurred under the provisions therejn referred to.
Where proceedings are already commenced, it is the duty of the prosecuting officer, upon receipt of the order of mitigation, and on the terms
and conditions thereof being complied with, to carry it into effect by
discontinuing the proceedings.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
February 17, 1882.
SIR: Your letter to this Department of the 18th of N ovember last directs attention to an application made to you by R.
S. Taylor, esq., on behalf of three persons charged with un-
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lawfully cutting and removing timber from the public lands
in Cherokee County, Ala., for mitigation of penalties and discontinuance of proceedings against them. The application
is accompanied by copies of the complaint in each case, and
also other papers relating to the matter; all of which are
herewith returned.
Yon observe that the proceedings in these cases were not
instituted under the direction of your Department, but that
it is understood that the offenders have not yet been brought
to trial. And you request an opinion upon the following
questions: "Has the Secretary of the ·N avv, under the prov1sions of section 4751 of the Revised Statutes, authorizing
him to mitigate fines, etc., power to direct a discontinuanceof further proceedings in these cases before trial and conviction of the offenders~"
The authority of the Secretary of the Navy to mitigate
fines, penalties, and forfeitures, under section 4751, Revised
Statutes, was considered by one of my predecess~rs in an
opinion dated January 23,1878 (15 Opin,, 436). It was there
held that such authority extends to any fine, penalty, or
forfeiture incurred under the provisions of the sections (2461,
2462, and 2463) designated in section 4751, and may be exercised by the Secretary as well where the proceedings, civil
or criminal, have not been instituted with his knowledge and
by his direction as where they have. But the inquiry whetller
it can be exercised before trial and conviction did not then
arise and was not passed upon. This inquiry, however, seeming" to be involved in the present case, I assume its consideration to be within the scope of your question.
Section 4751 declares: "All penalties and forfeitures incurred under the provisions of, etc., Rhall be sued for, rerecovered, distributed, and accounted for, under the directions
of the Secretary of the Navy, etc., and the Secretary is
authorized to mitigate, in whole or in part, on such terms and
conditions as he deems proper, by an order in writing, any
fine, penalty, or forfeitures so incurred."
The penalty or forfeiture is ''incurred" in the sense in
which this word is used in the first clause of that section, before any proceeedings for the recovery thereof have been
commenced. This is implied by the words, "shall be sued
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for," etc., when taken in connection with the preceding
words, "all penalties and forfeitures incurred," etc. The word
"incurred," as here employed, denote8 a condition of liability
to the penalty and forfeiture; the meaning of the clause being the same as if it read, "all penalties and forfeitures to
which any person has become liable under the provisions," etc.
I think that the word " incurred," as used in the last clause
of the section, is intended to be understood in the same sense in
which it is used in the first; and that when a person becomes
liable to a fine, penalty, or forfeiture under the provisions
referred to in the section, such fine, penalty, or forfeiture is
"so incurred," within the meaning of the last clause, though
no tr~al may ha \Te yet taken place. It results from this Yiew
that the authority of the Secretary to mitigate may be exercised previous to trial and conviction as well as after; the
only circumstance or condition necessary for its exercise being
• that a fine, penalty, or forfeiture has been incurred as above.
Support for this conclusion is derived from an examination
of former statutes on the same subject. By the act of March
1, 1817, chapter 23, the penalties and forfeitures thereby
imposed for unlawfully taking on board, transporting, or exporting live-oak or red-cedar timber cnt 011 the public lands
were authorized to be mitigated or remitted in the manner
prescribed by the act of March 3, 1707, chapter 13. Under
the latter act the Secretary of the Treasury (after a sum mary
inquiry before the district judge as there provided) had
''power to mitigate or remit" certain fiues, penalties, or forfeitures, where, in his opinion, the same were incurr~d without willful negligeuce, or any intention of fraud in thP person or persons incurring the same, ''and to direct the prosecution, if any shall have been instituted for the recovery thereof,
to cease anrl. be discontinued upon such terms or conditions
as he may deem reasonable or just." Here it was manifestly
contemplated that the power to mitigate or remit might be
exercised while the prosecution was pending and before trial,
if not preYions to the institution of the prosecution. The provisions of the act of 1817, adverted to above, appear to have
been superseded by those of the act of March 2, 1831, chapter
Go, by which last-mentioned act the power to mitigate fines,
penalties, and forfeitures incurred thereunder was conferred
()n the commissioners of the Navy pension fund, and the
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same power was afterwards devolved upon the Secretary of
the Navy by the act of July 11, 1832, chapter 194. In the
absence of any provision in the acts of 1831 and 1832 to the
contrary, it is fair to presume that the power of mitigation
given thereby to the commissioners of the Navy pension
fund and to the Secretary of the Navy was exercisable pending the prosecution and before trial, as under the former law.
Section 4751, Revised Statutes, but reproduces the law as it
stood after the passage of the act of 1832. ·
I am accordingly of opinion that undf\r section 4751, Revised
Statutes, the Secretary of the Navy has power to mitigate,
before trial and conviction of the offender, any fine, penalty,
or forfeiture incurred under the provisions therein referred
to. The exercise of this power is required to be " by an order
in writing," which should recite or refer to the section
under which it is issued, and express the "terms and condjtions" of the mitigation. Where proceedings have been
instituted, it would be the duty of the prosecuting officer,
upon receipt of the ordflr, and on the terms and conditions
thereof being complied with, to carry it into effect by discontinuing the proceedings.
Presuming that the foregoing furnishes a sufficient answer
to the question propounded by you,
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. W. H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.
MAIL-CONTJlACT BIDDER- BOND.

1

The Postmaster-General may require from the bidder for a mail contract
conformity to aU proper and reasonable administrative regulations or"
the Post-Office Department ; and if the bidder neglects to conform
thereto, his bid may be rejected.
Case of a material change by erasure and interlineation in the bidder's
bond, where no attestation by a witness appears thereon that such
change was made before execution of the bond, considered.
DEPARTMENT OJ:l' JUSTICE,

February 18, 1882.
SIR: In your letter of the 16th instant you state that in
the bond of a bidder for mail route No. 40121 there is an
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erasure and interlineation changing the penalty from $9,300
to $19,300, and there is no attestation of the witnesses that
the change was made before the bond was signed and sealed.
To your first question upon this case I answer that such
interlineation does not invalidate the instrument or impair
its legal effect, if in fact it was made prior to the execution
of the bond. The attestation of witnesses is merely for convenience of proof. The law does not require that there shall
be witnesses to the bond. It is, however, expedient and safe
always to require them, and that a note should be made by
them of any material alteration.
If a material change bY. interlineation or otherwise is made
in a bond subsequent to its execution, the instrument is thereby rendered void, unless it can clearly be shown that after the
change the parties assented to it, and still acknowledge the
signing and sealing as their act.
Because of the difficulty of making proof in either case, it
would seem to be extremely hazardous to accept a bond appearing upon its face to have been altered, unless by a note
or in some way it is attested that the change was made with
the assent of the partieR.
To your second inquiry I reply, that the Post-Office Department may require conformity by the bidder to all proper
and reasonable administrative regulations, and if he neglects
so to conform his bi.d may be rejected.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. T. 0. HowE,
Postmaster- General.
REGISTRY OF VESSELS.
A vessel built in the United States, and owned wholly by citizens
thereof, is entitled to be registered under the laws of the United States,
although she may have formerly belonged to citizens of a foreign
country.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 20, 1882.
SIR: The question submitted to me by your letter of the

16th instant is this: Is a vessel answering the conditions of
/
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.section 4136, Revised Statutes, except that she was built in
the United States and not in a foreign country, entitled to
registry'
I think she is.
The statutes prescribing the terms upon which vessels may
be registered should be read together in order to ascertain
their true intent and meaning.
By section 4132 vessels built within the United States, and
belonging wholly to citizens thereof, are entitled to the privileges of registry.
The case in hand is within this provision.
The vessel was built in the United States and is now owned
wholly by a citizen of the United States.
But meanwhile she has been owned in a foreign country.
If she had been built there also, she could be registered under
section 4136. Does the fact that she was built in the United
States deprive her of the privilege' If so~ a condition which
gives her registry in section 4132 takes it away in section
4136. These statutes should have a reasonable construction.
The whole tenor and drift of them from section 4132 to
,4136 inclusive is, that vessels built in the United States and
owned exclusively by citizens of the United States may be
registered or enrolled, and may then claim the protection of
the Government; and foreign vessels which shall come into
the possession and ownership of a citizen of the United States
in the manner and with the conditions set forth in section
·1136 are also entitled to the privilege.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Bon.

CHARLES

J.

FoLGER,

Secretary of the Treasury.
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NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.
National banking associations organized under the act of February 25,
186:3, may amend their articles of association where this would not
be in conflict with the provisions of the statute.
Where such associations are so organized for a period of less than twenty
years from the date of the act they can not, by amending their articles,
extend the period to twenty yl3ars from such date. ·
Where the articles provide for an increase of capital, and the maximum
of such increase is once fixed by the determination of the Comptroller
of the Currency, both his power and that of the association over thesubject are exhausted. A further increase and a new maximum can
not be effected by an amendment of the articles.
An amendment of the articles providing for an increase of the number
of director would not be inconsistent with the provision of section
5139, Revised Statutes, declaring that "No change shall be made in
the articles of association by which the rights, remedies, or security
of the existing creditors of the association shall be impaired."
The stockholders of an expiring association may organize a new one,.
and adopt for the latter the name of the former.
An association may, upon the expiration of the period limited for its
duration, convert itself into a State bank under the laws of theState,
provided it has liquidated its affairs agreeably to the laws of Congress;
and after it has thus become a State bank it may reconvert itself int(}
a national banking association, under sect,ion 5154, Revised Statutes,
and adopt the name of the expired corporation with the approval of
the Comptroller of the Currency.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

February 23, 1882.
SIR : Yours of the 1st instant incloserl a communication
from the Comptroller of the CurrPncy, dated the lOth ultimor
suggesting certain questions to which you request my attention. I have since carefully examined these questions, and
now have the honor to submit my opinion thereon. They areas follows:
(1) ''Can national banking associations organized under
the act of February 2.5, 1863, a,mend their articles of association? (See section 12 of this act.)
(2) ''If so, can associations so orgnnized for a period of less
than twenty years from the date oi the act, under the terms
of section 11, amend their articles of association and obtain
the full period of twenty years from the date of the act f
(See sections 5, 6, and 11 of the act of February 25, 1863.)
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(3) "Would an amendment of articles of association changing the maximum originally determined be inconsistent with
law, provided the new maximum be determined by the Comp·
troller of the Currency~" (Sections 5133, 5139, and 5142,
Revised Statutes.)
(4) "Would an amendment increasing the number of directors originally adopted be inconsistent with the terms of
section 5139, Revised Statutes, which provides that no change
shall be made by which the rights, etc., of creditors shall be
impaired~"
(See section 5145, RAvised Statutes.)
(5) "When the periods of succession of national banking
associations organized under any of the laws of Congress
expire, is there anything in the present national banking
laws of the United States to prevent those who may have
been stockholders of expiring corporations from organizing
new national banking associations with the same name as
those formerly possessed by the expiring associations, provided such names are taken with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency~"
(6) HIs there anything to prevent national banking associations whose periods of succession expire from converting
into State banks under the enabling acts of the various States,
and subsequently reconverting under section 5154, Revised
Statutes, into national banking associations with names
which had been previously held by the associations whose
corporate existence had expired, particularly in States where
there are also laws enabling State banks to convert into
national banking associations~ How would it be if there
were no such enabling acts as the ones mentioned~"
The :first two questions, which relate to the amendment of
their articles of association by national banks organized
under the act of February 25, 1863, may be appropriately
considered together.
The formation of national banking associations under
that act was regulated by the :fifth and sixth sections thereof,
which provided that persons (of whom the number was not
to be less than five) uniting to form such an association
should, under their hands and seals, make a certificate specifying its name, its place of business, the amount of its capital stock, and the number of shares into which the same is
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divided, together with the names and places of residence of
the shareholders, and the number of shares held by each.
This organization certificate, when duly acknowledged, was
to be transmitted along with a copy of the articles of association adopted to the Comptroller of the Currency, who was
required to record and carefully preserve both instruments
in his office.
Section 11 of the same act declared that every association
so formed ~'may make and use a common seal, and shall have
succession by the name designated in its articles of association, and for the period limited therein, not, however, exceeding twenty years from the passage of this act," and by
such name may contract, sue, and be sued, etc., and "make
by-laws, approved by the Comptroller of the Currency, not
inconsistent with the laws of the United States or the provisions of this act, for the election of directors, the management of its property, the regulation of its affairs, for the
transfer of its stocks," etc.
Thus ·an association formed as above was created into a
corporation of limited duration, the organization certificate
and articles of association, together with the provisions of
the statute by which corporate powers were conferred and
their exercise regulated, constituting, as it were, its charter.
Such corporations on certain prelimi11ary requirements being
complied with (see sections 7, 9, 11, 15, 16) was authorized
to carry on the business of banking by issuing circulating
notes, discounting bills, receiving deposits, etc., in accordance with the provisions of that act. (Sec. 17.)
The articles of association are in themselves a contract
which is fundamental in its character and is binding upon
all the parties thereto so far as it does not contravene the
law. Yet, when regarded irrespective of the statutes, they,
like articles of copartnership, would undoubtedly be subject
to any modification, though they could not be varied or
altered without the consent of each party unless the articles
otherwise provided. By section 12 of the act of 1863 it is declared that '' no change shall be made in the articles of association by which the rights, remedies, or security of the existing creditors of the association shall be impaired." This ...
provision is re-ena~ted in section 12 of the act of J:une 3, 1864,
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and also in section 5139, Revised Statutes. Here, in forbidding certain changes in the articles, the power to change
them is impliedly recognized, and they are in this regard left
to be dealt with upon the footing of a contract simply. In view
of this legislative recognition of the power to change, it must
be deemed that national banking associations organized
under the act of 1863 may amend their articles of association,
provided the amendment is not prohibited by or inconsistent
with the statute.
Recurring to the provisions of section 11 above, it will be
seen that a banking association formed under the acto(1863
is granted '' succession by the name designated in its articles
of association, and for the period limited therein," not ex·Ceeding twenty years from the passage of the act. The effect
of this provision is the same as if the name designated in the
articles and the period limited therein were at the time
when the corporation comes into existence expressly embodied in the section. Both the one and the other become~
then fixed by force of the statute 'and must so remain
until Congress authorizes a change. In neither can this be
accomplished by an amendment of the articles alone. I remark in this connection that numerous special acts have
been enacted permitting a change of name by associations
particularly described therein. Such legislation is indicative
·of the sense of Congress on this point.
In answer to the first and second questions submitted, I
accordingly reply: (1) That associations organized under
t.he act of February 25. 1863, can, in my opinion, amend their
articles where this does not conflict with the provisions of the
statu.te; (2) that associations so organized for a period of
less than twenty years from the date of the act can not, in my
opinion, by amending their articles, extend the period to
twenty years from that date.
The next question (the third) relates to the increase of capital stock. Section 5142, Revised Statutes, enacts: "Any
association formed under this title may, by its articles of
association, provide for an increase of its capital from time
to time as may be deemed expedient, subject to the limitations of this title. But the maximum of such increase to be
provided in the articles of association shall be determined by
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the Comptroller of the Currency," etc. Where articles oi
association provide for an increase of capital, and the maximum of such increase is once fixed by the determination of
the Comptroller, I am of opinion that both his power and
that of the association over the subject are exhausted, and
that a further increase and a new maximum can not be
effected by an amendment of the articles. The power to
amend, recognized in section 3739, even if it could be used
to introduce in the articles a provision for an increase of capital, under section 3742, where such provision is not already
contained therein, is necessarily controlled by the terms and
limitations of the latter section. I accordingly answer the.
third question in the affirmative.
In regard to the fourth question, I submit that an amendment of the articles providing for an increase of the number
of directors would not be inconsistent with the provision of
section 5139, Revised Statutes, that ''no change shall be
made in the articles of association by which the rights, remedies, or security of th~ existing creditors of the association
shall be impaired." Obviously such an amendment, which
concerns only the government of the corporate body, would
not affect the legal rights or remedies of creditors, or in con-·
templation of law their security.
To the fifth question I reply: The present national banking laws do not forbid the stockholders of an expiring corporation from organizing a new banking association, nor
from assuming the name of the old corporation with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency; and in ·the
absence of any prohibition to that effect, no legal ol>stacle
to the formation of a new aRsociation by such stockholders.
and the adoption pf the name of the old association would,
in my opinion, exist.
To the remaining question I reply, that I do not know of
anything to prevent a national banking association, upon
the expiration of the period limited for its duration, from
being converted into a State bank under the laws of the State,
provided it has liquidated its affairs agreeably to the laws of'
Congress; nor, after it has thus become a State bank, to prevent such bank from being converted back into a national
banking association under section 5154, Revised Statutes,,
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and adopting the name of the expired ·corporation with the
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. To enable a
State bank so to reconvert itself into a national banking as.sociation, authority from the State is not necessary. (Casey
-v. Galli, 94 U. S. R., 673.)
I return herewith the papers which accompanied your
letter.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

BIDS FOR MAIL CONTRACTS.
The statutory requirements relative to bids for mail contracts (by which,
inter alia, every proposal must be accompanied by bond with sureties)
are intended to protect the Government against imposition through
worthless bids.
Where such requirements are conformed to in point of forrn, but the
Postmaster-General is satisfied, from reliable information, that the
bond is worthless and therefore unacceptable, he may and should
treat the bid as though it were unaccompanied by a bond.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 14th instant inquires: ''Can the
Postmaster-General, or either of his assistants, reject a bid
.for mail service, which bid is correct and legal in form, because in the opinion of the Postmaster General, or in the
-opinion of either of his assistants, the sureties upon the bond
which accompanied the bid are not good and sufficient?"
To this inquiry I have the honor to submit the following
in reply:
The Postmaster-General, in addition to duties more particularly defined, is charged with the general superintend-ence of the business of his Department (sec. 396, Rev. Stat.),
and is thus invested with large discretionary powers.
The existing statutory provisions relating to bids for mail
contracts are intended to secure fair competition and to
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prevent fictitious or "straw" bidding. To this end it is required that '"every proposal for carrying the mail shall be
accompanied by the bond of the bidder, with sureties approved by a postmaster," etc., and besides this, other requirements (as oat~s of the sureties indorsed on the bond, and
sworn answers by same to interrogatories prescribed by the
Postmaster-General) are provided; all of which are designed
to protect the Department against imposition through worthless bids.
These provisions are not meant to limit the discretion of
the Postmaster-General, with which he is invested as abovet
any further than to forbid his entertaining a bid where they
are not complied with. If they have been conformed to in
point of form, but the Postmaster-General is satisfied from
other sources of information that the bond is worthless, I
·am of opinion that he may and should treat the bid as though
the bond had not accompanied it. Such action not being in
conflict with the statute, but rather in furtherance of its objects, would appropriately fall within the scope of his general
supervisory authority to which reference is above made..
The provision in section 3949, Revised Statutes, that contracts "shall be awarded to the lowest bidder," etc., must be
construed in connection with the other provisions adverted
to, by which it is contemplated that a bid in order to entitle
it to consideration should have with it an acceptable bond.
A worthless bond, though regular in form, can not be regarded as such, nor does the party oftering it thereby become
entitled to be treated as a bidder.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. 'r. 0. HowE,

Postmaster· General•

•
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Semble that the last section of the Union Pacific Railroad Company,
Eastern Division (formerly the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western
Railroad Company), was in fact completed prior to the time fixed by
statute, but not accepted by the President until about four months
after that time. ·
There is no legal objection to the issue of patents to the company for
lands lying along such section; but delay in this matt,e r suggested,
in view of circumstances stated.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 25, 1882.
SIR : The question presented for my opinion by your letter of the 4th instant may be resolved into two:
(1) Did the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad
Company, now the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division, finish the construction of its road in time as
fixed by law '
(2) If it did not, is there any law requiring the Secretary
of the Interior to withhold from the company patents to the
lands granted by the act of July 1, 1862, viz, for the lands
lying along the last section of constructed road not complete at the time fixed by the statutes~
It appears from the statement of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, accompanying your letter, that the time
prescribed by the act of July 1, 1862, and the subsequent
amendatory acts, for the completion of the road, expired June
27, 1872.
It further appears that as early as October 26, 1870, the
president of the road claimed that it had been completed,
and since August 15 had been in operation, and asked for
the appointment of commissioners to examine and report.
The vice-president of the company also, November 9,1870,
made a similar request, accompanied by an affidavit that the
road had been finished.
Commissioners, as required by the fourth section of the
act, were appointed January 13, 1871, who reported that the
section referred to had been completed, and recommended
its acceptance. This report, however, was not approved by
the President.
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A new commission was afterwards appointed, whose report,
dated October 4, 1872, was approved by the President October 19, 1872-three months and twenty-three days over the
time preBcribed by the statute.
It appears from this statement that the last section of the
road was in fact completed, though not accepted, prior to the
date fixed by law.
The entire road has been accepted by the President, and
the Land Office, having received notice of such acceptance,
has properly considered the road as finished in time.
The time that elapsed from J nne 27, 1872, the date fixed
by law, and October 19, 1872, when the President accepted
the road as finished, is not sufficient in a matter of this kind
to be taken into consideration. De minimis non curat lex.
But if, upon a very strict construction of the statutes, you
should be inclined to bold that the road was not complete
until so pronounced by the President, and that the three or
four months is of consequence in the matter, still the patents
could not be withheld without some action by Congress, or
some judicial proceeding on the part of the United States
with a view to a forfeiture, or an extinguishment of the
claim. There has been no such action or proceeding.
No forfeiture has been incurred under the law. A condition of forfeiture, and the only condition, is provided in section 17 of the law of 1862, which is to this effect: that if the
whole road was not completed by the 1st day of July, 1876,
then the said roads, with all their lands and property of
every sort, should be forfeited and taken possession of by the
United States.
Even if the facts were such as to make this law applicable
(as clearly they are not), some action by Congress would, I
apprehend, still be necessary, or some judicial proceeding to
declare and enforce the forfeiturP.
It will be seen, by what is said above, that in my opinion
there is no legal objection to the issue .of the patents.
You remind me, however, that there is some agitation in
Congress in respect to railroad land grants. I take the liberty to suggest, therefore, that action in the matter may be
delayed so that the executive branch of the Government
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will not seem to oppose or throw obstacles in the way of any
proposed measures of Congress upon this subject.
If, on the one hand, Congress will not act, the railroad
company having waited so long, and by so waiting involved
itself in the difficulty, some further delay will not inflict upon
it serious injury; and, on the other hand, should Congress
legislate touching the question of issuing these patents, and
in such way as to affect the rights of the company, it has
its remedy in the courts if it denies the power of Congress
so to legislate in the premises.
As requested, I return herewith the Commissioner's report.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.

C.ASE OF FITZ .TOHN PORTER.
P., a commissioned officer of the Army, was tried by a general courtmartial and sentenced "to be cashiered and to be forever disqualified
froru holding any office of trust or profit nuder the Government of the
United States." The proceedings aud sentence of the court having
been approved and confirmed by the President, the officer, in execution
of the sent·e nce, was cashiered and dismissed the service: Held, that it
is not competent to the President now to set aside and annul the finding and sentence of the court, aud to nominate the officer to the Senate
for restoration to his former rank in the Army.
Where the sentence of a 1egally constituted court-martial, in a case
withinitsjurisdiction,has been approved by the reviewing authority and
carried into execution, it can not afterwards bo revised and annulled.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 15, 1882.
SIR: Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter was in1862-'63 tried and
convicted by a general court-martial, and sentenced "to be
cashiered and to be forever disqualified from holding any
office of trust or profit under the Government of the United
States." . The proceedings and sentence of the court were
subsequently in regular course laid before the President, who,
on the 21st of January, 1863, approved and confirmed the
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same; and by his order of that date, in execution of the
sentence, it was "ordered that the said Fitz John Porter be,
and hereby is, cashiered and dismissed from the service of the
United States, as a major-general of volunteers, and as colonel
and brevet brigadier-general in the regular service of tue
United States, and forever disqualified from holding any office
of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.'~
Thereupon General Porter ceased to be an officer of the
United States, and his name was accordingly dropped from
the rolls of the Army.
Afterwards, in 1878, upon an application then made by
General Porter for relief, the President (in order that be
might be fully informed of the facts of the case, and be able
to act advisably on said application), convened a lJOard of
Army officers ''to examine, .in connection with the record of
the trial by court-martial of Major-General Porter, such new
evidence relating to the merits of ·said case as is now on :file
in the War Department, together with such other evidence
as may be presented to said board, and to report, with the
reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their opinion, justice requires should be taken on such application by
the President."
The hoard so convened made a report to the Secretary of
War under date of March 19, 1879, in which, after giving the
results of their investigations, they state that in their opinion
"justice requires at his [the President's] bands such action
as may be necessary to annul and set aside the rlndings
and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Maj. Gen.
Fitz John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which
that sentence deprived him, such restoration to take e1l'ect
from the date of his dismissal from service."
On the 5th of J nne, 1879, the report and proceedings of the
board were transmitted to Congress by the President, who,
in his accompanying message, said: "I have given to this report such examination as satisfies me that I ought to lay the
proceedings and conclusions of the board before Congress.
As I am without power, in the absence of legislation, to act
upon the recommendations of the report, further than by submitting the same to Congress, the proceedings and conclusions
of the board are transmitted for the information of Congress,
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and such action as in your wisdom shall seem expedient and
just."
There has since been no legislation by Congress on the
subject.
General Porter has, however, in a communication dated
December 23, 1881, renewed his application to the President
for relief, the relief there asked for being specifically stated by
him in the following words: '~To annul and set aside the
finding and sentence of the court-martial, and to nominate
me to the Senate for restoration to my rank in the Aally
under act of Congress of 1868."
What hereinafter follows is addressed to the question
whether it is competent to the President to afford the applicant the relief he asks, under existing law and the circumstances of this case.
Un entering upon the question, we are first led to inquire
as to the source of the jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial in our military service. That has been precisely and
authoritatively determined. In the case of Dynes v. Hoover
(20 How., 65), the Supreme Court of the United States, after
citing section 8 of the first article of the Constitution, whicb.
confers upon Congress power '' to make rules for the
Government and regulation of the land and naval forces;"
the fifth amendment which requires a presentment of a grand
jury in cases of capital or otherwise infamous crime, but expressly excepts from this requirement" cases arising in the
land and naval forces;" and also section 2 of the second
article which declares that '' the President shall be commander-in-chief of the Army and NavJ-," remarks: ''These
provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for
the trial and punishment of military and naval ofl'enses in the
manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that
the power to do so is given without any connection between
it and the third article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers
are entirely independent of each other."
Congres&3, in the exercise of this power, by the act of April
10, 1806, chapter 20, enacted rules and articles for the
government of the armies of the United States, and therein
provided for the creation of courts-martial for the trial of
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military offenses, (see that act, articles 64, 65, et seq.). These
rules and articles, as modified and added to by subsequent
legislation, were in force when the proceedings in the case
of General Porter occurred. And in this connection it may
also be stated that the Supreme Court again in the recent
case of Exparte Reed (100 U. S., 13) observes: ~'The constitutionality of the.acts of Congress touching Army and Navy
courts martial in this country, if there could ever have been a
doubt about it, is no longer an open question in this Courts."
It is assumed (there being no allegation to the contrary)
that the court-martial in this case was constituted, convened
and organized in conformity with the law of the military
service a~ ordained by Congress, that it had jurisdiction both
of tile offense alleged and of the person accused, that there
was no fatal irregularity in its proceedings nor any illegality
in its sentence, and that the latter was confirmed and carried into execution agreeably to law. Upon this state of facts
it may be inquired, Has the President power now to rev..iew
the proceedings of the court-martial and to annul its sentence~ Unless he possesses such power, it is submitted that
this mode of relief is not available.
The sixty-fifth Article of War (act of AprillO, 1806, cited
above) provided that no sentence of a court-martial shall be
carried into execution until after the whole proceedings shall
have been laid before the officer ordering the same, or the
officer commanding the troops for the time being; neither
shall any sentence of a general court-martial, in the time of
peace, extending to the loss of life, or the dismission of a
commissioned officer, or which shall, either in time of peace
or war, respect a general offi~er, be carried into execution
until after the whole proceedings shall have been transmitted
to the Secretary of War, to be laid before the President of
the United States for his confirmation or disapproval, and
orders in the case." (See also Revised Statutes, page 240,
articles 105, 106, 108, in which the same provision is embodied). Under this provision it was that the proceedings in
the case of General Porter were laid before and cohfirmed by
the President; and no other statutory provision then existed
or now exists giving him a power of review over such case.
In the case of Lieutenant Devlin, who was tried by a
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general court-martial in 1852, and sentenced to be dismissed,
and whose sentence was afterwards approved by the President under the same provision, and carried into execution,
Attorney-General Cushing considered the question whether
the proceedings of that court-martial could then (in 1854)
lawfully be re-opened, reviewed and set aside; and he held
that they could not. He says in his opinion : " The decision
of the President of the United States, in cases of this sort, is
that of the ultimate judge provided by the Constitution and
laws. Like that of any other Court in the last resort of law,
it is final as to the subject matter. There is one, and but
one, legal question, which would be competent in this case
after the final decision of the President upon it; namely,
that of nullity oi' the proceedings, as being, for instance,
coram non judice, or, for other cause, absolutely void ab init,io."
(6 opin. 370-371.)
In another case (that of Major Howe) the same AttorneyGeneral remarks : '' Unless the memorialist show that the
court-martial had no jurisdiction over the case, no cognizance
of him and the offense charged, his memorial must be unavailing; for tlle President of the United States has not now
(in 1854) any rightful authority to review and reverse the
sentence of a court pronounced in a case within its jurisdiction in 1842, then duly approved by the reviewing power, and
actually carried into full and complete execution. True it is
that the office and powers of the President are perpetual,
and every successor bas all the powers which his predecessors had whilst in office. But this must be understood of
matters executory, of things to be done, and not in relation
to matters executed, rightfully and legally transacted." (6
Opin. 507.)
To the same effect are the earlier opinions given by Attorneys General Legare and Nelson (4 Opin., 170 and 274), and
also the later opinions given by Attorney-General Bates (10
Opin., 64; 11 Opin., 19). The latter, in his opinion last cited,
uses this language: "Undoubtedly the President, in passing
upon the sentence of a court-martial and giving to it the approval without which it can not be executed, acts judicially.
The whole proceeding from its inception is judicial. The trial,
finding, and sentence are the solemn acts of a court or-

302

HON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
Case of Fitz John Porter.

ganized and conducted under the authority and according
to the prescribed forms of law. It sits to pass upon the
most sacred questions of human rights that are ever placed
on trial iu a court of justice; rights which in the Yery nature
of things can neither be exposed to danger nor entitled to
protection from the uncontrolled will of any man, but which
must be adjudged according to law. And the act of the officer who reviews the proceedings of the court, whether he be
the commander of the fleet or the President, and without
whose approval the sentence can not be executed, is as much
a part of the judgment according to law as is the trial or
the sentence. When the President, then, performs the duty
of approving the sentence of a court-martial dismissing an
officer, his act has all the solemnity and significance of the
judgment of a court of law. As it bas to be performed under the same sanctions, so it draws with it the same consequences. Now one of these consequences is that where a
judgment has been regularly entered in a case properly
within the judicial cognizance, from which no appeal has
been providP.d or taken, and it has been followed by execution, it is final and conclusive upon the party against whom
it is entered; and this effect attaches, in my opinion, to the
action of the President in approving the sentence of a courtmartial dismissing an officer, after that approval has been
consummated by actual dismissal."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte
Reed, above cited, referring to a general court-martial whose
doings were involved in that case, says: "It is the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of cases. * * * Its judgments,
when approved as required, rest on the same basis, and are
surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals, including
as well the lowest as the highest, under like circumstances."
Here it is proper to add that the very inquiry now under
examination has been resolved in the negative by the delib·
erate decision of a former administration, as appears by the
message of the President of June 5, 1879, hereinbefore referred to, transmitting to Congress the report and proceed-
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ings of a board of Army officers upon the case of General
Porter. The conclusion then reached was that the President was" without power, in the absence of legislation, to act
upon the recommendations of the report further than by sub·
mitting the same to Congress." This conclusion is a denial
<>f the ·existence of any power in the President to review and
" to annul and set aside the findings and Eentence of the
court-martial" in that case as recommende.d by the board;
and it is entitled to great weight, as being the view not only
of the President himself, but presumably that of his Cabinet,
among whose members were men eminent in the profession
<>f' the law.
·
·
These opinions of my predecessors and of the Supreme
Court, and also the decisions last abo,Te mentioned, all go to
establish this proposition: That where the sentence of a
legally-constituted court-martial in a case within its jurisdiction has been approved by the reviewing authority and carried into execution, it can not afterwards under the present
state of the law be revised and set aside. The proceedings
are then at an end, and the action thus had upon the sentence is in contemplation of the law final.
I am unable to arrive at a different conclusion, and I
accordingly hold that in the case under consideration the
President has no power to review the proceedings of the
court-martial and annul its s~ntence.
It follows from this view that the President can afford the
applicant no relief through a revision of the sentence in his
case.
That sentence involved immediate dismissal from tile Army
and disability to hold office thereafter. The d-ismissal is an
accomplished fact, and so far the sentence is completely executedj the disability is a contin~ing punishment, and in regard
to tllat the sentence is being executed. The latter may be
remicted by the exercise of the pardoning power, but the
former can not in any way be affected thereby. Thus a
pardon would not restore the applicant to the office in the
military service from which be was dismissed. (Ex parte
Garland,4 Wall.,333.) This could only be done by an appointment under special authority from Congress; since by the
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general law of the military service appointments to the rank
of general officers are to be made by selection from the Army,
and all vacancies in established regiments and corps to the
rank of colonel are required to be filled by promotion according to seniority, except in cases of disability or other incom-·
petency. (Army Regulations of 1881, article u; 14 Opin.,
499.) In this connection I remark that the act of 1868,
referred to by General Porter in his letter of request, was,.
as its title imports, only meant to be declaratory of the law,.
namely: that an officer cashiered or dismissed by sentence·
of a court-martial can not be otherwise restored to the military service than through a new appointment with the con~
sent of the Senate. The law is the same as to officers of the
Army who cease to be such in any other way (Mimmack v.
United States, 97 U. S., 427; Blake v. United States, 103
U. S., 237.) Power to appoint is not conferred by that
statute. This power remains subject to the gPneral law
already adverted to; and in the absence of special authority
from Congress, it can only be exercised with respect to a
person who has ceased to be an officer in the manner above
stated, where it might equally well be exercised if such person had never been an officer in the military service.
Upon the general question considered, the conclusion
arrived at is that it is not within the competency of the
President to afford the applicant the relief he has asked for;.
that is to say, that it is not competent to the President to
annul and set aside the finding and sentence of the courtmartial and to nominate him to the Sen~te for restoration
to his former rank in the Army.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

BENJAlVIIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
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PATENTS, ETC.

The President has power to designate one of his executive clerks to sign
for him, and in his name, all patents for land, etc. ; and should an exigency of the public service require it, he is authorized to appoint an
assistant to aid in performing that duty, so long as the exigency exists.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 16, 1~82.
SIR: I have examined a question which has arisen as to
the power which the President has by statute to appoint
officers to sign his name to patents for lands, etc.
The provision contained in the eighth clause of part 3,
section 1, of the act of June 19, 1878 (Supp. Rev. Stat., p.
378), substitutes for the secretary provided for in section
450, Revised Statutes, one of the executive clerks in the
President's office, to be designated by the President.
Section 450 is not wholly repealed, but only as much of it
as is repugnant to the la.t er statute, viz, that of June l 9,
1878. The provision in respect to the duty of signing, for
the President, his name to patents for land, etc., is not
repealed; but in respect to the officer who is to perform that
duty it is repealed, being repugnant to the lat~r statute.
"If the later statute is upon the same subject-matter with
the former and introduces some new qualification or modification so that it is impossible both should be in force, then
the later repeals the former; but if it be possible that both
can stand by construction, the question resolves itself into
an inquiry, what was the intention of the Legislature!"
"Affirmatives in statutes that introduce new laws imply a
negative of all that is not in the purview. So that a law
directing a thing to be done in a certain manner implies
that it shall not be done in any other manner." Mr. Justice
Thompson, in United States v. Case of Hairpencils, cited below.
See note 5, on page 155, Potter's Dwarris on Statutes-;
Davies v. Fairborn, 3 Howard, 636; United States v. Case of
Hairpencils, 1 Paine, 400.
There is no doubt that it was the intention of Congress
that one of the President's clerks should perform the duty
required of a secretary in section 450. The secretary's
function taken away, his office went with it.
272-VOL XVII--20
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Section 451 of the Revised Statutes is not, as I think,
materially -affected by the latP-r legislation. It is not repealed, expressly or by implication. The officer whom the
President is by that section authorized to appoint, for a temporary purpose, is called an assistant secretary. If the
condition set forth in the section exists, the President may
appoint an assistant to aid in the work to be done, and it is
of little consequence whether he is called an assistant secretary or an assistant to the executive clerk.
•
As the law now stands, the President bas power to designate one of his executive clerks to sign for him, and in his
name, all patents for land, etc., and if patents should accumulate and the number be so large t!lat they can not be
signed within a reasonable time he is authorized to appoint
an assistant to aid in performing the duty, so long as the
exigency exists.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

CLAIM OF WILLIAM G. LANGFORD.
Opinion of Attorney-General Williams, of May 3, 1875 (14 Opin., 569), as
to the rights of claimant in 640 acres of land within the Nez Perces
Indian reservation in Idaho Territory, re-affirmed; and advised that
he has no such possessory interest in such land as would warrant the
Interior Department in accepting the compromise proposed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

•

March 17, 1882.
SIR: In your letter of the lOth March, 1882, you request my
opinion upon the question whether or not William G. Langford bas such a title to, or interest in, 640 acres of land upon
the Nez Perces Indian Agency in Idaho as would warrant
the Interior Department in accepting a compromise, and asking Congress for an appropriation of such sum as might be
required.
The report of the Commissioner of Indian A:fl:'airs, transmitted with your communication,. corresponds in its statements with the state of facts upon which Mr. Attorney-Gen-
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eral Williams expressed his opinion of May 3, 1875, and I
agree with him that " the title imparted by the acts of 1848
and 1853 was at that period, and has ever since continued to
be, subject to the Indian right of Qccupancy in said tribe, the
enjoyment of which right moreover is assured thereto by the
Government by solemn treaty stipulations. Such being the
case, it can not be doubted that until this Indian right is extinguished the holder of said title has no right, merely by
virtue of that title, to enter upon and take possession of
the premises." (14 Opin., 568.)
The occupancy of the land by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions from 1836 to 1847 was by the
consent and allotment of the tribe; the occupancy by the
United States since 1862 has been by a similar consent, manifested by the treaties of 1855 (12 Stat., 957), and 1863 (14
Stat., 467). Chief-Justice Marshall, in J)hnson v . .llfcintosh
(8 Wheaton, 543), speaking of a deed poll executed by the
Illinois Indians, said (p. 593): "If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own benefit, or, in other
words, might purchase it, still he could acquire only that
title. Admitting their power to change their laws or usages
so far as to allow an individual to separate a portion of their
lands from the common stock and hold it in severalty, still it
is part of their
territory and is held under them by a title
I
dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from
their will, and if they choose to resume it and make a different disposition of the land the courts of the United States
can not interpose for the protection of the title. * * •
If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can
revise and set aside the proceeding."
It is not suggested in the present case that any grant was
made by the Nez Perces to the board, and it is fair to assume
that the inducement for the allotment was the appreciation
by the tribe of the benefits which the agents of the board
had come there to confer on them. If the presence of the
board became diatasteful to them, I know of no law to prevent the annulment of the allotment and the resumption of
the land.
When in 1855 they reserved the premises (inter alia), and
in 1862 permitted the establishment of the agency on the
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locus, it may well be considered either that they no longer
desired the presence of the board or that they deemed the
board to have forfeited its rights. This view is strengthened
by the fact that in article 10 of the treaty of 18r>5 (12 Stat.,
960), express provision is made for the allotment to William
Craig of a tract then occupied by him. Again in article 8
of the treaty of 1863 (14 Stat., 651), it appears that the Indians in council expressed a desire that Robert Newell
should have confirmed to him a tract which had been giYen
to him by an instrument in writing, signed by several chiefs
ot the tribe, dated June 9th, 1861 (very shortly after the agent
of the board had made his appearance and demanded
possession of the land in controversy).
The tribe again ignored the claim of the board by applying in 1868 for amendments to the treaty. These amendments, as agreed upon, provided inter alia for the survey of
the reservation and for the allotment of all lands susceptible
of cultivation and suitable for Indian farms "which are not
now occupied by the United States for military purposes, or
which are not required for agency or other buildings and
purposes provided for by existing treaty stipulations."
Mr. Langford's present right of possession, therefore, is one
which neither the courts 11or the Executive may regard.
Whether the tribe will confer a new privilege or will confirm the old privilege· to one who holds out none of the
original inducements rests in its discretion.
In addition to a surrender of all his rights and claim to the
land, Mr. Langford offers in the settlement proposed a release of all claims and rights to sue for damages for acts
done by any officer of the United States during the progress
of the dispute. As I am not informed of any illegal acts
done by officers of the United States during the dispute, this
release does not seem to me of any appreciable value.
He further offers to execute a paper binding him to take no
further steps to carry into execution the judgment recovered
against Newell in the district court. To the immunity thus
offered I attach no value, for the following reasons:
On the 12th of November, 1874, by virtue of a writ of execution under the judgment Langford was put in possession.
The judgment was thus executed and satisfied. His subse-
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quent ouster in June, 1875, was not by Newell, nor by any
one acting through or under him. A new action, and not a
writ on the old judgment, would be his proper remedy. As
he does not assert any possession since 1874, his right of
action became barred in 1879. (Sec. 5, act of January 23, 1864;
Civil Code of Idaho, 1880-1881, sec. 145.)
By sections 430, 434 (Civil Code) he can only obtain a writ
of execution after five years by leave of the court upon motion or by judgment for that purpose fouuded upon supplemental pleadings. Upon notice of such motion, or of such
supplemental proceedings, the satisfaction of the judgment
and the want of privity between Newell and the present
occupants will prove a successful obstacle.
In the suit Newell set up no title under the United States,
a11d if he had done so they are not bound by the judgment
against him. (Carr v. United States, 9b U. S., 433.) In
such supplemental proceedings, or on the motion, it would
be set forth that '~the possession attempted to be assailed
was that of the United States," and as was said by Bradley,
J., in Carr v. United States, supra, "when this is made apparent by the pleadings or the proofs, the jurisdiction of the
court ought to cease.''
These questions, however, may well be left to the courts to
determine, if Mr. Langford persists in his efforts to regain
possession by means of writs of execution under the judgment against Newell.
I am clearly of opinion that Langford has no such possessory interest in the land in question as would warrant the
Interior Department in accepting the proposed compromise.
It remains to consider his title to the premises. The
American Board came within the provisions of the act of
1853, and therefore the title to the land was confirmed and
established in it. That title was remised, released, and q nitclaimed to Langford in 1868. It is not intimated in your
communication that any other title is asserted, and as the
board is estopped by its quitclaim deed, and as section 33,
act of January 16, 1864 (Laws of Idaho), permits a sale of
real estate, notwithstanding a possession adverse to the
vendor, I see no reason why all the title of the board is not
vested in Mr. Langford. When the Nez Perces tribe cedes
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the land in question to the United States, it would seem that
they would take it for the benefit of Langford and his heirs.
Whether the United States will have any use for this
property after it ceases, by virtue of a cession of the tribe,
to be part of the reservation, what value should be attached
to Langford's title by reason of the buildings which may bl·
left on the premises when the cession shall occur, or what
would now be a reasonable price for his statutory title, are
questions which I do not discuss.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

CASE OF CADET WHITTAKER.
In general, courts-martial are governed by the same rules of evidence
which govern the ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction. These
rules (where not prov'ided by statute) are supplied by the common
law.
Evidence of handwriting, by comparison of hands, is inadmissible on a
trial by court-martial, excepting where the writing, acknowledged
to be genuine, is already in evidence in the case, or the disputed
writing is an ancient document.
The admission of such evidence is error, for which, if it was material to
the finding of the court, the sentence of the latter should be set aside.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
March 17, 1882.
SIR : Your letter of tho 6th instant states that Cadet Johnson C. Whittaker, of the Military Academy) has been tried
by a court-martial on two charges, the second of which is
"false swearing, to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline;" that among the specifications in support of this
charge is one to the effect that he falsely testified before a
court of inquiry that a certain note of warning was received
by him, and that the same was not written by himself; and
that the court-martial found him guilty of the specifications
under said charge and of the charge itself, as also of the
first charge, and sentenced him accordingly. You add:
" The record is now under examination by me, and I find
that on the trial the court, notwithstanding the objection of
the accused, admitted in evidence, to be used as standards
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of comparison by experts in handwriting with the said note
of warning, a considerable number of papers testified to be
in the hand writing of the ac~used, which papers were not
in evidence for any other purpose than to be used as such
standards, and were so used by the experts.
"After the overruling of his objection to their admission,
counsel for the accused, in reply to a question by a member
of the court, said: 'I believe we can not question their genuineness.'
"A large amount of testimony adverse to the accused, by
experts, based on their comparison of these standards with
the note of warning, was introduced by tlle judge-advocate
on the part of the United States.
"In preparing to submit the case to the President for fiual
action, grave doubts have been raised in my mind as to the
legality of the action of the court admitting the evidence I
have mentioned, and I have the honor to invite an expression
of your opinion on the subject."
It appears by your statement that, in order to prove that a
certain paper (the" note of warning") which was in evidence
in the case, and of whi~h the accused swore in a former proceeding that he was not the author, had in fact been written
by him, a number of other papers testified to as being in his
handwriting, but not otheru:ise in evidence in the case, were
allowed by the court (though objected to by him) to be used as
standards of comparison by experts, whose testimony based
on a comparison of the first-mentioned paper with these standards was admitted in behalf of the prosecution ; and the
inquiry involved is, whether the admission of this testimony
was not error for which the sentence of the court should be
set aside.
As no rules of evidence are specially prescribed by Congress for the observance of courts-martial, it must be deemed
that such courts are contemplated to be governed in general
by the same rules of evidence which -govern the ordinary
courts of criminal jurisdiction (2 Opin., 344; 3 Greenl. Ev.,
sec. 476; and compare Moore v. United States, 91 U. S., 270).
These rules are supplied by the common law, excepting, of
course, where others are provided by statute, in which case
the latter prevail.
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According to the rule of the common law, as laid rlown by
the English courts, evidence of handwriting by comparison of
lJands is inadmissible, except where the writing acknowledged
to be genuine is already in evidence in the cause or the disputed writing is an ancient document; these exceptions being
allowed of necessity (Doe, d. Perry v. Newton, 1 N. & P.,
1; 5 A. & E, 514). In a later case, Mr. Justice Patterson,
referring to the one just cited, said: "This court recently
has expressly determined that documents irrelevant to the
issues on the record shall not be received in evidence at the
trial in order to enable a jury to institute such a comparison.
Much less can it be permitted to introduce them In order to
enable a witness to do so~" (5 A. & E., 734.)
In the United States the courts generally adopt the same
view, where not controlled by statutes. Thus the Supreme
Court of the United States in Strother v. Lucas (6 Pet., 763),
remarks: "It is a general rule that evidence by comparison of
hands is not admissible where the witness has had no previous
knowledge of the handwriting, but is called upon to testify
merely from a comparison of hands. There may be ca~es
where, from the antiquity of the writing, it is impossible for
any living witness to swear that he ever saw the party write,
and where comparison of hand writing with documents known
to be in his hand writing has been admitted. But these are
extraordinary instances, arising from the necessity of the
case," etc. And in the recent case of Moore v. United States
(91 U. S., 270), the Supreme Court again recognizes the same
1'ule. Here the question was whether the Court of Claims
may determine the genuineness of a signature by comparing
it with the signatnre of the part~ to another paper. "By
the general rule of the common law," observes the court,
'" this can not be done either by the court or a jury; and that
is the general rule of this country, although the courts of a
few States have allowed it, and the legislatures of others have
authorized it. * * * But the general rule of the common
Jaw disallowing a comparison of hand writing as proof of signature bas exceptions equally as well settled as the rule itself.
One of these exceptions is, that if a paper admitted to be in
the handwriting of the party, or to have been.subscribed by
him, is in evidence for some other purpose in the cause, the
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signature or paper in question may be compared with it by
the jury" (see also United States v. Chamberlain, 12 Blatch.,
390; United States v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C., 729, and United
· States v. Prout, 4 Cr. C. 0., 301). To these authorities may be
added the following cases in the State courts, in which the
general rule of the common law, as above, appears to have
been adopted; (JJf.iles v. Loomis, 75 N. Y ., 288; The State v.
Clinton, 67 Mo., 380; Jones v. The State, 60 Ind., 241; Board
of Trustees v. Misenhe-imer, 78 Ill., 22; First National Bank v.
Robert, 41 Mich., 709; Kirksey v. Kirksey, 41 Ala., 626; Pope
v. Askew, 1 Ird. (N. C.) Rep., 16; Hawk-ins v. Grimes, 13 B.
lVJou. (Ky.) Rep., 257; Tome v. Parle Branch R. R. Co., 39 Md.,
36; Clay v. Anderson's Admr., 10 W.Va., 29; Kinney v. Flynn,
2 R. I., 319; Hanley v. Gaudy, 28 Tex., 211; Rant's Admr. v.
Kile's Admr., 1 Leigh's (Va.) Rep., 216; Clark v. Rhodes, 2
Heisk. (Tenn.) Rep., 206; The State v. Miller, 47 Wis., 530; The
State v. Fritz, 23 La., An., 55). In Pennsylvania, evidence
by comparison of handwriting is not allowed as independent
proof, and where allowed the comparison can be made only
by the jury (Anmick v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. State, 211; Haycock v.
Greup, 57 Pa. State, 438).
The rule of the common law above stated, which, as the
foregoing citations indicate, bas the approval of the general
current of judicial authority in this country, both federal and
State, must be deemed to be binding upon courts-martial as
a rule of evidence; and the admission of the testimony objected to by the accused, in the case under consideration,
being plainly a violation of that rule, this is error~ for which
(assuming such testimony to be material to the finding of
the court) the sentence should, in my opinion, be set aside.
Justice forbids the enforcement of a sentence which is founded
upon a conviction illegally obtained.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
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ELECTION LAWS OF UTAH.
Persons appointed under the bigamy act of March 22, 188;;!, chapter 47,
section 9, to perform the duties of the registratiOn and election offices,
thereby declared vacant, have authority to administer all oaths which
the former incumbents of these offices were authorized to administer
in the performance of the duties thereof.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 22, 1882.

SIR: In reply to your inquiry of yesterday, I have the
honor to state that upon examination of the recent polygamy
act with the election laws of Utah Territory, I entertain no
doubt that those persons who may be appointed under the
former to perform the duties of the registration and election
offices thereby declared vacant will have authority to adminIster all oaths which the former incumbents of these offices
were authorized to administer in the performance of the
duties thereof, whether as regards the registration of voterst
the conduct of elections, or the receiving or r~jection of votes
in that Territory. This must be the effect, as I conceive, of
section 9 of the aforesaid act, which in terms devolves upon
the persons so appointed "each and every duty relating to
the registration of voters, the conduct of elections," etc., to
be performed " under the existing laws of the United States
and of said Territory.''
By the Territorial law (act of February 22, 1878, chapter
12), both the registration officers and the judges of election
are authorized to administer oaths wherever. necessary to
carry the same into effect. The recent act of Congress, while
it introduces a new mode of appointing these officers, leaves
unchanged their functions, duties, and powers.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
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CLAIM OF REDICK McKEE.

•

The decision of the Secretary of the Interior of July 27, 1877, upon the
claim of Redick McKee, made under the act for the relief of the latter,
approved March 3, 1877, viz: that the claimant was entitled to bo
re-imbursed the money paid out by him as interest on money borrowed
for the Government, is as far as the Secretary was authorized. to go, and
an allowance of interest on the amount so paid out would have been
unwarranted.
It is a general rule that interest is not allowable on claims against the
Government. The exceptions to this rule are found only in cases
where the demands are made under special contracts, or special laws,
expressly or by very clear implication providing for the payment of
interest.
In view of the decision referred to, the claim should now be treated as
res judicata.
_
No rule of administrative practice is better settled than that when a
matter has once been passed upon and finally disposed of by the head
of a Department, it should not be disturbed or re-opened by his successors, excepting under extraordinary circumstances, such as the discovery of new facts, and the like.
The fact that an application for reexamination had been made to and
had not been acted upon by the head of Department by whom the decision was rJndered, does not withdraw the case from the operation of
the rule.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 28, 1882.
SIR: I have considered the question in the claim of Redick

McKee, formerly disbursing agf'nt of the Indian department in California, submitted in your letter of the lOth of
January last. The facts of the case, as stated by you, are
as follows :
·
"Mr. McKee, as disbursing officer of a commission of
which he was a member, rendered an account to the Government showing a balance due him May 5, 1853, on account of
disbursements of $9,671.56, of which sum $6,000 was money
borrowed by him in 1852 to meet his disbursements, the
G-overnment not having placed in his hands a sum sufficient
to meet the expenses incurred by the commissioners. His
account was suspended under the rules of the Indian service
and the regulations governing the accounting officers of the
Treasury until the 4th of August, 1865, when he was allowed
thereon $2,234.57.
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''In June, 1866, a further allowance of $560.26 was made
and the balance of the account remained suspended. He
then ap,p lied to Congress for relief, and on the 20d of J nne,
1870, a joint resolution (16 Stats., 667) was passed, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to examine the claim of
Redick McKee, on account of the disbursements referred to,
and to cause payment to be made of the whole, or as mu~h
thereof as be may find to be just and equitable, provided
that the amount so paid shall be accepted in full discharge
of the entire claim. Under this resolution he was allowed
$6,864.83, which amount was paid July 10, 1870, and was a
payment in full of his account as rendered in May, 1853.
"Still claiming, however, that the settlement of the
account mentioned did not make good the losses sustained
by him as disbursing agent for the Government, be again
memorialized Congress on tue subject, and an act for his
relief was approved March 3, 1877, (19 Stat., 541), providing, ' That the memorial and claims of Redick McKee, late
disbursing agent of the Indian department in California, (Miscellaneous Document 102 printed l(ebruary . 25,
1871), be, and hereby are, referred for examination and settlement to the Secretary of the Interior. If the Secretary
shall find the allegations and statements of the claimant
verified by the records of the Department, or other satisfactory evidence, he shall allow him such relief as may be
equitable and just, to be paid out of any money in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated.'
''Under this act my immediate predecessor examined the
claim and made certain allowances, which~ however, are not
satisfactory to the claimant, and heasks further consideration.
"His claim, under the act of 1877, rests upon the alleged
losses by reason of moneys paid out as interest on the $6,000
borrowed from 1852 to 1857, amounting to $8,100, sale of
real estate in San Francisco to satisfy mortgage given to
secure the loan mentioned, etc. All the points involved in
the case seem to have been passed upon by my predecessor,
unless it be the question whether, under the act of 1877,
there can be allowed interest on the $8,100 paid by McKee
for the use of the $6,000 borrowed by him for the United
States.
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" The $8,100 was allowed by Secretary Schurz, in decision
of July 27, 1877 (see inclosed pamphlet, page 13), not as
interest, but as moneys actually paid out for the use and
benefit of the Government. In subsequent decisions made
by him in the case he allowed interest on the valne of the
house sold under mortgage. The question submitted for
your opinion is whether, in view of the foregoing facts, it
is competent under the provisions of the act of March 3,
1877, to allow interest on the $8,100 paid out by McKee for
the use of the $6~000 borrowed by him in 1852 for the use
of the Government, or should the whole matter be considered as settled and closed by the decisions of my predecessor,
and therefore res judicata~"
A letter subsequently received from you, dated the 13th
of January, inclosed Honse Mis. Doc. No. 102, Forty-first
Congress, third session, being a memorial of Redick McKee,
praying certain allowances.
By the above-mentioned act of March 3, 1877, the memorial and claims of McKee set forth in said document were
referred for examination and settlement to the Secretary of
the Interior, who was directed to allow the claimant "sueh
relief as may be equitable and just" in case his allegations
and statements should be found verified by the Department
records or other satisfactory evidence. Among other claims
stated in the memorial and thus referred was the following:
"An allowance for the interest I [the claimant] had to pay
on money borrowed for the payment of Go\erument debts,
or interest at the legal rates in California on the amount
admitted and paid."
The Secretary in a decision made upon this claim, dated
July 27, 1877, held that the claimant was entitled to be reimbursed the money paid out by him as interest, and that the
act of 1877 authorized a settlement with him for the money
so expended, and the claimant was accordingly allowed
therefor the sum of $8,100.
The question ~ubmitted limits the present investigation to
the following subjects of inquiry: (1) Whether under the
act of 1877 interest is allowable on the $8,100 so paid out by
the claimant as above; or (2) whether this, in view of the
aforesaid decision, is to be consirlered res judicata.
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Recurring to the claim on which the sum of $8,100 was
allowed, it will be obsen-ed that this claim was substantially
for interest paid by the claimant on money borrowed for tbe
Government. As stated in his memorial, it was for "an
allowance for the interest he had to pay on money borrowed
for the payment of Government debts." Such being the
claim referred by Congress to the Secretary for settlement,
and there being nothing therein which calls for or suggests
the allowance of interest on the amount so paid, it seems to
me that the Secretary went as far as he was authorized to
go when he ascertained and allowed the amount of interest
paid by the claimant on the amount borrowed, and that an
allowance of interest on the a mount thus paid would have
been unwarranted.
The general rule is that interest is not allowable on claims
against the Government. The exceptions to tllis rule are
found only in cases where the demands are made under
special contracts, or special laws, expressly or by very clear
implication providing for the payment of interest (7 Opin.,
523; 9 Opin., 57). "An obligation to pay it," observes
Attorney-General Black in the opinion last cited," is not to
be implied against the Government a~ it is against a private
party, from the mere fact that the principal was detained
from the creditor after his right to receh,.e it had accrued."
I am unable to discover anything in the act of 1877, regarded either alone m.· in connection with the claimant's
memorial, which withdraws the present case from the operation of the rule above adverted to.
But even if interest on the amount paid by the claimant
might have been allowed under the act, I think the claim
must now be treated as res judicata. The decision and allowance of your predecessor thereon were a final disposition of
the subject, and no rule of administrative practice is better
settled than that when a matter has once been passed upon
and finally disposed of by the head of a department it should
not be disturbed or reopened by his successors, except under
extraordinary circumstances, such as the discovery of new
facts and the like, which form exceptions to the rule, but
none of which exist in the present case (16 Opin., 489; 1.5
Opin., 315 ; 13 Opin., 387).
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It is urged in behalf of claimant by counsel that in the
present case his letter to your predecessor, dated February
28, 1881, must be regarded as an application for a re-examination of the claim, and that said letter not having been
acted upon by your predecessor, ·the application may now
be entertained by you. But that such application was made
and not acted upon, as above, does not, I think, withdraw
the case from the operation of the rule just referred to, and
this view is fortified by an opinion of one of my predecessors
in a similar case (16 Opin., 452).
Accordingly, in direct answer to your question, I have the
honor to reply that, in my opinion, interest on the $8,100
paid out by McKee for the use of the $6,000 borrowed is
not allowable under the act of March 3, 1877, aud moreover
that this matter, in view of the action of your predecessor,
should be treated as res judicata.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. S. J. KIRKWOOD,
Secretary of the Interior.
CASE OF MASTER LUCIEN YOUNG.
Y. was advanced twenty-five numbers on the Navy list, under section
1506 Rt~vised Statutes, whereby he was promoted from the grade of ensign to that of master, to which latter grade he was confirmed March
3, 1879, to take rank from November 24, 1877: Held that his increased
pay commenced, not at 'the date from which he took rank as master,
but at the date Qf his appointment as master (Ma.rch 3, 1879).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 29, 1882.
Your letter of the 23d nltimo, in relation to the case
of Master Lucien Young, of the ~avy, · states: "Mr. Young
was advanced twenty-five numbers on the Navy list, under
the provisions of section 1506 of the Revised Statutes, which
advancement promoted him from the grade of ensign to that
of master, and he was confirmed in this grade March 3, 1879,
to take rank November 24, 1877, from which latter date he
claims to be entitled to the pay of master."
The question involved i~, whether by law the pay of Mr.
Young, as master, commenced at the date of his appoint·
SIR:
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ment {March 3, 1879), or at the date from which he was t()
take rank (November 27, 1877).
Previous to the act of July 15, 1870, chapter 295, the general rule was that the increased pay of all promoted officers
in the Navy commenced from the date of the signature of
an appointment to perform the duty of the higller grade, if
one was given before the issue of a commission, or from the
date of the commission if no appointment was previously
given. (Navy Reg., ed. of 1865, par. 1162; ibid. ed. of 1870t
par. 1508.) But this rule was changed by that act, the seventh section thereof providing that thereafter "the increased
pay of a promoted officer shall commence from the date he is
to take rank as stated in his commission." The provision of
the act of 1870 just quoted, which was general and applied
to any promoted officer, was repealed by the act of June 5,
1872, chapter 306, and the following proviso enacted: "That
if such officer shall have been promoted in course to fill a vacancy, and shall have been in the performance of the duties
of the higher grade from the date he is to take rank, he may
be allowed the increased pay from that date." By the latter
provision only those officers who are "promoted in course to
fill a vacancy," and have been in the performance of the duties
of the l1igher grade from their ranking date, become entitled
to the increased pay from that date. Officers otherwise promoted are impliedly excluded. With these officers, therefore,.
it must be deemed that their increased pay was contemplated
to commence at the date of appointmen't.
The provision of the act of 1872 is substan ally embodied
in section 1561 Revised Statutes, and thus the law as to the
commoocement of the pay of promoted officers in the Navy
remains what it was. As Mr. Young was not" promoted in
courRe to :fill a vacancy," his claim is obviously inadmissible
under that section. The result I arrive at is, that under the law
as it stood when he was advanced (which is still in force), his
increased pay commenced not at the date from which he takes
rank as master, but at the date of his appointment as such.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. W. H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.
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EVELETH'S CASE.
Under a provision in the act of June 16; 1880, enabling the Secretary of
War "to cause to be constructed a fire-proof roof for the building at
the corner of Seventeenth and F streets," in Washington, D. C., Mr.
James Eveleth, a clerk in the office of the Chief of Engineers, was
designated by the Secretary as his agent to take charge of and superintend the work, and was allowed a compensation of $300 per month
from the date of such designation until the completion of the work.
For the same period the salary of E. as clerk was suspended, and in
effect his duties as such also, these being performed by another person
who received the pay therefor: Held that it was competent to the Secretary to employ E. as above, and compensate him out of the fund appropriated for the service, and that this case is not within section 1765
Revised Statutes, there being no "additional pay, extra allowance, or
compensation" received by E.
DEPARTMENT OF JUST!CE,

April 3, 1882.
SIR: I gather from your letter of March 1, and the accompanying papers, these facts:
In the Sundry Civil Appropriation bill approved June 16,
1880 (21 Stats., 260), was inserted the following provision:
~'To enable the Secretary of War to cause to be constructed
a fire-proof roof for the building on the corner of Seventeenth
and F streets, · twenty-five thousand one hundred and
seventy-eight dollars and fourteen cents, or so much thereof
as may be necessary."
The Secretary of War designated, as his agent, to advertise, make contracts with the approval of the Secretary, take
charge of and superintend the construction of the roof, Mr.
James Eveleth, who was a clerk in the office of the Chief of
Engineers and superintendent of the Winder building.
As compepsation to Eveleth for his service in the work
committed to his charf!e as above, and in consideration of
his giving the bond required by law in the sum of $10,000,
the Secretary alloweci him $300 per month from the date of
his designation to the service to the time of the completion of
the roof. For the same period his salary as clerk and as superintendent of the Winder building was suspended, and in effect
his duties also, which were ·performed by other parties who
received the pay for the services rendered in those positions.
272-VOL XVII--21
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Eveleth accepted these terms, entered upon and performed
the duties assigned to him in respect to the ~onstruction of
the roof, and has received $2,700 for nine months' service.
He has rendered his account, in which he has credited himself with $300 each month, and bas returned to the Treasury
$278.12 whieh remained unexpended of the appropriation at
the completion of the work.
No exception to his account is taken, except to the monthly
item for his ser,ices.
The First CompLroller disallows that, and calls upon Mr.
Eveleth to pay back into the Treasury the $2,700.
Upon this statement I am of opinionFirst. That the Secretary of War having under the act full
power to cause the roof to be constructed, and complete control over the fund appropriated to pay for it, he could employ
such agent to superintend the work and disburse the fund as
in his discretion he deemed best, and he could properly
compensate the agent from the appropriation. Therefore the
payment to this agent authorized by the Secretary can not
be gainsaid or disallowed by any officer of. the Government.
(United States v. Jones, 18 Howard, 92.)
From the judgment of the court in the case cited I quote
one sentence: "The Executive Department of the Government, to which is intrusted the control of the subject-matter,
must necessarily determine all questions appertaining to the
employment and payment of such temporary agents and the
exigency which demands their employment."
Adapting to this case the language of the Supreme Court
in case of the United States v. Savings Bank of Pittsburgh,
decided at its present term, the allowance " by the head of
a Department in cases of this kind is not the simple passing
of an ordinary claim by an ordinary accounting officer, but
a statement of accounts by one having authority for that
purpose under an act of Oongress."
Upon the authority of these cases, I hold that the Secretary's action in this matter is not subject to revision or reversal by the accounting officers of the Treasury.
Second. The rule of action in cases of this kind I find
stated by the Solicitor-General in an opinion which was approved by the Attort;Iey-General. and which I adopt as fol-
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lows: '"Where the service in question is one required by law,
but not of any particular official, and compensation therefor
is fixed by competent authority, and is appropriated, the
-officer who under due anthorization performs the service
is entitled to the compensation of one having authority."
(Pierce's case, 15 Opin., 603.)
The above is a condensation of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Converse v. The United States (21 How., 463).
In each of these cases the claim of the officer who performed the service was upheld upon facts analagom~ to those
of the case in band. In the latter case he was the superintendent of a light-house district, and also was employed by
the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase all the supplies for
the light-house service throughout the United States, and to
make the necessary disbursements therefor. The court held
that he was entitled to the compensation provided by law
for this purpose as well as to his salary as superintendent.
In the former case Pierce was minister-resident of the
United States to the Hawaiian Islands, at a salary of $7,500.
Whilst he was such minister he was employed by the proper
:Officer of the Government to supervise and take testimony
to be used in the court of commissioners of Alabama claims.
It was held that he was entitled to the usual compensation
given in such cases to assistant counsel. These cases, then,
were not within the intent and purpose of section1765 of the
Revised Statutes.
The present case is the same in principle.
Third. This case is not within section 1765, because there
was no "additional pay, extra allowance, or compen~ation."
During the period for which Eveleth was paid $300 per
month he held no other position than that of agent to oversee the construction of the roof and to disburse the fund appropriated for that work.
His duties as clerk, etc., as well as his pay, had been suspended, and having accepted the terms of his employment
as agent, he has no c1aim upon the Government for compensation as clerk. He has received pay but for one service,
.a nd is entitled to pay for no other service. The pay he has
received is not therefore additional to any other compensation nor an extra allowance.
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Upon each of the grounds above stated, I conclude that
the United States has no claim upon Mr. Eveleth for the
money allowed him by the Secretary of War.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
In response to a resolution of the Senate directing the Attorney-General
to investigate and report to that body who are the owners of the land
and water-power at the Great Falls of the Potomac River: Advised
that any information on the subject found in the records of the Department would be gladly furnished the Senate, but that beyond this,
it was submitted, such investigation is not within the duties of the
Attorney-General as prescribed by law.
DEP.A.RTMEN1' OF JUSTICE,

April 5, 1882.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the following resolution, dated March 30, 1882:
"Resolved, That the Attorney-General be, and is hereby,
directed to investigate and report to the Senate, at the earliest day possible, who are the owners of the land on the Virginia and Maryland shores opposite Conn's Island, above
the Great Falls in the Potomae River, and who are the
owners of the water, water-power and privileges at the Great
Falls on said River.''
The records·of this Department furnish little information
on the subject of the resolution, but I find that on the 11th
of July, 1854, Attorney-General Cushing certified that the
deed before him from Mrs. Ann R. Green would vest in the
United States a valid title to certain land, lying in the
County of Fairfax and State of Virginia, at the Great Falls of
the Potomac, proposed to be purchased by the United States
for the Washington City Aqueduct (Titles, p. 47). (This is
the tract marked U.S. in the map accompanying Senate Report No. 242, Forty-seventh Congress, first session.)
On the lOth May and 7th July 1855, he certified that proceedings in condemnation of a tract of land in the State of
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Maryland, called "Hard to come at," taken by the United
States for the use of the Washington Aqueduct, followed the
process prescribed by the statute of Maryland, and that the
proceedings vested a valid title thereto in the United States.
(Titles, pp. 91, 93.) 'l'his is the tract marked '" Hard to come
at" on said map, and is believ.ed to include by resurvey the
entire tract marked "Falls Island." It would seem that
subsequently the United States took a conveyance for one
moiety of this tract from Cephas Willett and wife, who had
not been parties to the condemnation proceedings, for Attorney-General Bates on the 27th November, 1861, after expressing his concurrence in the opinion of Mr. Cushing,
(just cited,) says: "In my opinion, the deed of Cephas F.
Willett and wife conveys a valid title to the undivided half
of the land therein described [Hard to come at], and the
United States, as owner, succeeds to the ordinary riparian
rights which attach to the ownership of lands adjoining
streams not navigable." (Titles, p. 369.)
There are other opinions upon titles to land acquired by
the United States, either by purchase or condemnation, for
the use of the Washington Aqueduct, but none of them I
think come within the resolution except those of Mr. ·cushing of May 12, 1855, and December 18, 1856, in which he certifies that certain condemnation proceedings against a tract
of lanll in Montgomery County, Mary land, called "Ora wford's
Lodge," condemned for the use of the Washington Aqueduct,
vested a valid title thereto in the United States (Titles, pp.
93, 207). (This is the tract marked " U. S." on said map on
the Maryland shore.)
As to the lands claimed by individuals or corporations on
either side of, or in the river, the records of this Department
show only that a suit was commenced in 1868 by the Great
Falls Manufacturing Company, for the use of so much of
Conn's Island. (claimed to be its property) as is ·occupied by
the present dam. On the trial in 1881, the Attorney-Gen~ral
disputed the claimant's title to said island, and also objected
to the jurisdiction of the court. In 16 Court of Claims Reports, at page 160, will be found the findings of the court and
opinions. My predecessor deemed it proper to appeal from the
judgment, and the cause is now pending in the Supreme Court.
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I am informed, however, that the Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal Company claim to own certain portions of the Virginia
and ~Iaryland shores and water privileges within the limits
described in the resolution. To investigate and report upon
the rights of the above named and other possible claimants
would involve not merely an examination of the records of
Fairfax County, Virginia, and Montgomery County, Maryland, but also of papers and conveyanceR in the hands of private parties, and might necessithte as to q:uestions of nonuser and prescription the taking of testimony. Without
power to send for books and papers, and to compel the attendance of witnesses, the investigation would be fruitless,
besides being open to the objection of invading the proper
province of the courts.
So far as I can furnish information to the Senate from the
records of this Department, I will gladly do so; but, beyond
this, I respectfully submit that the investigation directed is.
not within the duties of the Attorney-General, as prescribed
by law. That this has been the uniform construction of my
predecessors abundantly appears from the published volumes.
of their opinions.
l\Ir. Wirt (1 Opin., 335), Mr. Taney (2 Opin., 499), Mr..
Crittenden (5 Opin., 561.), Mr. Bates (10 Opin., 164), Mr.
Evarts (12 Opin., 544), Mr. Williams (14 Opiu., 17, 177), and
Mr. Devens (15 Opin., 475), were of opinion that it is not
competent for the Attorney-General, in the absence of a
statutory requirement, to give opinions concerning any matters pending in Congress upon the request of either of the
Houses, or of any committee, and in this judgment I felt
obliged to concur in a communication addressed by me to
Ron. W. W. Crapo, chairman of the Committee on Banking
and Currency of the House of Representatives, on the 26th
of January ultimo.
Regretting that I can not further facilitate the labors of
your honorable body by the desired investigation and report,.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
The PRESIDEN1.' OF THE SENATE.

TO THE PRESIDENT.

327

Case of General Ward B. Burnett.

CASE OF GENERAL WARD B. BURNETT.
In this case it is held that General Burnett is entitled to, and should be
allowed, the increase of pension granted by the act of June 16, Hl80,
chap. 236, to a certain class of pensioners.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April10, 1882.
SIR: ThelatePresident(Garfield) submittedtoHon.Wayne
MacVeagh the question whether General Ward B. Burnett
should be allowed the increase of pension granted by the act
of June 16, 1880, to a certain class of pensioners. The Attorney-General referred the matter to the Solicitor-General.
In a memorandum made and submitted to the AttorneyGeneral on the 15th of June, 1881, the Solicitor reaches a
conclusion favorable to General Burnett's claim, and says that
it is very meritorious, adding that it is "met by objections
that are perhaps only inter apices juris."
On tlJe 23d of June, 1881, the Secretary of the Interior
addressed a letter to the Attorney-General, propounding several questions touching the case involving nice points of law.
This letter also was referred to the Solicitor-General, who
answered each of the questions. put by the Secretary in the
negative without assigning reasons.
This answer went to the Interior Department as the opinion
of the Department of Justice upon the whole case. Its effect
was to reject General Burnett's application.
General Burnett has again appealed to the President, who
again, March 25, 1882, refers the case to the Attorney-General,
and noting the "seeming conflict of opinion in the two com- ·
munications upon the subject from the Department of Justice,"
desires a further examination.
It is upon this second appeal to the President that the case
is now before me.
After looking carefully into the case, I am inclined to concur in the .first opinion, intimated by the Solicitor-General,
in his report made to the Attorney-General on the 15th of
June, 1881.
It is admitted that General Burnett was entitled to a pension of $50 per month under the law of June 181 1874, though
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it is under a special act that he has received that sum as a
pension.
The intent and spirit of the act of June 16, 1880, is that all
those soldiers and sailors whose present right it was at the
time of its passage to demand and receive a pension of $50 a
month, under the law of 1874, should have the same increased
to $72. To say that only those who, on the 16th of June~ 1880,
were upon the pension-roll under the act of 1874, are entitled
to the increase, is to put too literal and narrow a construction upon the statute. The words "now receiving" in the
act of 1880 should be construed to mean now entitled to receive. For if the precise literal meaning is insisted on, only
those who on that day-the 16th of June, 1880-actually received their pensions under the law of 1874 could hav~ the
increase; but this is absurd.
The intent and purpose of Congress in passing the act
should be considered, and a reasonable and literal construction giveu to it. It could never have been the intention of
Congress to shut out from its bounty veterans who, like Burnett-totally disabled, and helpless from wounds received in
battle-had, through ignorance, negleeted to put themselves
upon the pension-roll.
It is, howeYer, objected that if General Burnett's name was
placed on the roll under 'the general law, an increase of pension could not be allowed him except from the date of an examining surgeon's certificate made under a pending claim for
such increase. The objection is founded upon section 46982-,
Revised Statutes. The answer is that General Burnett is
within the exception of that law. His disability is, and has
been for more than ten years, specific and permanent.
Again, it is objected that if General Burnett's name should.
be placed on the roll under the law of 1874, to receive vension
under that law from a date subsequent to June 16, 1880, his
pension could not be increased under the act of the latter date.
This is clearly inter apices juris.
If his name were placed now upon the pension-roll he would
not receive his pension under the act of 1874:, but under the
act of June 16, 1880. The act of 1874 was an amendment of
the fourth section of the general pension law of March 3, 1873
(Sec. 4698 Revised Statutes), in this particular only, that it
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raised the pensions of those who were entitled to $31.25 per
month, under the law of 1873, to $50. Then the act of June
16, 1880, comes in and simply increases the pension8 of the
same class of pensioners to $72 per month. It is a substitute
for the act of 1874 and abrogates it.
It appears that the pensioners who, under the general law,
were on June 16, 1880, entitled to receive $31.25 per month
(which is General Burnett's case), are, under the act of June
16, 1880, enti11ed to $72 p~r month. There is no doubt that
this was the intention of Congress.
Cases like General Burnett's are entitled to the increase no
matter when they make application for it. The facts showing his right to be upon the pension-roll, not the time when
his name was placed there, are the important and governing
~onsiderations.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
CADET ENGINEERS IN THE NAVY.
McF., a cadet engineer, having completed the prescribed course of
instruction at the Naval Academy and at sea June 10, 1881, and successfully passed an examination, was confirmed by the Senate as an
assistant engineer December 20, 1881, to take rank from the former date:
Held that he become entitled to the pay of assistant engineer from the
date he took rank as such, if that date is subsequent to the vacancy he
was appointed to fill.
Section 1 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 392, comprehends cadet
engineers, and fixes the commencement of their pay in the grade of
assistant engineer when promoted thereto.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
April 10, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 1st ultimo submits for my consideration the case of Assistant Engineer Walter M. McFarland,
U. S. Navy, the facts of which, as stated by you, are as follows:
4
' Mr. McFarland was appointed a cadet engineer at the
Naval Academy September 15, 1875, and completed the prescribed course of study (four years) at the Academy June
10, 1879. He was then assigned to duty at sea, and completed the required term of service on naval steamers (two
OF
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years) June 10, 1881, at which time he was on duty on board
the U. S. S. Trenton, on the European station. Upon the
return of that vessel to the United States he was detached
November 9, 1881. In December following, Mr. McFarland
was ordered before the Board of Examining Engineers at
Philadelphia, Pa., for the final examination required of cadet
engineers as to their qualifications for promotion to the
grade of assistant engineer, and on the 30th of that month
the board found him qualified and recommended him for
promotion to that grade. He was notified of the result of
his examination as follows:
'''NAVY DEPARTMENT,
"'Washington, January 9, 1882.
" 'SIR: Having successfully passed your examination, and
having been confirmed by the Senate to the grade of assist- ·
ant engineer in the Navy, you will be regarded as such from
the lOth June, 1881.
"'As the standing or relative position cannot be determined until all your data shall have been examined, your
commission cannot now be issued.
" 'Respectfully,
'''ED. T. NICHOLS,
·"'Acting Secretary of the Navy.
"Ass't. Eng. WALTER M. MCFARLAND, U. S. Navy,
" 'Wa~hington, D. 0.'
~'The class of cadet engineers of which Mr. McFarland was
a member, and the class which completed the prescribed
course of instruction at the Academy and at sea in June,.
1880, were confirmed by the Senate December 20, 1881, the
former to take rank as assistant engineers from June 10, 1881,
and the latter from June 20, 1880, to fill vacancies in that
grade.
''In consequence of the absence at sea of a number of the
members of each of these classes, who have not been examined, the standing or relative position of the different members of the classes, which is dPtermined according to merit,
can not be assigned until all the cadets of those dates have
. been examined.
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"It has not been practicable to assemble the classes of
cadet engineers for examination at the conclusion of therequired term of sea setvice, as they are distributed to various
vessels on ·foreign stations; and the examinations are therefore delayed unt,il the expiration of the cruise of the vessel
to which they are attached.
"Upon the conclusion of the examinations of all the members of these classes they will he commissioned as assistant
engineers, to take rank as such from J nne 20, 1880, and June
10, 1881, respectively.
~'I inclose a communication from Assistant Engineer McFarland, transmitting a letter from the Fourth Auditor of
the Treasury in relation to his claim for difference of pay.
''At the time Mr. McFarland and other office1;s of the
classes referred to became entitled to examination, they
were absent in the performance of the duties of assistant
engineers, and by reason of such absence their examinations
were necessarily delayed. They will be commissioned as
assistant engineers, with rank from the dates they became
entitled to examination, to fill vacancies which have· existed
in that grade since those dates.
~.In view of these facts, I respectfully request that you will
advise me whether the members of the classes of cadet engineers referred to, who pass successfully the examination
prescribed by law and regulations and are subsequently
commissioned assistant engineers, are entitled to the pay of
that grade from the date they take rank as stated in their
commissions."
Upon consideration I am of opinion that the cadet engineers
referred to in your inquiry, who are promoted to fill vacancies in the grade of assistant engineer, thereby become en
titled to the pay of that grade from the date they take rank
therein, where such date is subsequent to the vacancies they
are appointed to fill respectively. The words ~'any officer
of t,he Navy," as mployed in the first section of the act of
June 22, 1874, chapter 392, comprehend cadet engineers, and
that section fixes the commencement of their pay in the
grade M assistant engineer when promoted thereto. It
supersedes section 1561,' Revised Statutes, as to officers promoted thereafter, and should be construed in connection with
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the last-mentioned section and other provisions relating to
the pay of officers in the Navy (sections 1556, 1557, 1558,
1562, Rev. Stat.), all of which are in pari materia.
Cadet engineers are ''officers" within the meaning of section 1558, so also within the meaning of section 1557, which
regulates the pay of ''officers on furlough." They are furthermore ''officers of a class subject to examination before
promotion" within the meaning qf section 1562. By section
1556 they are allowed, "after a final academic examination,
and untH warranted as assistant engineers, when on duty at
sea, one thousand dollars," etc. This provision regulates
their pay as cadet engineers. Upon promotion to the grade
of assistant engineer their pay in that grade is regulated as
to rate by another provision of the same section, its commencement being fixed by the act of 1874, as above.
I may add that the signification of the word "officer" in
article 36 (sec. 1624 Rev. Stat.), as given in an opinion
of this Department dated July 10, 1877, (15 Opin., 635),
has reference to the sense in which that word is used in
said article, between which and the statutory provisions cited
above there is no connection. The ruling in that opinion
does not, therefore, affect the subject here considered.
I am, sir, very respectfully, ·
BENJ .A.MIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. W. H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General has no control over the action of the head of Department at whose request and to whom an opinion is given, nor could
he with propriety express any judgment concerning the disposition Qf
the matter to which the opinion relates, that being something wholly
within the administrative sphere of such head of Department.
DEPARTMENT OF juSTICE,

April 14, 1882.
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the letter -of the
Bon. John Van Voorhis~ addressed to you under date of the
.3d ultimo, which by your direction was referred to me and
my attention specially invited thereto.
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In this letter reference is made to an opinion of the Acting
Attorney-General, rendered at the request of the Secretary of
the Interior in December last, concerning the insertion of
reservations in patents for mining claims, and it is suggested
that "there seems to be a reluctance on the part of some
subordinates in the Interior Department to act in accordance with the law as stated in" that opinion, and you are
requested to ask the Attorney-General if in his judgment
the opinion rendered as above should be carried into
execution.
With respect to this request I beg to state, that while it is
the duty of the Attorney-General to give his opinion upon
questions of law arising in the administration of any Executive Department at the request of the head thereof, such
duty ends with the rendition of the opinion, which is ad visory only. The Attorney-General has no control over the
action of the head of Department to whom the opinion is
addressed, nor could he with propriety express any judgment concerning the disposition of the matter to which the
opinion relates, that being something wholly within the administrative sphere and direction of such head of Department.
I accordingly refrain from giving any advice touching the
subject of the above request.
'
I am, sir, with great respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
SUPPRESSION OF LAWLESSNESS IN ARIZONA.
Upon consideration of the facts stated: Advised that the military forces
of the United States may be employed under section 5298, Revised
Statutes, after proclamation as required by section 5300, Revised Statutes, to aid in the execution of the laws and for the suppression of
combinations of outlaws and criminals in the Territory of Arizona,
without the need of further legislation.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 15, 1882.
SIR: In obedience to your request of yesterday, I have
examined the question whether further legislation is needed
to authorize the employment of the military forces of the'
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United States to aid in the execution of the laws in Arizona
Territory under the circumstances now existing there.
By recent telegrams from the governor of the. Territory,
it would appear that the enforcement of the laws is obstructed and resisted to such a degree by powerful coml•inations of ontlaws and criminals, with whom even some of the
local officers are alleged to be in league, that a state of lawlessness bordering on anarchy may be said to prevail. This
information js confirmed by a still later telegram from the
General of the Army, dated at Tucson, Ariz., who states that
''the civil officers have not sufficient forces to make arrests," etc. The governor asks that prompt action be taken
to protect citizens and property. He says he has no power
or means to restore order without the aid of Congress;
that there is no money in the treasury of the Territory avail·
able for that purpose; and he recommends the passage of a
law by Congress appropriating $150,000 to enable- him to
maintain and employ a \olunteer militia force to suppress
insurrection and aid the civil authorities to enforce the
laws, etc.
The exigencies of this case seem to me to be amply provided for by the laws of Congress now in force; and I am
accordingly of opinion that there is no necessity for the
legislation recommended by the goYernor, nor indeed for any
legislation of the character referred to in the question under
considera(ion.
Section 5298, Revised Statutes, provides : H Whenever, by
reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the
Government of the United States, it shall become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the
United States within any State or Territory, it shall be lawful
for the President to call forth the militia of any or all of
the States, and to employ such parts of the land and na,~al
forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to
enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United
States, or to suppress such rebtllion, in whatever State or
Territory thereof the laws of the United States may be forcibly opposed, or the execution thereof forcibly obstructed.''
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Section 5300 also provides: "Whenever:, in the judgment
()f the President, it becomes necessary to use the military
forces under this title, the President shall forthwitll, by
proclamation, command the insurgents to disperse and retire
peaceably to their respective abodes within a limited time."
By the first of these sections the President is expressly
authorized to employ the military forces of the United States
to ai<l in enforcing the laws upon the contingencies therein
stated, after having given proclamation as required by the
last-mentioned section. The act of June 18, 1878, chapter
263, section 15, prohibiting the use of any part of the Army
as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, excepts from the operation of that act cases
where such employment is "expressly authorized by the
Constitution or by act of Congress." The cases provided
for by section 5298, Revised Statutes, are within this excepti~Jn.

..

The contingencies contemplated by that section, upon
which the authority to employ the military forces thereunder
depends, seeming now to exist in the Territory of Arizona,
I am of opinion that such forces may be employed, after
proclamation as above, in the execution of the laws and for
the suppression of the above-mentioned combinations of
outlaws and criminals in that Territory, without the aid of
further legislation.
I herewith inclose a form of proclamation, which is submitted as an appropriate one for the present case. It follows the form heretofore used in like cases .
I am, sir, with great respect,

BENJAMIN

The

PRESIDENT.

~ARRIS

BREWSTER.
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01<~

DUTIES ERRONEOUSLY EXACTED.

Where certain importers of sugar, having made due protest and appeal
but failing to bring suit afterwards, applied to the Secretary of the
Treasury for a refund of duties illegally exacted, as indicated in the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Merritt v. Welsh (104 U.
S., 694): Advised that the Secretary can not grant the application uuder section 3012t, Revised Statutes.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 20, 1882.
SIR : In yours of the 5th instant, referring to the late decision by the Supreme Court in Merritt v. Welsh, it is stated
that amongst the importers of sugar interested in the rule
established in that case are some who, having made due
protest and appeal, did not bring suit, it being, as I understand,
now too late to do so. A question has thereupon occurred
before you whether, under section 3012z of the Revised Statutes, upon another application by these persons, you may
refund the excess of duty indicated in the above-named
case.
Upon consideration, I submit that you can not.
The methods by which money improperly exacted as duties
may be recovered are by proceedings, in the first instanc~,
before the Secretary of . the Trea~ury, begun a~ provided in
section 2931, and if successful before him, satisfied under section 3012~; but if unsuccessful before him, continued by suit
at law, which, if successful, is satisfied under section 989.
That section, 3012z, in its original shape as part of the act
of 1864, chapter 171, was intended to provide a satisfaction
for such claims only when otherwise regularly pending before
the Secretary, or at all events (considering the subsequent
suit as a part of the same proceeding) when not yet concluded,
seems to me evident upon inspection.
Although separated in the revision from those sections of
the act of 1864 in immediate local connection with which it
was originally enacted (and indeed inserted there, as its
numbering indicates, somewhat by an after-thought), it seems
that it does not contain a substantive grant of jurisdiction
·to the Secretary to hear applications not theretofore cogniz-
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able by him, but only a provision in satisfaction of cases
otherwise regularly brought and decided. In other words,
as already indicated, it plays the same part in relation to
the earlier clauses of section 2931 as section 989 does to the
latter.
In contemplation of law the claims in question were abandoned by failure to bring suit within the time limited after
the original adverse decision of the Secretary. Not only
must protest and appeal precede a proper application to the
Secretary, but, to be effective, these must be followed up in
the order, and with the diligence, specified. The exceptional
provisions upon this matter in cases of "non-compliance"
contained in section 3013 point to the same conclusion.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:

'BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
The word "chief," as used in the provision of the act of February 8,
1875, chapter 36, imposing a duty of 60 per cent. ad valorem on all
goods, wares, and merchandise made of silk or of which silk is a
component material of chief value, etc., means greater than either
of the other materials; not greater than their aggregate.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 22, 1882.
SIR: Inadvertently yours of the 30th ultimo was not
brought to my attention until yesterday. Herewith I beg
to submit an answer thereto.
You state that "An appeal bas been presented to this
Department involving the proper rate of duty on certain
merchandise composed of silk and other materials. The
value of the silk in the goods is less than half of the whole,
but exceeds that of either of the other materials. (The act
of February 8, 1875, imposes a duty of 60 per cent. ad va272-voL xvn--22
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lotem on all goods, wares, and merchandise made of silk or
of which silk is a component material of chief value, with
the condition, that cotton, flax, wool, or worsted, shall not be
a component material of over ~5 per cent. therein.) The
question is whether the term chief value in the act of 1815
means more than half the value of the wlwle, or more than
the value of each of the other materials. I will thank you
for your opinion upon the question thus presented."
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that the word "chief"
in tlte statute referred to by yon means greater than
eitlter of the other materials; not greater than their a,ggregate. :::iuch seems to be the force of the bare word itself,
and I am not able to discover any context sufficient to control this. The phrases "the component material of chief
value," "a component material of chief value," ~'the component part of chief value,'' ''a component of chief value,"
"chief component part," "principal ingredient," "chief
part" occur again and again in section 2504 of the Revised
Statutes. But I do not see that they tltrow light one upon
the other. Something may be suggested to the effect that
Congress was considering silk as compared with the part
of the compound that is not silk : and, in tltis connection,
that any reasonable policy underlying the condition to which
you refer excludes from the operation of the tax articles of
which "cotton, flax, wool, or worsted "-either or all-make
25 per cent.; but upon the whole it seems that Congress has
not said so; ami its will of course depends upon its words.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
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PENSIONS.
Under section 4702, Revised Statutes, the surviving child (the widow
and other children being dead) is entitled to the whole of the pension
to which the father would be entitled were he living.
It is not within the province of the accounting officers of the Treasury to
construe the pension laws and give instructions to pension agents as
to the payment of pensions. This properly belongs to the Commissioner of Pensions, whose duty it is, under the direction of the Secretary
of the Interior, to administer these laws.
DEP AR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

·

.

April 28~ 1882.

SIR: The question upon which my opinion is asked by the
letter of the Acting Secretary, bearing date.the 18th instant,
is whether, under section 4702 of the Revised Statutes, the
surviving child (the widow and other children being dead) is
entitled to the whole of the pension the father would be entitled to were he living, or only to such fractional part thereof
as he (the survivor) would have had the benefit of if the
other children or any of them were living. The language of
the statute is, "if there be no widow, or in case of her death,
* * * his child or children under sixteen years of age
shall be entitled to receive the same pension as the husband
or father would have been entitled to," etc.
His child or children, one or many, shall be entitled. It is
clear that the whole is given to the offspring of the father as
a class. If there is more than one child, they have a joint
estate, so to speak, in the pension. The statute disposes of
the whole. No part of it reverts or falls back to the Government until the last child arrives at the age of sixteen years
or until his death before reaching that age.
The pension office and the Secretary of the Interior hitherto
have so construed the law, and, after considering the subject in the light of the correspo~dence and documents accompanying the Acting Secretary's letter, I do not see that there
is good ground to depart from the practice which has so long
prevailed.
The Acting Secretary inquires further, whether pension
agents should receive instructions as to the meaning of the
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pension laws from the Commissioner of Pensions or from the
accounting officers of the Treasury.
I understand that chapter 5, under the head of "Department of the Interior," in the Revised Statutes, places the
entire administration of the pension laws in the control of
that Department, and that section 471 designates the Commissioner of Pensions as the officer whose special duty it is,
under the direction of the Secretary, to administer and carry
into execution these laws. He shall perform, to use the
language of the statute, "such duties in the execution of the
various pension and bounty land laws as may be prescribed
by the President." By which I understand that the Commissioner of Pensions is the officer provided by law in whose
hands the President, as the executive head of the nation,
shall place this part of the administration, to wit, the execution of the pension and bounty land laws.
Moreover, there are scattered through the title "pensions''
many sections pointing out in detail the duties of the Commissioner, and showing his authority to apply and con~true
these laws.
Sections 4746 and 4748 speak of the payment of pensions as
being within his" jurisdiction." He is required to furnish
instructions and forms to applicants, to issue certificates of
pensions, and notify the claimant or his attorney of the allowance made and the amount thereof.
By section 4768 the Commissioner is required to forward
the certificate to the pension agent who is to pay the same.
Pension agents are officers of the Department of the Interior, and take their instructions from the Commissioner ofPensions (sections 4779, 4784, 4785). There is no aHusion in any
of the pension laws to the accounting officers of the Treasury
as having any authority to construe those laws, or to direct
the pension agents as to the amount that shall be paid to
any class of pensioners or to whom pensions shall be paid.
This is matter for the supervision and instruction of the Commissioner. The certificate and his orders as to its payment
are binding upon the Comptroller and Jl.uditor.
If a payment has the authority of the Commissioner ofPensions, and especially if it has the sanction of the Secretary of
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the Interior, the decision is final; for the jurisdiction of the
whole matter is in these officers.
The duty of the accounting officers in respect to pensions
is to audit the accounts relating to them and to certify the
balances. (See sec. 277, Rev. Stat.) But this does not
require that they shall take from the Commissioner of Pensions the jurisdiction with which the law clothes him to construe and administer the pension laws, or interfere with his
instructions to pension agents. On the contrary, they are
bound to conform to his decisions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Bon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
The opinions of former .Attorneys-General construing the provisions of
the act of June 25, 1868, chapter 72, known as the eight-hour law
(section 3738, Rev. Stat.), reviewed, and the following conclusions deduced therefrom:
(1) That the act prescribes the length of tirne which shall constitute a
day's work, but it does not establish any rule by which the compensation for a day's work shall be determined.
(2) That it does not contemplate a reduction of wages simply because
of the reduction thereby made in the length of the day's work; but,
on the other hand, it does not 1'equire that the same wages shall be
paid therefor as are received by those who in similar private employments work a greater length of time per day.
(3) That it does not forbid the making of contracts for labor, fixing a
different length of time for the day's work than that prescribed in
the law.
This exposition of the act is in harmony with the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the case of United States v. Martin (94 U. S., 400).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 29, 1882.
SIR: The accompanying application for the enforcement
of the eight-hour law, addressed to you by Jacob M. Davis,
44
Secretary Executive Committee League Island Mutual
Protection Association," under date of March 13, 1882, and
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made in behalf of the workingmen employed by the Government in the navy-yards and elsewhere, was subsequently
referred to me by your direction for examination and report
upon the merits thereof, and also for such recommendations
as may be suggested by the conclusions arrived at. Having examined the application and considered the provisions
of the law to which it relates, J now have the honor to submit
the following report:
The application cites -the act of J nne 25, 1868, chapter 72,
entitled "An act constituting eight hours a day's work for all
laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the Government of the United States" (the provisions of which are embodied in section 3738, Hevised
Statutes), and refers to a proclamation of the President,
issued May 19, 1869, calling attention to said act and directing that from and after that date no reduction should be
made "in the wages paid by the Government by the day to
such laborers, workmen, and mechanics on account of such
reduction of the hours of labor," and also to a subsequent
proclamation of the President, issued May 11, 1872, again
calling attention to said act and directing "all officers of the
Executive Department of the Go\ernment having charge of
the employment and payment of laborers, workmen, or mechanics employed by or on behalf of the Government of the
United States to make no reduction in the wages paid by the
Government by the clay to such laborers, workmen, and mechanics on account of the reduction of the hours of labor."
It furthermore refers to section 2 of the act of May 18, 1872,
chapter 172, requiring the accounting officers in the settlement of all accounts for the services of the laborers, wotkmen, and mechanics employed by or on behalf o( the Government of the United States between the 25th day of June,
1868, the date of the act cont;tituting eight hours a day's
work for all such laborers, workmen, and mechanics, and
the 19th of May, 1869, the date of the proclamation of the
President concerning such pay, to settle and pay for the
same without reduction on account of reduction of hours
of labor by said act, when it .shall be made to appear that
such was the sole cause of the reduction of wages, etc. (same
provision being reproduced in section ,3689, Revised Stat-
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utes), and to the debate in the Senate on the passage of the
act of June 25, 1868.
These citations and references appear to be made with the·
view of setting forth the design of that act, as the same may
be gathered from the act itself, the debate in the Senate
thereon, the action · of the President in the proclamations
mentioned, and the subsequent actio_n of Congress.
It is then charged that since 1877 the eight-hour law has
been "openly violated and persistently disregarded" six
months in each year, and in this connection reference is made
to General Order No.227,dated June 30, 1877,and circular No.
8, dated March 28, l878, issued by the Secretary of the Navy,
and also to a circular, dated September 21, 1878, issued by
the Acting Secretary of the Navy, which, it is allowed,
"re.cognizes the validity of the eight-hour law from September 22 to March 20 of each year, and then enforces the
ten-hour system from March 21 to September 21 in each
year."
The application concludes with the following declaration:
"That we claim the strict enforcement of the national eighthour law, as passed by Congress June 25, 1868, according
to its plain meaning, that eight hours shall constitute a day's
work; a day's work that should bring a day's wages."
The application does not state specifically in what way the
law bas been violated as charged or give the facts upon which
such charge is founded ; but I infer that the complaint is
directed against the orders and circulars above referred to,
issued by the Navy Department. These orders and circulars
not being before me, I make no comment thereon. Whether
they continue in force I know not.
The provisions of the act of 1868, known as the eight-hour
law (sectlon 3738, Revised Statutes), have several times been
considered by my predecessors. The question, whether that·
act, in reducing the number of hours constituting a day's
work, was intended to work a corresponding reduction in the
compensation for a day's work, is discussed in an opinion of
Attorney·General Evarts to the President, dated November
25, 1868 (12 Opin., 530). He holds that "there is nothing
in the language of the act to indicate such intention,'' and that
''the plain import of the law is that a laborer, workman, or
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mechanic, in the employ of the Government, whether hired
by the day, week, or month, shall only be required to work
eight hours a day to earn llis daily, weekly, or monthly wages,
wllatever these may be." Yet be finds nothing in tile act requiring that "employes of the Government embracetl within
tbe act must receive as high wages for their day's labor of
eight hours as similar industry in private employments receives for a day's labor of ten or twelve hours," and remarks
that "the act is ""holly silent on the subject of wages, fixing
only the length of a day's labor." And the conclusion he
comes to is, that the act " does not require that the wages of
the shortened day of Government labor should be reduced in
the proportion of the hours of labor, and that the act as little
requires that the wages of this shortened day should be as
large as the wages of the longer day of private employment,"
and that " in this silence of the act itself on the measure of
wages, while it speaks only of the hours oflabor, the Departments are left to the guidance of the rule of equality of compensation for equal worth oflaborin Government and in private
employment.''
Attorney-General Hoar, in response to an inquiry from the
Secretary of the Navy as to the meaning and effect of the act
of1868, taken in connection with the act of July 16, 186~,
chapter 184 (which latter act provided "that the hours of
labor and the rate of wages of the employes in the navy-sards
shall conform, as nearly as is consistent with the public interest, with those of private establishments in the immediate
vicinity of the respective yards, to be determined by the commandants of the navy-yards, subject to the approval andrevision of the Secretary of the Navy"), gave an opinion under
.Jate of April 20, 1869 (13 Opin., 29), in which he refers to
the opinion of Mr. Evarts, and approves the conclusions there
arrived at. He says: "In my opinion the statute of June
25, 1868, has nothing to do with the compensation to be paid
to workmen in the navy-yards, and leaves that to be determined under the provisions of the act of July 16, 1862. The
provision that eight hours shall constitute a da.r's labor has
no tendency whatever to show whether the day's labor thus
established shall be paid at a lower or higher rate than the
day of ten hours labor, or at the same rate. The rate of com-
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pensatioh is still left by law to be determined under the rule
prescribed by the statute of July 16, 1862, so as to conform,
as nearly as is consistent with the public interest, with the
rate of wages of p~ivate establishments in the immediate vicinity of the respective navy-yards, 'to be determined by the
commandants of the navy-yards, subject to the approval and
revision of the Secretary of the Navy.' If the private establishments in tLe n('ighborhood employed their hands for five
hours a day only, there would, obviously, be no justice in reducing the wages of those employed in the navy-yards for
eight hours to the amount paid by the day in private establisments; but the law intended no such result. On the other
baiHl, I find nothing in the statute which requires you to pay
the same price for eight hours' labor which private establishments pay for ten or twelve, unless the amount of service
rendered or the quality of the work make the fewer hours in
the navy-yards equivalent in value to the longer time hired
in private establishments, or, for some other reason, make it
consistent with the public interest."
In an opinion to the Secretary of War, dated May 31,
1871 (13 Opin., 424), Attorney-General Akerman considered
the act of 18G8 in connection with the President's proclamation of May 19, 1869, hereinbefore mentioned, apparently
adopting the construction given that act by his predecessors.
Attorney-General Devens, in answer to an inquiry suggested by the Secretary of the Navy, whether a circular issued by the Navy Department undbr date of March 21, 1878
(announcing that "the Department will contract for the
labor of mechanics, foreman, leading-men, and laborers on
the basis of e'ight hours a day, but that all workmen electing
to labor ten hours a day will r~ceive a proportionate increase
of their wages"), accords with the meaning and intent of
section 3738, Revised Statutes, which embodies the eighthour law, rendered an opinion dated July 9, 1878 (16 Opin.,
58), holding that the circular is in accordance therewith.
This conclusion is based on the construction given that section by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of u-nited States v. Martin (94 U. S. Rep., 400), which is regarded as decisive and binding upon the Executive Depart-
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ments. In that case, he says: ''The court, after observing
that the section 'was a direction by Congress to the officers
and agents of the United States, establishing the principle
to be observed in the labor of those engaged in its service,'
holds that it only prescribes the length of time which shall
amount to a day's work when no special agreetnent is made
'upon the subject, and that it does not forbid the making of
contracts fixing a different lPngth of time as the daJ''s work.
• There are several things,' tlie court adds, ' which the act
does not regulate, which it may be worth while to notice.
First, it does not establish the price to be paid for a da,y's .
work. • * * It does not specify any sum which shall
be paid for the labor of eight hours, nor that the price shall
be more when the hours are gre3(ter, or less when the hours
are fewer. Second, the statute does not provide that th~
employer and the laborer may not agree with each other
as to what time shall constitute a day's work. * * 'li:We regard the statute chiefly as in the nature of a direction from a principal to his agent that eight hours is
deemed to be a proper length of time for a day's labor, antl
that his contracts shall be based upon that theory.' The
circular mentioned is in perfect harmony with this authoritative expo.3ition of the law. It proposes to contract for
labor on the basis of eight hours constituting a day's work,
and herein the direction of the statute is fully conformed to .
.A.nd although it provides for the allowance of a proportionu.te increase of wages where th~ workmen elects to labor ten
hours a day instead of eight, yet this is not at variance with
the law. On the contrary, such a provision must be deemed.
entirely consistent with the law."
Since the decision of the Supreme Court above referred
to a joint resolution was introducetl into and passed the
House of RepresentatiYes during the second session of the
Forty-fifth Congress, declaring that, according to the true
intent and meaning of the act of June ~5, 1868~ 4 ' eight hour.'
constitute a day's work for all such laborers, workmen, and
mechanics; and while said act remains upon the statutebook no reduction shall be made in the wages paid by the
Government by the day to such laborers, workmen, and
mechanics, on account of the reduction of the hours of labor
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but all heads of Departm~nts, officers, and agents of the
Government are hereby directed to enforce said law as long
as the same is unrepealed." This resolution went to the
Senate and was there postponed to the next session, but no
action was afterwards taken thereon by that body. The
same resolution was re-introduced in the House during the
first seHsion of the Forty-sixth Congress, and considered and
laid on the table.
During the second session of the Forty-sixth Congress a
joint resolution passed the House, declaring "that, according to the true intent and meaning of section 3738 of the
Revised Statutes, all laborers, workmen, and mechanics
employed by or in behalf of the Government, shall hereafter receive a full day's pay for eight hour's work; and all
heads of Departments, officers, and agents of the Government are hereby directed to enforce said law as herein interpreted." This, however, failed in the Senate.
The legislation thus proposed, which met the approval of
one of the houses of Congress, while it apparently assumes
that the construction theretofore given the statute by the
executive and judicial departments of the Go~ernment does.
not accord with the intention of Congress in enacting it,
also assumes that some provision is necessary to more clearly
and distinctly declare that intention, which, as expressed
in such proposed legislation, was this: (1) that eight hour8should constitute a day's work for all laborers, etc., who are
within the statute; (2) that no reduction should be made in
the wages paid by the day to such laborers, etc., on account·
of the reduction in the hours of labor; (3) that all such
laborers, etc., should receive a full day's pay for eight hours'
work. Neither of these propositions, however, seems to me
to express an interpretation of the law substantially different
from that which it has already received, as above.
Recurring to the opinions of my predecessors herein before
mentioned, I deduce from the views there presented the following results:
(1) That the act of 1868 (section 3738, Rev. Stat.) prescribes the length of time which shall constitute a day's work;
but it does not establish any rule by which the compensation
for a day's work shall be determined-this being left to be
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fixed in the ordinary or customary manner, where the law
does not otherwise provide.
(2) That it does not contemplate a reduction of wages simply because of the reduction thereby made in the length of
the day's work; but, on the other hand, it does not. require
that the same wages shall be paid therefor as are received by
those who in similar private employments work a greater
length of time per day. This matter of wages is to be dealt
with as pointed out in the precediug paragraph, having due
regard to the public interest.
(3) That it does not forbid the making of contracts for
labor, fixing a different length of time for the day's work
than that prescribed in the law
This exposition of the act referred to is in harmony with
the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of United Btates
v. ~Martin, cited above. There the court say that the act
"prescribed the length of time which should amount to a
da;y's wurk, when no special agreement was made upon the
subject," but that "it does not establish the price to be paid
for a day's work;" that ''it does not specify any sum which
shall be paid for the labor of eight hours, nor that the price
shall be more when the hours are g-reater, or less when he
hours are fewer," and that "it is silent as to everything except the direction to its officers that eight hours shall constitute a day's work for a laborer."
"We regard the statute," remark the court, "chiefly as in
the nature of a direction from a principal to his agent that
eight hours is deemed to be a proper length of time for a
day's labor, and that his contracts shall be based upon that
theory. It is a matter between the principal and his agent,
in which a third party has no interest. The proclamation of
the President and the act of 1872 are in harmony with this
view of the statute.
"We are of opinion, therefore, that contracts fixing or giving a different length of time as the day's work are legal and
binding upon the parties making them."
The view of the statute here announced must be regarded
as an authoritative ic.terpretation of its provisions; and if,
being thus interpreted, the statute fails to accomplish the
objects which tt is claimed Congress had in view when en-
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acting it, this failure can now be remedied, as it seems to
me, only by ad<liti:onal legislation.
With respect to the charge implied in the application for
an enforcement of the statute-indeed, expressly made therein-namely, that its provisions are not complied with by the
officers charged with the employment of laborers, etc., for the
Government, I am unable, from want of information on the
subject, to form an opinion. As already in tim a ted by me,
the application does not state specifically wherein there is a
non-compliance with the law. In this connection, therefore,
I remark that no recommendations are suggested by my examination of that paper.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Xhe

PRESIDENT.

REDEMPTION OF ''CONTINUED FIVES" OF 1881.
In calling for redemption the new bonds issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury, known as "contitiued :fives," those which have the highest
number, i. e., "the bonds of each class last dated and numbered," as
provided by the third section of the act of July 14, 1870, chap. 256,
should be called first.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 4,1882.
SIR: The case stated in yours of the 26th ultimo is substantially as follows:
The act of July 14, 1870, having authorized the issue of
certain five per cent. bonds redeemable at the pleasure of the
United States after ten years from the date of their issue, by its
third section provided: "That the payment of any of the bonds
hereby authorized after the expiration of the said several
terms of ten * * * years, shall be made in amounts to be
determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, at his discretion, the bonds so to be paid to be distinguished and described by the dates and numbers, beginning for each successive payment with the bonds of each
class last dated and numbered, of the time of which intended
payment, or redemption, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
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give public notice, and the interest on the particular bonds
so selected at any time to be paid shall cease at the expiration of three months from the date of such _notice."
Accordingly, upon the 12th of .May, 1888, a call was made for
certain of the bonds so issued, a clause being annexed thereto~
to the effect that in case any holders of such bonds (within
defined limits) ''shall request to have their bonds continued
during the pleasure of the Government, with interest at the
rate of three and one half per cent. per annum in lieu of their
payment at the date specified, such request will be granted
if the bonds are recehTed by the Secretary of the Treasury on
or before the 1st day of July, 1881."
Such request was accordingly made generally by the holders in question, and in the end bonds to the amount of $4:01,504,900 were continued, the method of doing this being a sur
render and cancellation of the old bonds and an issue of the
same amount of registered bonds of like description but bearing a new series of numbers, and having printed across their
face "At the request of, and for value received by, the
owner of this· bond, the same is continued during the pleaRure of the Go\ernment, to bear interest at the rate of three
and one-half (3z) per centum," etc. These bonds were issued,
beginning with Bond No.1 in each denomination, in the order
of the receipt at the Department of the surrendered bonds,
and so of course without reference to the priority of numbers
of said surrendered bonds.
Upon this state of facts you ask, whether, ''in calling
what are known to rue as continued fives, I shall be justified
by law in calling the lowest numbers first, or must I call the
highest numbers first."
Upon consideration I have to submit to you my opinion
that the bonds which haYe the highest numbers-or, to use
the language of the third section of the act of 1870 (above),
those of each class" last dated and numbered "-are to be
called first.
The ''continued fives" have no other authorization than
the above act of 1870. They must therefore eonform to the
law of their being as therein established, subject only to
such voluntary diminution of the burden upon the debtor
as it might please the bondholder to accord. In contem-
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plation of law tlt~y are the fi 'ves of 1881; with the inciuentimpertant financiall,y out not in point of law-that their
holders have agreed to remit, virtually to pay back into
the Treasury, 1-2- per cent. of the annual interest thereupon
merely to conciliate the United States so that they might
uot 80 quickly determine their will, and call the bonds.
I submit that any discussion of the character of the bonds
in question must necessarily assume as its basis the fact that
in the transaction uy virtue of which they were issued, there
was no party who was competent to bind the United States
by any modification of the incidents to the original bonds.
This fact was well known to all who took part in that transaction, the details of which show a scrupulous observance
thereof. All that the Secretary of the Treasury did therein,
{)r was, or could have been, understood to do, was virtually
to receive for the United States a remission of a part of the
<>riginal debt.
It is in accordance with this that the bondholders required
no counter-stipulations, not even one for a change of that
practice by which theretofore the registered fives of 1881 had
been subject to change of number, and so to loss of grade,
upon every occasion when an old bond was changed for a new,
-e. g., on an assignment of sueh bond-when by a uniform
and unquestioned practice the old bond was surrendered
and a new one issued with a new n~tmber corresponding to the
date of the transaction. ,
Even if some party competent to bind the United States
as to a change of policy hatl been dealt with by the bondholders when the ''continued fives" were issued, it seems
that a failure by the latter to insist upon a change iu the
previous system and effect of numbering and renumbering
would be very 8trong in favor of the conclusion to which I
have come, but when it is added that there was then present-as was perfectly well known to, and acted upon by,
all-no one who could so bind the D nited States, such conclusion is one from which it is difficult to escape.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- GeneraZ.
1
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CLAIM OF J. AND R. H. PORTER.
The award made by the Third Auditor on the lOth of May, 1861, under
the law of March 3, 1849, chapter 129, in favor of James and Richard
H. Porter, was binding upon all officers of the Government.
The act of July 28, 1866, chapter 297, modifying the said act of 1849,
did not affect claims adjudicated by the Auditor before its passage.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 4, 1882.

SIR: On the lOth ultimo you referred to me papers in the
case of R. H. Porter, requesting my opinion upon the question presented therein.
The facts, so far as it is deemed necessary t~ state them,
are as follows:
The claim of James and Richard H. Porter, having been
presented to the Treasury Department, was submitted l'Y
the Secretary in the year 1861 upon a report of the facts by
the Third Auditor to the Attorney-General for his opinion
upon questions of law. On the 25th of April, 1861, Hou.
Edward Bates, Attorney-General, delivered an opinion, holding that the claim was valid under the law of March 3, 1849,
and that the claimants, upon the facts as found, were entitled
to payment from the Government for the cattle, mules,
horses, and wagons lost or destroyed, etc. Thereupon the
Third Auditor adjusted the account, and on the lOth of May,
1861, awarded to the claimants the sum of $10,100. The
same day the First Comptroller admitted and certified this
balance. The award then passed to a warrant, which, however, was not signed by the Secretary. He disapproved the
adjustment, and sebt the case back to the Auditor.
Three years afterwards that officer took up the case, reconsidered it, anJ made a second award, allowing to the claimants $750. This was never .acquiesced in by the claimants.
They protested, and have insisted from that day until now
that the first adjudication was final. And this is the question now before me, whether the Third Auditor had power
to reopen the case, after he had once adjusted the account,
found a balance due to the claimants under the law, and
certified his judgment; in other words, whether the decision
of the Third Auditor was final.
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The third section of the act of March 3, 1849, (9 Stat.,
415) provides that claims presented under that act shall
be adjusted by the Third Auditor. The fourth section provides that in all adjudications of said Auditor, "when such
judgments shall be in favor of the claim, the claimant or his
legal repre8entatives shall be entitled to the amount thereof
upon the pi'oduction of a copy thereof, certified by said
Auditor, at the Treasury of the United States." This was
the law in force when the Porter claim was adjusted. It
puts all claims under it in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Third Auditor. He is made the sole tribunal to decide
them, and his awards are called judgments. The law provides no appeal from them, and for no second hearing after
they have been rendered and certified. To obtain payment
of them it was only necessary to produce copies certified by
the Auditor at the Treasury of the United States.
It will at once be seen that a broad distinction was made
between these claims as to their adjustment and final settlement and those submitted to the Third Auditor under the
law of March 3, 1817, and subsequent acts. His decisions
in the latter cases must be examined and reviewed by the
Second Comptroller. With respect to the former there is no
such requirement. In express terms the findings of the
Auditor were made final.
Now, it has been held by this Department, and the
authority for the proposition is ample, that where a statute
imposes a particular duty upon an executive officer, and he
has performed the duty according to his understanding of
the law, there is no appeal from his action or his decision,
unless such appeal is expressly provided by law. His decision is final and conclusive. (See 16 Opin., 317; 1 Opin.,
624; 2 id., 481-482; 5 id., 275; 11 id., 14; United States v.
Ferriera, lJ Howard, 40.) It was said by Chief-Justice Taney
in this case, where jurisdiction in a class of claims had been
conferred by statute upon the Secretary of the Treasury, that
his decision was" final and conclusive;" that" it would not
be disturbed by an appeal to this or any other court, or in
any other way, without the authority of an act of Congress."
When, therefore, the account in this case was adjudicated
by the Third Auditor and he had certified his judgment, it
272-VOL XVII--23
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became a liquidated demand-a demand, in the language of
the law, to be paid at the Treasury of the United States. It
was binding upon all the officers of the Government. The
case had passed from the jurisdiction of the only officer to
whom the law gave authority to consider it and had become
res judicata. Neither the Auditor nor any other officer of the
Government had control over it. The judgment belonged to
the Messrs. Porter, to whom the law gave the right to demand
payment of it at the Treasury.
As regards the effect of the act of July 28, 1866 (14 Stat.,
327), which substitutes for the fourth section of the act of
184:9 a provision that the findings of the .A.uditor Rhall be
submitted to the Second Comptroller for revision, it need
only be said that it can not reach back to a matter which
had passed into judgment in 1861. The language of the
statute of 1866 can not be construed as retroactive, so as to
affect claims which had been adjusted before its passage.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No power is expressly conferred by statute upon any two of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to act without the third, and it
seems that the three Commissioners should be present and acting when
any business of importance pertaining to their office is to b~ transacted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 10, 1882.
SIR: The statute concerning Commissioners of the Dis·
trict of Columbia authorizes the appointment by the President, with the ad vice and consent of the Senate, of two perSOJ~s, who, with an officer of the Corps of Engineers of the
United States Army of rank above that of captain, shall be
Commissioners of the District, and shall exercise all the
powers and authority which were vested in the Commission·
ers under the act of June 20, 1871. (Act of June 11, 1878,
sees. 2 and 3, Supp. Rev. Stats., 340.)

)
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No power is expressly conferred upon any two of them to
act without the third.
Especial importance seems to be given to the connection
of the officer of Engineers with the Commissioners from civil
life, indicating a purpose in the 1egislative mind that the
former should be a guide in many matters, and a check perhaps in others, upon the action of the latter. Hence it is
provided that the Engineer officer detailed from time to time
by the Pre!:!ident for this duty shall not be required to perform any other duty.
Another provision is that " one of said three Omnmissione}·s
shall be chosen president of the board uf Commissioners at
their first meeting, * • * * and whenever a vaoanoy shall
occur thereafter."
From which it is reasonably inferred that the board is to
be always full when any business is to be done; for when a
vacancy occurs the organization of the Commissioners as a
board is dissolved. There must be a new election of chairman to constitute them a legal body. The whole tenor of
the statute seems to require that the three Commissioners
shall be present and acting when any business of importance pertaining to their office is to be transacted.
My decided impression is that it would be unsafe for the
two remaining Commissioners, the seat of the Engineer
officer being vacant, to act as if the board were full.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
DECLARATIONS IN PENSION CASES.
The proviso in section 4714, Revised Statutes, is to be construed as applicable to the new limitation prescribed by section 2 of the act of March
3, 1879, chapter 187, as to date of filing peusion claims; and a declaration made in accordance therewith may be accepted, to ex-empt a
claim from such limitation.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
·
May 10, 1882.
SIR: By a letter received from Acting Secretary Bell, of
;your Department, dated the 12th of January last, directing
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my attention to sections 4709 and 4714, Revised Statutes,
and also to section 2 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter
187, it is inquired "Whether the prov-iso to section 4714,
which authorizes the acceptance of a declaration made before an officer duly authorized to administer oaths" for general purposes, to exempt a pension claim from the limitation as to date of filing prescribed by section 4709, a section
which has been repealed, has any force or effect to exempt
a pension claim from the limitation as to date of filing prescribed by the second section of the act of March 3, 1879;
and if not, whether, when a declaration taken before some
officer duly authorized to administer oaths. for general purposes, not an officer of a court of reoord, was filed prior to
July 1, 1880, there is otherwise sufficient authority of law to
accept the same as a valid declaration to save the arrears of
pension in case a drclaration taken before an officer of a
court of record, as required hy section 4714 of the Revised
Statutes, shall be filed after July 1, 1880."
To this inquiry I submit the following in reply:
Section 2 of the act of 1879 is a re-enactment of the provisions of section 4709, Revised Statutes, with some modifications thereof. Among these modifications is the introduction of a new limitation for filing applications for pensions,
which affects the commencement of the pension, and which
takes the place of the limitation prescribed in the latter section. The former section may well be regarded as intended
by Congress to be a substitute for the latter, and such it
undoubtedly is in legal effect. Thus regarded, a fair implication arises that provisions of a remedial character contained
in other sections of the Revised Statutes, which prfwiously
applied to section 4709 and were left unchanged by the new
legislation, were contemplated by Congress to be applicable
to section 2 of the act of 1879 so far as consistent therewith.
Agreeably to this view, the proviso in section 4714, to which
reference is above made, and which is remedial in character,
must be construed to apply to the new limitation introduced
by the act of 1879, which, as I have already remarked, takes
the place of the limitation prescribed in section 4709. Unless so construed, that proviso would seem to be without any
operation or effect whatever-a result which should be
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avoided where (as in the present case) an interpretation leading to a different result is admissible.
I am accordingly of opinion that the proviso in question
authorizes a declaration made in accordance therewith to be
accepted to exempt a claim from the limitation as to date of
filing prescribed in section 2 of the act of 1879.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Where a Senate bill was, a.t the request of a Senator, submitted to the
Attorney-General by the head of a Department for an opinion thereon,
in order that such opinion might be laid before the committee of the
Senate in charge of the bill: Held that the Attorney-General is not
authorized to give an official opinion in this case, it involving no question of Departmental administration.
DEPARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE,

1lfay 11, 1882.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
Jetter of the 6th instant, with the inclosures, to wit: a letter
of the 28th ultimo, addressed to you hy Senator Cockrell, of
Missouri, transmitting a copy of Senate bill N o.l798, entitled,
a ''Bill to quiet titles to lands in Missouri entered under the
graduation act; " and also your reply to the Senator, dated
the 6th instant.
The Senator asks through you that the bill be considered
by the Department of Justice, and he announces his purpose
to present any communication you might receive from this
Department to the Committee on Public Lands.
According to your request the bill has been examined, and
is found to present no question of law upon which there can
be any doubt; for Congess has power to dispose of the public
lands and of all claims of the United States thereto. If it
chooses to do so, Congress may not only give them away, but
may confirm titles in those who bad obtained them by fraud.
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The question upon the bill is one merely of policy or expediency.
Referring to section 356, Revised Statutes, I beg to suggest that the Attorney-General is not authorized to give his
advice or opinion in the matter, there being no "question of
law arising i:q the administration of your Department."
I must also, though reluctantly, assign atJ.other reason for
declining to advise with reference to this bill.
My pre4ecessors have decided, and on several recent occasions I have concurred in their decision, that the AttorneyGeneral is not authorized to give his official opinion upon a
call of either House of Congress or any committee or mem ber thereof. It appears to me that the present case is within
the spirit if not within the letter of the rule .
. It is unquestionably the right of the bead of any Department to call upon me for an official opinion in respect to a11y
question of law pending before his Department, and it is my
. duty promptly to respond to his request; but I can not admit
that a committee of Congress can directly or indirectly call
for such an opinion for its use in matters of legislation. If
given for that purpose, it would be entitled to no more consideration in Congress than the opinion of any person presumed to have some knowledge of the point in question.
( 14 Opin., 177.)
As relating to the subject of your letter, I have the honor
to transmit a copy of a telegram from the district attorney at
St. Louis, without comment thereon.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.
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PROFESSORS OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY.
The professors of the Military Academy at West Point are commissioned
officers of the Army, whose pay and allowances are assimilated to those
of a lieutenant-colonel and a colonel; and in case of such disability as
is described in section 4693, Revised Statutes, they are entitled to pensions at the same rate with officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.....,

.1.tlay 12, 1882.
SIR: In yours of 'the 4th instant you inquire: First,
whether the professor of French at the Military Academy at
West Point is within the provisions of the pension law ; second, whether the professors at West Point are commissioned
officers of the Army; and, third, if they are entitled to pensions under section 4693 of the pension law, what rate of pension are they entitled to ~
The professors at the Military Academy are by law. a constituent part of the Army (sec. 1094 Rev. Stat.). They receive their appointment or commission from the President
(sec. 1313). The provision for their retirement is the same
with that for officers of the Army ' (sec.1333). They have the
same pay and allowances as lieutenant·co1onel for the first
ten years of service, and after that time the pay and allowances of colonels. (Sec. 1306.)
I think that the intent and the effect of these provisions is
to make the professors of the Military Academy at West Point
commissiom~d officers of the Army; and as in pay and allowances they are assimilated to the rank of colonel and lieutenant-colonel, so in case of such disability as is described in
section 4693, Revised Statutes, they are entitled to pensions
at the same rate with officers of the rank last named.
Very respectful1y, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEW ORLEANS.
Consideration of the facts, as gathered from the papers submitted, concerning the indebtedness of the First National Bank of New Orleans
(au insolvent bank) to the United States, and of certain questions propounded with reference thereto.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 12, ·1882.
SIR: In yours of the 29th ultimo the following questions
are asked:
(1) "Is the United States a preferred creditor of the First
National Bank of New Orleans, so that it can exact its whole
demand, though other creditors get less or nothing~
(2) "If the first question is answered in the negative, can
this Department give credit to the Comptroller of the Currency for the amount that the United States bas received
over and above the 70 per cent. dividend declared by the
Comptroller, assuming that the United States is entitled to
but the amount of the avails of the sales of the vessels, viz,
$188,07 5.4 7 ~
(:3~ ~'Is the assumption correct that the United States is a
creditor only for that amount, or is it also a creditor for the
amount of Thomas P. May's check of $315,879.10 ~"
No statement of facts accompanies such questions. From
the papers inclosed by you, however, I gather such facts, so
far as material, to be as follows :
On the 11th of May, 1867, an official examination of the
affairs of the bank had shown it to be hopelessly insolvent.
Upon the 13th special agents of the Treasury of the United
States had taken possession thereof, and from that time
until the 27th, when it passed into the hands of a receiver,
the bank remained under their charge and control. Upon
the 13th it appeared by its books that Thomas P. May was
a creditor of the bank, by deposits, to the amount of $315,879.10, and for this he, being then indebted to the United
States in a much larger amount ou the same day, drew a
check payable to a firm of which he was a member, and then
as member of that firm indorsed the same and delivered it
to an agent of the United States in part satisfaction of his
debt. Prior to the delivery of this check, but after the bank
had gone into the charge of the agents of the Treasury, May

TO THE SECRETARY OJ!' THE TREASURY.

361

First National Bank of New Orleans.

requested the acting cashier of the bank to certify it, but be
declined. Afterwards, however, the word" good" was written upon its face by the receiving teller, who added his signature thereto. It turned out that at that time the bank
owed May nothing.
At the time of its failure the bank owed $188,075.47 to cer·tain of its private creditors, and afterwards, this amount having been paid to such creditors by the United States, the latter in 1872 were subrogated to their claim against the bank.
Having considered the questions stated by you as above,
I now submit answers thereto :
(1) The debt due to the United States because of the subrogation as above is not entitled to be preferred.
When the bank went into the hands of the receiver that
debt was due to private parties. The pro rata due thereupon
became immediately fixed, although ascertained only afterwards. What the United States subsequently became entitled to, therefore, was only such pro rata.
(2) Understanding that the amount received by the United
:States has gone into the Treasury, I submit that it can not
be withdrawn for the purposes indicated. If there were
-other dividends payable on the same account hereafter, inasmuch as the proceedings before the Comptroller are in
fieri until the fund is completely administered, I suppose
that such an adjustment might be corrected.
(3) I have found nothing in the papers to show that the
United States are creditors further than as regards the
.amount to which they were subrogated as above.
The certification of the May check under the circumstances, i. e., the official impotence of "the teller at the time,
.and the knowledge of the officer who received the check for
the United States of the existing condition of the bank, could
impart no additional validity thereto, and otherwise, not having been accepted, it could create no debt against the bank.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Approved:
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
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CASE OF DR. BROOKE-RELATIVE RANK.
Previous to the act of March 2, 1867, chapter 159, rauk in any grade in
the Army was determined by date of commission or appointment; and
where commissions were of the same date, then, as between officers of
· tb'e same regiment or corps, by the order of appointment.
That act (sec. 1219, Rev. Stat.,) introduced a new rule, cumulative in its
character, for determining relative rank as between officers "having
the same grade and date of appointment and commission," which, as
regards officers of the same regiment or corps, operates only where such
officers, being of the same grade and date of appointm"nt and commission, have (one or more) "actually served, whether continuously or at
different periods, as a CQmmissioned officer of the United States," etc.
Where none of them, when appointed, bad thus actually served, the
former rule (i. e., order of appointment) would still be applicable in
fixing their relative rank in the corps.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 18, 1882.
SIR: In compliance with tne request contained in your letter
of the 6th of January last, I have considered the claim of Dr.

Brooke, assistant surgeon with the rank of captain, for restoration to the position among officers of that grade in the
Medical Corps of the Army which he occupied in the Army
Register of 1878.
This claim involves a question affecting the relative rank
in that corps of Assistant Rurgeons Smart, Brooke, Gardner,
and Whitehead, who appear in the subsequent Army Registers in the order here named.
These officers were appointed as assistant surgeons in the
regular Army in the following order: Brooke, November 22,
1862; Gardner, November 22, 1862; Whitehead, April 13,
1863; Smart, March 30,1864. Under the law as it then stood,
which remained unchanged until the passage of the act of
July 28, 1866, chapter 299, au assistant surgeon, during the
first five years of his service, ran ked as a first lieutenant, and
after having served that period he ranked as a captain. lhey
ea~h, therefore, held the rank of first lieutenant up to the date
of that act; their relative rank, with respect to one another,
corresponding with the order of their apvointment, as above.
But by the effect of that act, and without any new appointment or commission, they each simultaneously, namely, on
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July 28, 1866, became clothed with the rank of captain. And
hereupon the inquiry ariseH, whether the relative rank of these
officers, after thus attaining the rank of captain, remained the
same it previously was.
By the law of the military service at that period, rank in
any grade was determined by date of commission or appoint·
ment; and where commissions w~:qe of the same· date, then,
as between officers of the same regiment or corps, by the order
of appointment. (Army Reg. of 18{)3, par. 4 and 5.) The act
of 1866 worked no change in that regard. It is clear that,
governed by this rule, the officers referred to would stand
in the rank of captain precisely as they had previously stood
in the rank of first lieutenant, since they each held the office
of assistant surgeon with the rank of captain by virtue of the
same commission or appointment by which each originally
held the same office with the rank of first lieutenant.
Subsequently, by the act of March 2, 1867, chapter 159, it
was provided that, ''in fixing the relative rank to be given to
an officer as between himself and others having the same
grade and date of appointment and commission, there shall
be taken into account, and credited to such officer, whatever
time he may have actually served, whether continuously or at
different periods, as a commissioned officer of the United
States, either in the regular Army, or, since the 19th of April 1
1861, in the volunteer service, either under appointment or
commission from the governor of a State or from the Presi·
dent of the United States," and this provision was made .applicable to all ''appointments" theretofore made under the
act of July 28, 1866. (See same provision embodied in sec.
1219, Rev. Stat.)
This is the only legislation, since the act of 1866, which
need be considered in connection with the matter in hand. A
new rule was thereby introduced for determining relative
rank in the Army as between officers "having the same grade
and date of appointment and commission," which was more.
over to operate retrospectively upon appointments already
made under the act of 1866. As regards officers of the same
corps this rule, which is cumulative in its character, comes
into play only where such officers, being of the same grade
and date of appointment and commission, have (one or more)
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"actually served, whether cuntinuouslyor at different periods,
as a commissioned officer of the United States," etc.; where
none of them, when appointed, had thus actually served, the
former rule (i. e., order of appointment) would still be applicable ·in fixing their relative rank in the corps.
To come within the terms of the legislation referred to, the
case must be that of two or more officers who not only have
the same grade, but who also have the same date of appointment and com mission. What, then, is the present case~
Not one of the officers mentioned received his appointment
under the act of 1866. The commissions under which they
now serve were all issued prior to that act, and all of them
bear different dates, excepting those of Brooke and Gardner,
between whom, however, no question of relative rank could
arise under the new rule above adverted to.
It is submitted that, in view of these circumstances, the
present case can not be regarded as falling within the provisions of the act of March 2, 1867 (sec. 1219, Rev. Stat.,),
and that consequently the relative rank of the four officers
mentioned, as between themselves, stands unaffected thereby.
The result at which I arrive is, that according to the law
of the military service -the relative rank of those officers
within their corps must be deemed to remain th~ same in the
rank of captain which it previously was in the rank of first
lieutenant; being still governed, as original1y, by the date
and order of their appointment. (Army Reg. 1881, pars. 10,
12, 13.)
I add that the rulings of this Department contained in
opinions dated June 6, 1878, July 2, 1878, and January 21,
1880 (16 Opin., 56, 605, 651) apply to a state of facts which
di:fl'ers essentially from the present case, and are in nowise
involved in the consideration of the latter.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
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APPOINTMENT TO CIVIL OFFICE.
K. was elected and qualified. as Senator from 16wa for a term which
would expire in March, 1883. He resigned in March, 1881, to accept
the position of Secretary of the Interior, which office he also resigned
in the latter part of the same year. ~ince then, by act of May 15, 1882,
chapter 145, the office of tariff cqmmissioner was created: Advised
that the second clause of section 6 of the first article of the Constitution disqualifies K. for appointment to such office.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 26, 1882.
SIR: It having been suggested that Governor Kirkwood
might not be eligible to be appointed on the tariff commission under certain provisions of the Constitution, after conference at the Cabinet the matter was referred by you to me
for examination. Knowing that it was your desire to appoint
Governor Kirkwood, as it was also the hope of all the members of the Cabinet that he would be appointed, I have given
the subject presented to me a serious consideration and a
thorough examination, in conjunction with the Solicitor-General, whose assistance I invited in conference upon the subject. The opinion that I now give is the product of that joint
examination.
The Solicitor-General has deposited with me in my Department a written opinion concurring with me.
Mr. Kirkwood was elected and qualified as Senator from
Iowa for a term which will expire in March, 1883. In March,
1881, he resigned to accept the position of Secretary of the
Interior, and having recently resigned this office, is now in
private life. Since his second resignation the office of
tariff commissioner has been created by act of Congress,
and the question is whether, in those circumstances, the
second clause of the first article, section 6, of the Constitution of the United States disqualifies 'him for appointment
as such commissioner. The clause is as follows :
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under
the authority of the United States which shall have been
created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office
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under the United States shall be a member of either House
during his continuance in office."
It is unnecessary to co.nsider the question of the policy
which occasioned this constitutional prohibition. I must be
controlled exclushyely by the positive terms of the provision
of the Constitution. The language is precise and clear, and,
in my opinion, disables him from receiving· the appointment.
The rule is absolute, as expressed in the terms of the Constitution, and behind that I can not go, but must accept it as it
is presented regarding its application in this case. I caused
careful search through the opinions of the .Attorneys General for a precedent upon this question, but none has been
found. No opinion is recorded in which the subject is considered. Neither is there any record of published cases in
the reports of the United States that touch upon this point.
Among the decisions of the State courts four cases only
were found in which a like constitutional prohibition has
been considered. They are not directly in point here, and I
can obtain no help from them to avoid the conclusion 1 have
before expresRed. They maintain in effect the same principle
and adopt the same rule of interpretation which I here submit disables Governor Kirkwood from receiving this appointment.
I am sir, with great respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDEN1'.
UTE RESERVATION.
Upon the facts presented: Advised that additional legislation is required
to enable the Secretary of the Interior to treat the Uncompahgre Ute
Indian Reservation as public lands.

DEP.A.RTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

1l1 ay 26, 1882.

SIR: Yours of the 18th instant, in relation to the lands included in the Uncompahgre Ute Reservation in Utah, varies
in some degree the detail of facts contained in a communication addressed to me in the same connection upon the 12th
of January last by your predeces~wr, and closes with the
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same question, viz: "Whether, on this state of facts, additional legislation is required to enabl~ your Depar~ment to
treat such reservation as public lands."
Upon consideration I am of opinion that the variation
above alluded to does not affect the answer which I am to
give, and that I must advise, as heretofore, that such additional legislation is needed.
In the state of things anticipated by Congress as about to
arise from the removal of the Indians in question, I think it
plain that the special statutory condition precedent to the
giving of the character of public lands to the lands contained
in th~ reservation was to be pursued, and that no power but
that of Congress could represent the, United States in consenting to a change thereof. That condition, \iz, the allotment to the Indians of lands in severalty, has not been pArformed.
Suppose, however~ that the actual state of things is not
that which was anticipated, the difficulty in the way of treating these lands as public seems removed only one stage in
the discussion, inasmuch as a question arises, who has the
power to apply to this unanticipated state of the case a conclusion which the legislature drew only upon a different
hypothesis.
The statute of 18~0, chapter 223, and Indian agreement
thereby confirmed., bound the United States to give and the
Uncompahgres to receive in severalty allotments of" lands on
Grand River, near the mouth of the Gunnison River, in Colorado, if a sufficient quantity of agricultural land shall be
found there; if not, then upon such other unoccupied agricultural lands as may be found in that vicinity and in the
Territory of Utah."
In executmg this agreement one of your predecessors (confirming the report of a Commissioner tllat there is not a sufficient quantity of lands in Colorado) bas located the Indians
entirely in Utah, and these have agreed to receive their allotments there. Conceding, as I cheerfully do, that this arrangement will turn out to be one greatly to the advantage
of all concerned, and therefore fit to be done, it seems that
for its complete effect in point of law it should be ratified
by Congress; iu other words, that the willingness of the In-
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dians wholly to abandon Colorado is in point of law a mere
proposal by them to Congress, which has the corresponding
right of looking into the matter and of saying whether it is
approved.
In either case, therefore, I am of opinion that a political
question remains outlying, and therefore that additional legislation is necessary for the purpose which you mention.
I return herewith the letter of Mr. Belford which accompanied :your communication.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

CASE OF EASTERN DREDGING COMPANY.
The facts in this case held not to constitute sufficient grounds to justify
the Secretary of War in releasing said cotLpany from the performance
of its contract with the United States to do dredging in Charles River,
Massachusetts, to the extent of 100,000 cubic yards at the price per
cubic yard specified in the contract.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
June 10, 1882.
SIR: I have examined the case presented in your letter of
the 1st instant and in the accompanying papers, which are
herewith returned.
It appears that the Eastern Dredging Company, of Portland, Me., entered into a contract with the United States,
agreeing to do dredging in Charles River, in the State of
Massachusetts, to the extent of 100,000 cubic yards, at 37
cents per cubic yard in situ.
In the advertisement of proposals, which is made part of
the contract, there is this paragraph : .
"The dredging must be done in such places and in such
manner as the United States engineer in charge shall direct,
and the material removed by the contractor and deposited
by him in such ·places as shall meet the approval of the
said United States engineer in charge. The value of the
material for filling the low grounds in this vicinity must be
duly considered in the prices offered for the work."

..
TO THE SECRETARY OF W.AR.

369

Case of Eastern Dredging Company.

About 12,500 cubic yards of the dredging was done below
Brookline bridge, and the material taken out was disposed
of on terms satisfactory to the contractor. But above the
bridge, where the remainder of the dredging is to be done,
there is no demand for the material to be taken out, and the
proprietors of land upon the shores will not allow it to be
dumped upon their grounds.
The Dredging Company now makes application to the
Secretary of War to be released from the performance of its
contract, because, as it alleges, there is in the language
above ·quoted a representation binding upon the Government that the material could be sold at some price.
I am unable to see any such force in the clause referred
to. The material is spoken of as having value for filling
the low grounds in the vicinity, and the bidders are called
upon to consider this in making their offers. Here is no
warranty, no promise, not even an assurance that they will
be able to sell it at any price. The subject-matter of the
contract was before them. They were not deceived, or need
not have been. They were told in effect to inquire, examine,
and satisfy themselves as to what disposition they would be
able to make of the material, and then, in view of the result
of such inquiry, to make their bids.
But the company alleges that they were told by Colonel
Thorn, of the Engineer Corps, who executed the contract on
behalf of the Government, that the material could be sold
at 10 cents per cubic yard or more, and that his reports to
his superior in Washington were exhibited in which he made
similar statements.
The answer to this is that the statements were true.
Material dredged from Charles River was sold by this company and others for more than 10 cents per cubic yard.
But the whole thing was before the eyes of this company.
The subject-matter of the contract was in such situation
that the party undertaking the work had full opportunity to
inspect and examine the truth of the representation, if any
was made.
The company stood on an equal footing with the Government's officer in respect to the power of ascertaining whether
the material could be disposed of and at what price.
272-VOL xvn--24
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The company complains also that because of the refusal
of the riparian proprietors to allow the dredged matter to
be put upon their premises it is compelled to carry it a great
distance, to pass through several draw-bridges, etc.
~rhis also was a thing to be considered by the company
before undertaking the work. What it agreed to do is to
remove and deposit the material in such places as shall be
approved by the engineer in charge. The language is very
plain. The obligation is perfect. Can the company be
discharged from performance because the transportation is
more difficult and to a greatf\r distance than they at first
expected~

Upon a full consideration of the case made in the papers,
I am unable to discover sufficient grounds to justify the Secretary of War in releasing said company from its contract,
nor do I think he has the power to do so. He can not discharge the legal and just 'c laim of the Government upon the
company that it shall fulfill its obligations undertaken with
knowledge of their extent and requirements.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
NEW ORLEANS, BATON ROUGE AND VICKSBURG RAILROAD
COMPANY LAND GRANT.
The assent of Congress to the transfer made by the New Orleans, Baton
Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company to the New Orleans Pacific
Railway Company of all the interest of the former company in the land
grant contained in section 22 of the act of March 3, 1870, chapter 122,
was not necessary to entitle the latter company to the benefit of such
grant in aiel of the construction of the road. projected by it. The grant,
by its terms, is in prmsenti; the interest of the New Orleans, Baton
Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company therein, at the time of the
transfer, was assignable, and the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company was such a successor or assignee as is contemplated by said act.
For the 68 miles of the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas Railroad, if constructed prior to said act, no benefit can be claimed by the New
Orleans Pacific Railway Company under said transfer from the grant;
nor, in case of such prior construction and the non-construction of
any portion of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg road, has
the purpose of the grant failed and the grant lapsed.
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If theN ew Or leans, Mobile and Texas road was constructed subsequently

to the elate of said act, so much of its road as is now owned by the
New Orleans Pacific Railway Company is such a road as is contemplated for acceptance by the President, and patents may issue to the
latter company for lands opposite to and conterminous with such constructed portion of the road.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 13, 1882.
SIR: By a letter dated the 5th of January last, your predecessor submitted to me a number of questions arising upon
an application of the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company
for certain lands claimed under the land grant made to the
New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company by the act of Congress of March 3, 1870, chapter 122.
The land grant mentioned is contained in the twenty-second
section of that act, which provides: "That the New Orleans,
Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company, chartered
by the State of Louisiana, shall have the right to connect, by
the most eligible route, to be selected by said company, with the
said Texas Pacific Railroad at its eastern terminus, and shall
have the right of way through the public land to the same
extent granted hereby to the said Texas Pacific Railroad
Company; and in aid of its construction from New Orleans
to Baton Rouge, thence by the. way of Alexandria in said
State to connect with the said Texas Pacific Railroad Company at its eastern terminus, there is hereby granted to said
company, its successors and assigns, the same number of
alternate sections of pnblic lands per mile, in the State of
Louisiana, as are by this act granted in the State of California to said Texas Pacific Railroad Company; and said
lauds shall be withdrawn from market, selected, and patents
issued therefor, and opened for settlement and pre-emption,
upon the same terms and in the same manner and time as is
provided for and required from said Texas Pacific Railroad
Company within said State of California: Provided, That
said company shall complete the whole of said road within
five years from the passage of this act"
The eastern terminus of the Texas Pacific Railroad, as fixed
by the same act, was a point at or near Marshall, 'rex.
The New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad
Company was incorporated by an act of the legislature of
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Louisiana, passed December 30, 1869, which authorized it to
construct and operate a railroad "from any point on the line of
theN ew Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad within
the parish of Livingston, running from thence to any point on
the boundary line dividing the States of Louisian:1 and
Mississippi," the route here indicated lying east of the Mississippi):tiver. It was also authorized to construct and operate
a branch railroad from its main line (above described) to the
city of Baton Rouge; and for the purpose of connecting its
railroad with the railroads of other companies, etc., it was
furthermore authorized "to construct, maintain, and use, by
running thereon its engines and cars, such branch railroads
and tracks as it may find necessary and expedient to own
and use," and such branch railroads were, for all the purposes
of the act, to be deemed and taken to constitute a part of the
main line of its railroad within the State of Louisiana.
On November 11, 1871, that company filed in the General
Land Office a map designating the general route of a road
projected thereby from Shreveport by way of Alexandria to
Baton Rouge, and thereupon a withdrawal of the public lands
along the same was ordered, which became effective in December following.
Subsequently, by an act of the legislature of Louisiana,
passed December 11, 1872, the same company was given
"full power and authority to commence the construction of
their road in.the city of New Orleans or Shreveport, or at any
intermediate point or points on their line of road as may best
suit the convenience of said company and facilitate the speedy
construction of a continuous line from the city of New Orleans
to the city of Shreveport, or perfect r::~ilroad communication
with the Texas Pacific Railroad, or any other railroad in
northwestern Louisiana, at or near the Louisiana State line:
Provided, however, That the said company shall construct the
line of its road between the city of New Orleans and the city
of Baton Rouge on the east side of the Mississippi River to
the corporate limits of the said city of Baton Rouge or adjacent thereto."
In the meantime, by the act of Congress of Ma.v 2, 1872,
chapter 32, the Texas and Pacific Railway Company (formerly styled the Texas Pacific Railroad Company) wa8 ''au-
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thorized and required to construct, maintain, control, and
operate a road between Marshall, Texas, and Shreveport,
Louisiana, or control and operate any existing road between
said points, of the same gauge as the Texas and Pacific Railroad." The same act further provided that "all roads terminating at Shreveport shall have the right to make the
same running connections, and shall be entitled to the same
privileges for the transaction of business in connection with
the said Texas and Pacific Railway, as are granted to roads
intersecting therewith."
On February 13, 1873, a second map was filed in the General Land Office by theNew Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company, designating the general route of a
road projected thereby from New Orleans to Baton Rouge,
and a withdrawal of the public lands along the same was
ordered, which took effect in April, 1873. The route between
those places thus designated lies on the east side of the Mississippi River.
That company has not constructed any part of its road
either on the route between New Orleans and Baton Rouge
or on the route between the latter place and Shreveport;
nor, indeed, has there been a definite location of its road anywhere between the points mentioned. Nothing beyond the
designation of the general route thereof appears.
Pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors, adopted
December 29, 1880, all the right, title, and interest of that
company in and to the aforesaid grant of public lands made
by the act of March 3, 1871, were deeded by it to the New
Orleans Pacific Railway Company. This action of the board
of directors and officers of the former company was afterwards approved and ratified by the stockholders thereof at
.a meeting held in December, 1881.
The New Orleans Pacific Rail way Company was originally
incorporated under the general laws of the State of Louisiana in June, 1875. · Its charter was subsequently amended
by acts of the Louisiana legislature, passed February 19,
1876, and February 5, 1878. It is thereby authorized to construct a railroad "beginning at a point on the Mississippi
River at New Orleans, or between New Orh·ans and the parish of Iberville on the right bank of the Mississippi, and
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Baton Rouge on the left bank, etc., or from any point within
the limits of this State, and running thence toward and to the
city of Shreveport," which is made its northwestern terminus.
The route of this company, as projected, is understood to
extend from New Orleans to Baton Rouge, and thence by way
of Alexandria to Shreveport. Between New Orleans and
Baton Rouge it lies on the west side of the Mississippi River,
while the designated route of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge
and Vicksburg Railroad Company between the same point
lies on the east side of that river. Between Baton Rouge
and Shreveport its general course and direction correspond
in the main with the route designated by the last named
company. It is throughout its entire length from New Orleans to Shreveport within the limits of the before-mentioned
withdrawals of public lands.
In October, 1881, the president of the New Orleans Pacific
Railway Company made affidavit that three sections of its
road were then completed and ready for examination by the
Government; whereupon a commissioner was appointed to
examine the same, the result of whose examination appears
in a report made by him to the Secretary of the Interior
under date of the 26th of that month. One of the sections
embra~es 60 miles of road, beginning on the west bank of the
1\lississippi River, opposite New Jrleans, and ending near
the town of Donaldsonville; another embraces 20 miles of
road, near Alexandria; and the third em braces 50 miles of
road, terminating at Shreveport. For each of these sections
lands are claimed by that company under the aforesaid land
grant as assignee of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and
Vicksburg Railroad Company. No map of definite location
of any portion of its road has been filed other than of the constructed portions.
It appears that in February, 1881, the New Orleans Pacific
Rail way Company purchased from Morgan's Louisiana and
Texas Railroad and Steam-ship Company the road constructed on the west bank of the :Mississippi River by the
New Orleans, n1obile and Texas Railroad Company from ·
Westmego to White Castle, a distance of G8 miles, aud that
the same has become a part of the main line of the road of
the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company.
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The following are the questions submitted:
"(1) Was the graut to the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and
Vicksburg Railroad Company a grant- in prmsenti?
~' (2) Had the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg
Railroad Company at the date of the alleged transfer of lands
to the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company such an interest in the lands under said act as was assignable~
·
'' (3) Is the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company such
a successor to or assignee of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge
and Vicksburg Hailroad Company as is contemplated by said
act~
·
'' (4) Should it appear tl;tat the 68 miles of the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas Railroad was constructed prior to
the act of March 3, 1871, granting lands to aid in the construction of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Uailroad, can the New Orleans Pacific Company (its assiguee)
claim any benefit from the grant~ Or, in case of such prior
com~truction and the nou-construction of any portion of the
New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg road, has the purpose for which the grant was made failed and the grant
consequently lapsed~
" (5) If the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas road was constructed subsequently to the date of said act, is so much of
its rm1d as is now owned by the New Orleans Pacific Company such a road as is contemplated for acceptance by the
President within the meaning of said act, and may patents
issue to the latter for lands opposite to and conterminous
with such constructed portion of road~"
These questions are accompanied by a request for an opinion upon such other questions of law as may suggest themselves touching the transfer of said land grant to which refence is above made.
Of the above-stated questions the first three may be considered together, in connection with the following inquiry,
which presents itself at the outset: Whether the assent of
Congress to the transfer made by the New Orleans, Baton
Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company of all its interest
in said land grant to the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company is necessary (by reason of anything in the provisions
of the grant itself) to eutitle the latter company to the bene-
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fit of said grant ·in aid of the construction of the oroad projected by it.
The act of March 3, 1871, passed to the New Orleans,
Eaton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company a present interest in a certain number of alternate sections of public
lands per mile within the limits there prescribed. Its language is: "There is hereby granted to the said company" the
number of alternate sections mentioned-words which import a grant in prmsenti, and not one in futuro, or the promise of a grant (97 U. S., 496.) But the grant thus made is
in the nature of a float: It is of sections to be afterwards
located, their location depending upon the establishment of
-the line of the road. Until this is definitely fixed the grant
does not attach to any specific tracts of lands. Upon the line
of the roads being definitely located, the grant then first acquires precision~ and the company becomes invested with an
inchoate title to the particular lands covered thereby, which
can ripen into a perfect title only as the construction of each
section of 20 miles of road is completed and approved, when
the right to patents for the lands opposite to and conterminous with such construction accrues. ·
The provisio in the grant that the company shall complete
the whole of its road within five years from the date of the
act is a condition subsequent, the failure to perform which
does not ipso facto work a .forfeiture of the grant, but only
gives rise to a right in the Government to enforce a forfeiture
thereof. Yet, in order to enforce a forfeiture, such right
must be asserted by a judicial proceeding authorized by law,
or by some legislative action amounting to a resumption of
the grant (Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall, 44). Hence,
until advantage is taken of the non-performance of the con(lition, under legislative authority, the interest of the grantee
in the grant remains unimpaired thereby.
Such being tile nature and effect of the grant and its ac~ompanying condition, and no action having been taken
either by legislation or judicial proceedings to enforce a forfeiture thereof, it follows that at the period of said transfer
by the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Raifroad
Company this company was invested with a present interest in the number of alternate sections of public lands per
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mile granted by the act of 1871, notwithstanding it was
already in default in the performance of the condition referred to, and that it still retained a right to proceed with
th~ construction of the road in aid of which the grant was
made until advantage should be taken of the default. But
as it had not then definitely fixed the line of its road, although
a map designating the general route thereof was duly filed,
that interest did not attach to any specific tracts of land, but
remained a float, as it were, needing a definite location of
the road before it could become thus attached. Was the interest here described assignable to au other company so as to
entitle the latter to the benefit of the grant in aid of the
.construction of its road between the places named therein
without the assent of Congress~
Doubt bas perhaps arisen on this point, in view of the fact
that in one or two instances it has been thought expedient
to obtain legislation by Congress confirming or authorizing
a similar assignment (see sec. 2 of the .Act of March 3, 1865,
chap. 88, and sec. 1 of the Act of March 3, 1869, chap. 127),
and also in view of the adverse ruling of this Department
in the case of the Oregon Central Railroad Company (13
Opin., 382). However, a similar assignment made in 1868
by the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company to the
Pike's Peak Railroad Company, afterwards known as the
Central Branch Company, was held to be valid by .AttorneyGeneral Stanbery in an opinion given to the Secretary of the
Treasury, under date of July 25, 1866.
In the latter case, the Hannibal and St. Joseph Company,
which was incorporated by the State of Missouri with au·thority to construct a railroad between Hannibal and St.
Joseph, within that State, was by the Pacific Railroad act of
July 1, 1862 (sec. 13), authorized to "extend its road from St.
Joseph via .Atchison, to connect and unite with the road
through Kansas, * * * and may for this purpose use any
railroad charter which bas been, or may be, granted by the
legislature of Kansas," etc.; and by the fifteenth section of
the same act it was provided that" wherever the word company is used in this act, it shall be construed to embrace the
words their associates, successors, and assigns, the same as
if the words bad been properly added thereto." Subsequently,
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in 1863, an assignment was made by that company of all its
rights under said act (which included an interest in both a
land and a bond subsidy) to the Atchison and Pike's Peak
Railroad Oompany, a company previously organized under a
charter granted by t~te legislature of Kansas. The latter
company, having constructed a section of 20 miles of the
proposed rt>ad west from Atchison, claimed the benefit of the
grant made to the Hannibal and St. Joseph Company as its
assignee, and this claim was recognized and allowed in accordance with the opinion of the Attorney-General. It will be
observed, however, that the Hannibal and St. Joseph Company was authorized to "use any railroad charter which has
been, or may be, granted by the legislature of Kansas," and
this, together with the provision in the fifteenth section
quoted above, may have been regarded as sufficient to sustain
the assignment.
In the case of the Oregon Central Railroad Company, men tioned above, a grant of a right of way through the public
lands, and also of alternate sections thereof, was made to tltat
company," and to their successors and assigns," by the act of
May 4, 1870, chapter 69, for the purpose of aiding in the con .
struction of a railroad and telegraph line between certain
places in Oregon. In August following an in~trument was
executed by the company assigning all its interest in the
grant to the Willamette Valley Rail way Coll!pany, and thereup9n the question arose whether the grant was susceptible of
being thus transferred. The Attorney-General (Mr. Akerman), to whom the question was submitted, after reviewing
the various provisions of the act, some of which (see sec. 5)
imposed certain duties and required certain important acts
to be p·erformed by the company, decided in the negative,
holding that upon consideration of those provisions 1fe Oregon Central Oompany wa.s alone within the contemplation of
Congress in respect of the donations made and duties imposed
by that act. The words ''their successors and assigns,'~
as used in the act, were regarded as words of limitation
merely.
But the grounds upon which that decision appears to have
been based are not found to exist in the case now under con-
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sideration. Here a grant of a certain number of alternate
sections of public lands per mile is made to theNew Orleans,
Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, in aid of the construction of a road from New
Orleans by the route indicated to connect with the eastern
terminus of the Texas aud Pacific railroad; which lands are
required to be ''withdrawn from the market, selected, and
patents issued therefor, and .opened for settlement and preeruption, upon the same terms and in the same manner and
time as is provided for and required from said Texas Pacific
Railroad Company." The grant is coupled with no special
duties or trusts for the performance of which there is reason
to believe the particular company named therein was more
acceptable to Congress than any other. Its purpose is to
secure the construction of a railroad between the points designated; and whether this purpose be fulfilled by that company or by another company must be deemed unimportant in
the absence of any provision indicative of the contrary. The
interest derived by the grantee, though it remain only a float,
is a vested interest, and it is held under the same limitation
which applies after it develops into an estate in particular
lands. Until extinguished by forfeiture for non-performance
of the condition annexed to the grant, I perceive no legal
obstacle arising. out of the grant itself to a transfer of such
interest by the grantee to another company; and should the
latter construct the road contemplated agreeably to the re·
quirements of the grant, and thus accomplish the end which
Congress had in view, I submit that it would clearly be
entitled to the benefits thereof.
The question of the assignability of the interest of the
grantee would be more difficult if, after definitely locating
the line of its road and thus attaching the grant to particular
lands along the same, it was proposed to transfer that interest to another company for the benefit of a road to be constructed by the latter on a different line, though following
the general course of the other road. But in the present
case the facts give rise to no such difficulty. The grant had
not previous to the transfer become thus identified with a
particular line of road, and was thereafter susceptible of
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location upon the line of the road projected by the assignee .
(the New Orleans Pacific Company), provided the road met
the requirements of the grant in other respect~, as to which
no doubt is suggested.
My conclusion is tllat the assent of Congress to the assignment made by the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company, as above, is not necessary in order
to entitle the assignee to the benefit of the l~nd grant in
question.
The remaining questions relate to the 68 miles of railroad
formerly belonging to the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas
Railroad Company, but now owned by the New Orleans
Pacific Company, and made a part of its mainline between
New Orle11ns and Baton Rouge.
The land grant in question was, as its language imports,
made in aid of the construction of a railroad between certain
termini-contemplating a road .to be constructed, not one
already constructed. It has not been the policy of Congress
thus to aid constructed roads. Had a constructed road
existed at the date of the grant which extended from one
terminus to the other, ant..l afterwards the New Orleans,
Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railway C01ppany, instead of
entering upon and completing the construction of a road, had
purchased the road already constructed, this, it seems to me,
would not have satisfied the purposes of the grant so as to
entitle the company to the benefit thereof. The same objection would apply where the constructed road extenderl over
only a part of the route contemplated by the grant. So far
as I am advised, the action of the Government hitherto has
accorded with this view. On the other hand, if such a road
was constructed subsequently to the date of the grant and
is owned by the grantee or the assignee of the latter, I see
no ground for excluding it from the benefit of the grant
should it otherwise fulfill the requirements thereof.
Agreeably to the foregoing views, and in direct response to
the several questions submitted, I have the honor to reply as
follows:
The first, second, and third questions I answer in the
affimrative. The fourth question (including the alternative
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added thereto) I answer in the negative. The fifth question
I answer in the affirmative-assuming as I do the company
named thereip to be an ~.ssignee of the grantee in the act
referred to.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. 1\tl. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

MIAMI INDIANS OF INDIANA.
The children of Thomas F. Richard ville, a Miami Indian of Indiana, are
entitled to share with other persons upon the roll of the Eastern Miamis equally, and without deduction, in the distribution of the fund
($221,257.86) appropriated by the act of March 3, 1881, chapter 132, for
the payment of the Miami Indians of Indiana.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
June 15, 1882.
SIR: The question submitted to me by your letter of the
· 29th ultimo is substantially this: Whether the children of
Thomas F. Richardville, a Miami Indian of Indiana, are entitled under the act of March 3, 1881, to share with other
persons upon the Indiana Miami 'roll equally, and without
deduction, in the fund distributed by that act~
It provides that the sum of $221,257.86 belonging to the
Eastern Miamis be divided among them. That all may participate who are entitled, it is provided that a census be
taken and a list of the names of all the individuals belonging to the land of Eastern Miamis be made out.
This enumeration and list, distinguishing between males
and females apd between those over twenty-one years and
those under that age, was to be reported to the Secretary of
the Interior, and when approved by him it is declared "shall
stand as the true list of the persons entitled to share in the
payments provided for in this act." And. it further declared
that "each person named in said list shall be entitled to receive the same amount, irrespective of age or sex." No matter
whether they have shared lawfully or unlawfully in other
OF
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funds, all persons upon this list, approved by the Secretary, shall share equally in this fund. No deduction from the
share of any one is proYided for. Such is the law-mandatory in its terms and unmistakable in what it comruands.
The children of Thomas F. Richard ville are upon this list
of the Eastern Miamis with the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior. There is no question of their right to be upon
that list. Upon this statement there can not, in my opinion,
be a doubt as to the right of each of these children to receive
an equal portion of the fund with eYery other person upon
the list. The law leaves no discretion in the Secretary to
make any deduction from their shares.
But it is said that these children have shared in the installments that have been paid from the fund belonging to the
Western Miamis, and by the third article of the treaty of
June 5, 1854 (their father being of the eastern band and
claiming to draw for himself and children from the fund belonging to that part of the tribe), they (the children) are forbidden to receive any portion of the fund belonging to the
western band; and it has been claimed that the Secretary
of the Treasury, exercising a kind of equitable jurisdiction
in the matter, may reiro burse the Western Miami fund by
deducting from the shares of these children in the eastern
fund so much as they have received unlawfully, as alleged,
from the western fund.
In answer to this it should be sufficient to cite the law by
which alone the Department of the Interior is authorized to
make any distribution at all of the fund belonging to the
Eastern Miamis. Each person upon the list shall receive
the same amount from that fund.
If it were necessary to pursue this subject further it might
be stated that under section 4 of the act of March 3, 1873,
a census of the Western Mia~is was taken. According to
the provisions of the act none were to be included unless
j nstly entitled under the treaty of June 5, 1854. In this
census and upon the lists which were to be submitted to the
Secretary of the Interior for his approval the Richardville
children then born were enrolled, and this enrollment had the
approval of the Secretary. The chiefs of the Western Miamis
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also have since expressed their free and hearty assent that
.all the children, with their mother, who has always belonged
to the western band, should be upon their roll and participate in their funds.
Now, it is submitted that if the children have been upon
both rolls and have received benefit from both funds with the
knowledge and approval of the Secretary, this was matter
for the consideration of Congress. The facts being known,
the act of March 3, 1881, was passed, and there is no provision in it for deductions from the shares of these children in
the fund to be distributed. There is therefore no ground for
the assumption that the Secretary may subtract anything
from their portions.
Moreover, the Western Miamis, in whose interest the prohibition was inserted in the treaty, do not complain; they
make no demand that the moneys received by these children
from the western fund should be paid back. In respect to
them the prohibition seems to have been waived by those
who were interested in its observance.
Without continuing this discussion, I rest upon the law of
March 3, 1881, and am clear in the opinion that according to
its provisions the children of Thomas F. Richardville must
receive without deduction equal portions with all others upon
the list of Eastern Miamis of the moneys distributed under
that law.
Tbe papers accompanying your letters are herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

•
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CASE OF ZADOC STAAB.
Where a contract for the delivery of certain supplies at · an Indian
agency provided for the acceptance of goods inferior in quality to
the sample where the emergency demanded it, held that the time and
place of delivery before the goods were distributed were eminently the
time and place to determine their relative value.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 15, 1882.
SIR: In your letter of the 5th of April you transmit a com.
munication of the UommiEsioner of Indian Affairs, and request
my opinion upon the case of Zadoc Staab, stated therein.
The facts are as follows: By a contract dated May 9,1881,
with H. Price, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Zadoc Staab
agreed to deliver at the Navajo Agency, N. Mex., 100,000
pounds of wheat, at $5.13 per hundred pounds. The contract being by its terms subject to the approval of the Board
of Indian Commissioners and the Secretary of the Interior,
their respective approvals were indorsed thereon.
Staab delivered 96,862 pounds of wheat, much of which
was inferior to the sample, and the agent· designated to receive the same, compelled by the necessities of the service to
receive it, appointed inspectors to determine the percentage
of value less than the sample. The provision of the contract
under which this was done is as follows: ''Provided that in
the case of any article to be furnished under this contract,
if the quality of that offered shall be inferior to the standard
of the sample upon which the ctmtract was awa.rded, and the
necessities of the service be such as to compel the party of
the first part, or his agents, to accept the articlP. or articles
offered, then the same may be. received subject to the inspection and test of a competent inspector, to be designated by
the party of the first part, to determine the percentage of
value less than the sample aforesaid, and upon whose findings payment shall be made at a percentage of deduction
twice greater than the difference in value lwtween the articles
so furnished and the price herein agreed to be paid."
The inspectors recommended a; discount of 5 per cent. on
the entire qnantity of wheat delivered. The recommenda-
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tion was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, '
and a deduction of twice the difference in value, or 1G per
cent., amounting to $496.90, was made from his accounts.
This action was approved by the Board of Indian Commissioner~ and the Secretary of the Interior. When the account reached the Second Comptroller for settlement he deducted the further sum of $165.63 (3t per cent.), and stated
a balance due Staab of $4,306.49 instead of the $4,472.12,
allowed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Board
of Indian Commissioners, the Secretary of the Interior, and
the Second Auditor. Thereupon the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to section 191 of the Revised Statutes, returned the papers for reconsideration by the Second Comptroller, who replied that he saw no reason to modify his
decision.
He places his decision upon three grounds: .F irst, ''whatever necessity there may have been at the beginning to compel the acceptance of part of the inferior wheat, it is not
shown that there was any exigency demanding an· immediate
supply of wheat' for consumption in the future;" Second,.
that the two inspectors '"were not appointed in a manner
known to the law, nor were they designated by the party of
the first part (the Commissioner of Indian Afl'airs);" Third,.
that the clause of the contract "which purports to provide·
• that boards of survey, or other designated officers, shall determine the price to be paid for supplies, is of no force as part
of a contract."
While designation by the local agent of the inspectors was
not literally within the terms of the contract, the approval
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Board of Indian
Commissioners, and the Secretary of the Interior of the recommendations of the inspectors was an ample ratification
of their appointment.
Whether the necessities of the service compelled acceptance of the articles offer~d was a question which, from, its
nature, was determinable only by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs or his agents, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior. Speaking of section 10 of the act of March 2,
1861 (12 Stat., 220, now 3709, Rev. Stat.), Mr. Justice Miller
says (Speed's Case, 8 Wall., 77) "that statute, while requiring
272-VOL xvn--2f>
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such advertisement as the general rule, invests the officer
charged with the duty of procuring supplies or services with
a discretion to dispense with advertising, if the exigencies of
the public service require immediate delivery or performance.
It is too well settled to admit of dispute at this day, that
where there is a discretion of this kind conferred on an officer, or board of officers, and a contract is made in which they
have exerciserl that discretion, the validity of the contract
can not be made to depend on the degree of wisdom or skill
which may have accompanied its exercise." If, on account
of the impossibility of readvertising or of the contractor procuring better articles in time to meet the exigencies, authority is lodged answhere to accept supplies inferior to therequirementR of a contract, it is vested in the officer or officers
charged with the duty of making the purchases, and the
rights of third parties are not to be affected by the correctness of the conclusions of such officers as to the necessity
. which compels such acceptance. That the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs passed upon this question before receiving
the wheat does not appear; it is sufficient that he and the
Secretary of the Interior approved the deductions and allowance for payment.
It remains only to consider the agreement between the
Commissioner and Mr. Staab that payment should be made
upon the findings of the inspectors, for if the agreement was
valid, neitller party might appeal from their findings to the
accounting officers.
In United States v. Slwewsbwry (23 Wall., 508) the contract
provided that a board of survey should examine the quantity
and condition of stores transported, and in case of loss, deficiency, or damage, report the apparent causes, assess the
damages, and state whether it was attributable to neglect or
want of care on the part of the contractor, and the proceedings should be attached to the bill of lading and "conclude
the pa:;-ments to be made on it.'' Under this a board of
Hurvey recommended a deduction for a deficiency in the
amount of corn d~livered by the contractor. Subject to this
deduction and under protest the claimant was paid. The
· Court of Claims, holding that the proceedings of the board
failed to carry out the intent and terms of the contract, ren-
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dered judgment in favor of claimant for the amount of the
deduction, which judgment on appeal was reversed by the
Supreme Court. lVfr. Justice Swayne, in delivering the
opirdon, says (p. 517): "The provision of the contract touching the board was important to the Government. The points
of delivery were in the wilds of the West. If there was any
failure by the contractor, the time and place of delivery were
the time and place to ascertain the facts and to put the evidence in effectual 8hape. Afterwards it might be impossible
for the Government to procure the proofs, and if it were done
the expense might greatly exceed the amount of the items
in dispute. • * * We think the reports were sufficient,
and that they conform in every substantial particular to the
requirements of the contract".
In Kihlberg v. The United States (97 U. S., 398) the contract
provided that transportation should be paid according to
distance, which was to be ascertained and .fixed by the chief
quartermaster. The quartermaster discharged this duty, and
the Supreme Court held that as the difference between his
estimate and the distances by air-line, or the road usually
traveled, was not so material as to justify the inference that
he did not exercise the authority given him with an honest
purpose, his action was conclusive upon the appellant as well
as upon the Government.
While nothing was said in the former case about the validity of the clause providing for a board of survey, it is apparant that its validity was involved in and essential to the
decision. A distinction may be drawn between deductions
for the loss of supplies caused by neglect of the transporter
and th~ percentage of deduction to be made for the inferior
quality of supplies; but I see no difference in principle, and
I am of opinion that the proviso in clause 5 of the present
contract is valid. If the Commissioner may accept goods
inferior in quality when the emergency demands it, the time
aud place of delivery before the goods are distributed or·consumed are eminently the time and place to determine its relative value, and I think it was perfectly competent for the
Commissioner and contractor to agree that then and there
the controversy should be determined. A different case
might be presented if there were proof of fraud, or if the

•
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difference between the views of the inspectors and of the accounting officers was so gross as to necessarily imply on the
part of the inspectors bad faith or a failure to exercise an
honest judgment; but no feature of that kind presents itself
here.
·
I think these views answer the several inquiries of the
Commissioner of Indian Aff<Jirs without taking them up in
detail.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

TONNAGE TAX.

e.,

A foreign vessel, i.
one belonging wholly or in part to a subject of a
foreign power, is not liable to the penal tax prescribed in section
4371, Revised Statutes. This tax applies exclusively to vessels belonging to citizens of the United States, which are capable of being and
should be enrolled and licensed.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
June 17, 1882.
SIR: In a letter dated the 1st instant, the Ron. :g. F.
French, then Acting Secretary of the Treasury, requested
my opinion upon the following question:
'' Does a foreign vessel, or one not licensed, enrolled, or
registered as a vessel of the United States, become liable to
the penal tax prescribed in section 4371 of the Revised
Statutes by conveying passengers between different ports
and places in this country, if the vessel does not t}'ansport
goods in violation of section 4347 of the same statutes~"
By section 4371 vessels of 20 tons or upward, other than
registered vessels, which are found trading between district
and district, etc., without being enrolled and licensed, includipg also unlicensed vesRels less than 20 tons and not less than
5 tons found so trading, are required to pay the same 1ees and
tonnage in any port of the United States at which they may
arrive as vessels not belonging to a citizen of the United
States, if they are "laden with merchandise the growth or
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manufacture of the United States only, distilled spirits excepted, oP. in ballast." The same section further provides
that if the ves~el has 011 board any articles of foreign growth
or manufactur-e, or distilled spirits, other than sea stores,
she shall, together with the lading found on board, be forfeited.
·
Section 43-i 7 declares ·that " no merchandise shall be
transported under penalty of forfeiture thereof from one
port of the United States to another port of the United
States in a vessel belonging wholly or in part to a subject of
any foreign power; but this section shall not be construed
to prohibit the sailing of any foreign Yessel from one to another port of the United States, provided that no merchandise other than that imported in such vessel from some foreign port, and which shall not have been unladen, shall be
carried from one port or place to another in the United
States." The remainder of the section is unimportant in
connection with the question under consideration.
This question concerns "a foreign vessel, or one not
licensed, enrolled, or registered as a vessel of the United
States;" and in view of the reference therein to sectiou 4347,
I understand it to mean only a vessel of the same character
as i~ described in that section, namely, one belonging wholly
or in part to a subject of a foreign power, and which is in
the same section also called a foreign vessel. In reply thereto
I submit that the "penal tax" in section 4.371 is not applicable to such a vessel. It applies, as the context shows, exclusively to vessels belonging to citizens of the United
States which are capable of being and should be enrolled
and licensed, but which are found trading in the manner described without enrollment and license. Thus the penalty
imposed upon a vessel so trading is payment of the "same
fees and tonnage" as are paid by vessels not belonging to
citizens of the United States, i. e., foreign vessels. Its object is to compel American vessels employed in the coasting
trade and fisheries to become enrolled and licensed. When
enrolled and licensed, they are exempted from tonnage duties
{sec. 4220, Rev. Stat.); when not, they are su~jected, by way
of penalty, to the fees and tonnage payable by foreign ves-
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sels. What these charges are must be ascertained by reference to statutory provisions contained elsewhere tuan in section 4371. In no case, as it seems to me, can a foreign vessel become liable to a penalty under that section.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
/:3ecretary of the Treasury.

CLAIM OF GENERAL PAUL.
Under the joint resolution of April12, 1870, granting to GenerAl Gabriel
R. Paul (retired) ''the full pay and allowance of a brigadier-general
in the Army of the United States," that officer is not entitled to an allowance of forage.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

June 19, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 9th instant submits to me the
question whether Brig. Gen. Gabriel R. Paul is entitled to
allowance of forage under the joint resolution of Congress
granting him the" full pay and allowance of a brigadier-general of the United States Army."
The resolution was approved April 12, 1870, and General
Paul claims forage from that date. General Paul is a retired
officer, and was so prior to the passage of the joint resoluthe allowances granted
tion. Be is doubtless entitled to
by law and regulations to officers of his rank.
But Army officers are not and have not been since the year
1816 allowed forage except for'' horses actually kept by them
in rvice when on duty, and at the place where they are on
duty." (See sec. 1272, Rev. Stat., p. 22l, and the acts cited
in the margin.) The allowance is further modified and restricted by section 8 of the Army appropriation act of June
18, 1878. (Supp. Rev. Stats., p 362.)
The clear intent of all the acts upon the subject is to provide
food for horses belonging to officers engaged in active duty
with soldiers in the field or at military posts. Not since the
act of April 24, 1816, if ever, have officers off duty been allowed forage. The term "allowance," as used in the resolution, means only such things as are allowed by law and reg-
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ulations to brigadier· generals in the same condition or
status in which General Paul then was. He hall no need of
horses for the performance of (t,ny duty required of him.
The reason for the allowance of forage failing, it can not
be supposed that it was the intention of Congress that he
should haYe it. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact
that by the later acts forage must be supplied in kind,
where it is allowed at all-the supposition being that there
are horses in existence and in use by the ufficer, and necessary to the efficient performance of his duties. It certainly
seems incongruous that the Quartermaster-General should
issue hay, oats, and corn in quantities sufficient to feed three
or four horses to an officer who can not need horses for military uses.
I agree with the Department of War, that the General's
claim to the allowance must be rejected.
The papers are herewith returned.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,

Secretar_11 of War.
INDIAN INSPECTOR-BOND.
Although the general functions and duties of Indian inspectors do not
include specifically the disbursement of public money, and these officers are not required by statute to give bonJ, yet the Secretary of the
Interior may lawfully assign to them other duties relating to business
concetning the Indians in addition to those prescribed whenever the
exigencies of the public service require it.
Where the particular duty thus assigned to an inspector involves the
receipt or disbursement of public money, it is competent to the Secretary to take a bond for the protection of the Government against loss,
although such bond may not be required by statute; ancl the bond
would be valid and binding upon both principal and sureties if voluntarily given by the officer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 21, 1882.
SIR: By a letter of your predecessor, dated the 4th of
April last, and the accompanying papers, it appears that a
requisition was issued by the Secretary of the Interior on
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the 22d of March, 1882, for an advance of $950 out of certain Indian appropriations to J. M. Haworth, an Indian inspector, to be charged to the latter on the books of the
Treasury under bis bond dated :J\iay 11. 1880; the object of
the ad vance being to enable that officer to defray the expenses of a delegation of Indians which he was directed by
the Secretar~ to bring to Washington.
The bond mentioned is in favor of the United States in
the sum of $5,000, with four sureties tllereon, and is conditioned that tile obligor sllall, during his holding and remaining in said office, ''carefully discharge the duties thereof,
and faithfully expend all public moneys and honestly account, without fraud or delay, for the same and for all public property which shall or may come into his hands."
The requisition was returned to the Secretary by the
Second Comptroller with the remark "that as the bond is
conditioned for the faithful performance of Mr. Haworth's
duties as inspector, and as the disbursement of the funds in
question does not appear to be part of the duty of an inspector, he entertains grave doubts as to the liability o~ the
bondsmen f~r money placed in Inspector Haworth's hands"
from the appropriations indicated.
Hereupon the following inquiry is presented for my consideration: Whether the inspector and his sureties would
be liable on his bond for money advanced to him "for the
object aforesaid.
.
·The general functions and duties of Indian inspect.ors are
defined in .section 2045, Revised Statutes. These do not
include specifically the disbursement of public money, and
those officers are not required by statute to give bond. Yet
the Secretary of the Interior is charged with the supen·ision
of public business concerning the Indians (sec. 441, Rev.
Stat.), and may lawfully assign to inspectors other duties ·
relating to that business in addition to those prescribed
whenever the exigencies of the public service require it;
and if the performance of such duties is undertaken by
them, they become responsible for the proper discharge
thereof. Where the particular duty involves the receipt or
disbursem~nt of public money, or the custody of public
property, it is undoubtedly within the competency of the
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Secretary to take a bond for the protection of the United
States against loss, although such bond may not be required
by any statute, and the bond would be valid and binding
· upon both principal and sureties if voluntarily given by the
officer. (United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet., 114; United States v.
Bradley, 10 Pet., 343).
In the present case, the duty assigned to Inspector
Haworth is of a special character, involving, as incidental to
it8 discharge, the disbursement of public money. Whether
he or some ·other officer should be intrusted with this duty
is a matter that belongs to the Secretary of the Interior to
determine. The condition of his bond, that he shall ''faithfully expend all public moneys and honestly account,. without
fraud or delay, for the same," etc., is broad enough to cover
any failure of duty on his part as regards the money proposed to be advanced to him, and in my opinion both he and
his sureties would be liable on the bond (assuming it to be a
voluntary one) for the money so advanced.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
The allowance made to the Union Pacific Railway Company for special
service, to be paid out of the so-called "special facilities" appropriation, can not lawfully be paid to the company in cash, but must be
retained and applied as directed by section 2 of the act of May 7, 1878,
{lhapter 90.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

June 22, 1882.
SIR: In your letter of this date you inquire: "If a contract shall be concluded with the Union Pacific Railway
Company for special mail facilities, to be paid out of the socalled special facilities appropriation, can the · allowance be
paid in cash, or must it be passed to the credit of the company as the regular mail pay is now credited~"
To thi,s inquiry I have the honor to reply, that in my
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opinion the allowance under such contract can not lawfully
be paid to the company in cash, but must be retained and
applied as directed Ly section 2 of the act of May 7, 1878,
chapter 90. That section declares that " the u,hole amount
of compem·ation which may from time to time be due to said
several railroad companies respectively (among wllich is included the company above name(l) for services rendered for
the Government shall be retained by the United States," etc.
This provision is very comprehensive. It includes all mail
service, special or other, which may be rendered by the company either under contract or otherwise, and it forbids a
cash payment thereto of any allowance for such service.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS _BREWSTER.
Ron. TIMOTHY 0. HowE,
Postmaster- General.

REPRIEVE OF CHARLES J. GUITEAU.
Upon examination of the papers accompanying an application made to
the President asking for the appointment of a commission to examine
and consider the mental condition of Charles J. Guiteau, and praying
for his reprieve pending the investigation: Advised, for reasons stated~
· that the application be not granted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE~

.June 23, 1882.
SIR : Yesterday was sent to me by your secretary the
papers presented by Miss Chevaillier, of Boston, consisting
of petitions and letters of physicians and experts in support
of an application for tlle appointment of a commission to consider the mental condition of Charles J. Guiteau, and also
praying for his reprie,~e pending such an investigation. Iu
addition to the papers transmitted to me by your secretary,.
I have had presented to me to~day a written argument or
statement from Dr. W. W. Go<lding, and also an argument
signed by George M. Beard, l\f. D.; W. W. Godding, M.D.;
and Miss A. A. Chevaillier. The whole question has been
carefully and thoughtfully considered, and I have arrived at
the conclusion that I can not recommend a reprieve for the
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purpose requested. It is doubtful if the President, in a case
like this, has the power to appoint such a commission to reverse the sentence of the law. The case of this man has been
thoroughly and fairly tried in a prolonged public judicial investigation, in a court of competent jurisdiction, before an
able, upright judge, and a jury of impartial men. Abundance of testimony was offered upon the question of his sanity
or insanit,)' ; in fact that was the main and only issue and the
only point contested. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of President Garfield by the defendant, Charles
J. Guiteau, was an admitted fact. It was conceded to have
been done by lying in wait for his victim with a deadly
weapon, carefully prepared for the purpose. The weapon
was used with intent to kill, and the shooting by the defendant caused the death of President Garfield. All these
facts were undisputed. The only question mooted was that.
of the moral, mental, and legal responsibility of the accused.
The question of sanity or insanity, I repeat, was the only
issue. He had a painfully protracted trial, during which latitude in every particular was allowed, almost to the straining of the law, in his behalf; more latitude than was ever
known to have been given to any defendent in all of the recorded annals of the law. He was permitted to say at
pleasure all that occurred to him, whether in order or out of
order. The eYidence was overwhelmingly against him upon
this very point of insanity. The case wa~ submitted to the
jury by a judge of acknowledged learning; a discerning,
cautious, upright officer, in a charge that was calm, deliberate, and fair, and within one bour after that charge the
jury found the prisoner guilty in manner and form as he
stood indicted. In view of this I again express my decided
conviction that the requests submitted in these petitions.
ought not to be granted.
The application comes at a late day. It is an effort to secure by an extrajudicial hearing a rever~ml of a solemn verdict and judgment obtained in the due administration of the
law. Such attempts must be discouraged. The law must be
maintained. and confirmed by a strict conformity to its determinations and conclusions obtained in a regular and orderly
manner.
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TLe assertion tLat the sense of all the best medical talent
sustains this application because it believes the defendant
insane is contradicted by Dr. Godding, who to-day, when
heard orally lly me, admitted that out~ide of those now applying for this reprieve the preponderance of the medical
talent in this country was the other way and belie\ed him
to be sane. I will further add that the defendant has exhausted all the remedies of the law for his relief. Since his
tria] his cause has been heard with deliberate care before the
whole bench of the Supreme Court of theDistrictof Columbia,
and no error in fact or law has been found, hut that court
dismissed his appeal and ordered judgment on the verdict.
After that he applied to Mr. Justice Bradley, of the
Supreme Court of the United States, for a writ of habeas corpus, and again the subject was considered by that learned
justice, and the careful conduct of the Supreme Court of the
·District commented on and applauded and the writ of habeas
corpus refused.
At the last hour you are asked to reprieve this justly condemned man-to investigate in an unusual if not irregular
way a fact that bas been solemnly determined b:i the constituted authorities of the law.
I submit it ought not to be done. It will establish a dangerous precedent. It will shake the public confidence in the
certainty and justice of the courts by substituting your will
for the judgment of the law and its forms at the instigation
of a few who assert that he was and is insane, and who press
their application contrary to the "preponderance of the medical talent of the country who believe the other way and
think him sane," as is admitted by one of the most conspicuous, earnest, and important of the petitioners.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
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CASE OF W. W. ARMSTRONG.
The fact that one of the officers composing a court-martial is junior in
rank and another inferior in grade to the accused, does not of itself rellder either of them incompetent to sit.
Where the approval of the proceedings, :findings, and sentence of a courtmartial by the President is attested by an entry on the record signed
by the Secretary of War, this is sufficient evidence of such approval.
(But see NoTE on page 399 post.)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 28, 1882.
SIR: I have considered the case of W. W. Armstrong, forw._erly a first lieutenant of the Sixteenth Regiment of Infantry,
which was sometime since referred to me by your direction.
In the fall of 1870 Mr. Armstrong, while holding that office,
was tried and convicted by a general court-martial! and sentenced to dismissal from the Army. The proceedings of the
court having been approved, the sentence was carried into
execution on the 18th of N ovem 'ber, 1878. He now claims
that the dismissal was illegal and \'oiu, on two grounds: (1)
That two of the officers composing the court were incompetent to sit, inasmuch as they would, and rlid; become advt(nced in their respective grades by his dismissal; (2) That
the record of the court-martial does not bear the President's
signature to the approval of the proceedings.
The two officers referred to in the first of these objections
are First Lieutenant Noble and Second Lieutenant Whitall,
of the above-named regiment. The uetail for the court originally consisted of six officers. One of these (Lieutenant
Palmer) was challenged by the accused and the challenge
was sustained; whereupon the officer challenged was relieved.
The accused was then asked whether he objected to any of
the other officers sitting, and he declared that he did not.
Thus there was a wai-ver of his right to challenge the remaining
members of the court, if any ground therefor existed.
The fact that Lieutenant Noble was junior in rank or that
Lieutenant Whitall was inferior in grade to the accused, did
not of itself render either of them incompetent t.o sit, The
first objection therefore fails.
With respect to the other objection : It appears that the
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approval of the proceedings, findings, and sentence of the
court by the President is attested by an entry on the rec~rd,
signed by the Secretary of War, under date of November 1~,
1870. This is sufficient evidence of approval. The action of
the President in matters relating to the .Army which require
his approval and direction may in general be signified
through and authenticated by the head of the War Department. Where the latter acts in such matters, he in contemplation of law acts under the direction of the President, and
i:::; to be regarded as the mere organ of the executive will.
( Uniterl States v. Eliason, 16 Pet., 302; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13
Pet., 513.) This principle has long and frequently been acted
upon in. the matter of court-illartial proceedings required to
be laid before the President for confirmation or disapproval.
(See 7 Opin., 372; 15 Opin., 290; 16 Opin., 350.) In 15 Opinions, page 295, it is observed by one of my predecessors:
co In the case of the confirmation of a sentence of dismissal
by a court-martial, no formality appears to be prescribed by
law for attesting the determination of the President; and as in
cases of that sort the attestation of 's uch determination by a
written statement, signed by the Secretary of War, is in accordance with long usage, that mode of attesting the President's action confirming a sentence of dismissal is to be considered as sufficient." And it was there held that such statement is a sufficient authentication of the act of the President without an express averment therein that it is made by
direction of the President; the presumption being always
that such direction was given. It follows that, in the present case, the President's signature to the approval of the proceedings on the record was not necessary to make the sentence effectual.
I am accordingly of opinion that Mr. Armstrong was, by
the execution of the sentence of the general court-martial
hereinbefore referred to, lawfully dismissed from the Army,
and that his application for restoration to the position therein
from which he was thus dismissed should be denied.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREV\"STER.
The PRESIDENT.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

399

Claim of Passed Assistant Engineer Webster.

NOTE.-Since the foregoing opinion of Attorney-General Brewster was
given, it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the case of Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S., 54:J, which involved the
.c onsideration of the provision in the 65th Article of War (see act of April
10, 1806, chap. 20) ueclaring tllat, in time of peace, no sentence of a general
<Jourt-martial extenuing to the los!:! of life, or the dismission of a commissioned officer, etc., shall be" carried into execution until after the whole
proceedings shall have been transmitted to the Secretary of War, to he
laid before the President of the United States, for his confirmation or
disapproval, and orders .in the case," as follows:
(1) That the action required of the President by this article is judicial
in its character, aud in this respect differs from the administrative action
considered in Jrilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; United States v.Eliason, 16
Pet., 291; Confiscation Cases, 20 Wall., 92; United States v. Farden, 99 U.S.,
10; Walsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S., 755.
(2) That (without deciding what the precise form of an order of the
President approving the proceedings and sentence of a court-martial
should be, or that his own signature should be affixed thereto) his approval must be authenticated in a way to show, otherwise than argumentatively, that it is the resnlt of his own judgment and not a mere departmental order which may or may not have attracted his attention,
and that the fact that the onler was his own must not be left to inference
{)nly.
CLAIM OF PASSED ASSISTANT ENGINEER WEBSTER.
W. was appointed an acting third assistant engineer in the volunteer
Navy February 8, 1862, and performed sea service continuously until
May 20, 1864, when be was made a third asl:!istant engineer in the regular Navy, and completed two years of ~:;ea service as such January 1,
1867. He was promoted to the grade of second assistant engineer
October 6, 1869, to take rank from January 1, 18fiH. On July 1, 1870,
he completed two years' sea service in the latter grade, and on March
12, 1875, was promoted to the grade of passed assistant engineer, to
take rank from October 29, 1874: Held, that the credit of his volunteer
servicP, under section 1412, Revised Statutes, does not entitle him to
the benefits claimed therefor as regards promotion to or pay in his
present grade.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, June ~8, 1882.
SIR: By a letter of your predecessor~ dated lhe 12th of
April last, my opinion was requested upon the claim of Passed
Assistant Engineer Harrie Webster, of the Savy, which (as
there stated) is as follows: "that by reason of sea service
performed by him as a volunteer officer (acting third assistant engineer), in which he has been credited under the provisions of section 1412, Revised Statutes, he had become en-
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titled to examination for promotion to his present grade J nne
8, 1868, and to pay as a passed assistant engineer from date.''
The facts of the case are thus present,ed in said letter:
''Mr. Webster was appointed an acting third assistant engineer in the volunteer Navy February 8, 1862, and was continuously on duty at sea until May 20, 1864, when he was ap.pointed or transferred to the regular Navy as a third assistant
engineer. He completed his two years' sea service as a third
assistant engineer January 1, 1867, which was the term of such
service required by the regulations then in force to qualify him
for examination for promotion to the grade of second assistant
engineer. Mr. Webster failed upon his examination for promotion in October, 1868; he was re-examined in July of the next
year, found qualified, and warranted a second assistant engineer October 6, 1869, to take rank as such from January
1, 1868. On the first of July, 1870, he completed the period
of sea service as a second assistant engineer (two years) required by regulations then in force to qualify him for examination for promotion to the grade of first (passed) assistant
engineer. In February, 1875, l\tlr. Webster was examined,
found qualified, and on the 12th of March following he was promoted to the grade of passed assistant engineer, to take rank
as such from October 29, 1874, to fill a vacancy in that grade."
According to the foregoing statement the period of sea
service (two years) as a second assistant enoineer, which was
necessary to qualify Mr. Webster for promotion to his present
grade, was not completed until the 1st of July~ 1870. His
previous service in the volunteer Navy as acting third assistant engineer was not available at any time to complete
that period earlier than the date first mentioned, such volunteer service having been performed in a different grade.
Bence the credit of this volunteer service under the provisions of section 1412, Re,Tised Statutes, could not entitle him
to the benefits claimed therefor as regards promotion to or
pay in his present grade. I am therefore of opinion that the
claim is inadmissible.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. WILLIAM E. CHA.NDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.
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PENSION OF GENERAL WARD B. BURNETT.
Rates of pension which should be allowed General Burnett under the
general laws of March 3, 1873, June 18, 1879, and June 16, 1880, and
under the special act of March 3, 1879, stated; aud advised that two
pension certificates be issued-one under the general law of June 16,
1880, the other under the special act of March 3, 1879.
DEP ARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

June 29, 1882.
SIR: Replying to your letter of the 24th in st. concerning

the case of General Wa,rd B. Burnett, [ have the honor to
advise you that, according to the opinion rendered by this
Department on the lOth of April last, the rates of pension
which should be allowed General Burnett are as follows:
From June 4, 1872 to June 4, 1874, $30.75 per month (act of
March, 1873, fourth section); from June 4, 1874 to June 17,
1878 (act of June 18, 1879), $50 per montiJ; from June 17,
1878, $72 per month (act of June 18, 188D).
Under the special act of :March 3, 1879, General Burnett has
drawn, and is entitled still to draw, $50 per mo·n th. True, this
was given him "in lieu of the pension he now receives," but the
pension he was then receiving was $30 per month. This was
not the sum he was entitled to receive under the general law.
The $30 it is presumed ~as paid him under section 4695,
Revised Statutes, as for total disability, and in lieu of this
the special act gives him $50. It is provided now that nothing in this act (the special act) shall entitle General Burnett
to arrears of pension. [tis not under this act that back-pay
of pension is claimed, but under the general laws cited above,
which entitle him to the rate of pension prescribed therein.
I do not think the special act can be so construed as to deprive General Burnett of these. It should be considered as
a law by itself, intended to show the estimate of Congress of
the great services of General Burnett to the country, having
regard also for his helpless condition.
I am of the opinion that two pension certificates should be
issued to General Burnett-one under the act of June 16, 1880,
the other under the special act of March 3, 1879.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.
272-VOL XVI~-- 26
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ASSISTANT SURGEONS-RELATIVE RANK.
Opinion of May 18, 1882, viz, that where certain assistant surgeons had
attained the rank of captain on the same day, but whose appoinments
and commissions were not of the same date, their relative rank as be·
tween themselves was not determined by the provisions of section 1 of
the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 159 (sec. 1219, Rev. Stat.), but by the
date and order of their appointment-reaffirmed.
Under section 17 of the act of July 28, 1866, chapter 299, an assistant
surgeon who served as such less than three years in the regular Army,
or less than three years in the voluntuer forces, did not become immediately entitled to the rank of captain, although his volunteer and
regular service, when combined, may have amounted to three years.
But by the second section of the act of March 2, 1867, the officer would
have a right to have his volunteer service computed, and if at the
date of that act this service, united with his service in the regular
Army, made three years, he would then be entitled to the rank of captain. This provision, however, did not operate retrospectively, so as
to affect or alter the previous relations of the offiuer in the service.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 30, 1882.
SIR: Agreeably to the desire expressed in your letter of
the 9th instant, I have reconsidered, in connection with certain communications from Assistant Surgeon Smart, referred
to me therewith, the opinion which I had the honor to address to you on th~ 18th ultimo upon a question affecting
tue relative rank in the Medical Corps of tuat officer and
Assistant Surgeons Brooke, Gardner, and Whitehead.
One of those ~ommunications presents Dr. Smart's views
upon a point since suggested, which you say has not heretofore received attention so far as you know, and which is
stated by you as follows: "The act of July 28, 1866, authorized a certain number of assistant surgeons in the regular
Army with the rank, pay, and emoluments of lieutenants of
cavalry for the first three years' service, and with the rank.
pay, and emoluments of captains of cavalry after three years'
service; and provided that original vacancies in tltat grade
should be filled by selection, and that persons so selected.
who had served as assistant surgeons three years in the volunteer service, should be eligible for promotion to the grarle
of captain. An inspection of the Army Register discloses the
~
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fact that at .the date of the passage of this act (July 28, 1866)
Dr. Brooke had been an assistant surgeon in the regular
Army for more than three years, but that Dr. Smart had
been assistant surgeon in the volunteer service for about
one and one-half years and an assistant surgeon in the regular Army a little more than two years, so that to consider
him as having served three years it was necessary to combine his service as a volunteer with his service in the regular Army in order to enable him to be promoted to the
grade of captain under the act of July 28, 1866. I do not
find in that act," you further state, "any authority for such
a combination. The act seems to require that the three years'
service should have been completed either in the volunteer
service or in the regular Army. No doubt if the attention
of Congress had been called to this circumstance the act
would have been amended so as to authorize -a combination
of fractional services in each branch. Dr. Smart, in his communication, argues that the second :>ection of the act of
l\Iarch 2, 1867, covers this point. As at present advised I
am unable to concur with him. * * * If my views on
this subject are correct, Dr. Smart was not entitled to be promoted to the grade of captain until the 30th of 1\-Iarch, 1867,
a date subsequent to those on which that grade was attained
by Drs. Brooke, Gardner, and Whitehead respectively. If
I am correct in these views, this is an additional ground on
which Dr. Smart should be held not to rank Dr. Brooke or
the two other assistant surgeons named."
Upon re-examination of the question considered in my
opinion of the 18th ultimo, I remain entirely satisfied with
.. the conclusion there arrived at. It appeared by the last Army
Register, then before me, that the four assistant surgeons
above mentioned had each attained the rank of captain on
the same day (July 28, 1866), and this was assumed to be
correct. Their attainment of this rank was not by virtue of
any new appointments or commissions, but by operation of
law. The appQintments and commissions by which they hold
the office of assistant surgeon and under which they are
serving therein are not all of the same date. Upon this
state of facts, I held that the provisions of the first section
of the act of 1\Iarch 2, 1867 (sec. 1219, Rev. Stat.), are inappli-
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cable to determine t.he relative rank of these officers in their
corps as between themselves (those provisions appl_ying only
to officers of "the same grade and date of appointment and
commission"), but that such relative rank must be determined by the date and order of their appointment. In other
words, that although the officers in question are of the same
grade (captain), and although the date when each gained
that grade is the same (as was assumed), yet they are not
within the rule prescribed by the act of 1867 (sec. 1219, Rev.
Stat.) for fixing relative rank, because their appointments
and commissions are not also of tho same date; and that
their relative rank is governed by the other rule adverted to,
namely, by date and order of ~ppointment.
This seems to me to admit of no doubt, and to be decish·e
of the question respecting the relative rank of the abovenamed officers as between themselves.
But you suggest that, on grounds hereinbefore stated,
Dr. Smart was not legally entitled to the rank of captain on
the 28th of July, 1866, and did not become legally entitled
thereto until the 30th of March, 1867, and you request an
expression of my views upon this point.
Upon consideration I am of opinion that under section 17
of tbe act of July 28, 1866, fl>n assistant surgeon who has
served less than three years in the regular Army or less
tban throe years in the volunteer forces did not become
entitled to the grade of captain, although his volunteer and
regular service when combined may have amounted to, or
even exceeded, three years. By the effect of that section all
assistant surgeons then in tbe regular Army who at the date
of that act had served three years as such became immediately entitled to the rank of eaptain; and the same section,
after setting apart the original vacancies created by that act
in the grade of assistant surgeon for persons to be selected
from those who had "served as staff or regimental sm·geons
or assistant surgeons of volunteers in the Army of the United
States two years during tbe late war," provid~d that persons
who bad served as assistant surgeons three years in the
volunteer service shall be eligible for promotion to the grade
of captain. This is the only provision in that act whieh
makes volunteer service an element in determining tbe right

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

405

Assistant Surgeons-Relative Rank.

to promotion in the Medical Corps; and to entitle an officer
to the benefit thereof it requires him to have served as an
assistant surgeon three years in the volunteer service, hereby
impliedly excluding such service from computation when less
than that period.
It follows that the one and one-half years' service rendered
by Dr. Smart as an assistant surgeon of volunteers could not
legally be taken into account under the act of July 28, 1866,
to make up the three years' service necessary to e title him
to the rank of captain.
Yet I think that under the second section of the act of
March 2, 1867, he had a right to have his volunteer sen·ice
.computed. By this section it was provided ''that in all
matters relating to pay, allowances, rank, duties, privileges,
and rights of officers and soldiers of the Army of the United
States the same rules and regulations shall apply, without
distinction, for such time as they may be, or have been, in
the service, alike to those who belong permanently to that
service, and to those who as volunteers may be, or may have
been, commissioned or mustered into the military service
under the laws of the United States for a limited period."
This provision is materially modified in the Uevised Statutes,
wherein it partly appears in section 1292 and partly in the
one hundred and twenty-third article of war. As thus modified, it comes into play only when there are in the military
service both volunteers and regulars as distinct organizations
.or forces, subjecting the officers and soldiers in each of these
forces in the matters enumerated to the same rules and regulations. But, as originally enacted, while it extends to no
persons but those who are in the military service, its inclusion of officers and soldiers who may , ~, have been" commissioned or mustered into the service as volunteers affords
ground for the construction that where officers and soldiers
belonging to the regular Army fall within the terms of that
description (i. e., where they have been in the volunteer service before entering the regular Army), their past service as
volunteers must be estimated thereunder in all cases in
which, according to the rules and regulation& referred to, it
would be estimated had it been performed by them as regulars. (15 Opin., 332.)
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However, the provision of the act of 1867 here adverted
to had no retrospective operation. While itmightalter the
status of an officer then or thereafter, it did not have the
effect to alter his previous relations in the service. Hence
in Dr. Smart's case the date of his rank as captain-to which
rank he, in my opinion, became entitled by virtue of that
provision-could not be earlier than the date of that act.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of lVar.

CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD LAND GRANT.
Certain lands within the 10-mile limits of the Central Pacific Railroad,
being parts of odd-numbered sections granted thereto by the act of
July 1, 1862, chapter 120, were, under section 7 of that act, ordered to be
withdrawn, and this order was received at the land office at San Francisco on the 30th of January, 1b65. The map showing definite location of line of said road was filed in General Land Office l!'ebruary 13,
1873, and on May 12, 1874, said lands were selected by the railroad
company as inuring to it under said grant. But the same landR were
selected by the State of California June 13, 1865, as indemnity for
deficiency of school lands granted by acts of March 3, 1853, and February 26, 1l:l59, and a list thereof was certified and approved to the
State September 8, 1870. The railroad company applies for patents
for these lands: Advised that the Secretary of the Interior is not
authorized by the general laws or the provisions of the act of July 1,
1862, to issue such p;ttents to the company.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 3, 1882.
SIR: Yours of July 18, 1881, addressed to the Attorney-

General, states a caRe which is briefly as follows :
Certain lands within the State of California are in dispute
before you between the State and the Central Pacific Railro.a d Company.
These lands are within the 10- mile limits of the road of the
company, and are parts of odd-numbered sections granted t<>
it by the act of July 1, 1862, section 3, (12 Stat., 489). Accordingly, upon the 23d of December, 1864, they were, under
section 7, duly ordered to be withdrawn, and this order was
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received at the land office at San Francisco upon the 30th
of January, 1~65. The map showing the definite location of
the line of road for the place in question was filed in the
General Land Office on the 13th of February, 1873, and upon
the 12th of May, 1874, the lands now in dispute were selected
by the company as inuring to it under the grant aforesaid.
The same lands were selected by the State upon the 13th
of June, 1865, as indemnity for actual deficiency of school
lands granted by the United States by acts of March 3, 1853,
sections 6 and 7, and February 26, 1859 (10 Stat., 244, and
11 Stat., 385,), and upon the 8th of September, 1870, a list
thereof was certified and approved with the following clause
attached thereto, ''subject to any valid interfering rights
which may have existed at the date of selection."
The plat of the township in question was duly filed in the
proper local land office on the lOth of June, 1865.
Upon this state of facts the company applies for patents
for the land abo,·,e referred to; and in such connection you
ask the question whether you have jurisdiction in the premises, and authority under the general laws, and the express
provision of the act of July 1, 1862, ~Section 4 (12 Stat., 492),
to issue such patents.
The list above mentioned is treated by you as in substance
a sort of consolidated patent, authorized by section 2449 of
the Revised Statutes, which provides that in certain specified cases where lands are granted by Congress to a State or
Territory a list thereof, certified by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, ''shall be regarded as conveying the
fee·simple of all the lands embraced in such lists that are of
the character contemp1 ated by such acts of Congress and
intended to be granted thereby; but when lands embraced
in such lists are not of the character em braced by such acts
of Congress, and are not intended to be granted thereby,
said lists, so far as such lands are concerned, shall be perfectly null and void, and no right, title, claim, or interest
shall be conveyed thereby."
It is contended by the company:
(1) That under the facts of the cr.,se, the lands are not included in the list to the State, and that therefore the company is entitled to a patent.
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(2) That inasmuch as the land in question, at the time of
the selection by the State, and of ljhe certification and approval of the list, had been reser'Ded for its own uses 1 as above,
it was not of the "character contemplated" by the act under
which the selection had been made by the State, and therefore that by the acts such. list, so far as these lands are concerned, is "perfectly null and void,'' and should be so treated
by the General Land Office, and a patent accordingly be
issued as applied for.
Whatever operation is to be given to the exception in thd
above approval of the list by your predecessor, viz, that of
''any valid interfering rights," and also to a like sweeping
provision in section 2449 of the Revised Statutes, is to be
so given only by cow·ts called in due course of law to consider
the titles thus created. Neither of those clauses confers 'upon
a succeeding Secretary the power of reversing official action
by which the lands therein designated have been "cm·ti.fied."
ThiR is true as regards even the statutory provision in question (Moore v. Robbins, G Otto, 533), whilst the words of exception in the list may, in addition, well be considered superfluous.
As to the effect of the words ''shall issue," in section
4 of the act of 1862, to which you call my attention particularly, as being insisted upon by the company, I have to say
that, granting its effect to be imperative, I am of the opinioli
that the command is not intended to operate in cases where
it would come in collision with general principles, and that
its meaning is that so far as the plan of the act in which it
o~curs is conce'rned, or no other objection existing, the patents
shall issue.
Upon the whole matter you will understand me as answering your question in the negative.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting .A. ttorney- General.
The SEORETARY OF THE INTERIOR •
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NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS .
.A national bank whose charter is about to expire, but which has taken
no steps toward going into liquida.tion under sections 5220 to 5224,
Revised Statutes, can not withdraw all of the bonds deposited to
secure its circulation, upon depositing lawful money equal to the
amount of its outstanding circulation, notwithstanding the provisions
of sections 5159 and 5160, Revised Statutes, ancl section 4 of the act of
Jun~ 20, 1874, chapter 343.

DEP ARTMEN1' OF JUS1'ICE,

July 5, 1882.
SIR: Yours of the 27th of May last communicates, for an
opinion by the Attorney-General, the following question
suggested by the Treasurer of the United States:
"May a national bank whose charter is about to. expire
by limitation of law, but which has taken no steps toward
going into liquidation under sections 5220 to 5224 of the
Revised Statutes, withdraw all of the bonds deposited with
the Treasurer of the United States to secure its circulation,
upon depositing lawful money equal to the amount of lts outstanding circulatiou, uotwithstanding the provisions of sections 5159 and 5160 of the Revised Statutes and of section 4
of the act of June 20, 187 4, in regard to the amount of bonds
1·equired to be kept on deposit with the Treasurer~"
An earlier reply to this communication has been hitherto
prevented by unavoidable accident.
After careful consideration thereof I now an3wer the
.question in the negative.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS I!REWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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SALE OF MIAMI LANDS IN KANSAS.
The lands which have been or are to be sold and the proceeds distributed by the act of May 15, 1!:!82, chapter H4, were set apart for the sole
benefit of the Miami tribe of Indians, meaning thereby those who at
the time of the survey of the reservation had emigrated and settled on
the lands.
This class of Miamis only are entitied to the proceeds of the sales of the
residue mentioned in the second article of the treaty of June 5, 1854,
being the same lands referred to in section 3 of the act of May 15, 1882.
Those individual Miamis or persons of Miami blood who are named in
the corrected list referred to in the Senate amendment to the fourth
article of the treaty of June 5, 1854, and their descendants, have no
right to or interest in the said residue or the proceeds of the sales
thereof.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Ju,ly 7, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant calls my attention to
the act of Congress, approved May 15, 1882, entitled "An
act to provide for the sale of the lands of the Miami Indians
in Kansas."
The third section of the act declares that the net proceeds
of the sales shall belong to said Miami Indians and shall be
disposed of as now provided by law.
In the fourth section there is a saving of the rights or
claims of these indiddual "1\fiamis or persons of Miami
blood or descent, who are named in the corrected list referred
to in the Senate amendment to the fourth article of the
treaty of June 5, 1864, or their descendants," and before any
distribution is made under the act the Secretary of the Interior is required to obtain the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral "as tG what rights or interests, if any, said persons
have or had in and to said lands,'' etc.
Hence your request for my opinion in the !)remises.
In order to a full understanding of the question, it will be
useful to refer briefly to two treaties of the United States
with these Indians, prior to that of June 5, 1854.
By article 10 of the treaty of November 6, 1838 (7 Stat.,
569), the United States stipulated "to possess the Miami
tribe of Indians~ and guaranty to them forever a country
west of the Mississippi River, to remove to nnd settle on when
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the said tribe ma.y be disposed to emigrate from their present
countt·y."
The land was promised on the implied condition that the
tribe would remove to and settle on it.
There is no guaranty or promise to those who should refuse
to emigrate.
Then followed the treaty of November 28, 1840 (7 Stat.,
582), by the first article of which th~ Miamis ceded all of
their remaining lands in Indiana. Article second fixes the
consideration at $550,000. This was the entire consideration. By article eight it was stipulated that the tribe should,
within five years, move to the country assigned them west
of the Mississippi.
. Hitherto, however, no lands west of the Mississippi bad
been assigned to them, but the Senate in consenting to the
ratification of the treaty, February 25, 184.1, added a section
by way of amendment as follows: "The United States
hereby stipulate to set apart and assign to the Miamis for
their occupancy west of the Mississippi, a tract of country
* • • (giving the boundaries)-estimated to contain five
hundred thousand acres."
This was in fulfillment of the promise made by the treaty
of 1838, and was an inducement held out to the tribe ~o emigrate. The lands were given to them for their Jccupancy.
Accordingly, in the year 1846, the Miamis, as a tribe, did
emigrate and took possession of the lands so assigned for
their use, and which were intended for the benefit of those
only who should settle upon them.
Then came the treaty of June 5, 1854 (10 Stat., 1093), upon
the construction of which the present question arises.
It is stated in the preamble that certain persons, whose
names are given, " being duly authorized by said tribe," represented the tribe of Miami Indians in making this treaty;
and certain other persons, whose names are given, are styled
"Miami Indians, 'residents of the State of Indiana, being
present and assenting," etc.
It is plain that two classes of Indians were represented in
the negotiation of the treaty; first, the Miamis who had emigrated to the west, and who still preserving the ijribal organization constituted the Miami tribe proper; second, certain
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individuals or families of :Miami blood who did not emigrate
with or had separated from the tribe and remained in Indiana. This distinction runs through the treaty, the provisions thereof differing as they apply to one or the other of
these classes.
By the first article the l\liami tribe ceded to the United
State8 all the tract of country set apart for them west of the
Mi~:5sissippi River, reserving, however, 70,000 acres for their
future homes and for school purposes.
The second article, after providing for the survey of the reservation, proceeds as follows: 41 Within four months after
the approval of such surveys, each individual or head of a
family of the Miami tribe now residing on said lanfs shall select, if a single person, two hundred acres, and if the head of
a family, a quantity equal to two hundred acres for each
member of the family, which selections shall b3 so made as
to include in each case, so far as practicable, the present residences and improvements of each person or family, and
where it is not practicable, the selection shall fall on lands
in the same neighborhood; and if by reason of absence or
otherwise any single person or head of a family entitled to
land as aforesaid shall fail to make his or her selection within
the p~riod prescribed, the chiefs of the tribe shall proceed to
select the lands for those thus in default.''
Thus a portion of the reservation was disposed of, and it
is plain to see who were entitled to allotments, to wit: those
and those only who, being of the l\liami tribe, were then settled on the land; that is, at the expiration of four months
after the approval of the surveys. The language excludes
all who had refused to emigrate, and, of course, the Miami
Indians of Indiana.
Furthermore, it is provided in the second section that,
after all the selections shall have been made (the school
lan.]s as well as the allotments), '·the said chiefs shall proceed to select in a compact body * • * the residue of
the seventy thousand acres, which body of land shall be held
as the common property of the tt·ibe, but may at any time,
when the chiefs and a majority of the tribe request it, be
sold by the President and the net proceeds be paid to the
tribe."
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The third article provides the consideration for the lands
ceded ($200,000), which the United States agreed to pay to
"the Miami tribe of Indians;'' and, as if to remove all
doubt, that the lands ceded, as well as those reserved and
the residue thereof, after all allotments had been selected,
belonged to the Western Miamis who emigrated and constituted the tribe proper, it is forbidden uy the last clause of
the third article that any part of the consideration money or
the moneys produced by the sale of the said residue, shall
ever be appropriated or paid to any person who has drawn
or is permitted to draw from the annuities payable to the
Miamis iu Indiana.
This inhibition plainly includes those persons embraced in
the corrected list spoken of in the first proviso to the Senate
amendment of the fourth article of the treaty-the same
who are referred to in the fourth section of the act under
consideration. Articles 4 and 5 are occupied with readjustments, settlements of claims, and the equitable division,
according to numbers, between the two classes, of funds,
annuities, etc., provided by this and previous treaties, except
the fund arising from the sal6 of the western lands, which
is diRposed of by articles 2 and 3.
Throughout these settlements and dispositions the two
classes of Miamis are recognized as separate and distinct
parties, with separate and distinct interests. As an example,
the very clause of the treaty referreu to in the fourth section
of the act of :May 15, 1882, in connection with the inhibition
above mentioned, may be cited. That clause reads as fol- .
lows:
"Provided, That no person other than those em braced in
the corrected list agreed upon by the Miamis of Indiana, in
the presence of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in June,
eighteen hundred and fifty-four, comprising three hundred
and two names as :Miami Indians of Indiana and the increase
of the families of the .persons embraced in said corrected list,
shall be recipients of the payments, annuities, commutation
moneys, and iJJterest hereby stipulated to be paid to the
Miami Indians of Indiana."
That is, the Western Miamis are 1orbidden to participate
in the funds, annuities, etc., of the Miamis of Indiana, and

414

HON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTEl{
Sale of

~llami

Lands In Kansas.

the latter, by the third article, are prohibited from sh.aring
in the funds and proceeds of the sales of lands belonging to
the Miami tribe of Indians.
By the foregoing statement, drawn from the treaties of the
United States with these Indians, the following conclusions
are in my opinion established:
First. That the lands which have been or are to be sold
amd the proceeds distributed by the act of May 15, 1882,
were set apart, assigned to, and were for the sole benefit of
the Miama tribe of Indians, meaning thereby those who, at
the time of the survey of the reservation, bad. emigrated and
settled on the lands.
Second. That this division of these Indians only are
entitled to the proceeds of the sales of the residue mentioned in the second article of the treaty of June 5, 1854,
being the same lands referred to in the third section of the
act of May 15, 1882.
Third. That those individual Miamis or persons of Miami
blood or descent, who are named in the corrected list referred
to in the Senate amendment to the fourth article of the
treaty of June 5, 1854, and their descendants, have no title
or claim to or interest in the said residue, or the proceeds of
the sales thereof.
In my judgment they never had any part or lot In the
reserved lands.
Before concluding this paper it is proper that I should
advert to the act of June 12, 1858, in the third section of
which it is claimed that Congress gave a construction to the
treaty of June 5, 1854, by which construction the persons
referred to in the Senate's amendment of the fourth article,
viz, the Miamis of Indiana should be allowed to share equally
with the Western Miamis in the resrrved lands and in the
proceeds thereof.
The deduction is exceedingly broad and liberal, carrying
the effect of the act of 1858 far beyond what its terms express.
But I deem it sufficient, in answer to the argument, to refer
to subsequent legislation, wherein Congress seems to have
reconsidered that of June 12, 1858.
By the fifth section of the act of March 2, 1867, the question was submitted to the Attorney General: What persons

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

415

General Ward B. Burnett's Case.

should be permitted to participate in the funds appropriated
to the Miamis of Indiana ~
Attorney-General Stanbery, in an elaborate opinion (12
Opin., 236), decided that only those Indians named in the list
referred to in the Senate amendment to the fourth article of
the treaty could receive anything from those funds. ,Thereupon the sixty-eight names which were added to the list
under the act of 1858 were stricken off.
Again, by the fourth section of the act of March 3, 1873, it
was submitted to the judgment of the Secretary of Interior
whether "those persons of 1\'Iiami blood or descent for whom
provision was made" in the act of 1858 were entitled to share
in the reserved lands set apart for that portion of the tribe
known as Western Miamis.
The Secretary, in an opinion dated May 9, 1873, held that
they were not so entitled.
It appears therefore that by the acts last cited the third
section of the act of June 12, 1858, so far as it may be supposed to affect the question in hand, is virtually repealed.
Very respe~tfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

GENERAL WARD B. BURNETT'S CASE.
Where a pensioner was entitled to, though not actually receiving, a
pension of $50 a month under a general law, and while so entitled a
special act was passed giving him another pension: Held that his
right under the general law did not cease or become merged in that
granted by t.he special act.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

July 7. 1882.
SIR: In the pension case of General Ward B. Burnett I
have the honor to observe, in reply to your letter of the
3d instant, that the said pensioner under the general act of
1879 was entitled to, though he was not receiving, a pension
of $50 a month. While so entitled, Congress passed a special
act giving him another pension. This did not take away his
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right under the general law, nor was his pension merged in
that granted by the special act.
The case is exceptional. In the law, under the title "Pensions," as enacted in 1878, nothing can be so construed as toallow more than one pension at the same time to the same
person. But subsequently, Congress having the power,
stepping beyond the rule prescribed in section 4715, by a
separate, independent law gives to a pensioner already entitled to a pension of $50 another pension of the same
amount. Section 4715 has, in my judgment, no application
to a case of this kind.
The special act of March 3, 1879, has not been repealed or
its force and effect taken away by any subsequent legislation.
I adhere to the opinion expressed in my letter of the 29th
ultimo.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

TRANSPORTATION OF CHINESE LABORERS.
Chinese laborers coming from foreign lands cannot be transported
across the territory of the United States without violating the act of
May 6, 1882, chapter 1~6, unless such laborers were in the United
States on ti.le 17th day of November, 18d0, or came here within ninety
days after the passage of said act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 18, 1882.
SIR: I have duly considered the question submitted for

opinion in your communication of the 12th July instant,
na.mely, whether Chinese laborers desiring to return to their
native land from other foreign lands may be lawfully transported across the territory of the United States, and have
reached the conclusion that they cannot be so transported
without a violation of the act of Congress of the 6th of May,
1882, entitled "An act to execute certain treaty stipulations
relating to Chinese," unless the persons mentioned were in
the United States on the 17th of November, 1880, or came
here within ninety days next after the passage of the said act.
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The first &ection of the statute provides that from and
after the expiration of ninety days next succeeding its passage "1he coming of Chinese laborers to the United States
be, and the same is ltereby, suspended, and during said suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to
come, or having so come after the expiration of said ninety
days to remain, within the United States."
The second section makes it penal for the master of any
vessel knowingly to bring within the United States in such
vessel and land, or permit to be landed, any Chinese laborer
from any foreign port or place.
The third section withdraws from the operation of the preceding sections Chinese laborers who were within the United
States on the 17th November, 1880, or who should come
therein within ninety days next after the passage of the act,
and prod nee to the master of the vessel bringing them and
to the collector of the port in whiflh they shall arrive the
evidence required by the act that they belong to the one or
the other of the excepted classes. This section also removes
from the purview of the act any master of a vessel, not
bound to any of our ports, which shall come within the jurisdiction of the United States "by reason of being in distress or in stress of weather, or touching at any port of the
U uited States on its voyage to any foreign port qr place:
Provided, 1'hat all Chinese laborers brought on such vessel
shall depart with the vessel on leaving port."
As it is a rule of interpretation to which all assent, "that
the exception of a particular thing from general words
proves that, in the opinion of the law giver, the thing excepted would be within the general clause bad the exception
not been made" (Brown v. The State of JJiaryland, 12 Wheat.,
438), it must be taken as clear that it was the opinion of
Congress that but for the exceptions named in the third section of the act foreign- bound vessels with Chinese laborers
on board coming into our ports in distress, or touching at
them for any other purpose, would have been embraced by
the general words of the act. If, then, it was the sense of
Congress that the hospitality of our harbors would have
been denied by the statute to such vessels, altlwugb entering them in a crippled or even sinking condition, but for the
272-VOL xvn--27
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saving in their favor, it is difficult to understand how the
implication could be stronger that it is the legislative will
that Chinese laborers shall not be brought to our shores for
the purpose of transit across our territory or for any other
purpose not expressly taken out of the general words of the
statute. The necessity, in the opinion of Congress, for the
exception of cases so extreme seemR to leave no room for
argument that it was the intention to extend the prohibition
of th~ statute to all other cases not clearly embraced by the
exceptions named. Indeed it would be difficult to imagine
a more forcible example of the principle that exceptions
strengthen the force of a law in cases not excepted than is
afforded by tile statute under consideration.
Again, according to the settled canon of interpretation,
applicable to all writings, expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the enumeration in the statute of the cases in ·which Chinese
laborers may be brought within the United States, notwithstanding the inhibition of tile first section, must, in my
opinion, be held to be exclusive of all other cases not enu' . "a general
merated. "Where," says a well-known authonty,
act of Parliament confers immunities which expressly exempt
certain persons from the effect and operation of its provissions, it excludes all exemptions to which the subject might
have been before entitled at common law. The introduction of the exemption is necessarily exclusive of all other
independent extrinsic exceptions. The maxim is clear,
expressum facit cessare tacitum. Affirmative specification
excludes implication." (Dwarris on Statutes, p. 605.)
This view of the statute is confirmed by the first article of
the treaty with China, which gives the United States tile
right not only to regulate, suspend, or limit the residence of
Chinese laborers in this country, but, furthermore, to regulate, suspend, or limit their ~'coming" here. As· its title indicates, the act in question is pursuant to the treaty, and
thus not obnoxious to the imputation of harshness or inhospitality towards a friendly power.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARHIS BREWSTER.
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MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

A member of Congress is not an "officer of the Government" within the
·meaning of the provision in section 6 of the act of August 15, 1A76,
chapter 287, whereby "all executive officers or employes of the United
States, not appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate, are prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving
from any other officer or employe of the Government any money or
property or other thing of value for political purposes," etc.
That provision is intended to regulate the conduct of the inferior officers,
etc., of the Government with re::,pect to these and other officers, etc.,
in its service, as ordinarily understood. To place a construction thereon
which would embrace among the latter those who are not'' officers" in
the common acceptation of the word, and thus enlarge the penal effect
of the provision, would not be warranted by any sound rule of interpretation.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1882.
SIR: !have considered the question suggested by l\ir. Alfred
Thomas, chief of a division in the office of the Second Comptroller, in his letter to you of the 6th instant, incompliance with
sour request indorsed thereon under date ofthe 8th instant.
By section 6 of the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 287,'
"All executive officers or employes of the United States, not
appointed by the President with the ad,ice anrl. consent of
the Senate, are prohibiterl. from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer or employe of the Gove-;·wment,
any money or property or other thing of value for political
purposes," etc.; and t.he inquiry is, whether a member of
Congress is au "officer of the Government" within the meaning of this provision.
Unquestionably the station ofmemberof Congress (Senator
or Representative) is a public office, taking these terms in
a broad and general sense, and the incumbent thereof must
be regarded as an officer of the Government in the same
sense. Thus provision is made for administering an "oath
of office" to the members of both houses of Congress (sees. 28
and 30, Rev. Stat.) So the words,~' every person elected or
appointed to any office of honor or profit, either in the civil,
military, or naval service,'' employed in section 1756, Revised
Statutes, which prescribes an oath of office, includes mem-
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bers of Congress. So in section 1786, which provides that
''whenever any person holding office, except as a member of
Congress," etc., the station of member of Congress is distinctly recognized as an office.
But it seems that a member of Congress is not an officer
of the United States in the constitutional meaning of the
term. In the case of Blount, on an impeachment before the
Senate in 1799, the question arose whether a Senator was a
civil officer of the United States within the purview of the
Constitution, and the Senate decided that he was not. This
question arose under the fourth section of the second article
of the Constitution.
"Other clauses of the Constitution," observed Judge Story,.
in section 733 of his work on the Constitution, " would seem
to favor the same result, particularly the clause respecting
appointment of officers of the United States by the Executive,
who is to 'commission all the officers of tbe United States;'
and the sixth section of the first article, which declares that
' no person holding any office ~tnder the United States shall be
a member of either house during his continuance in office;'
and the first section of the second article, which declares that
no 'Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of
trust or profit under the United States shall be appointed an
elector.'" To these clauses may be added that in section 3 of
the fourteenth article, which provides that" no person shall
be a Senator, etc., who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an o.fficer of the United States,"
etc. These clauses show a marked discrimination between
members of Congress and officers j the latter term, in the
sense in which it is there used, not including legislators.
In the penal legislation of Congress a like discrimination is
made. See, for example, the second, third, and sixth sections
of the act of February 26, 1853, chapter 81. That the words
''any officer of the United States," found in the second sec.
tion of that act, do not include members of Congress, is
manifest from the enactment of the third section, in which
they are specially designated. In the sixth section the
same words are used in a similar restricted sense. Compare,
also, sections 1781 and 1782, sections 5450 and 5451, and sections 5500 and 5501, Revised ~tatutes. In legislation of this
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character the word officer appears to be uniformly employed
in a tSense not more comprehensive than that in which it is
employed in the Constitution, as above; that is to say, not
in that broad and general sense which would include members of the legislative branch of the Government.
Section 6 of the act of August 15, 1876, being legislation
of the same chat'acter as that just referred to, it is fair to
assume that the word "officer" is there used in the narrower
sense adverted to, and that it does not include a member of
Congress. The provisions of that section are intended to
regulate the conduct of the inferior officers of the executive
department of the Government, etc., with respect to these
and other officers, etc., who are in the public service, as
ordinarily understood. To place a construction thereon
which would embraee among the latter those who are not
officers in the common acceptation of the word, and thus
enlarge the penal e:fl'ect of those provisions, would not be
warranted by any sound rule of interpretation. Upon these
considerations I am of opinion that a member of Congress
is not an " officer of the Government" within the meaning of
that section.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

RETIRED LIST OF THE ARMY.
In determining whether the limit of four hundred, prescribed by the act
of Juue 18, 1878, chapter 263, has been reached or not, the number
retired under the act of June 30, 1882, chapter 254, must always enter
jnto the computation.
No retirement can lawfully be made under the laws existing prior to
the act of June 30, 1882, when the number already on the retired list
amounts to four hundred; although, by retirements under that act, the
list is subject to temporary augmentation beyond the limit of four·
hundred.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 26, 1882.
SIR: I have given due consideration to your communication of the 15th July instant, asking whether the words,
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"and no act now in force shall be so construed as to limit
or restrict the retirement of officers as herein provided for,,.
contained in the fourth proviso of section 1 of the act of 30th
June, 1882, which declares that an officer of the Army who
bas served forty years shall, upon application to the President, "be retired from active service and placed on the
retired list," and that an officer who bas reached the age of
sixty-four'' shall be retired from active service and placed on
the retired list," is without effect upon the act of 18th June,
1878, which declares that ''the retired list shall hereafter be
limited to four hundred in lieu of the number now fixed by
law," so that no matter what may be the number of the
officers retired under the above-mentioned provision of the
act of 30th of June, 1882, retirements may continue to be
made under the pre-existing law::s, regardless of that number,
ntil such retirements shall have reached the said limit of
four hundred, or whether retirements made under the act of
30th June, 1882, although unrestricted by the said limit of
the act of 18th .Tune, 1878, must nevertbeleAs always be
included in the computation to ascertain whether the limit
prescribed by the act last mentioned bas been reached or not;
and I am of opinion that, in determining whether the limit
of four hundred prescribed by the act of 18th June, 1878,
has been reached or not, the number of officers retired under
the act of 30th June, 1882, must always enter into the computation, so that no retirement can validly be made under
the laws anterior to the act of 30th June, 1882, if the aggregate of retirements under that act and the laws preceding it
shall at any time amount to four hundred.
It is to be remarked, in the first place, that there is but one
retired list for the Army known to law. Accordingly, the
act of 30th June, 1882, declares that when an officer is withdrawn from active service under its provisions be shall be
" placed on the retired list," meaning clearly the list already
-established by law.
And when an officer is thus placed there, it would seem
that he can no more be disregarded in reckoning the number
on the list than an officer put there by virtue of any previous

• law.
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To bold that whenever the number on the retired list has
reached four hundred, in consequence of retirements under
the act of 30th June, 1882, such retirements may be disregarded in reckoning the number on the list as to cases for retirement arising under other lfl,ws, would be nothing less than
to hold that the act of June, 188~, bad repealed the limit.of
the act of June, J 878, in all cases outside the former act where
the list can be brought below th~ maximum by eliminating
retirements under that act, in the face of the declaration of
the law, as it now stands, that there shall be no retirement,
outside the act of June, 18S2, when the list numbers four
hundred, however that number may be made up.
No such reading of the act of J nne, 1882, is admissible, ancl
no such result can be reached without legislation.
Congress has evinced no purpose in the act of June, 1882,
to make a permanent increase of the number of the retired
list. It is true that the list is subject to temporary augmentation beyond the said limit by retirements under that act,
but this excess is exposed to constant diminution and destruction by the occurrence of vacancl.es.
A. similar ruling was made by Mr. Attorney-General Devens
under the old law, fixing the limit of the retired list at three
hundred. lle held that three officers who had been placed
on the retired list, in obedience to as many special acts of
Congress, must be included in any enumeration to ascertain
tlle number on the list, notwithstanding their cases were exceptional, and they would ha ,·e been entitled to retirement if
the list bad been full when Congress directed them to be
placed there. (16 Opin., 26, 27.)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN HARRIS BHEWSTE:R.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.
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POST-TRADERSHIP AT FORT LEWIS, COLO.
Where one person bad been appointed post-trader for a certain military
post, and subsequently, on a change in the location of the post, another
person was appointed post-trader for the same post: Held that as the
la-;-;- allows but one post-trader to be appointed for a military post, the
second appointment must be deemed to work a revocation of the :first,
and accordingly that the last appointee is entitled to the place.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

J'ltly 21>, 1882.
SIR: By the papers which accompanied your letter of the
6th instant, in regard to the post-tradership of the post of
Fort Lewis, Colo., it appears that early in the year 1879 the
establishment of a military post called Fort Lewis was commenced at Pagosa Springs, on the San Juan River, in Colorado, under an appropriation made by the act of March 3,
1879, chapter 182. During the same year Mr. W. S. Peabody
was duly appointedpost-trader at the post of Fort Lewis, and
entered upon the proseGution of business as such. In the following year the location at Pagosa Springs was abandoned,
and a new site for the post was selected on the La Plata
River, in Colorado, distant about 75 miles from the former.
Here the post of Fort Lewis was finally established.
In the meantime a change had taken place in the garrison.
The troops who were on duty at Pagosa Springs w~re ordered
away before the location of the post was changed, and its
establishment on the new site was accomplished by other
troops. The latter, viewing the post thus established as a
neu' post, took steps to have a post-trader appointed therefor, disregarding the claim of Peabody to the place under
his appointment as above. And subsequently, on December
23, 1882, Mr. J. G. Price was appointed a post-trader at the
post of Fort Lewis (new), on the recommendation of a council of administration, approved by the commander of the
post Price is now carrying on the business of post-trader
there; but Peabody claims that he is legally entitled to the
place.
Hereupon you submit the following question: "Who is
legally the post-trader at the post of Fort Lewis, Colorado 1"
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It has been held by one of my predecessors that a posttrader is simply a person licensed by the Secretary of War,
with the; concurrence of the council of administration and
commanding officer of the post, to carry on a certain traffic
at a military post; that he is removable at the pleasure of
the Secretary; and that his removal would consist merely in
a revocation of his license by the Secretary, in which the
concurrence of the council of administration and commanding officer of the post is not required. (15 Opin., 278.) In
this view I concur. And as the law allows but one posttrader to be appointed for a military post, when the appointment of a person as trader at a particular post has been
made and subsequently another person is appointed traderat the same post, the second appointment must be deemed
to work a revocation of the first. Accordingly, in the case
under consideration, the appointment of Price as post-trader
at Fort Lewis (which appears to have been made in conformity with the requirements of the statute) operated to
revoke the previous appointment of Peabody as trader at
the same post.
In direct answer to your question, then, I reply, that in
my opinion Price is legally the post-trader at that post.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMlN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

ARMY OFFICERS' PAY ACCOUNTS.
Where an officer's account for the same month was paid twice by different paymasters-one payment being made in November and the other
in December: Held that the paymaster who made the last payment is
chargeable with the overpayment.
In such case the Government may hold liable for the overpayment both
the officer who ma,de and the officer who received the payment.
As between two conflicting claims to a credit for a disbursement made
on the same day, which. might then have been lawfully made by either
one of the claimants, but not by both, regard may be had to the actual
t.ime of day when the payment by each was made in order to determine
which had priority.

I
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When the arnount of overpayments to an officer are charged to the paymasters making them, and the Government afterwards recovers a part
of the loss sustained by such overpayments, the balance of the loss
should be apportioned to all of these paymasters pro rata.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July, 21, 188~.
SIR: Your letter of the 2d of March last requests an opinion
upon certain questions propounded by the Second Comptroller of the Treasury, which, together with the facts giving
rise to them, are contained in a statement of that officer inclosed therewith. The following are the facts and questions
as thus presented:
"James L. Mast, ]ate first lieutenant Second United States
Artillery, was on duty within the limits of the Charleston payoffice prior to October 20, 1877. After that date he was on
duty within the limits of the New York office. He deserted
in March, 1878. His pay was drawn twice for August, 1877,
three times for November, 1877, and twice for December,
1877. Charging him with the overpayments and allowing
all possible credits, he remains indebted to the United States
under appropriation' Pay, etc., of the Army, 1879, and prior
years,' in the sum of $353.34:; he is also indebted in the further sum of $214.17, as charged on the books of the Third
Auditor.
"Payments for August, 1877.-The act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1878, did not become a law until November 21,1877,
and funds for the payment of officers for that year were not
received at New York until November 24, 1877, on which day
an account of Mast for August was paid to an assignee by
the chief paymaster at New York. The propriety of this
payment has not been questioned. Another account for
August was paid to an assignee December 4, 1877, also at
the New York office, by Paymaster A, who has been charged
with the amount of his payment. A asks that the charge
be removed. He urges that on December 4, 1877, the chief
paymaster's vouchers for payments made in November had
not been abstracted, and therefore that it would have been
impracticable to examine those vouchers and ascertain
whether a payment for August had been previously made.
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It does not appear, however, that at the time he made the
payment, or for a long time afterwards, he knew whether
said vouchers had been abstracted, nor does it appear that he
made any inquiries concerning payments made by other paymasters at the same office.
"Question 1. Is Paymaster A chargeable with the overpayment for August~"
I answer this question in the affirmative. Lieutenant M.'s
account for his services during August having been previously
paid, nothing remained owing by the Government for those
services when the payment by A of another account for the
same was made. Hence the latter, in making such payment,
exceeded his authority as a disbursing agent, and thereby
incurred liability to the Government for the amount so paid.
Where an officer has been paid a second time for the· same
service, the Government may hold liable for the sum so paid
both the officer who made and the officer who received the
payment.
''Payments for November, 1877.-Paymasters A and B, at
the New York office, paid accounts for Mast for November as
follows: B, on the 30th of November, 1877; A, on the 4th of
December, 1877. Each payment was made to an assignee ot
Mast. Mast was on duty at Fort McHenry, Ivid., and the
assignee paid by B was engaged in business in Wheeling,
W.Va. It is therefore held as a fact that B must have
known that the account paid by him had been transferred
before it ha(J become due. (See paragraph 1349 of the .Army
Regulations of 1863.) The account paid by A had also been
transferred before it had become due. A shows that an a"!:>stract of the payments made by B in November was not
made until after the 4th of December, and that B was absent
from New York on duty from the 1st to the 5th of December;
but he fails, as before, to show that he knew of the existence
of the difficulty suggested at the time of payment, or that be
made any effort before payment to ascertain whether payment had been previously made by any other paymaster at
the same post. A bas been charged with the amount of the
payment made by him. . B has not been charged.
"Question 2. Is .A liable on account of overpayment forNovember!

•
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"Question 3. Is B liable on account of overpayment for
November~"

These questions I answer, the one (question 3) in the negative and the other (question 2) in the affirmative. A is liable for the amount here paid by him upon the same ground
precisely on which his liability rests in the preceding case.
''A third account for November (the statement adds) was
paid by Paymaster Cat Charleston, S.C., December 6, 1877 ••
to an assignee. The account had been transferred before it
became due, and 0 knew of that fact at the time of the payment, and knew also that Mast was not then serving in the
Charleston district. (See paragraph 1348, Army Regulations
of 1863, and circular on pages 28, 64, 82, and 101 of memoranda, circulars, and .circular letters, Paymaster-General's
Office.) C has been charged with the amount paid by him.
''Question 4. Is C liable for the overpayment made by
him¥"
I answer, yes. His liability rests upon the same ground
as A's.
"Payments for December, 1877.-Paymasters A and B,
both still in the New York office, each paid to an assignee
an account of Mast for December, on the last day of that
month. A third account was presented at a later date to
B, who declined to pay it. Each of said paymasters was
chargeable with notice that the account paid by him had
been transferred before maturity. It does not appear that
either of them made any effort to ascertain whether payment had been made by or demanded of the other.
" Question 5. Shall A be charged, shall B be charged;
shall both A and B be charged on account of the double
payment for December¥"
Assuming, in this case, that the officer's compensation for
December was lawfully payable on the last day of that month,
the question here propounded turns on the prio'r ity of pay·
ment. If A paid first, then B is liable and should be
charged, on the ground that when the latter paid there was
nothing due from the Government, and so no authority in
him to pay. And vice 'ttrsa. As between two conflicting
claims to a credit for a disbursement made on the same day,
which might then have been lawfully made by either one of
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the claimants, but not by both, regard may well be had to
the actual time of day when the payment by each was made
in order to determine which was prior.
"No payment was made for January, 1878 (the statement
continues), but two accounts for that month, which had been
received at the New York office from assignees, were forwarded by the chief paymaster to the Paymaster-General,
indorsed as follows: 'Payment refused, both accounts being
for January, 1878, and received before the expiration of the
month.'. On the 1st of March, 1878, said Paymaster B, after
inquiring in all the offices if his (Mast's) accounts for February had been either presented or paid, paid an account of
Mast for February, 1878, to an assignee. Said account had
evidently been transferred before maturity, and as Mast's
post was Fort McHenry and the assignee resided in Wheeling, W. Va., B was chargeable with notice of the fact. Besides B knew that at least two accounts had been presented
for December, and he was chargeable with notice as to the
condition of Mast's account with the Government, at least
so far as the same was affected by payments made to him or
to his assignee through the New York office, and proper
inquiry would have developed the fact that, by reason of
duplication of payments, .Mast was in arrears to the United
States. (See sec. 1766, R.. S.)
"Question 6. Is B chargeable with the account so paid by
him for February, 18781
"Question 7. If the aggregate of the charge against paymasters on account of payments made to Mast be at the end
fonud to exceed the loss actually sustained by the United
States, how will the amount of tha.t loss be apportioned~"
To the former of these quest,ions I reply, that if B was
chargeable with notice when he paid the account for February, that 1\iast was then in arrears to the United States, he
incurred liability for the payment so made, and the result
would be the same, I think, if the facts then in possession of
B were such as to put him upon inq uit·y as to the state of
M.'s account with the Government; otherwise B would not
be liable for the payment and could not properly be charged
therewith.
To the other question I reply, that the apportionment of
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loss should be pro rata. Thus, if the amount of overpayments chargeable to A be $200, and the amount chargeable
to B $300~ and the Government should recover from.. M. a
portion of the loss thus sustained, say $100, the balance of
the loss should be borne by A and B in proportion to the
amount with which th(>y were charged, respectivdy; that is
to say, $160 by A and $240 by B.
Another case is presented as follows :
'' Paymaster E paid an account of James H. Whitton,
second lHmtenant Fifth United States Infantry, for April,
1877, on the 9th of May, 1877, to an assignee, and ·another
for the same month on the 31st of May, 1877, to Whitton
himself. E has been charged with the amouut of the overpayment.. Whitton left the service May 31, 1877. He never
drew his pay for January, 1877. He is charged with the sum
of $98.25 on the Third Auditor's books, and with the sum of
$673.96 on the Second Auditor's books, the latter charge
being on aceount of ordnance am] ordnance stores for which
he was responsible. E asks that said January pay be so
applied as to relieve him from responsibility for said overpayment. It is the practice of the accounting officers to
follow the order prescribed in paragraph 1363 of the Army
Regulations of 1863, and where an officer is in arrears toreimburse the United States out of his undrawn pay for public
property unaccounted for to the exclusion, if necessary, of a
paymaster wbo bas made an O\erpayment.
'' Question 8. Ought tl1e charge against E to be removed,
as he requests, or ought the practice hitherto obtaining to
be adhered to ~ "
In reply to this question I submit that E has no right, as
against the United States; to have the said January pay of
W. applied for his own relief. At the time E incurred liability for the overpayment to W. (.\fay, 31, 1877), the latter,
as it would seem, already stood indebted to tile United
States, and on general principles, irrespective of the practice
referred to, the pay mentioned should first be applied in satisfaction of such indebtedness. I accordingly answer the
first branch of the question in the negative, and the alternative, or last branch, in the affirmative.
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The following case is also presented:
"An account of E. W. Maxwell, second lieutenant Twenti.eth United States Infantry, for March, 1878, was paid on the
30th of that month, at New York City, by Paymaster D.
Said Maxwell was on duty at that place from March 2 to
April 8, 1878. The propriety of the payment so made is not
doubted. Paymaster E, at Washington, D. U., paid a second
account of Maxwel1 for March on the 31st of March, and an
account for April on the 30th of April, 1878. ·Maxwell was
not serving within the limits of the Washington office on
either of the dates last mentioned. Each of the accounts
paid by E was held by an assignee, and had been transferred.
before maturity. E has been charged with the entire amount
paid by him. A second account for April was paid by Paymaster F, at San Antonio, Tex. Maxwell was on duty within
the limits of the San Antonio office from April 26 to May 31,
1878. He was dismissed the service by sentence of courtmartial in Augnst, 1878. It appears from the record of the
court that the account paid by F was paid before the end of
the month (see sec. 364:8, R. S.) to an assignee to whom it had
been assigned before it was due. F has been charged with
the amount paid by him.
"Maxwell being credited with all undrawn pay, it was
found by. a settlement confirmed February 21, 1879, that his
pay was overdrawn in the sum of $15.6.'5. He is indebted to
the United States in the fm,ther sums of $138.51 and $275.48,
tor public property received by him April 7 and 15, 1878, for
which he failed to account, as appears by a settlement confirmed February 20, 1880, since which date he has stood
charged with the total sum of $449.60.
"In May, 1881, the assignee to whom Paymaster E had
paid Maxwell's account for April presented certain claims to
Paymaster F for payment. From the amount of the claims
so presented F withheld a sum equivalent to Maxwell's pay
for April, 1878, proposing to deposit the same in the Treasury to make good the duplicate payment made to said assignee by Paymaster E for that month. 1 Said assignee having presented the case to the Paymaster-General, that officer,
on the 9th of June, 1881, asked of the Second Auditor that
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he 'be furnished with a copy of any settlemeut made in your
(the Second Auditor's) office of the pay of Lieut. E. W. Maxwell, Twentieth Infantry, showing his present indebtedness.
to the United States on account of pay.' The PaymasterGeneral's letter was returned by the Second Auditor's office
with an indorsement stating that copy of statement in the
case of Maxwell was inclosed. T_he paper inclosed was a
copy of the statement of account with the settlement confirmed February 27, 1879, indicating a balance of pay overdrawn $15.55, and no reference was made to the settlement
of February 20, 1880, nor to the balance of $429.60. Thereupon the Paymaster-General, in July, 1881, directed F to
refund to said assignee the difference between the sum withheld by him, as aforesaid, and the sum of $15.65, the latter
now being the balance found due in said settlement of February 27, 1879. F did as he was directed. It is claimed that
no charge should be found against either E or F on account
of payments for April, 1878.
''Question 9. Shall E be relieved from responsibility on
account of his payment to .Maxwell for March, and shall E
and F, or either of them, be relieved from responsibility on
account of said payments to Maxwell for April, 1878 ~"
Answer. The facts above set forth furnish no ground whatever for relieving E from his liability for the payment of ~i.'s
second account for March. But in regard to the overpayment for April, the claim for relief therefrom seems to be
well founded. The assignee of M.'s account for that montht
to whom E made payment, had at the time of such payment
no claim against tlle U uited States by reason of the assignment, an account of ::\1. for the same month having then
already been paid by F, and nothiug being then due to
l\I. for that period. When, therefore, the assignee subsequently presented claims for payment, an amount due on
such claims sufficient to offset the overpayment for April
might properly be retained, as it in fact was retained for that
purpose by F. The relinquishmeqt of this amount by the
latter, which was available for the extinguishment of theliability incurred for the overpayment for April, cannot, under
the circumstances stated, justly operate to the disadvantage
of either F or E. They should not be made to S':Jffer for the

TO THE SECRETARY . OF THE TREASURY.

433

In tern a I Revenue.

error or inadvertence of other officials. In my opinion, they
are entitled to be relieved from liability for that overpayment.
I return herewith the papers which accompanied your letter.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

INTERNAL REVENUE.
The 50 per centum required by section 3176, Revised Statutes, to be
added to the tax upon taxable property owned by any person who
neglects or refuses to make a list or return of' such property, and to
verify the same as provided by law, is a penalty, not a tax.
In the case stated, the facts bring it within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, given by section 5293, Revised Statutes, to remit
fines, penalties, etc.
Section 3120, Revised Statutes, affordM no relief to the party, the addition
to his tax having been legally made.
DEPA.RTMEN~ OF JUSTICE,

July 28, 1882.
In your letter of the 17th instant you ask my opinion
as to the proper construction of the provision in section 3176,
Revised Statutes, which requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to add 50 per cent. to the tax upon taxable
property owned by any person who neglects or refuses to
make a list or return of such property and to verify the
same as required by law..
Is the addition a tax only, or is it a penalty 7 I think it is
a penalty. It is referred to and called a penalty or forfeiture in the act from which section 3176 is taken. This sec, tion is a re-enactment of the latter part of section 14 of the
· revenue act of the 30th of June 1864 (13 Stat., 227.)
In sectiop 110 of the act, page 278, it is provided that any
refusal or neglect by banks or bankers to make the return
required of them shall su~ject tbem to pay a penalty of $200,
'' besides the additional penalty and forfeitures in other cases
272-VOL XVII--28
SIR :

provided in the act." Now the only "additional penalty"
applicable in such a ease is tha provided in section 14,
namely the 50 per cent. added to the tax when parties neglect or refuse to return lists of their taxable property.
In other analogous eases the exaction for neglect or failure
to ~mply with the requirement of t.he law is termed a pen"lty. Thus in the last paragraph of section 9 pf the act of
July 13, 1866 !14: Stat., 147), it was required tha tin lists or
returns of o\)jects of taxation tl)e persons returning such
lists should declare whether the rates and amounts were
~tated according to their value in legal-tender currency or in
eoin~d money, and a neglect or refusal so to declare brought
upon the party au addition to his tax of the" penalties" imposed by law in other eases of like neglect or refusal.
There are other instances which need not be cited. Those
referred to above show abundantly the legislative understanding that the addition of 50 per cent. to the tax in ease
of refusal or neglect, etc., provided in section 3176 is a penalty.
;ro the same effoot the Supreme Court in Wrigltt v. Blakes lie
(1'01 U.S., 178) uses this language. "Another point made
by the plaintiff again t the as
ment relates to the bo per
cent. added to the amount of the sueeesston tax, and exacted
by way of penalty for refusing to make a return as required
by the statute. The assessor evidently thought that he was
authorized to impose the penalty prescribed by the fourteenth section of the act of 1864, • • • which was, it is
true,~ penalty of 50 per cent. of the tax for refusal or neg}eet to make a list or return."
Moreover, in the customs laws what is called an" addition"
to the tax or duty has been treated by the courts as a penalty.
By the seventeenth section of the act of August 30, 1842
(5 Stat., 564), and by section 8 of the act of July 30, 1846
(9 Stat., 43), if the invoice of goods imported was less by upwards of 10 per cent. than the appraisal of the officer, there
was "tMlded" to the duty imposed by law upon the goods
when fairly invoiced 50 per centum by the earlier law and 20
per centum by the later.
These acts have not unfreqqently come before the courts, •
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and though the particular question does not seem to have
baen raised, that is, whether the addition is a tax or pen·
alty, still it is in almost every instance called a penalty and
treated as such, as if there could be no doubt upon the
point. •(See Belchet v. La'lcrence, 21 Howard, 251-256; Man·
lzattan Gas Light Co., v. JJfaxwell, 2 Blatchford, 405; Howland v. J.llaxu·ell, 3 id., 146 ;' Carnes v. JJlaxwell, 3 id., 420;
B(tnnendaltl v. Redfield, 4 id., 223; Bischof v. Maxwell, 4
id., 384.) In Spring v. Russell (1 Lowell's Decisions), the
judge calls' the like provision in other acts a "penal duty."
Such no doubt it is in section 3176, Revised Statutes. It is
in the nature of punishment, and was intended, by ·fear of
its exaction, to induce all persons holding taxable property
to make out lists thereof and. return the same within the
time prescribed by law.
In the case stated in your letter of the private banker
there was no fraud or willful negligence, but in ignorance
of the statute he failed to make his semi-annual return. As
oon as he had knowledge of the requirement be obeyed.
The penalty is less than $1,000.
In my opinion the facts bring the case within the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, gh?en by section 5293,
Revised Statutes, to remit fines, penalties, a.nd forfeitures
which are imposed under authority of any revenue law.
Section 3120, Revised Statutes, affords no relief to the
party; the addition to his tax having been legally made.
(See 10 Opin., 667.)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJA~IIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Ron.

CHARLES

J.

FOLGER,

Secretary of the.. Treasury.
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CASE OF CHARLES D. COLEMAN.
The order of the President in this case, of March 3, 1869, which was
rescinded March 13, 1889, bemg executory and in its nature revocable,
and having remained unexecuted at the time of its rescission, was
completely annulled there by.
A general officer, commanding a military department in July, 1865, bad
no power to appoint a court-martial for the trial of an officer under
his command where be was himself the "accuser or prosecutor"; nor
could such power be imparted to him otherwise than by a legislative act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 2, 1882.
SIR: I have examined the application of Mr. Charles D.

Coleman, dated the 8th ultimo, in connect,ion with his supplemental application of a suh~equent date, both of which
were referred to me by your direction for an opinion upon
the legal questions presented therein. The facts of his case,
as stated in tite original application, are in substance the
foll6wing:
In June1 1863, thp applicant was appointed by the President provost-marshal of the f\rst district of Missouri, onder
the act for eprolling and calling out the national forces, etc.,
~nd entered upon and continued in the discharge of the
duties of that office until June 17, 1865, when he was placed
under arrest and in close confinement upon charges preferred against him by the order of Major-General Dodge,
then commanding the Department of the Missouri. He was
afterwards brought to trial on such charges before a courtmartial, convened by the order of General Dodge, convicted
and sentenced (inter alia) "to be imprisoned for a period of
seven months (and thereafter until he should turn over a .
certain sum of money), ~t such place as should he designated
by said commanding general, and to be dishonorably dismissed from the service." The procee<Jings and sentenoo
were approved by General Dodge, and the sentence carried
into execution by his order; the applicant was dishonorably
dismissed from the service, and imprisoned in the Missouri
penitentiary, where he remained in confinement until April
28, 1866, when he was discharged by the United States cir-
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<mit court for the district of Missouri on a writ of habeas
corpus.
The applicant further states in substance, that General
Dodge was the actual accuser in the case, and that the courtmartial was changed by his orders (in relieving some of the
members thereof from longer service tbereon) ''subsequent
to all the material evidence having been produced."
In February, 1869, the applicant presented a petition to
President Johnson "praying for a reversal of such conviction and sentence," upon which the President made the
following order : ·
''EXECUTIVE l\I.A.NSION, JJ[arch 3, 1869.
"Case of Coleman, C. D., captain. Convicted of fraud
upon Government. Recommended for removal of disability.
''Respectfully referred to the Secretary of War. Let the
disabilities be removed and an honorable discharge granted.
"ANDREW JOHNSON."
Upon the recommendation of the General of the Army,
dated ~farch 13~ 1869, that the foregoing order be not executed (such recommendation being approved by the President), that order was rescinded by an order of the Secretary
of War, attested by "Ed. Schriver, Inspector-General."
The applicant claims that the order of President Johnson
was final, that its rescission was unauthorized and illegal,
and should ~e disregarded, and that it should be executed.
This claim in my opinion is not well founded. The order
referred to, being executory, was in its nature revocable at
any time before the execution thereof; and as it remained
unexecuted at the time of its rescission as above, such
rescission being made by competent authority completely
annulled it, and thenceforth the matter stood precisely as
if such order bad never been issued.
Some elements in the case which are only briefly adverted
to in the original application are presented more at large in
the supplemental application. In the latter tbe applicant
states:
"By a report made by the Judge-Advocate-General, dated
December 16, 1865, upon a review of the case, he found and
determined as a question of fact, that General Dodge, by

(
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whose order the court-martial was convened for my trial,
and the :findings and sentence of such court wer~ approved
anu ca;rried into execution, was the a~tual accuser against
me, although not appearing as the prosecutor of record, and
held that all the proceedings in the case were void ab initio
for that reason, and adYised that I be released and restored
to my office."
By a supplemental report made by the Judge-AdvocateGeneral, dated January 17, 1866, while adhering to the fact
thus found and determined by him in his previous report,
that General Dodge was the actual accuser in the case, came
to the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the action of
General Dodge in thus conYening such court, and in thus
approving of the :findings and sentence, and in thus carrying
such sentence into execution, was authorized and lawful,
notwithstanding l1e was the actual accuser, by reason of an
indorsement upon the papers relating to the case, of which
the following is a copy :
" Referred to Major-General Dodge, commanding the Department of :Missouri, with directions to secure the money in
question, and to bring the parties to justice. By order of
the Secretary of War.
"C. A. DANA,
"Assistant Secretary of War."
Hereupon the applicant proposes the following question:
" Could General Dodge, as commandant of the Department of Missouri, in the month of Julyl 1865, have lawfully
convened a court-martial for the trial of a subordinate officerunder his comm~md, in a case in which he was the rrctual
accuser, upon such direction of the Secretary of War as herein
before set forth; or could he ha\e lawfully approved of the
:findings and sentence of a court thus convened, and. carried
such sentence into execution, extending to the dismissal of
such officer from the service ; and if General Dodge was the
actual accuser, as thus found, are the :findings, conviction,
and sentence of such court valid or invalid ~"
Under the sixty-fifth article of war (act of April10, 1806,
chap. 20), "any general officer commanding an army or colonel commanding a separate department," was authorized
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to appoint general courts-martial whenever necessary. But
by the act of May 29, 1~30, chapter 179, it was provided
that whenever such general officer or colonel shall be the
''accuser or prosecutor" of any officer in the Army under his
command, the general court-martial for the trial of the accused shall be appointed by the President, and furthermore,
that the proceedings and sentence of the court shall be sent
directly to the Secretary of War, to be laid before the President for his approval or orders in the case. The act of December 24, 1861, chapter 3. which gave to the commander
of a division or of a separate brigade power to con"'ene general courts-martial in time of war also contained a provision
that when such commander shall be the accuser or prosecutor, the court shall be appointed by the next higher commander. The purpose of these provisions in the acts of1830
and 1861, limiting the authority vested in the officers mentioned to appoint general courts-martial, is obviously to
guard against results which would not be in harmony with
a proper sense of justice, and which might ensue if the officer by whom the charge is made, and who is interested in
the issue, were permitted to detail the members of the court
which is to try the accused, the danger being that such officer, under the influence of a· strong feeling against the accused, might select those who are hostile to the latter or
unduly biased in his own favor, and who, for that reason,
would be less able to render a fair judgment in the case.
And it is very clear that, by force of these provisions, an
officer in command of an army or a department, etc., had, at
the period to which the present case refers, no power to appoint a general court-martial for the trial of an officer under
his command where he was himself the "accuser or prosecutor;" nor could such power be imparted to him otherwise
than by a legislative act. It is unnecessary to add that the
appointing of a court-martial, convened l>y an official without authority to appoint it, would be void and would have
no eft'ect.
I submit then, in answer to the above question (especia11y
the last clause thereof), that if General Dodge was the actual
accuser in the case under consideration, the court-martial
by which the applicant was tried was illegally constituted
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and the findings and sentence thereof were consequently
void. Whether the fact in that regard be, as it is here,
hypothetically stated, is a subject upon which I express no
opinion; it not being within the province of the AttorneyGeneral to determine questions of fact.
.
I have the honor to be, your obedient serT"ant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
EXPENSES OF LAST SICKNESS.
The Commissioner of Pensions is not invested with power to audit and
adjust accounts for the last sickness aud burial of deceased pensioners
arising under section 47ltl, Revised Statutes. This power belongs solely
to the proper accounting officers of the Treasury by virtue of section
2:16, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMEN1' OF

JUSTICE,
August 3, 1882.
SIR: The question presented by the letter of the Second
Comptroller, referred to in and accompanying your communication of the 8th July ultimo, requesting my opinion, is
whether the accounts presented by persons who have borne
the expenses of " the last sickness and burial" of deceased
pensioners, under section 4718 of the Revised Statutes, must
be audited and adjusted in the Treasury by the accounting·
officers after an examination of the original vouchers and
papers, or whether the Commissioner of Pensions may determine finally the amount properly due for such expenses, and
by w:ithholding the original vouchers from the accounting
officers compel them to audit and allow such claims upon the
mere certificate of that officer.
It is conceded by the Comptroller ih his letter that the
Commissioner of Pensions is authorized to decide who are
entitled to be pensioners and the amounts to be paid to them,
respectively, as such, and that his decision is to that extent
conclusive as to the accounting officers; but he insists that
claimants for reimbursement of expenses of the last sickness
and burial of pensioners are not in any sense on the footing
of pensioners, and that the ascertainment and allowance of
the difl'erent items of such expense belong exclusivel,.v to
the accounting officers of the Treasury.
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Section 4718, Revised Statutes, provides that when a pensioner, or a person entitled to a pension and "having an ap·
plication therefor pending, ''shall die, not leaving a widow or
child him surviving, "no payment whatsoever of the accrued
pension shall be made or allowed, except so much as may be
necessary 1o reimburse the person who bore the expenses of
the last sickness and burial of the decedent, in cases where
he did not leave sufficient assets to meet such expenses."
It may be assumed as established that the decision of the
Commissioner of Pensions placing a person on the pension
roll, and fixing the amount of his pension, is conclusive, and
consequently that in settling the accounts of pension agents
the accounting officers have no authority to go behind the
pensioner's certificate.
It must be taken as equally clear that, as the pew•:ion law
determines the amounts to be paid the various pensioners,
the action of the Commissioner of Pensions, in allowing or
directing payment of a pension, cannot be said to ever in- .
volve an accounting, in any proper sense of that term.
An examination of the various provisions under the title
"pensions" in the Revised Statutes will show that, with the
€xception of said section 4 718, there is not one that calls for
the auditing and settling of accounts, and 'that there is an
€ntire absence of any direct or express intention that the
Commissioner of Pensions should have the power to audit accounts. So far from it, indeed, the law withholds from him
the power to administer oaths, which is expressly conferred on
the Auditors of the Treasury that t bey may take testimony
"in any case in which they may dPern it, necessary for the
due examination of the accounts w·ith which they shall be
cbarged." (Sec. 297, Rev. Stat.)
Congress has provided an admirable system for the adjustment of public accounts (chaps. 3 and 4, Rev. Stat.), and
has declared that ''all claims and demands whatever by the
United States or against them, and all accounts whatever in
which the United States are coneerneu, either as debtors or
ascreditors, shall be settled and adjusted in the Department of
the Treasury." (Sec. 236, Rev. Stat.) This system has been
in operation from the foundation of the Government, and
there can be no doubt as to the general intention of Congress
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that all unliquidated demands against the Government shall
be adjusted by the accounting officers forming the system.
Whether we regard sections 4718 and 236 as holding the
same relation to one another as when the former was section
25 of the act of 3rd l\Iarch, 1873, and the latter section 3 of the
act of 3rd March, 1817, or, since the enactment of the Revised
Statutes, parts of one and the same statute, I perceive no
ground whatever for holding that section 4718 was intended
to restrict or qualify the declaration contained in section 236,
that all demands and accounts whatever against the Government shall be audited and adjusted in the Treasury.
It is the first rluty of the exponder of several cognate statutes, or of several provisions of the same statute, to give
them all a harmonious interpretation, and nothing short of
some irreconcilable repugnancy can justify him in imputing
to the legislature confused or inconsistent intentions.
From the time of the passage of the act, of 1873 until a very
recent date, according to the Comptroller's letter, these two
provisions have been trt•ated as in perfect harmony, and
accounts under section 4718 have been audited and adjusted
by the accounting officers after an examination of the original
vouchers aml papers in the accustomed way, and it is only
by a strained construction of this section that any collision
between it and section 236 is now produced.
It follows, therefore, that the Commissioner of Pensions bas
no authority to au( lit and adjust accounts under said section
4718, Revised Statutes.
It is proper to add that my opinion of the 28th April, 1882,
which the Comptroller says has been invoked as an authority
for the new interpretation of section 4718, does not conflict
with this opinion. In the former it was held that Congress
intended that a decision of the Commissioner of Pensions as
to the amount demandable by a pensioner should be conclusive, while this opinion holds that Congress had no intention
to invest that officer with the power to audit and adjust
accounts under section 4 718. The language of each opinion
must be taken in connection with its subject-matter.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, ~
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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REGISTRY OF VESSELS.
A registered vessel of the United States, wholly and continuously owned
by a citizen of the United States, does not forfeit her privileges as such
by having been employed under a foreign flag since the rebellion.
An Americau built vessel, wholly and continuously owned by a citizen of
the United States, but as yet unregistered, may be admitted to registry~
although she has sailed under a foreign flag since the rebellion.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Aug'ust 16, 1882.
SIR: The questions submitted for my opinion in your communication of the 21st July ultimo are:
(1) "Can a vessel, built and registered in the United States
since the close ~f the rebellion, but which has been employed
under a foreign :flag, though in the continuous ownPrship of
a citizen of the United States, be again admitted to registry
as a vessel of the United States withoqt the authority of a
special act of Congress 7
(2) "Can a vessel, built and owned as above described,.
which was never registered as a vessel of the United States,
but which has been placed under a foreign :flag immediately
after having been built, be admitted to registry without such
special act of Congress f"
I will consider these questions in their order.
I. A vessel to be entitled to registry under our navigation laws must have been built within the United States, or
captured in war by citizens of the United States and condemned as prize, or adjudged to be forfeited for breach of the
laws of the United States, or wrecked in our waters and purchased and repaired by ~. citizen of the United States, provided the repairs amount to three-fpurths of the cost of tlte
vessel when so repaired, and must in each case be wholly
owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States and commanded by a citizen thereof.
A registered vessel of the United States may be denationalized permanently or temporarily in several ways, namely:
by voluntary sale to a foreigner; or hy capture and condemnation under the authority of a foreign power, saving, how- ·
ever, to the owner at the time of such capture and condemnation, by a sort of jus postliminii, the right to a new register
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if he should regain his lost property in such vessel; or by
having sailed under the flag and enjoyed the protection of any
foreign government during the rebellion; or by the owner of
any inter~st in her usually residing in a foreign country, but
during such rE.lsidence only, unless such owner be a consul of
the United States, or the agent for and partner iu some house
of trade consisting of citizens of the United States actually
carrying on trade within the United States ; or by the owner
of any interest in her, being a naturalized citizen of the United
States, residing more than one year in his native country, or
two years in any other foreign country, unless such person be
a consul or other public agent of the United States, saving
that in such case such vessel may have a. new register if sold
in good faith to a citizen of the United States. (Sees. 4132,
4133, 4134, 4135, 4136, 4165, Rev. Stat.)
These are the several conditions in which vessels may enjoy
or forfeit the privileges of registration unqer our navigation
laws. Considering the care with which these laws have been
framed, it would seem but reasonable to conclude that if Congress had intended that a vessel with an American register,
and continuously owned by a citizen of the United States,
should forfeit her privileges as such by sailing under the protection of a foreign flag since the close of the rebellion, such
intention would have been clearly expressed. The silence of
Congress on this head, and the precision and particularity
with which it has set forth the cases in which the benefits of
registration may oe lost, alike forbid any resort to implication for the purpose of raising other grounds of forfeiture,
especially when the effect of doing so must be to abridge the
rights of our own citizens and diminish our tonnage. To
hold otherwise would be to violate ·one of the best-settled
canons of interpretation, that the enumeration of excepted
ca~es strengthens the application of a statute to cases not
excepted.
I am therefore of opinion that a registered vessel of the
United States. wholly and continuously owned by a citizen
()r citizens of the United States, does not forfeit her prhTileges
as such by the fact of having sailed under the protection and
flag of a foreign power since the rebellion.
2. The same reasoning also cond nets me to the opinion,
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in answer to the second question, that an American-built vessel, wholly and continuously owned by a citizen or citizens
of the United States, but as yet unregistered, is entitled to
registry, albeit she has sailed under the protection and flag
of a foreign power since the rebellion. Until Congress has
said that. the employment of such a vessel in the home or colonial trade of another power shall debar her from taking out
an American register. her right to do so exists in full force.
The statute permits registry, but does not command it.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

CONTRACT WITH THE OSAGE NATION OF INDIANS.
Upon the facts stated: Advised that Charles Ewing, esq., is entitled t()
the compensation charged in his account for services rendered the
Osage Nation of Indians under a contract therewith, executed in compliance with the la'Y' respecting contracts with IndianA, dated February 14, 1877.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A. ugust 21, 1882.
SIR: I have examined the case of Charles Ewing, esq., to
whose letter addressed to you on the 7th instant you invite
my attention, and ask for an expression of' my views upon
the que&tions arising upon the facts therein stated.
Mr. Ewing's statement; shows that in a contract with him
dated the 14th day of February, 1877, entered into by the
Osage Nation of Indians through its duly-accredited agents
(the said contract being drawn up and ex,..,cuted in compliance with the law regulating contracts with the Indians,
section 2103, Revised Statutes), it is stipulated that Mr.
Ewing should receive 7~ per cent. of all moneys that he
should cause to be passed to the credit of said nation in the
Treasury of the United States. The Osages claimed that
large sums of money were due them, or should in law and
justice be placed to their credit, chiefly for their lands in
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Kansas taken and sold or otherwise disposed of by the
United States; and the services to be rendered by Mr.
Ewing were, among other things, the obtaining settlements
from the United States and causing the moneys which in
justice belonged to the Osages to be placed to their credit
at the Treasury of the United States.
The contract was duly approved by the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs aml by the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to section 2103, Revi~ed Statutes.
Under this contract ~ir. Ewing has rendered very im.
portant and valuable services, and has caused large sums
of money to be deposited in the Treasury of the United
States to the credit of the Osage
.As required by section
2104 9 Revised Statutes, he has made affidavit of his services
and presented his accounts. The Secretary and the Commissioner have certified that he has complied with and fulfilled the coutract (sec. 2101, Rev. Stat.), and they have approved the accounts for his compensation. The accounts, two
in number, have been passed by the Second Comptroller and
have been paid, except a portion of the last one.
This account, approved as aforesaid, was for $17,706.27,
which is 7-l per cent. upon $236,083.88 placed tc the credit
of the Osages in the Treasury.
The Second Comptroller excepted from this account the
percentage on an item of $70,096.12, which he postponed for
further examination.
This sum was, without agreement or treaty with or authority from the Osages, taken from their funds by the
United States and paid over to the Cherokees in payment
for lands in the Indian Territory purchased of them for the
use and for the settlement in that Territory of the Kaw or
Kansas tribe of Indians. There was no privity between
the Osages and the Kaws. There was no indebtedness of
the latter to the former. Clearly the United States assumed
the obligation to reimburse the Osages. They had a right
to -look to the Government of the United States as their
debtor, 'but they were not credited with the money in the
Treasury. There was nothing to show that the United
States recognized the indebtedness.
In the review of the accounts of the Osage Nation with
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the United States, which by the contract :\1r. Ewing was bound
to make, this error was discovered and brought to the at·
tention of the Secretary, and the result was that the sum
named above was p.assed to the credit of the Osages.
Now it is nought to the purpose to say that the Osage
Nation would ha\e been reimbursed so f;OOn as lands enough
in Kansas belonging to the Kaws could be sold. Non constat
that this would ever happen. The first question is, upon
whom was the obligation in the first instance to pay back the
money' But, as already intimated, this question ha~ been
decided by competent authonty, and in accordance with tile
decision the money bas been credited to the Secretary of the
Interior as trustee for the Osages.
I caonot o.oubt that this result was brought about by Mr.
Ewing's efforts, executed in strict performance of his contract. The Secretary of the Interior in his letter of July 11,
1881, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, recounts at
length, and with much particularity, the services rendered
by Mr. E'iing, and says in conclusion tllat the Indians are
reaping the benefit::; of those services, and in view of the
worn Htatement contained in his affidavit of l\fay 18, 1880,
accompanying his accounts, it is clear that the money of
which he claims a percentage was caused to be passed to the
credit of the Indians by Mr. Ewing within the intent and
meaning of the contract.
I .concur in this conclusion. The sum now in que8tion is
part of the account referred to by the Secretary. It was
due at the date of the contract, and should in law and justice have been placed to the credit of tlle Osages. Through
Mr. Ewing's services it bas been so eredited. He is therefore entitled to the compe11sation agreed upon-that is, 7~
per cent. upon $70,096.12; for the full sum was deposited in
the Treasury, no deduction having been made on account
of Mr. Ewing's feeA.
His letter of August 7, addressed to the Secretary, is herewith returned.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,

Secretary of the Interior.
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COLONEL SWAYNE'S CASE.
S., while a major-general uf volunteers, was, in July, 1866, appointed
colonel of the Forty-fifth United States Infantry, and on September 10,
1866, accepted the appointment and took the oath of office. From
that time until August :H, lts67, when he was mustered out of service as
a major-general of volunteers, he continaed to draw the pay of a majorgeneral: Held, that the settlements made by the accounting officers in
the matter of his pay as major-general are conclusive upon the executive department of the Government, and can not be re-opened.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A 11,qust 29, 1882.
SIR: The case of Col. Wager Swayne, presented in your
communication of the 8th instant, and in the letter of the
Comptroller referred to in and accompanying it, is as follows: Colonel Swayne is entitled to a certain allowance as
a percentage increase on his retired pay. On the 28th July,
1866, he being then a major-general of volunteers, was appointed colonel of the Forty-fifth United States Infantry,
and on lOth September, 1866, accepted the appointment in
writing and took the oath of office. From the time of his
appointment as colonel to 31st August, 1867, when he was in
terms mustered out of the service as a major-general of volunteers, Colonel Swayne continued to draw the pay of a majorgeneral. The question for opinion is, whether the Government is entited to set against his allowance for percentage
increase so m~h of the pay received by him as major-general from the lOth September~ 1866, the date of his acceptance of the appointment of colonel, to 31st August, 1867,
when he was mustered out of service as a major-general of
volunteers, as represents the excess of a major·general's pay
over that of a colonel.
I am of opinion that upon principles of administrative policy, which ought to be considered firmly established, the settlements between Colonel Swayne and the accounting officers in the matter of his pay as a major-general of volunteers
are conclusive upon the executive department of the Government, and can not be re-opened in the way indicated.
In Hedrick's case (16 C. Cis. R. 88) it was held that settlements with a supervisor of internal revenue, crediting him
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with clerk hire paid to a person who was at the same time a
gauger, and who therefore could not legally receive compensation as clerk, were eonc!usi ve on the judicial department
of the Government, and that the Government could no more
recover back money paid under a mistake of law than an
individual. That case and Colonel Swayne's seem to be identical in principle, assuming argumenti gratia that the allowance of a major-general's pay to Colonel Swayne after his
appointment as colonel was mistaken. But in disposing of
this case it is not necessary that I should go further than to .
hold that the settlements with Colonel Swayne are conclusive
upon the executive department of the Government.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAl\IIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

SOLDIERS' HOME.
In passing upon recommendations made by the Board of Commissioners
of the Soldiers' Home under section 4816, Revised Statutes, the Secretary of \Var is invested with a discretionary power to approve or disapprove the same.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
August 30, 1882.
SIR: I have considered the question proposed in your letter of the 26th instant, and herewith send my opinion.
You ask whether you have discretion in passing upon recommendations made by Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home
under section 4816 of the Revised Statutes.
The question you propound is not without its difficulties.
:\'Iy :first impression upon reading the sectign you desire me
to construe was that you had no discretion. A cursory reading of the act would seem to confine the power given under
it to the Board of Commissioners. The language of that section, so far as important here, is:
"The officers of the Soldiers' Home shall consist of a governor, * * * and the officers shall be taken from the
Army, and appointed or removed from time to time, as the
272-VOL XVII--29
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interests of the institution may require, by the Secretary of
War, on the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners."
After study and examination of the subject, my opinion is
that "the interests of the institution" mentioned in the section are committed jointly to the Secretary and the Commissioners: that is, the Secretary of War, in acting under
that section, is to act in view of those interests, as well as
the Commissioners. His authority is limited to the negative
upon their "recommendations," and their recommendations
. are limited in section 4816 to persons" taken from the Army."
This limitation, however, does in neither case forbid or prevent discretion or responsibility within the sphere of its exercise. The Secretary does not act as a mere clerk or ministerially in passing upon the recommendation of the Board.
The recommendation implies that the person to whom it is
addressed is to consider it. The word "recommendation"
does not mean command, order, direct, or even appoint. It
is equivalent to submit, suggest, or indicate. The Commis·
sioners are officers of the Army, under the immediate control
of the Secretary of War, and it would be an official anomaly
to have them, by the mere force of the interpretation of the
act, invested with absolute power over the discretion of their
superior, the Secrectary, in any matter that relates to the
Army, or is connected with the Army, or the Department of
War.
If these Commissioners were to recommend an officer on
actual duty, and whost3 services were needed in the command
that he held, it can not be maintained that the mere act of
their recommendation would oblige the Secretary to transfer
him to this position from that line of duty where he was, in
the judgment of the Secretary, most useful.
The act of 1870, section 1259, provides that retired officers of the Army may be assigned to duty at the Soldiers'
Home upon a selection by the Commissioners, approved by
the Secretary of War. In the case presented the Commissioners have selected a retired officer, and the Secretary of
War may approve or disapprove of this selection.
Again, in section 1415 of the act of 1851: ''The majority
of the Commissioners shall also have power to establish,
from time to time, regulations for the general and internal
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direction of the institution, to be submitted to the Secretary of War for approval," etc. '' For approval." Thus it
will be seen that in the other part of the laws or statutes relating to this institution and to the power of the Commissioners the joint authority of the Secretary of War is recognized. He has power to approve. The whole policy of this
law, and of all law regulating and prescribing the relations
of officers to tbe Secretary of War, is to make them subordinate to his command and subject to his discretion.
The Governor of the Soldiers' Home is an officer of the
United States, and within the second clause of the second
section of Article II of the Constitution, and as such his appointment is necessarily to be made either by the President
in conjunction with the Senate, or by the President alone,
or a court of law, or a head of a Department.
In view oftbat, it must be assumed that Congress intended
the function of appointment, in the full conRtitutional sense,
should be performed by the Secretary of War. No part of
that function has been intended to be invested in the Board
of Commissioners. Appointments to office under the Constitution is one of the highest executive functions, and includes
discretion. To give that discr~tion to any other person than
those named in the Constitution is in effect to vest such appointments in such other persons; and so to divest the head
of a Department of any element necessarily included in an
appointment to office is in effect to divest him of the pow~r
of appointment, and so to evade the constitutiona1 provisions.
I submit that while it is competent for the legislature to
define any one way or another a sphere within which an appointment is to be made, yet that the appointment itself, in
tbe constitutional sense of that word, resides in the Secretary. Appointment, in the sense employed in section 4816,
is an executive act, as meant by the court and as expressed
by the court in the case of Decatur vs. Paulding, on page
515 of14 Peters, and again asserted in Gaines vs. Thompson, in
7 Wallace, 351, and frequently elsewhere.
The presumption is that any duty imposed by statute upon
a head of a Department is an executive duty as contra-distinguished from ministerial. It would require a definite assertion in the context of a statute to make such an act min-
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isterial. The implication in this statute, apart from all that
I have said in connection with the constitutional provision,
is that the act of the Secretary was meant to be discretionary. Where a compound act is to be performed by officers
of a lower and a higher grade, so much of that act as is to
be performed by the latter partakes of the character suitable· to his relative dignity; that is, the higher fttnctions in- ·
volved in the act remain with him. I am of the opinion. that
you have a discretion.
Since I have inyestigated this matter, at my request you
caused a search to be made in the records of your Department, so that I might learn wbat ·had been heretofore done
by the Commissioners and the different Secretaries that related to this subject, and you have furnished me with the
record of the proceedings of the Board in 1858 in the case of
Colouel Payne. In the letter of the Board, signed by its
President, General Jessup, the Board expressly say that" the
action of the Board, as you are aware, with regard to Colonel
Plympton, is inoperative until it has received your approval."
''The action" was the appointment of Colonel Plympton.
This is a· distinct acknowledgment by the Board of the Secretary's discretionary authority, and of his power to approve
or disapprove their action.
Then, again, in the same matter it appears that Mr. Secretary Floyd exercised his discretion, for upon the back of the
letter is indorsed his order, to wit, that "the resignation of
the governor is accepted, for the reason of his incompetency
and unfitness for the piace he has occupied. The strongest
proof of this fact is to be found in the reasons assigned by
that officer in his tender of resignation." Here the Secretary
passed upon that subject as a matter within his discretion
and jurisdiction to approve or disapprove, 'giving reasons for
his action, which would not have been done if be were merely
. performing a clerical or ministerial duty, for his reasons would
have been unnecessary.
.After which indorsement the Secretary adds: "The approval of Colonel Plympton's nomination is for the present
withheld. The present lieutenant· governor of the Military
.Asylum will be immediately relieved, and his place supplied
by the lieutenant-governor of the Harrudsburgh Branch
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Asylum." Thus it will be seen that the Secretary exercised
his superior authority, and used his own discretion in making
a special order in the case, which was not at all in conformity
with the'' recommendation" of the Board.
I conclude, as I have before stated, that the proper interpretation of this act is that the Secretary has the discretion,
that nothing but a positive statute depriving him of it would
warrant any other interpretation, and it is doubtful under
the Constitution if such an act would be valid.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The

SECRETARY OF WAR.

POTOMAC RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
The provision in the act of August 2, 1882, chapter 375, making it "the
duty of the Attorney-General to examine all claims of the title to the
premises to b.e improved under this appropriation;" i.e., the appropriation "for improving the Potomac River in the vicinity of ·washington," etc., does not forbid the commencement of the work until the
Attorney-General shall have performed the said duty.
DEPARTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE,

September 2, 1882.
SIR: Yours of the 30th ultimo incloses certain communications to yourself regardi;:tg the improvement of the Potomac river in this vicinity, ordered by act of Congress of
August 2, 1882, and ipquires whether there be any legal
obstacle to a commencement of that work until the AttorneyGeneral shall have concluded his action, which in the same
connection the statute requires of him.
The work contemplated by the act consists of three items:
improvement of navigation, establishment of harbor lines, and
raising of the flats; and towards this the sum of $400,000 is
appropriated.
·
The statute then proceeds: "And it is hereby made the
duty of the Attorney-General to examine all claims of the
title to the premises to be im.p roved under this appropriation, and see that the rights of the Government in all re-
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spects are secured and protected ; and if be deems it necessary he is authorized to cause a suit or suits in law or in
equity to be instituted, in the name of the United States, in
the supreme court of the ·District of Columbia, against any
and all claimants of title under any patent which in his
opinion was by mist~ke, or was improperly or illegally issued
for any part-of the marshes or flats within the limits of the
proposed impro-vement."
By referring to reports mentioned in the act it appears
that the improvement proposes, amongst other things, to
create more than 700 acres of land upon the flats, of great
value for either public or private purposes.
Inasmuch as the claim of title spoken of in the act is understood to apply to the flats, I suppose that my special duty as
above directed more particularly concerns that item.
uongress takes notice that there are existing "claims of
title" to the flats, as I gather, which conflict with rights of
the United States, i. e., with their proprietary rights, inasmuch as no mere claim of private title can interfere with the
ordinary rights of the Government to impro-ve navigation.
Nevertheless, Congress has not exp'ressly made this appropriation contingent upon the proposed ascertainment of such
titles, nor upon consideration do I find that the statute contains any implication to that effect.
I observe from the report of the Board of Engineers referred to in the statute that the proposed impro\ement is
to cost about $2,500,000. By comparing with this amount
that of the above preliminary appropriation, it appears that
operations of several years' duration are contemplated. In
connection with the above matter of titles Congresf) therefore probably concluded that an expenditure of $400,000,
whilst substantially valuable to navigation, would probably
not greatly raise the flats or increase their -value, and that in
any event the control which the United Stateg have of the
question by their eminent domain rendered this topic one of
no g~eat immediate importance in comparison with that of
others which suggested an absolute appropdation and the
usual course of action thereunder.
Upon the whole I answer the above question in the negative.
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I will avail myself of this opportunity to say that I shall
be greatly obliged if you will furnish me with any information in your possession or at your command that will facilitate the duty in the above connection which the act has de'\folved upon me.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

THE Sl.VANNAH RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
The $1,000, authorized by the act of March 3, 1881, chapter 136, to be
expended from the appropriation for improving Savannah River,
Georgia, in the payment of damages for land taken for widening the
channel opposite Savanah, may be so expended without a transfer of
the title to the land, the purpose of the provision being to indemnify
for the loss of the land, not to acquire ownership thereof.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 19, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 5th ultimo, inclosing a communi·
cation from the Chief of Engineers, and other papers, inquires ''Whether or not it will be necessary to require a
transfer of the title from the State of Georgia to the United
States for land taken by the United States in improvement
of the Savannah River before payment of the same can be
made."
This inquiry bas reference to a part of Fig Island, opposite the city of Savannah, Ga., which has been cut away
by the United States for the purpose of widening the channel of the river at that point.
Previous to the cutting away of the premises an act was
passed by the legislature of the State of Georgia (approved
October 8, 1879) authorizing and providing for the condemnation thereof for the purpose mentioned. Under that act,
the object of which was to enable the United States to
acquire the right to cut away the premises, proceedings
were bad in the superior court of Chatham County by the
mayor of the city of Savanah in the name of the State, which
resulted in a judgment for $1,000 awarded the owner as
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damages for the land, upon payment of which, by the terms
of the act and of the judgment~ the title to the land would
pass "out of the owner into the State of Georgia."
After the judgment was rendered the question arose
whether it could be paid out of the then existing general
appropriation for the improvement of the Savannah River.
This question was referred to the Attorney General, who,
in an opinion dated July 10, 1880 (16 Opin. 540), held that
that appropriation was not available for payment of the
judgment. Subsequently, on January 3 1881 (as appears by
the papers submitted), the judgment was paid by the mayor
of Savannah on behalf of the city.
Since then the land condemned has, as already stated,
been cut away by the United States, the locus now forming
part of the bed of the river. By the act of Congress of
March 3, 1881, chapter 136, it is provided that of the sum
thereby appropriated for improving Savannah harbor and
river, $1,000 may be applied to payment of damages for land
taken for widening the channel opposite Savannah. The
city of Savannah having presented an account against th~
United States for $1,000 paid by the mayor as aforesaid for
damages awarded for the land so taken, the question now
proposed is whether the payment of damages authorized by
that act can be made without a transfer to the United States
of the title to the land.
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that payment of damages, under the above provision of the act of 1881, may be
made without a transfer of title to the land. The purpose
of that provision is to indemnify for the loss of land, not to
acquire ownership thereof. The law under which the condemnation proceedings were had contemplates that the damages awarded for the land taken for widening the channel
shall be paid by the General Government, but requires that
the title to the land thus taken shall be held by the State,
which is proprietor of the river bed. By the taking and
cutting away the premise~ became a part of the bed
of the river, and the title to such part, as well as to the rest
of the river bed, is now in the State. In providing for payment of damages for the property so appropriated Congress
must be presumed to have been aware of the proceedings
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mentioned and of the disposition of the title thereunder;
and in the absence of any provision relating to the title, it
may well be inferred that such disposition was meant to be
left undisturbed.
I addt that as the city of Savannah has through its
mayor wholly satisfied the judgment for damages awarded
the owner of the land, and thus extiJ?.guished his claim
(all which occurred sometime prior to the act of 1881), it
may reasonably be regarded as, in contemplation of the
above-mentioned provision of that act, entitled to receive
the payment authorized thereby.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
Hon. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

PENSION-DEPENDENT RELATION.
A contract surgeon, on entering the service, was ordered to duty in a
post hospital at a distant place, and in obedience to the order went
aboard a steamer to proceed thither, but before the departure of the
boat became too sick to go on, and was removed to a hospital, where
he died in a few days of typhoid fever, leaving a dependent mother, but
no widow or child: Held that, under the provisions of sections 4692,
4693, and 4707, Revised Statutes, the dependent mother is entitled to
be enrolled as a pensioner, on the ground that the deceased, when taken
down with sickness, was "in transitu" under orders.
When au officer is ordered to go to a given point for duty and has set
about his preparations to do so, his transitus has begun.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 26, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th of August ultimo, submitting for opinion the case of Lydia S. Bicknell, who is an applicant for a pension as dependent mother of S. S. Bicknell,
who was a contract surgeon in the United States Army, bas
been duly considered by me, and I have the honor to submit
my opinion thereon.
The facts as giveri in your letter are as follows: On the
18th of October, 1863, S. S. Bicknell entered into a contract

458

HON. S. F. PHILLIPS
Pension-Dependent Relation.

with the United States at St. Louis, Mo., for duty as a contract surgeon at Cairo, Ill.~ or elsewhere; on the 20th of the
same month Bicknell was ordered to duty at; the post hospital at Cairo, Ill. In obedience to said order he went aboard
a steamer at St. Louis to proceed to Cairo, but, being too
sick to do so, was, on the 25th of the same month, removed
to a hospital at St. Louis, where he died, on the 29th of the
same month, of typhoid fever. Bicknell left no widow or
child, but did leave a mother, the applicant, who was dependent on him for support.
The question propounded on this state of facts is this:
"Granting that the disease which caused the death of Dr.
Bicknell was contracted by him after the date of his contract with the Government, and while he was preparing to
proceed to the place where he was ordered for duty, were
the circumstances under which the disease was contracted
such as to devolve upon his mother a right to pension under
the provisions of the fourth paragraph of section 4693 of
the Revised Statutes, in connection with the provisions of
section 4707'"
Section 4707 provides that if any person em braced by sections 4692 and 4693 has died from causes which would have
entitled him to an invalid pension under said sections 4:692
and 4693, leaving no widow or legitimate child, but leaving relations who were dependent upon him for support in
whole or in part, such relations shall be entitled to receive
the same pension as such person would have been entitled to
if he had been totally disabled, in the following order: first,
the mother, etc.
Section 4692 provides that the persons specified in the several classes enumerated in section 4693 shall be entitled to be
placed on the liRt of invalid pensioners.
The fourth paragraph of section 4693 provides that" any
acting assistant or contract surgeon disabled by any wound
or injury received or disease contracted in the line of duty,
while actually performing the duties of assistant surgeon
or acting assistant surgeon, with any military force in the
:field, or in transitu, or in hospital" shall be entitled as a
beneficiary under said section 4692.
By sections 4692 and 4693 the dependent mother of a con-
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tract surgeon dying of disease is entitled to be enrolled as a
pensioner if the disease was contracted in the line of duty in
any one of three conditions, namely: (1) While actually performing medical duty with a military force in the field, or (2)
while proceeding from one point to another under orders, or
(3) while on duty in a hospital.
In my opinion these several conditions are entirely distinct and independent of one another, and were intended to
define the several predicaments happening in the line of
duty, in some one of which a contract surgeon must have
been smitten by mortal illness in order to transmit the right
to a pension.
That Dr. Bicknell had not actually begun to move physically on his way to Cairo when first stricken by the hand
of death is established, but it is conceded that ~e had then
already begun to make his preparation to do so. If, then, he
is to be brought within the terms of the law, it must be on the
ground that he was "in transitu" while making his preparations. Is this the meaning of the law~ In my opinion it is.
When an officer is ordered to go to a given point for duty
and has set about his preparations to do so, in my opinion
his transitus has begun. To hold otherwise would be to
disregard the liberal policy on which the pension laws have
uniformly been administered.
It follows that, upon the facts stated by you, the applicant,
Lydia S. Bicknell, is entitled to be enrolled as a pensioner.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS;
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN RESERVATIONS.
The State of Oregon has jurisdiction over the case of a murder of one
Indian by another, committed upon an Indian reservation within •the
limits of the State, unless the reservation was excepted out of the State
at the time ofits admission, or unless its jurisdiction is restricted by
the provisions of some treaty with the Indians still in force.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 13, 1882.
SIR: Yours of the 7th instant, inclosing copy of a commu-

nication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, presents
the case of an Indian who is charged with the murder of
another Indian on an Indian reservation within the State of
Oregon, and who is at present in the custody of the military
authorities at Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory. This
case is one over which the United States court has no juris·
diction. At the suggestion of the Commissioner you request
to be advised whether it is within the jurisdiction of the
State courts, to the end that, if so, the accused may be
turned over to the authorities of the State of Oregon for
trial.
I have examined the subject of jurisdiction, and the conclusion reached is, that unless the reservation referred to
was excepted out of the State at the time of its admission
into the Union, or unless its jurisdiction is restricted by the
provisions of some treaty with the Indians still in force, the
State of Oregon has jurisdiction OYer offenses committed
upon the reservation, whether by Indians or others. This is
believed to be in harmony with the doctrine laid down in
United States v. McBratney (104 U. S., 621; United States v.
Yellow Sun (1 Dill., 271); United States v.. Bailey (1 :McLean,
234); and it deriYes additional support from a recent decision
of the supreme court of Wisconsin in a case precisely in point
(see State v. Doxtater, 47 Wis., 278). I discover no exception
in the act of admission of the kind indicated, and am not
aware of any treaty proYision in force which excludes from
the criminal jurisdiction of the State the Indians on reservations within its borders. Assuming, then, that no such provision exists, the accused is, I think, amenable to the criminal
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jurisdiction of the State of Oregon, and may properly be
turned over to the authorities of that State, in accordance
with the laws of the Territory in which he now is.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
S. )f. PHILLIPS,
Actin~ Attorney- General.
Bon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

CLAIM OF DR. J. W. BAYNE.
Section 37 of the act of July 28, 1886, chapter 299 (if not a.lready repealed
by force of sectio~ 5596} Revised Statutes), was superseded by the act
of March 1, 1875, chapter 115, which in effect conferred authority to
modify existing Army Regulations as well as to create new ones.
The codification of" The Regulations of the Army and Geueral Orders,"
under section 2'of the act of June 23, 1879, chapter 35, which was approved and published February 17, 1881, superseded the body of Army
Regulatioul:) promulgated in 1863. Hence paragraph 1304, 1305, and
1306 of the latter regulations are not now in force.
B. was in the military service as a surgeon, under contract dated January
1, 1881, and on duty at the Washington Arsenal, District of Columbia,
from January 1 to April30, 1881: Held that he was entitled, for that
period, to the commutation for quarters allowed by law to an assistant
surgeon of the rank of first lieutenant, if no public quarters were available for his accommodation.
Traveling allowances, as authorized by paragraph 2280, Regulations of
1881, can be lawfully paid a contract surgeon where they constitute
part of the contract.
As a general rule, a contract surgeon is entitled to pay only from the
time he enters upon duty under his contract.
Semble that the maximum fixed by paragraph 1305 of the Regulations of
1863 for the compensation of contract surgeons continued up to February 17, 1881; but that thereafter compensation at a rate exceeding
such maximum was allowable.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 21, 1882.
SfR: I have considered the questions some time since submitted by you at the requestoftheSecondComptrollerofthe
Treasury, in the matter of the claim of Dr. John W. Bayne
for commutation for quarters allowed by law to an assistant
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surgeon of the rank of first lieutenant from January 1 to
April30, 1881, during which period. the latter was in the service of the United States as a contract-surgeon, on duty at
the Washington A.rsenal, District of Columbia, under a contract dated January 1, 1881. The questions are these:
"(1) Can the claim aforesaid lawfully be allowed¥
"(2) Was Dr. Bayne entitled to compensation at any rate
exceeding the limit fixed by paragraph 1305 of the Army
Regulations of 1863, viz : $80 a month for said period or any
part of it~
"(3) Can mileage (sec. 1273, Rev. Stat.) or travel pay (sec.
1289, R~v. Stat.) be lawfully paid to a physician employed under such a contract as was made with Dr. Bayne~
"(4) Under such a contract, can actual traveling expense8
(18 Stat., 452), or any allowance in lieu thereof, be lawfully
paid to the physician on account of travel from the place of
making the contract to the place where service is to be rendered, or travel performed in returning to his home after
determination of the contract ~
"(5) Is the physician entitled to pay from the date the contract is made, or only from the date service begins at the
place fixed in the contract for performance thereon
"(6) .A.re paragraphs 1304, 1305, and 1306, as published on
pages 313,314, and 518 of the Army Regulations of 1863, now
in force~"
The above questions, as you well remark, comprehend
other points than those immediately involved in Dr. Bayne's
claim, and are chiefly controlled by the Army Regulations.
The Army Regulations of 1863 had at the time of their
promulgation a legislative recognition by virtue of the act of
April 24, 1816, chapter 69, subject to any alterations the
Secretary of War might adopt with the approbation of the
President. By section 37 of the act of July 28, 1866, chap.
ter 299, Congress directed a new code of regulations to be
prepared and reported to Congress at its next session, "the
existing regulations to remain in force until Congress shall
have acted on said report." A report was subsequently
made but never acted upon (13 C. Cls. R., 9). By the act of
March 1, 1875, chapter 115 (modifying section 20 of the act
of July 15, 1870, chapter 29!), the President is authorized to
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" make and publish regulations for the government of the
Ar·my in accordance with existing laws." It is to be observed that section 37 of the act of 1866 (if not previously
repealed by force of.sect~on 5596, Revised Statutes) was super·
seded by the act of 1875, which in effect conferred authority
to modify existing regulations as well as to create new ones
( Uni~d States v. Eliason, 16 Pet., 302). By joi~t resolution
of August 15, 1876, the President was requested to postpone
all action in connection with the publication of said regulations until after the report of the commission created by the
act of July 24, 1876, chapter 226, is ''received and acted on
by Congress at its next session." But by section 2 of the
act of J nne 23, 1879, chapter 35, the Secretary of War was
directed "to cause all the Regulations of the Army and
General Orders now in force to be codified and published to
the Army," etc. D:"nder this last provision the codification
of the Regulations of the Army and General Orders was approved ·and published in February, 1881; and this codification must be deemed to have superseded the body of Army
Regulations promulgated in 1863.
On the 17th of November, 1880, a new form of contract to
be used in employing a private physician, in whi~h certain
allowances are specified, was approved by the Secretary of
War (see Regulations of 1881, par. 2283). This took the place
of form 18, referred to in paragraph 1304 of the Regulations
of 1863, and those allowances (which were not specified in
that form nor authorized by the Regula.tions of 1863) thus
became, from the date of their approval, incorporated in to
the Army Regulations. The contract with Dr. Bayne provides (inter alia) that" when on duty at a post or station
where there are public quarters belonging to the United
States, he shall receive the quarters in kind allowed by law
to an assistant surgeon of the rank of first lieutenant; when
on duty at a post or station where there are no public quarters, he shall receive the commutation for quarters allowed
by law to an assistant surgeon of the rank of :first lieutenant," etc. These allowances are the same as those approved
by the Secretary of War, as above. They are not forbidden
by any statute and are conformable to the Regulations of the
Army as they stood at the time the contract was made.
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Upon the foregoing considerations, I answer the first of
the above questions in the affirmative, assuming the fact to
be that no public quarters were available for Dr. Bayne's
accommodation; and to the last question (the sixth), I reply
that paragraphs 1304, 1305, and 1306 of the Regulations of
1863 are not now in force, having been superseded by paragraphs 2279,2280, and 2281 of the Regulations of 1881.
Respecting the third, fourth, and fifth questions, the
answer I submit is, that traveling allowances, as authorized
by paragraph 2280, Regulations of 1881 (such allowances not
falling under any statutory prohibition of which I am aware),
can be lawfully paid where they constitute part of the contract, and that as a general rule a contract surgeon is entitled
to pay only from the time be enters upon duty under his contract or is under orders.
The second question remains to be considered. By paragraph 1305 of the Regulations of 1863 a maximum was fixed
for the compensation of contract-surgeons, which, so long as
the same was in force, operated as a restriction upon the authority of officers contracting wit.h private physicians. The
Regulations approved and published February 17,1881 (paragraphs 2279 and 2280), in which the provisions of said
paragraph 1305 are in the main embodied, omitted such
maximum; and thus the restriction above adverted to,
which, as far as my information goes, continued until that
date, was removed. Dr. Bayne's contract is dated January
1,1881, and the compensation therein ($100, per month) exceeds the maximum fixed as above. Upon this state of
facts, the answer I submit to the question under consideration is, that he was not entitled to compensation at any
rate exceeding the limit fixed by paragraph 1305 of the Regulations of 1863, at least for the period from January 1 to
February 17, 1881; but that compensation at a rate exceeding that limit was allowable after the last-mentioned date.
I am, sir, very respectfully, BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Bon.

RoBERT

T.

LINCOLN,

Secretary of War.
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VACANCY IN OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SURQEON-GENERAL.
The vacancy existing in the office of assistant surgeon-general may be
filled by appointing thereto any one of the surgeons with the rank of
colonel or the chief medical purveyor (all of whom hold offices of the
same g1·ade in the medical corps as that of the vacant office), or by promoting thereto the senior <.officer in the medical corp_s having the rank
oflieutenant-colonel, which is the next grade below.
Where there are two or more offices of the same grade in a corps, ea!}h
requiring a separate commission, .on a vacancy occurring in such grade
the rules of promotion do not preclude the appointing power from determining to which of these offices the senior in the next grade below
shall be appointed. An incumbent of one of them may be transferred
by appointment to another which is vacant ·w ithout prejudicing the
rights of such senior, whose claim to promotion would be fully met
by appointing him to either.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 23, 1882.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th of August last, which inclosed certain memoranda from the office of the AdjutantGeneral, and is also supplemented by a letter dated the 2d
ultimo inclosing a communication from the Surg(\OR·General of the Army, submits the following questions for ~n
opinion thereon :
"(1) The office of assistant surgeon-general with the
rank of colonel having been made vacant by the appointment of the late incumbent to the office of Surgeon-General,
is it a position to which, under the provisions of law, the
officer next in rank possesses an inchoate right~
"(2) Should this be determined affirmatively, which officer of the 1\Iedical Department is entitled to the promotion: J. H. Baxter, chief medical purveyor of the Army with
rank of colonel, dated June 23, 1874; Robert 1\Iurray, the
senior surgeon with rank of colonel dated June 26, 1876; or
John F. Hammond, the senior-surgeon among those holding
the rank of lieutenant-colonel~"
In the consideration of these questions I have been much
aided by the information contained in the memoranda and
communication above mentioned.
272-voL xvn--30
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The :Medical Corps of the Army as at present established
embraces the following offices: Surgeon-General with the
rank of brigadier-general; assistant surgeon-general with
the rank of colonel; chief medical purveyor with the rank
of colonel ; surgeon with the rank of colonel; assistant medical purveyor with the rank of lieutenant colonel; tmrgeon
with the rank of lieutenant colonel·; surgeon with the rank
of major; assistant surgeon with the rank of captain or ftrst
~ieutenant. (Act of June 23, 1874, chap. 458; act of June
26, 1876, chap. 61.)
The gradtJ of these offices respectively in the corps must,
in the absence of any provision of law otherwise providing,
be deemed to correspond with the degree of their military
rank. Accordingly, the offices of assistant surgeon-general,
chief medical purveyor, and surgeon with the rank of colonel, having each the same military rank, are to be regarded
as of one and the same grade. So the offices of assistant
medical purveyor, and surgeon with the rank of lieutenantcolonel, each of which has the same military rank, are of
one and the same grade. The office of surgeon with the
rank of major is of itself a separate grade, while theoftlce of
assistant surgeon contains two grades.
Thus, although there are eight distinct offices in the Medical Corps, each requiring a separate commission,· but six
grades of officers exist therein-the latter, as already stated,
corresponding to the military rank with which such officers
are invested.
A vacancy exists in the office of assistant surgeon-general,
and the questions submitte(.l involve the inquiry whether in
filling that office the law of the military service requires the
chief medical purveyor or the senior surgeon with the rank
of colonel or the senior officer holding the rank of lieutenantcolonel to be appointed thereto.
Appointments in the :Medical Corps are regulated partly
by statute and partly by Army Regulations having the force
of law. By section 1193, Revised Statutes, the appointment
of Surgeon-General is by selection, which moreover must be
made from that corps. Section 1204, Revised Statutes, -declares that "promotions in the staff of the Army shall be
made in the several departments and corps respectively."
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Vacancies therein to the rank of colonel are, by paragraphs
36 and 37, Army Regulations of 1881, to be filled " by promotion according to seniority, except in case of disability or
other incompetency ; " and such promotion is to be made according to the corps-i. e. the officer to be promoted to a
vacancy in any corps must be taken from that corps.
It is very clear that, by these provisions, vacancws in the
several grades of the Medical Corps, from the rank of major
to that of colonel inclusive, are required to be filled by pro·
motion according to seni01·ity. Hence, in supplying a vacancy
in any of the grades just adverted to, the appointee can not
be taken by selection from an inferior grade.
In the case under consideration, t.h e vacant office belongs
to one of those grades (viz, that of the rank of colonel); and
standing in the sam~ grade to which it belongs are found
two other distinct offices, the incumbents whereof, by reason
of their rank, do not come within the above provisions,
which regulate promotion to the rank of colonel, and there
stop. Having attained that rank, neither of these incumbents has any legal ground of preference over the other in
respect of future appointm~nts. If, therefore, one be eligible for appointment to the vacant office so must the other
be, and the appointing power would be at liberty to confer
the appointment upon either. In this connection the question suggests itself whether the vacant office referred to can
be thus filled-in other words, whether the existing vacancy
in the office of assistant surgeon-general can be supplied
by the appointment of an officer belonging to the same grade
in the Medical Corps to which that office belongs (e. g., the
chief medical purveyor, or any one of tp.e surgeons with the
rank of colonel).
An appointment from one office in the corps to another
office of the same grade therein cannot be regarded as a promotion. This term, as applied to the military service, signifies advancement from an inferior to a superior grade, as
from the grade of captain to that of major, etc., and the rules
for promotion in that service deal with vacancies in certain
grades therein, prescribing how such vacancies, when they
exist, shall be filled. Thus under these rules the senior
officer in the Medical Corps having the rank of lieutenant-
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colonel is entitled (except in case of disability or other
incompetency) to be appointed to fill a vacancy happening
in the next grade above. But in that grade there are three
separate offices. Does such officer's right to promotion
require that he be appointed to fill the particular office
therein which happens to become first vacan't! Or would it
be sufficient, so far as he is concerned, if the vacancy in the
grade were filled by his appointment to any other office
therein~ I think the latter would be sufficient. If the three
offices referred to should each become vacant at the same
time, it will hardly he doubted that tlte senior in the next
grade below might be appointed to either at the will of the
appointing power; his right to promotion to fill a vacancy
existing in the grade above not entitling him to any particu. lar office therein. On the other hand, if but one of these
opices should become vacant (which is the case under consideration), I entertain no doubt that it would be competent
for the appointing power to fill the vacant office by the
appointment thereto of an incumbent of either one of the
other offices in the same grade, still leaving a vacancy in
that grade to be filled by the promotion of the senior officer
in the next grade below; and that the latter, upon being
appointed to fill the vacancy thus left, would get all that the
rules of promotion entitle him to. In a word, where there
are two or more offices of the same grade in a corps, each
requiring a separate commission, I am of opinion that, on a
vacancy occurring in such grade, the existing rules of promotion do not preclude the appointing power from determining to which of these offices the senior in the next grade
below shall be appointed, and that an incumbent of one of
them may be transferred by appointment to anoth~r which is
vacant without prejudicing the rights of such senior, whose
claim to promotion would be fully met by appointing him to
either.
The foregoing views lead to this result, that the vacancy
now existing in the office of assistant. surgeon-general may
be filled by appointing thereto any one of the surgeons with
the rank of. colonel, or the chief medical purveyor (all of
whom hold offices of the same grade in the :Medical Corps as
that of the vacant office); or it may be filled by appointing
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thereto the senior officer in the Medical Corps having the
rank of lieutenant-colonel, which is the next grade below.
The latter officer is by the rules of promotion in the military
service entitled to the vacancy existing in the grade to which
the office of assistant surgeon-general belongs, and, unless
one of the officers of that grade above mentioned is appointed
to such office, those rules require that he should be given the
appointment.
Accordingly, in answer to your first question, I reply that
no officer possesses an inchoate 'right to the vacant office of
a~sistant surgeon-general.
The senior surgeon among
those holding the rank of lieutenant-colOJ,lel, however, has a
right to the vacancy in the grade to which that office belongs;
so that the office cannot be filled by an appointee from an
inferior grade other than himself. · The conclusion here
reached se~ms to render an answer to the remaining question
unnecessary.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BHEWSTER.
Hon. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

INTERNAL REVENUE.
The net profits of a railroad company earned in 1871, and which during
that year were used for construction, or were appropriated to the payment of money borrowed for construction and actuc1lly used therefor
during that year, or in a subsequent year were appropriated to the
payment of money so borrowed and used, are liable to taxation under
section 15 of the act of July 14, 1870, chap. 255.
DEP .A.R1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

October 25, 1882.
Yours of August 15 incloses a communication to
yourself from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in relation to the taxation of certain profits made by railroad /
companies during the year 1871, and submits for my consideration the questions stated below.
In connection therewith the Gommissioner calls attention
to the difference in wording upon this subject betwixt the
SIR :
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internal revenue act of 1870 and that of 1864 previously in
force.
The words of the act of 1864 as amended in 1866 (13 Stat.,
283, and 14 Stat., 138) that designate the profits of railroad
companies liable to taxation, are profits "carried to tbe
account of any fund, or used for construction." Those of the
act which controls the question below (1870; 16 Stat., 260)
are, ''undivided profits of any such corporation which have
accrued and been earned and added to any surplus, contingent, or other fund," omitting any express mention of construction.
It seems that the words "used for construction" in the
former act are superduous. If companies carry their profits
to the account of one or another fund (and that is necessary
to proper book-keeping, and will therefore for the purpose of
such statutes be conclusively presumed), then of course such
profits as are used in construction are also so carried; that is,
the former clause of the language above quoted from the
act of 1864 includes the latter.
I am of opinion therefore that the recasting of that provision in the act of 1870, in the course of which that later
clause has been omitted, does not relieve from taxation
H profits" (see 93 U. S., 225) used for construction, inasmuch
as such profits must necessarily be carried to the account
of-i. e., "added to"-some constr,uction "fund," and therefore be included in the words above quoted from that act.
The questions put by you in this connection are as follows:
"(1) Were the net profits of a railroad company, which
accrued and were earned in 1871 and were used for construction in that same year, liable to taxation under section 15 of
the act of July 14, 1870 (16 Stat., p60) ~
"(2) Were the net profits of a railroad company which
accrued and were earned in 1871, and during that year appropriated to the payment of money borrowed for construction
and actually used for construction during that year, liable to
taxation under section 15 of the act of July, 1870 (16 Stat.,
260)~

'' (3) Were the net profits of a railroad company which
accrued and were earned in 1871, and in a subsequent year
appropriated to the repayment of money borrowed for con-
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struction and actually used for construction during 1871,
liable to taxation under section 15 of the act of July 14, 1870
(16 Stat., 260) ~"
I answer these questions in the affirmatiYe. As I do not
think that profits earned and carried to construction account
in 1871 are exempt from taxation, so also I do not regard as
exempt profits so earned and necessarily carried to the account of some other fund in that year, but in a subsequent
year changed and put to construction ·account.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BE~JAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.
By section 5208, Revised Statutes, and section 13 of the act of July 12,
1882, chapter 290, the certification of a check drawn upon a national
bank, where at the time of certification the drawer has not on deposit
with the bank, and regularly entered to his credit on its books, an
amount of money equal to the amount of the check, is prohibited.
Whether the check be marked by the bank '"accepted," or simply "good,"
can make no difference; either constitutes a certification within the
meaning of the statute.
The acceptance of a check, where the drawer has no funds on deposit, is
a loan of the credit of the bank rather than a loan of money, and, if
otherwise unobjectionable, is not within the restriction provided by
section 5200, Revised Statutes.
Liabilities so incurred by a bank are within the limit imposed by section 5202, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

N ove'inber 24, 1882.
SIR: In a letter of the 5th ultimo the Ron. J. C. New,
then Acting Secretary of the Treasury, submitted for my
conAideration the following questions, which have been suggested by the Comptroller of the Currency:
"(1) Has a national bank the legal right to accept checks
drawn upon it, unless the drawer has the amount stated in
the check actually on deposit in the bank¥
" (2) If a national bank has the power to make such
an acceptance, would such acceptance at a time when the

money was not on deposit to the credit of the drawer be a
liability to it for money borrowed, and as such be required
to be limited to one-tenth of the paid-in capital of the bank,
as provided by section 5200, Revised Statutes?
-a (3) If a national bank has the power to accept such
checks equal in amount-in any case to one-tenth of its capi' W'9uld the acceptance of any number of such checks to
amount .exceeding, in the aggregate, the amount of its
paid-in capital, be in Yiolation of section 5202, Revised
Statutes !"
The :first of these questions, I understand, arises under
section 5208 of the Revised Statutes, and section 13 of the
act of July 12, 18R2, chapter 290.
Section 5208, Revised Statutes, forbids any officer, clerk,
or agent of a national bank " to certify" a check drawn upon
it, unless the drawer has on deposit with the bank at the
time the check is certified ''an amount of money equal to the
amount specified in such check ;" and declares that the act
of any such officer, clerk, or agent, in violation of this sectiop, Shall subj~ct the bank to '' the liabilities and proceed.
t.h~ patt ot the Oomptroller as provided for in seeP 5*"· SeCtion 13 of the act of 1882 puni he& with tine
or imprisonment, or both, any; such officer, clerk, or agent
who shall '' willfully violate the provisions" of said section
5~08, or who shall "resort to any device, or receive any :fictitious obligation, direct or collateral, in order to evade the
provisions thereof, or who shall certify checks before the
amount thereof shall have been regularly entered to the
credit of the dealer upon the books of the banking association."
These provisions, together, prohibit the certification of a
check drawn upon a national.ba~k where at the time of certification the drawer has not on deposit with the bank, and
regularly entered to his credit on its books, an amount of
money equal to the amount of the check.
What, then, is certification of a check ? It is an act on
the part of the bank upon which the check is drawn im·
plying (as is observed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wan., 604) "that the
check :is drawn upou sufficient fnuds in the bands of the
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drawee, tlu:tt they have been set apart for its satisfaction,
and that they shall be so applied whenever the check is presented for payment. It is an undertaking that the check is
good then and shall continue good, and this agreement is as
binding on the bank as its notes of circulation, a certificate
of deposit payable to the order of a depositor, or any other
obligation it can assume."
No particular form is required for the certification. Ordinarily this is done by simpiy writing the word ''good" upon
the face of the check, adding thereto the signature or initials
of the certifying officer. But any language employed by
such officer, importing that the check is good and will be
paid, would seem to be sufficient. (See 2 Daniel on Neg.
Inst., sec. 1606.)
A check being an order for the payment of money addressed to a bank or banker, it is always presumed to be
drawn against funds on deposit therewith. It is not, when
considered with reference to its purpose, presentable for
acceptance, but only for payment-that is to say, payment is
the only acceptance which in contemplation of law enters into
the arrangement of the parties. Hence, if the payee or
holder of the check presents it with the view of having it
certified instead of paid, he does so at the peril of discharging the drawer. (First Nat. Bank v. Leach, 52 N.Y., 353.)
In Security Bank v. National Bank (67 N.Y., 462) the court
say : " The manifest object of a certification is to indicate the
assent off he certifying bank to the request of the drawer of the
check that the drawee will pay to the holder the sum mentioned;
and this is what an acceptor does by his acceptance of a
bill." Whether such assent is indicated by writing the word
"good" or the word "accepted" upon the check can make
no difference. As between the holder of the check and the
bank the obligation assumed by the latter is precisely the
same in either case, and thus the legal e.ffect of marking a
check "accepted'' being the same as marking it'' good," the
employment of the former expression may, equally with that
of the other, well be deemed to import a certification thereof.
Agreeably to this view, the acceptance. of a check, other than
for immediate payment, is not legally distinguishable from
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its certification. In fact and effect the words are equivalents-they are for the same forbidden purpose, to produce
the same forbidden result .
The aim of the statute, in · prohibiting the certification of
uhecks by national banks where the amount thereof is not on
deposit to the credit of the drawer~ is obviously to provide a
guard against the risks and evils attending such pledging of
their credit without adequate ~Security. The mischief sought
to be avoidf'd is the inmtrring of liabilities by these banks on
checks drawn upon them without sufficient funds, and inasmuch as the liability is the same whether the check be marked
by the bank " accepted" or simply '' good," either of these
modes of incurring it would seem to be sufficient to bring the
case within the prohibition rAferred to. Each may properly
be regarded as constituting a certification according to the
meaning and intent of the statute. To construe otherwise
would be to allow a " device" to "evade the provisions" of
the law, and such too as by express terms is prohibited and
punished.
In answer to the first question I accordingly reply, that in
my opinion a national bank can not legally accept checks
drawn upon it where the drawer has not on deposit therewith the amount stated in the check. To do so renders the
bank subject to certain proceedings on the part of the Comptroll~r of the Currency (under section 5234 Revised Statutes),
and the officer by whom the acceptance is made becomes
liable to the penalties provided in the act of July 12, 1882.
The case presented in the second question is not, in my
opinion, covered by the provisions of section 5200, Revised
Statutes.
The restriction there applies only to liabilities ''for money
borrowed." The acceptance of a check, where the drawer has
no funds on deposit, would be a loan of the credit of the bank
rather than a loan of money, and, if otherwise unobjection~ble, it could not properly be regarded as within the terms
of the restriction adverted to.
The third question presents the same case in connection
with section 5202, Revised Statutes, which declares that '' nQ
association shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable,
to an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock act-
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ually paid in, and remaining undiminished by losses or otherwise,'' except on account of demands of the nature therein
described. Liabilities incurred by the acceptance of checks,
the drawers thereof having at the time no funds on deposit
with the bank, do not appear to fall within any of the exceptions enumerated; and assuming such acceptance to be lawful, I am of the opinion that the limit imposed by section 5202
extends to liabilities thus incurred, and that the acceptance
of checks by a bank, without the existence of funds on deposit therewith, to an amount exceeding in the aggregate the
amount of its paid-in capital, would be a violation of that
section.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAl\IIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

REMOVAL OF ASSISTANT POSTMASTER OF WASHINGTON, D. C.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 25, 1882.
have examined the law and decisions in the matter ·
of the proposed removal of the assistant postmaster of this
city, and am of opinion that if he holds a public office, such
removal can be made by that authority only in which by law
t he appointment is vested.
In the case of inferior officers whose appointment is by
law vested in the heads of Departments, or in officers appointed by the President, he can only act indirectly by his
authority over his own appointee.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTEH.
The PRESIDENT.
SIR: I

SUSPENSION OF POSTMASTER.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 25, 1882.
On examination of the provision in section 3836 of
the Revised Statutes, whereby a special ageut may in cerSIR :
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tain cases be put in charge of a post-office, I do not think it
can properly apply to the case of suspension of a r{ostmaster
uy the President under section 1768. Of course such an
agent might be designated by the President to fi1l the place,
but he would have to give a bond, as required by the lastmentioned section.
Very respectfully,
BENJA~IIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

CO~:IMISSIONERS

OF THE DISTRICT OF COL Ul\:IBIA.

The official term of each of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, appointed from civil life (excepting the first two appointments),
is three years ; and in case of the death, resignation, or removal of
the incumbent during such term, his successor shou be appointed,
not for the full term of three years, but for the unexpired term of
such incumbent, if any remains.

DEPAR'l':MENT OF JUS'l'ICE,
December 16, 1882.
SIR: There being a vacancy in the office of one of the two
civil Commissioners of the District of Columbia on December
16, 1882, for what term should the President renominate a
person to fill that office~ That is the question submitted to
me.
The construction of the following clause of paragraph 2,
act June 11, 1878 (20 Stat., 103), is involved in the vacancy
now to be filled :
. "The official term of said Commissioners appointed from
ch·illife shall be three years and until their successors are appointed and qualified; but the first appointment shall be one
Commissioner for one year and one for two years, and at the
expiration of their respective terms their successors shall be
appointed for three years."
There are two kinds of official terms, one or the other of
which Congress doubtless had in mind in this enactment.
In one the term is appurtenant to the person. Thus ''collectors * * * sh~ n, be appointe(l for the term of four
years" (Rev. Stat., sec. 2613), and in such cases, if the col-
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lector dies or resigns, the term which is his ends, and his
successor begins a like term of four years.
In the other, the term is a legal fixture as to beginning and
duration, and the person is, so to speak, appurtenant. Thus
certain Senatorial terms commence J\larch 4, 1883, and continue six years. The incumbent on that day may or may
not fill out the term. If one dies or resigns the term remains,
and some other person or persons may be put in to hold the
unexpired part, but not to begin a like term.
. Undeniably the former kind is that which is usually prescribed, and when the latter kind is created some apt expression of the intent will be found.
If the clause quoted bad ended with the word "qualified,"
a term of the former kind would have been perfectly designated. In that case, if such a Commissioner had, by death
or otherwise, ended his term, the President, as in the case of
a collector, could have made a new appointment for the like
term, the residue of the clause at least adding nothing to
the legislative purpose, taken in that sense.
But Congress must be presumed to have had a definite
purpose in that addition, which, if ascertained and found consistent with the preceding matter so as to give reasonable
efl'ect to all parts of the clause, should determine its true construction.
It appears by the context that there were to be on July 1,
1878, one engineer detailed ancl two civil Commissioners.
The term of the former is at the will of the President. The
terms of the latter were not limited by the original act of June
29, 1874. (18 Stat., 117.) Now Congress fixes the limit of
three years, and the result might be that on .July 1, 1881, two
experienced officers would go out, to be replaced by two inexperienced ones.
It will be conceded, no doubt, that such a result would be
in the legislative sense "a mischief to be remedied," aml it
is -in just such cases that the scheme of arranging the several
official terms in a fixed consecutive series has been long and
successfully applied to official bodies in all departments of
the Government.
The vital essence of such a plan is that the term is fixed,
and the officer, as it were, belongs to it.
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When Congress therefore so arranges the first appoint·
ment that tlle full terms shall begin consecutively at the end
of one and of two years, does it not substantially follow the
plan on which the Senate and like bodies are organized, and
with the same intent.
The language employed is so significant that it is impossible to suppose that it had not a definite purpose; and unless
it can be shown to have some meaning (and what that may
be ]tis not easy to conceive) whicll more reasonably harmo·
nizes with the ·opposite theory, it ought to be taken in that
which the words and context and reason of thA case most
readily suggest.
When once in this way the legislative intent is reached,
minor difficulties which may be supposed to arise from the
use or absence of particular words or forms of expression
will disappear. Thus the use of the word "their," in the
last clause, presents no obstacle to the view taken. It occurs
twice in a clause which is unmeaning, or at least unnecessary,
if taken in connection with the preceding matter understood
as creating a personal term. It evidently relates to the
immediate context. Congress was not thinking of death
or resignation of the first two appointees, but of the fact
that they would, in the ordinary course, hold on to "the expiration of their respective terms of one and two years,"
when, with "their successors," the full term series would
begin.
The fact tliat no express provision is made for filling
vacancies which might arise by death or resignation. is not
significant, unless it can be shown that without such provision the power would not exist, which will hardly be contended in view of the constitutional power of the President
and the provisions of the tenure-of-office acts. Such incidents as death or resignation may, of course, temporarily
affect the object sought, but they are so notably rare as to
be practically disregarded; at all events, Congress, when
dealing with a term of three years, can hardly be supposed
to have considered them.
The question has been considered as if unaffected by precedent, but it is important to observe that the opposite
view was taken of it by Attorney-General Devens (16 Opin.,
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537), whose opinions must be respected as official conclusions
and because of their acknowledged merit.
A..n examination of the opinion of Attorney-General Devens
does not satisfy me, however, and with great reluctance I
must express my dissent. The first impression expressed by
him upon this subject was, as it appears by the opinion itself,
in an off-hand oral statement which, being acted upon, he subsequently enlarged into the opinion which is published, maintaining his first impression, and standing by it probably because it had been acted upon. I have read it with great
care and re-read it, and I again say I do not concur in it.
I think the policy of the law and the intent and purpose
of the law creating this office would conflict with the interpretation he puts upon it; indeed, it would subvert it. Quoad
this point, the views that I before expressed I again repeat.
The vacancy must be filled for the unexpired term, and
not for an entire term of three years. The person is appurtenant to the term-not the term appurtenant to the
person, and the President has constitutional power to fill
this office, as he has any other office, it being vacant, during such unexpired portion of the term for which it is vacant.
I am, with respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
ALLOWANCES TO DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.
Opinion of Attorney-GeiJeral Devens, of :May 18, 1877 (15 Opin., 277), upon
the subject of allowances to district attorneys under section 827, Revised Statutes, concurred in.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
December 19, 1882.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 16th instant, with inclosures.
In compliance with your request I have considered the
matter brought to your attention by the district attorney for
the southern district of New York, in his letter of the 25th
ultimo, aRd have the honor to advise you that I abide by
the opinion of my predecesso&, General Devens, upon the
subject. Section 827 of the Revised Statutes makes the
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compensation of district attorneys for the class of service
mentioned in that statute dependent upon the approval of
the Secretary of the Treasury.
The court in which the suit is brought certifies such
compensation as it deems proper, but the final decision is
with the Secretary, who must approve. He certainly is not
bound by the action of the court. To him is given a discretionary power in determining the compensation.
In exercising that power he may well take into consideration the amount the attorney receives from other sources of
emolument, and may limit his compensation in the class of
cases named in the statute, so that his entire emoluments
shall not exceed a reasonable sum. This, I think, is the point
of your inquiry. 'rhere is no doubt in my mind that the
Secretary had this power under the statute to adopt the rule
which is set forth in the circular of June 4, 1877.
I return herewith the inclosures of your letter.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

SUPPLIES FOR REVENUE MARINE SERVICE.
No legal obstacle exists to re-imbursing the appropriation for the Navy
Department from the appropriation for the Revenue Marine Service
with the cost of such heavy ordnance and ordnance stores as may be
furnished by that Department to be used in said service.
Where one Department receives from another Department supplies which
are within the scope of appropriations belonging to each, a re-imbursement of the appropriation of the one from the appropriation of the
other, of the cost of such supplies, is not a violation of section 3678,
Revised Statutes; nor do the provisions of 3618, Revised Statutes, apply to such case.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

IJecernber 20, 1882.

SIR: By your letter of the 17th ultimo you inform me that
it has been the practice of your Department for many years
H to obtain from the Ordnance Bureau of the Navy Department such heavy ordnance aJld ordnance stores as are required in the armaments of Revenue 1\iarine vessels, and to
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re-imburse the appropriation for ordnance (Navy Department)
with the cost value of such stores, transferring the money on
the books of the Department from the appropriation for the
Revenue Marine Service." You further inform me that the
Solicitor of the Treasury bas rendered an opinion to the effect
that a transfer of property, such a~ is above described,
would be a sale within the meaning of section 3618, Revised
Statutes, and that re-imbursement could not be made for the
article thus furnished.
In directing my attention to this subject you request an
opinion from me upon the following question : "Whether
there is any legal obstacle to t.he re-imbursing, by the usual
transfer to the appropriation for the Navy Department from
. the appropriation for the Revenue Marine, of the cost of such
articles as may be furnished by the Navy to be used on revenue-cutters~"

I have examined this question, and will now briefly state
my views thereon.
The only statutory provisions that seem to be involved are
those found in sections 3618 and 3678, Revised Statutes.
The latter section provides that H all sums appropriated for
the various branches of expenditure in the public service
shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others." The effect of this
provision is to make unlawful the diversion of funds appropriated for one object of expenditure to another object of
expenditure. It forbids an appropriation for any purpose to
be thus enlarged beyond the amount thereof as fixed by
Congress. The inquiry here rises whether the case under
consideration falls within the prohibition contained in that
section.
Where appropriations, made for different Departments, are
applicable to the same objects of expenditure (e. g., the same
kind of supplies), it may often be advantageous to the public
service and in the interest of economy for one Department
to avail itself of resources and facilities at the command of
anot-her Department in obtaining the supplies needed; and
in the absence of any statute forbidding it, I perceive no objection to such a course. Should one Department receive in
this way from another Department supplies which are within
272-voL xvn--31
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the scope of appropriations belonging to each, I submit that
a re-imbursement of the appropriation of the one Department
from the appropriation of the other of the cost of such supplies would not violate the pro'"isions of said section 3678.
This could not be regarded as a diven;ion of funds from one
object of expenditure to auother, which is inhibited by that.
section; since the case supposes that the supplies are a legitimate object of expenditure for either appropriation. Nor
would the appropriation of the Department furnishing the
supplies be thereby enlarged. Such re-imbursement, indeed,
implies the co-ntrary, being the refunding of what was previously taken from that appropriation in the manufacture or
purchase of the supplies furnished. I am accordingly of opinion that the case presented in your letter is unaffected by the
provisions of that section. ·
·
In regard to section 3618, I am also of opinion that its provisions do not apply to that case. This section provides how
moneys derived from sales of public property, with certain
exceptions, shall be disposed of. Funds thus derived, where
it is not otherwise provided by law, remain subject to future
appropriation by Congress. They can not be placed to the
credit of existing appropriations, or be applied to objects of
expenditures within the same, thus enlarging such appropriations. But where articles are manufactured or purchased
by one branch of the public service under an appropriation
made for that purpose, and are afterwards, on grounds of administrati '"e expediency, transferred to another branch of the
service, the latter thereupon re-imbursing the appropriation
of the former with the cost of the articles out of an appropriation applicable to the manufacture or purchase thereof,
this transaction is not a sale either according to the ordinary
or the legal signification of that term. .Tt is nothing more
than a transfer of the custody and use of the property and
consequent accountability for the same, accompanied by a
transfer of the cost thereof from one appropriation to another,
within the scope of either of which the expenditure may
properJy come. The ownership (a transfer of which is an inseparable element in a sale of property) remains unchanged.
Section 3618 extends only to such cases as relate to '' proceeds of sales," receipts which are in the nature of revenue,
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belonging to no appropriation, and not available for expenditure without authority from Congress. 'The present case
does not appear to be one of that character.
J.Vly conclusion is that there is no legal obstacle to re-imbursing the appropriation for the Navy Department from
the appropriation for the Revenue Marine with the cost of
the articles to which your question refers.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secreta1·y of the Treasury.

CHINESE LABORERS.
The provisions of section 1 of the act of May 6, 1882, entitled "An act
to execute certain treaty l'Jtipulations relating to Chinese," are to be
construed with the provisions of the treaty referred to, wherein it
is as immigrants into ' this coun:ry that Chinese laborers are dealt
with; and thus construed, a Chinese laborer who comes to this country
merely to pass through it is not within the prohibition of the statute.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 26, 1882.
SIR: At your request, I have deliberately reconsidered

the subject of the construction of the act of Congress of the
6th ufMay, 1882, entitled "A.n act to execute certain treaty
stipulations relating to Chinese." My first opinion on this
sn bject was given under circumstances somewhat too urgent,
pressed as I was by your Department because it was pressed
by others, and I am gratified to have an opportunity to reconsider my former conclusions with care. T11e subject should
not have been hastened and hurried as it was in the first instance.
The preamble of the act is in these words: "Whereas in the
opinion of the Government of the United States the coming
of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order
of certain localities within the territory thereof;" and the first
section enacts " That from and after the expiration of ninety
days next after the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese
laborers to the United States be, and the same is hereby,
suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be law-
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ful for any Chinese laborers to come, or having so come after
the expiration o'f said ninety days, to remain wrthin the
United States."
The treaty stipulations referred to in the title of the act are
those contained in the treaty between this country and China,
bearing date the 17th of November, 1880, which is twice referred to in the body of the act.
The preamble of the treaty recites that the necessity for
"a modification of existing treaties" has become necessary
in consequence of the increasing immigration of Chinese
laborers and the embarrassments caused by tmch immigration, and the first article provides that "Whenever, in the
opinion of the GoT"ernrnent of the United States, the coming
of Chinese laborers to the United States, or their residence
therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests of that
country, or to endanger the good order of the said country
or of any locality within the territory thereof, ·the Government of China agrees that the Government of the United
States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence, but may not absolutely prohibit it. The limitation
or suspension shall be reasonable and shall apply only to
Chinese who may go to the United S~ates as laborers, other
classes not being included in the limitations. Legislation
taken in regard to Chinese laborers will be of such a character only as is necessary to enforce the regulation, limitation, or suspension of immigration, and i1nmigrants shall not
be subject to personal maltreatment or abuse."
There can be no doubt that the act of Congress now under
consideration was intended to carry into effect the stipulation in this article that the Governmentofthe United States
might suspend the immigration of Chinese laborers to this
country. But in applying the statute a serious doubt has
arisen as to whether it was the intention of Oongress to prohibit all persons answering to the description of Chinese
laborers, and not embraced by the exceptions in the third
section, who should come to our shores merely for the purpose of going through the country on their way to China,
or only such persons of that class, not coming within the
said exceptions, as should come here to seek occupation
as laborers.
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The preamble of the act, stating that in the opinion of the
Government "the coming of Chinese laborers to this country
endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory," etc., would seem to have exclusive reference to the
Chinese laborer as a dweller in our midst and a competitor with
our own laboring classes, for it is in this way only that he is a
disturbing element, and not to him as a passenger over our
territory, in which character he has never been objectionable.
The statute being in pursuance of the treaty, must be construed as in harmony with it, and as intending to suspend
only the coming of Chinese laborers in the way contemplated
by the treaty. Upon reference to the provisions of the treaty
already referred to and quoted, we find that it is as immigrants into this country that Chinese laborers are dealt with,
and that the right of the United States to suspend the coming of such persons is confined to cases in which they come
''as laborers." Looking then at the mischief to which the act
was directed, and the language of the treaty, I do not think
that a Chinese laborer coming to this country merely to pass
through it can be considered a~ within the prohibition of the
law, be being neither an immigrant nor a laborer coming here
as laborer.
As the prohibition of the act applies to Chinese laborers
coming into the country to stay as laborers, and as the regulations touching certificates of identification prescribed by
the fourth and sixth sections are ancillary to that end, and intended to prevent frauds upon the act, and therefore applicable only to Chinese coming here for permanent or temporary residence, I am of opinion that Chinese passing through
this country to other countries are not required, before crossing our borders, to produce the specified certificates of identification, provided they competently prove in some other
manner their status as mere transient passengers. Of course
the certificate would dispense with other proof. The character of such proof may very properly be regulated by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
It may be said that the exceptions in the third section in
favor of vessels bound to foreign ports, and driven into our
ports by distress or stress of weather, or merely touching at
such ports, strengthen the prohibition of the statute as to
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all cases not excepted. Btit the application of this canon of
interpretation proceeds on the presumption that the legislature, by excepting SQme cases, has manifested a purpose to
subject to the statute all like cases not excepted. If, however, it appears elsewhere in the statute that it c~ld not
have been the intention of the statute to limit the exceptions to those named, the presumption that might otherwise
extst can not arise.
· Besides, the exceptions mentioned are such as would have
been implied anyhow if Congress had not referred to themr
a consideration that would greatly weaken their force as the
foundation of a presumption of legislative intent. The maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, while of frequent use, requires great discrimination in its application, and, as Judge
Story says, is " often incorrectly applied." (3 Howard, 313,
Ex Parte Christy.)
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HAHRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. F. T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of tate.

ARBITRATION OF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Where it was proposed to ·submit to arbitration claims of the United
States against certain mail contractors: .Advised that the right to submit in the cases mentioned is doubtful; in view of which a different
course is suggested.
DEPA.RTMENT OF JUSTIOE,

December 28, 1882.
Sm: On the papers referred to me by you concerning the
arbitration of claims of the United States a~ainst certain
mail contractors, I have to answer as follows :
You request me to advise you whether the submission
agreed to by George Bliss, esq., acting for the United States,
and R. G. Ingersoll, esq., acting for the contractors, is valid.
(Letter November 25, 1882.)
I have not found any opinion of my predecessors bearing
on the question involved, but in the case of United States v .
.Ames (1 Woodbury and Minot 89), the circuit court held
broadly that a submission by the United States attorney
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was invalid on account of the want of authority in any officer
of the United States to enter into a submission in their behalf that shall be binding, saying: "All judicial power is by
the Constitution vested in the Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. (Constitution, art. 3, par. 1.) No department nor officer has a right to vest any of it elsewhere," etc.
The Court of Claims, however, in the case of the Great
Falls Manufacturing Company (16 C. Cis. R., 195) made the
following distinction as shown by the syllabus:
"Though an officer may not be authorized in terms to submit a matter to arbitration, yet if he be specially authorized
by Congress to act in regard to the subject-matter of the
submission, so that he will ba\e power to carry into effect
the decree which the award may direct, he has power to submit the matter to arbitration." The Chief-Just.ice dissented
on the ground that no authority to arbitrate had been given
by Congress. (Page 200.)
I have found no other Federal decision than these, and no
statute authorizing such submission ; but it appears that by
section 4057, Revised Statutes, the Postmaster-General is
required to cause suit to be brought to recover such claims
as those in question.
It is apparent from the statement of Mr. Bliss that if no
legal impediment exists it would be greatly to the advantage of the United States to carry out the submission, and it
further appears that the contractors are not only desirous to
do so, but are willing to give bond to abide by the result.
1\lr. Bliss is of opinion that the submission is lawful, but
enters into no discussion of the subject, and furni~hes no authority for his opinion, which, in view of the decision above
cited, is unfortunate. Thus far, knowing his experience in
acting for the Government, I have assumed he knew of some
statute or authority to warrant the course he has taken.
The circuit court proceeded apparently on the ground that
where by ~tatute a particular authority is vested, or mode
of proceeding is directed, it is exclusive, and section 4057 cited
gives peculiar force to the doctrine as applied to this case.
It might also be said that the officers of the United States
concerned in this matter, if considered either as general
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agents or as agents with designated powers, are unautlwrized to bind their principal by this species of contract.
The Court of Claims does not dispute, but avoids such
reasoning by holding that the delegation of authority to
submit need not be express, but may be implied from the
nature and extent of control over the general subject-matter
expressly given. Section 4057 seems to stand in the way of
taking any benefit of this distinction.
In ordinary cases it might be put on the general power of
an attorney at law to act for his client, but even there the
weight of authority is, I think, that the power can be exercised only after suit brought, though there are decisions upLolding its exercise before. It is doubt.ful whether such a
doctrine is applicable to the present case, for it is difficult to
imply a power in the Attorney-General to submit to arbitration a. case in which the Postmaster-General is specially directed to cause suit to be brought. As a question of law,
therefore, the right of submission seems to me to be in serious
doubt.
Assuming, however, that both parties are desirous of securing the practicable ad vantage of the submission, and are
willing to take such measures as may avail to put the proceeding beyond question of its legality, I suggest that end
would be accomplished by the formal commencement of snits
in the supreme court of the District against the respective
contractors, in which by their attorney ~hey should enter
their appearance. Then, upon application and by consent of
parties, the court would doubtless appoint the persons
named in the present agreements as arbitrators, and their
award could be returned to and made the judgment of the
court. This course will satisfy the reasonable doubt in your
mind, and, unless open to some objection which does not occur to me, would avoid the danger of making a precedent
which might under other circumstances be used to the disadvantage of the public.
In this connection I call your attention to Alexandria Canal
Company v. Swan (5 How., 86), in which suit, brought in the
circuit court of Washington County, the cause after issue
was referred by a rule of court to four arbitrators upon terms
specified in a written agreemeu t file(l iu the ca~e setting
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forth the manner in which the arbitrators were to be selected, etc. The Supreme Court upheld the proceeding, ChiefJustice Taney declaring that "a trial by arbitrators appointed by the court with the consent of both parties is one
of the modes of prosecuting a suit to judgment as well established and as fully warranted by law as a trial by jury."
(See also Newcomb v. -Wood, 91 U.S., 582.)
The proposition of the contractors to give bond to abide
the result, though indicative of their good faith, does not
seem to me to change the legal aspect of the case, for if, by
inherent defect of authority, the promise of one side is not
binding, it would, I think, affect the validity of the collateral
no less than of the principal agreement.
I am, with respect, etc.,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. TIMOTHY 0. HowE,

Postmaster- General.
POLICE FOIWE OF THE DISTRIUT OF COLUMBIA.
Under the provisions of the act of July 11, 1878, chapter 180, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia have power, in their discretion, to
remove members of the police force of the District of Columbia without such trial as is contemplated by section 356 of the Revised Statutes
of said District.
DEP .ARTMENT OJi' JUSTICE,

December 30, 1882.
SIR: Having transmitted to me the request of the District Commissioners for my opinion upon the question
whether the Commissioners have power to remove, without
such trial as is contemplated by section 356 (Rev. Stat. of D.
C.), members of the police force of the District, I answer as
follows:
A brief outline of antecedent legislation may throw light
on the subject.
For a long period prior to February 21, 1871, three municipal organizations, namely, the county of 'Vashington and
the cities of Washington and Georgetown, respectively, were
invested with the ordinary functions of local gover!lment fthe
city of Washington being governed by a mayor, aldermen,
and common council), but by act of that date (16 Stat., 419)
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the District of Columbia was created a bGdy corporate ia
place of those three organizations with a new form of government consisting of a governor, secretary, and legislative
assembly. A board of public works and board of health
were also established as auxiliary organizations.
This scheme of government proved in some respects unsatisfactory to Congress, as is shown by report of its investigating committee, and by act of June 20, 187 4 (18 Stat.,
116), the plan of vesting the executive power in Commissioners was substituted as a temporary expedient (the legislative assembly being abolished), and a joint committee was
authorized to prepare and submit a plan for a permanent
form of government.
The committee reported its scheme, but Congress rejected
. it and other projects, and on July 11, 1878, passed the act
under consideration entitled "An act providing a permanent
form of government for the District of Coiumbia" (20 Stat.,
102), and this act has been continued to th~ present time
without substantial modification.
Under the so-called old corporation of Washington City
the power of appointment to local offices was vested in the
mayor and aldermen; and that of removal in the discretion
of the mayor. Under the plan of 1871, the appointment to
and removal from offices created by the legislative assembly
were vested in the governor at his discretion, and this power
by the act of 1874 (section 2) Congress transferred to the
Commissioners, authorizing their appointment and proceeding as follows: ''who shall, until otherwise provided by law,
exercise all the power and authority now lawfully vested in
the governor or board of public works of said District, except
as hereinafter limited."
But Congress saw fit to add the following plenary authority in a proviso to the section, ''and said Commissioners
are hereby authorized to abolish any office, to consolidate
two or more offices, reduce the number of employes, remove
from office and make appointments to any office authorized
by law."
·
This provision was re-enacted in the act of 1878 (section 3)
in identical terms, except that the words ''under them"
were inserted before the words ''authorized by law.."
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It can not be doubted that it was intended by the provisions cited to give the Commissioners power in their discretion to appoint to and remove from every office under their
jurisdiction where a different wode of appointment or removal was not specified expressly or by legitimate inference.
It is especially important to note this, since the general purpose or policy of Congress in such legislation when once
clearly apprehended should have controlling efl'ect in the
construction of doubtful terms. They should be presumed,
if possible, to have a meaning in harmony with such purpose rather than one opposed thereto.
Braring this in mind, we are prepared to state the question at issue, which is in brief whether, by the sixth section
of the act of 1878, Congress in bringing under the authority
of the Commissioners an additional number of offices,
namely, those of the police force, intended as to them to vary
from its pre-viously established policy of confiding in those
officers a discretionary power of appointment and removal.
It may be fairly asserted that to maintain such an intent it
ought to be shown by at least a very strong inference.
The language is that from a fixed date ''the board of
metropolitan police and the board of school trustees shall
be abolished, and that all the powers and duties now exercised by them shall be transferred to the said Commissioners
of the District of Columbia, who shall have authority to employ such officers and agents and to adopt such pro-visions as
may be necessary to carry into execution the powers and
duties devolved upon them by this act." (20 Stat., 107.)
The powers and duties referred to will be found set forth
in chapter 13 of the Revised Statutes of the District. The
material point is that the power of removal then exercised
by the police board was limited by the following provisions:
''Each person so appointed shall hold offiee only during
such time as he shall faithfully observe and execute all the
rules and regulations of the board, the laws of the United
States, and the laws or ordinances existing within the District, and which apply to any part of the District where the
members of the force may be on duty." (Sec. 341.)
"No .person shall be removed from the police force ex~ept
upon written charges preferred against him to the board of
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police and after an opportunity shall have been afforded him
of being heard in his defense; and no person removed from
the police force for cause shall be re-appointed to any office in
said force." (Sec. 355.)
If Congress in making this transfer bad said that the
powers and duties so transferred should be performed as
theretofore by the police board or in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws, or had made use of some equivalent expression, it would have given such evidence of its
intent as under the circumstances might be expected if it intended to retain a mode of proceeding which was inconsistent
with the plenary authority vested in the Commissioners since
their creation.
By reference to the last clause of the section and that of
the seventh section it will be seen that when it intended to
preserve a particular system from the effect of consolidation
the expression is apt and clear.
But aside from this, if Congress had made the transfer in
the present terms and had stoppeu with the words "District
of Columbia," the question would still be whether the express
grant of power over all officers, which by its terms would
clearly include the new offices, is to be limited by inference
from the mere use of such words as " the powers and duties
now exercised." It would not be a strained construction of
these words under the circumstances to interpret them in a
general sense, and as not intended to incorporate details inconsistent with the existing plan.
The objection to this which may be suggested is that this
would repeal by implication the provisions as to tenure and
removal above cited; but this is met by observing that by section 15 all laws inconsistent wit;h the provisions of the act
are repealed. If found inconsistent, therefore, the repeal is
express, and the practical difference is one which it is submitted is of weight in just such cases. Without such a clause
the courts would feel bound to be even ingenious in preserving the said provisions; with it they are instructed that
Congress expects that such inconsistent provisions will be
found and directs their repeal. They are not obliged, therefore, to struggle against an apparent inconsistency, but may
at once recognize it and give effect to the repealing section.
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But it is not necessary to resort to such reasoning in view
of the immediate context which must of course be taken as
defining the sense in which the preceding text is used. The
words are "who [the Commissioners] shall have authority to
employ such officers and agents, and to adopt such provisions as may be necessary to carry into execution the powers
and duties devolved upon them by this act."
The plain intent of this clause, I submit, is to give the
Commissioners plenary power to retain the existing police
scheme both as to its official and regulative features, or to
modify or substitute without limit. So taken it is in perfect
harmony with the general purpose and policy before noted,
and strengthens instead of impairing the power granted to
it by section 3.
It was perfectly competent, therefore, for the Commissioners, formally or tacitly, to adopt (or not) the provision for
removal by trial on written charges, and to continue it so
long as they should deem it necessary.
Extended argument to sustain this position is surely needless, unless it can be shown that the clause above mentioned
is susceptible of some different and inconsistent interpretation. It can not be presumed that Congress intended to bind
the Commissioners, by the words'' powers and duties now exercised," to proceed by trial to remove a member of the police
force, when they substantially say in the same sentence to
them, "you may use your discretion in the entire subjectmatter.''
It is not claimed that the question is without difficulty,
but on the whole case it seems to me that Congress did. not
intend to force on the Commissioners (without apparent
reason) the anomaly of a mode of removal as to one class of
their appointees differing from that prescribed as to all others,
but wisely left the matter to their own good judgment. I
think, therefore, that the Commissioners are at liberty to
adopt the method of removal at their discretion in the case
under consideration.
I feel less hesitation in arriving at this conclusion from the
fact that in a case which seems to me to be substantially
analogous the general term of the supreme court of the District decided that justices of the peacf>, who under sections
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1030, 1031, Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, could
be removed only as therein prescribed, could be removed by
the Commissioners in their discretion, when by subsequent
legislation the appointment of justices was vested in the
governor (act February 21, 1871), and that authority was by
Congress transferred to the Commissioners as before stated.
(Bates v. Dennison, 3 McArthur, 130.) A copy is hiclosed.
I am, with respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS.
The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have power, under the
act of June 11, 1878, chapter 180, to abolish a part or the whole of the
board of fire commissioners of said District.
~EPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 30, 1882.
Sm : From the paperp referred to me it appears that you
have transmitted to me the request of the Commissioners of
the District for my opinion on the question whether they
have power to remove members of the board of fire cernmissioners of the District of Columbia, or to abolish a part
or the whole of said board.
· That board was created by act of the legislative assembly
of the District, approved August 21, 1871 (acts first legislative assembly, 75), and that assembly was created and its
powers prescribed by the act of Congress approved February
21, 1871 (16 Stat., 420).
.
By the former act the power of appointment and removal
was vested in the discretion of the governor of the District.
The powers of the governor were transferred to the Commissioners of the District, created by Congress in the act of
June 20, 1874 (18 Stat., 116), and they were further empowered as follows:
"And said Commissioners are hereby authorized to abolish
any office, to consolidate two or more offiaes, reduce the
number of employes, remove from office, and make appoint·
menta to any office authorized by law."
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The same powers were substantially renewed in those
officers by the act of June 11, 1878 (20 Stat., 104), the only
difference in the cited clause being the insertion of the words
"'under them" before the words "authorized by law."
Under this authority there seems to "be no doubt that Congress intended to give the power specified in th~ question.
There is nothing, apparently, in the opinion of my predecessor, the honorable Attorney-General Devens (16 Opin., 179),
in conflict with this conclusion.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
RETIRED LIST OF THE NAVY.
An officer who was retired as a commodore, and has since been promoted
to the grade of rear-admiral on the retired list, under the act of August
157 1876 (sec. 1460, Rev. Stat., as amended), is not entitled to any increase of pay by reason of his promotion.
The first section of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 392, is in pa1·imateria
with the provision touching the pay of promoted officers contained in
section 7 of the act of June 15, 1870, chapter 295, the act of June 5,
1872, chapter 296, an<l section 1516, Revised Statutes, and was designed
to fix the commencement of the increased pay of promoted officers in
active service only.
Section 1591, Revised Statutes, which ueclares that an officer promoted
on the retired list shall not, in com;equence of such promotion, be entitled to increase of pay, is applicable alike to officers promoted under
section 1461, Revised Statutes, and to those promoted under section
1460, as amended.

DEP..A.RTMENT

JUSTICE,
January 9, 1883.
SIR: I have considered the question submitted to me in a letter received from the Ron. H. F. French, Acting Secretary,
dated the 23dof October last, which is thus stated: "Is a commodore in the U. S. Navy, retired, who was promoted to the
rankofrear-iulmiral, retired, under the act of August15, 1876,
entitled to the pay of a rear admiral, retired, from the date of
his promotion, or for any portion of that time, under the provisions of the acts of August 15, 1876, re-enacted in sectidn
1460, Revised Statutes, June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 191), and the
Navy appropriation acts of February 23,1881 (21 Stat., 331),
OF
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and August 5, 1882, notwithstanding the provisions of the
acts of March 2, 1867, and July 15, 1870, re-enacted in section 1591, Revised Statutes'"
This question involves an examination into, and its answer
depends upon, the law relating to retired naval officers as it
stood before the passage of the act of August 5, 1882, chapter 391, which provides that thereafter "there shall be no
promotions or increase of pay in the retired list of theN avy,
but the rank and pay of officers on the retir~d list shall be
the same that they are when such officers shall be retired."
By section 1461, Revised Statutes, officers on the retired
list of the Navy became entitled to promotion as their several
dates upon the active list were promoted; but, by a proviso
therein which imposed restrictions as regards pl'omotions to
the grade of rear-admiral upon the retired list, promotion to
that grade was forbidden while it contained the full number
allowed by law.
Section 1591, Revised Statutes, declared that "no officer,
heretofore or hereafter promoted upon the retired list, shall,
in consequence of such promotion, be entitled to any increase
of pay." This provision is taken from the fifth section of the
act of July 15, 1870, chapter 295.
By section 1460, Revised Statutes, as ameuded by the act
of August 16, 1876, chapter 302, it was enacted: ''There
may be allowed upon the retired list of the Navy nine rearadmirals by promotion on that list: Provided, That this section shall not prevent the Secretary of the Navy from promoting to the grade of rear-admiral on the retired list, in
addition to the number herein provided, thoRe commodores
who have commanded squadrons by order of the Secretary of
the Navy, or wh~ have performed other highly meritorious
service, or who, being at the outbreak of the late war of the
rebellion citizens of any State which engaged in such rebellion, exhibited marked fidelity to the Union in adhering to
the :flag of the United States." The amendment of this section made by the act of 1876 consists of the addition of the
last clause, beginning with the words "or who, being at the
outbreak of the late war," etc. Its effect was to authorize
the promotion to the grade of rear-admiral of such commodores as came within the terms of the clause, notwithstand-
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ing the limitation prescribed in that section as to the number of rear-admirals allowed upon the retired list by promotion.
The question submitted presents the case of an officer who,
previous to the date of that amendment, was retired as a
commodore, and who afterwards was promoted to the grade
of rear-admiral .on the retired list under the provision in the
amendment, and the inquiry is, whether by such promotion
he became entitled to the retired pay of that grade.
Mention is above made of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter
392. The first 8ection of that act provides that on and after
the date thereof ''any officer of the Navy who may be promoted in course to fill a vacancy in the next higher grade
shall be entitled to the pay of the grade to which promoted
from the date he takes rank therein, if it be subsequent to
the vacancy he is appointed to fill." This section is in pari
materia with the provision touching the pay of promoted
officers contained in section 7 of the act of June 15, 1870,
chapter 295, the act of June 5, 1872, chapter 296, and section
1516, Revised Statutes, and must be considered in connection therewith in determining its scope. Thus considered, it
was manifestly designed to fix the commencement of the increased pay of promoted officers in active service only.
Previous to the act of 1870 the general rule was that the
increased pay of such officers commenced from the date of
the signature of an appointment to perform the duty of the
higher grade if one was given before the issue of a commission, or from the date of the commission if no appointment
was previously given. (Navy Regulations, edition of 18651
par. 1162; ibid., edition of 1870, par. 1508.) But this
rule was changed by that act, the seventh section thereof
providing that thereafter '' the increased pay of a promoted
officer shall commence from the date he is to take rank as
stated in his commission." That this provision applied exclusively to officers on the active list clearly appears by reference to section 5 of the same act, which prohibits any increase of the pay of officers on the retired list in consequence
of their promotion thereon. The provision of the act of 1870, ·
above quoted, was repealed by the act of June 5, 1872, chap272-VOL XVII-32
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ter 306, and the following proviso enacted: '~That if such
officer shall have been promoted in course to fill a vacancy,
and shall have been in the performance of the duties of the
higher grade from the date he is to take rank, he may be
allowed the increased pay from that date.'' The latter provision is substantially re-enacted in section 1561, Revised
Statutes, as follows: " When an officer is pro'moted in course
to fill a vacancy, and is in the performance of the duties of
the higher grade from the date he is to take rank, he may be
allowed the increased pay from such date." This section
extends to officers prmpoted on the active list only; section 1591, Revised Sta~utes, covering the case of officers
promoted on the retired list. The sole purpose aud intent
of the first section of the act of June 22, 1874, was to modify
the rule prescribed by section 1561, as above, fixing the
period at which the increased pay of an officer on the active
list, who is "promoted in course to fill a vacancy," shall
begin. It in no way affected section 1591, which thereafter,
as before, remained in full force.
Section 1591 contains a general provision, which, unless
elsewhere restrained in its application (and no statute having this effect has come under my notice), must be deemed to
extend alike to officers promoted on the retired list under
section 1461 and to officers promoted thereon under section
1460 as amended. By this legislation Congress authorized ·
promotion on the retired list of the Navy, expressly providing, however, that such promotion sh?uld not carry with it
enhancement of pay, thus in the case of an officer promoted
on that list separating his pay from his rank and making
the former not dependent on or governed by the latter. This '
it was undoubtedly competent for Congress to do.
The pay of retired naval officers is regulated by sections
1588, 1590, and 1893, the two last-mentioned sections being
of a special character. Section 1588, which furnishes the
general rule on the subject, fixes the pay of a retired officer,
when not on active duty, at one-half or three-quarters (as
the case may be) of the sea pay elsewhere provided in the
· Revision for the grade or rank heid by him at the time of
his retirement. Provision is not made by that or any other
section or statute, of which I am aware, for an allowance to
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the officer of an increase of pay upon his promotion to a higher
grade. On the contrary, such allowance is explicitly prohibited by section 1591.
I may add, in connection with the prohibition of the section just adverted to, that the enactment of a similar prohibition in the act of August 5, 1882, does not warrant
the implication that a retired officer was theretofore entitled
under the law to an increase of pay upon promotion on the
retired list. Such an implication could not fairly arise in the
face of a previously existing statutory provision still in force,
expressly declaring that such an officer should not be so entitled. By section 1589, retired officers of the class therein
described, who were promoted to the grade of rear-admiral,
are to be considered as retired as rear-admirals, and the
effect of this provision was to entitle them to the retired pay
of that grade. But other retired officers thus promoted fell
under the operation of section 1591.
The Navy appropriation acts of February 23, 1881, and
August 5, 1882, to which reference is made, in providing for
the pay of retired officers, state the number appropriated for
in each grade. Thus the act of 1882 appropriates "for fortytwo rear-admirals, twenty commodores," etc. On examination of the estimates on which this appropriation is based it
will be found that the forty-two admirals include thirty-nine
at $4:,500 per annum and three at $3,750 per annum, and the
twenty commodores include eleven at $3,750, seven at $3,375,
and two at $2,625 respectively. These differences in the pay
of officers standing in the same grade on the retired list are
the result of the operation of the provisions already adverted
to, by which promotion on that list was authorized, but without increase of pay in consequence of such promotion; and
those acts, so far from affording ground for the assumption
that all the rear-admirals enumerated (as well those who
have attained that grade by promotion as others) were intended to have the retired pay of that grade ($4,500 per
annum) indicate a contrary intention.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that an officer ~ho was
retired as a commodore and has since been promoted to tlle
grade of rear-admiral on the retired list under the act of
August 15, 1876 (sec. 1460, Rev. Stat. as amended), is not
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entitled to any increase of pay by reason of his promotion,
and accordingly I answer the question submitted in the
negative.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHAS. J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

INTERNAL REVENUE.
Where an application was made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for a refund of taxes paid in Decomber, 1864, upon spirits lost by
leakage or evaporation while stored in a bonded warehouse uetween
July 1 and December 31, 1864: Advised that the act of June 30, 1864,
chapter 173, then in force, did not authorize any allowance for leakage
in such case.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 12, 1883.
SIR: Yours of July 14last submits questions which have
occurred in your Department in connection with the application of W. T. Pate & Co. to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Rev. Stat., sec. 3220), for a refund of taxes paid by
them in December, 1864, upon spirits lost by leakage or evaporation while stored in a bonded warehouse between July ~
and December 31, 1864.
.
It seems that Pate & Co. first made application for this
refund in October, 1876, and that this was rejected by the clerk
whose official duty it was to pass upon such cases in the first
instance; also, that immediately afterwards the applicants
brought suit therefor in the Court of OlaimR, alleging (a necessary jurisdictional fact) that such claim had been previously rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Reven'lte, and
referring in that connection to an exhibit which showed the
action of the clerk, as above stated.
It also appears that, according to the course of office in
such matters, rejections by the clerk were brought to the
attention of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by submitting for his consideration and signature a letter certifying
such rejection to the collector of internal revenue for the
proper district.
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There is no evidence that this was done in the case of Pate
No copy of such a letter is to be found in the proper
letter book. The original application itself has disappeared;
the only evidence of its existence at any time being a sort of
docket entry in the register of the clerk in question, adding
thereto the word rejected.
The suit in the Court of Claims was in the end dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, under the decision in Nichol's Oase,
(7Wall., 122). Subsequently the application in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue was renewed before a succeeding Commis-sioner, and this has pended there ever since.
Thereupon you ask(1) "Is the application to be treated either as having been
rejected in 1876 or as abandoned 7
(2) ''Did the act of June 30, 1864, authorize allowance for
leakage in a bonded warehouse 7 "
1. As to rejection and ahandonment, I submit that the
.circumstances do not show a rejection by the Commissioner.
There was none expressly, and it seems that what passed before the clerk did not amount to one, and also that the allegation in the Court of Claims, attended as it was by a reference to a paper which corrected it for the matter now under
-consideration, did not amount to an estoppel. Neither do I
see proof of any abandonment of the claim by the parties interested.
However, the conclusion to which I have come as regards
the second question renders the above unimportant, and as
it is improbable that the circumstances which attend the first
question will be repeated, I will not trouble you with my reasons therefor.
2. As to an allowance by the act of 1864 of ''leakage" in
a bonded warehouse, I submit that there is no such allowance.
I h.ad prepared an opinion to this effect upon the 9th of
August last, but upon being requested to allow opportunity
for further argument on behalf of the claimants that conclusion was suspended for several months. Of late other engagements have prevented my sooner considering the arguments which have been presented by the learned gentlemen
who represent the claimants.
& Co.

502

RON. S. F. PHILLIPS
Internal Revenue.

In May,1880, whilst discussing the question whether warehouse leakage was allowed by the act of 1866, one argument
which occurred to the contrary was the difference as to the
definition of the object of taxation in that act and in the previous acts of 1864 and 1862. An a fortiori argument presented itself in that connection (16 Opiu., 670), and by inadvertency the definition in those previous acts was spoken of
as allowing such leakage. It was unnecessary to the argument to say that the a fortiori argument was all that was
material, and that obviously would have been only the
stronger if the previous acts had also disallowed of warehouse
leakage.
Under the influence of the context which the act of 1864
presents in connection with the passage quoted in the opinion
just alluded to, I conclude that the expression" distilled and
sold or distilled and removed for consumption or sale," by
which the act of 186! defines the spirits on which the tax is
to be "levied, collected, and paid'' (13 Stat., 243), is to read
reddenda singula singulis, as providing that such tax is to
be levied upon the spirits when distillr.d, but is not to be collected and paid until they are sold or removed fm· consU?nption
or sale, or, in other words, the tax which is to be ascertained
at the former period is to be satisfied only at the latter.
That context consists of the detailed provisions for the government and guidance of the officials that were to be concerned in ascertaining and collecting the tax.
Three officers of the Government were to be directly concerned with this ascertainment and collection-an inspector,
an assessor, and a collector. Before the spirits were remo\ed
from the distillery for any purpose the inspector was to ascertain the actual amount and proof of the spirits contained
in each cask or package (p. 244). These particulars were by.
him to be communicated in duplicate to the asse~sor and the
collector for the district.
Thrice in every month (p. 243) the distiller also was to
communicate to each assessor and collector duplicate accounts
taken from a book required to be kept by him showing the
amounts of spirits distilled, and also sold or removed, etc., by
him since his last account, and thereupon he was also to pay
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to the collector the tax due upon the amount so sold or removed.
The inspector was required to mark upon the cask or other
package the quantity and proof of the spirits therein contained. These packages were to be so marked before they
were removed into a warehouse.
No method of inquiry into such contents is given other
than a gauging by the inspector. No other gauging by him
except as above is authorized in general. In two exceptio,nal
cases an allowance for deficiency in the ascertained contents
of a package and a consequent re-inspection are authorized
by the sixty-first section of this act wage 245): first, for
leakage upon removal to some other warehouse, and secondly,
for loss upon re-distillation for the purpose of being exported. In both of these cases the deficiency anticipated,
and within certain limits pro vi ied for, was such as might
reasonably take place during absence from the warehouse,
i. e., during transit or in re-dist,illation. But for the fact of
lenkage in packages under ordinary circumstances, i. e., anterior to their removal from a warehouse, or, indeed, for the
official ascertainment of such fact if suggested or suspected, I
find no provision of law. Indeed, the provisions for ascertaining the deficiencies mentioned in section 61 assume the results
of the official inspection first made as conclusive upon the quantity removed from the first warehouse, conclusive as to both
the Government and the owner; any deficiency in relation to
that ascertainment being assumed as due to tJ·ansit or redistillation, and therefore as within certain limits to be
allowed.
I therefore conclude as a general rule that the packages
marked by the inspector before removal, and as so marked,
became fixed units of one or other degree in all accounts
betwixt the distiller and the Government, and that to this
rule there can be no exceptions except such as are statutory,
the only exceptions of that class to which my attention has
been called being those just mentioned, neither of which
affect the case before me.
No suggestion is made by you that any uniform official
construction of the act of 1864 has prevailed upon this point.
Such construction as to a statute of this sort no longer iu
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force would be entitled to great respect. My attentiou has
been called by the learned gentlemen who have argued thi~
matter on behalf of Messrs. Pate & Co. to certain circulars
issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue whilst the
act of 1864 was in force, as showing a practical construction
allowing warehouse leakage. Without admitting a right in
any one to modify the facts of this case as stated by yourself, I may, in deference to such suggestion, be allowed to
say that all of these, beginning with Circular No. 13, December 15, 1863, refer to one or both of the exceptional cases
mentioned above first affecteu by the act of 1863, :March 3,
chapter 74, section 18 (12 Stat. 723); see Circular No. 15
(March 1, 1864); No. 40 (February 1, 1866); "Special" No.1
(July 6, 1864).
I hardly need to add in reply to suggestions made upon
the argument that any general reference in circulars or statutes to the quantity of spirits in a warehouse at the time of
their removal is to be taken as a reference to the aggregate
of units, as above defined.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitm·- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
I concur with the Solicitor-General.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

CIVIL-SERVICE BILL.
Doubt suggested whether the provision in section 3 of the act "to
regulate and improve the civil service," etc. (22 Stat., 403), for the
employment of a" chief examiner," does not come in conflict with th6
constitutional rule on the subject of appointments.
The word "employ" is sometimes used in our legislation in a sense
equivalent to " appoint."
DEP A.RTMEN'l.' OF JUSTICE,

January, 22, 1883.
SIR. In the matter of the civil-service bill, having received from you a letter written by one Mr. O'Connor at the
instance of the State Department, and also a paper prepared
by the Secretary of State, and havi11g been requested by you
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to consider them, I have done so, and now submit the following suggestions and reflections arising out of that consideration.
Section 3 of the act "to regulate and improve the civil
service" provides that " said commission is authorized to
employ a chief examiner, a part of whose duty it shall be,
under its direction, to act with the examining boards so far
.as practicable, whether at Washington or elsewhere, and to
.s ecure accuracy, uniformity, and justice in all their proceedings, which shall be at all times open to him." He is to re-ceive a salary at the rate of $3,000 a year, and he shall be
paid his necessary traveling expenses incurred in the dis-charge of his duty.
Doubt is suggested whether the chief examiner, whose
employment is thus provided for, does not come within the
.category of an officer of the United States.
The Constitution (sec. 2, art. 2) in providing how officers
of the United States shall be appointed declares that the
President shall nominate, and by and with the consent of
the Senate appoint, certain officers described, and '" all other
<>fficers of the United States whose appointment . are not
herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established
by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment
<>f such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments."
If the chief examiner be an officer of the United States,
then consistently with the above provision his appointment
.can not be vested in the said Commission.
Is he such officer~ In United States v. Maurice (2 Brock.,
103), Chief-Justice Marshall says: "An office is defined to
be a public charge or employment, and he who performs the
duties of the o:ffice i.ct an officer." If employed on the part of
the United States he is an officer of the United States.
In Hartwell v. U. S. (6 Wallace, 385) the Supreme Court
defines an office to be a ''public station or employment conferred by the appointment of the Government. The term
embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and
duties." In this case the defendant was a clerk appointed
under the act of July 23, 1866,"by the assistant treasurer
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at Boston, with the approbation of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
'~ The employment of the defendant," continues the court1
''was in the public service of the United States. He was
appointed pursuant to law, and his compensation was fixed
by law. Vacating the office of his superior would not have
affected the tenure of his place. His duties were continuing
and permanent, not occasional or temporary. They were to
be such as his superior in office should prescribe."
The court held that the defendant "was a public officer,"
meaning an officer of the United States, and that he was
appointed by the head of a Department within the meaning
of the constitutional provlsiou upon the subject of the appointing power.
The use of the word ''employ" instead of the word" appoint" is unimportant, the former being sometimes used in
our legislation in a sense equivalent to appoint. Thus in
the third section of the act of March 3, 1815, chapter 94,
the word "employ" is used in conferring authority to appoint inspectors of customs, who are declared to be "officers
of the customs." These are officers of the United States, and
though employed by the collector with the approbation of the
Secretary of the Treasury, they are nevertheless appointed
(according to the ruling in the case iast cited) by a head of
Department within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution above adverted to.
So, by the act of March 3, 1865, chapter 98, the AttorneyGeneral is "authorized to e'mploy in his offico one chief clerk
at a salary of $2,200 per annum," etc., and by section 5 of
the act of July 23, 1866, chapter 208, he is also '' a~tthorized
to employ in his office * * • a clerk to be known as the
law clerk, at an annual salary of $2,500," and by section
363, Revised Statutes, he may" employ and retain" attorneys
and counsellors to assist district attorneys. It is under this
last provision that the officers known as assistant district
attorneys are appointed. The chief clerk, law clerk, and
assistant district attorneys just referred to are officers of the
United States, whose appointments, being conferred by the
head of a Department, are made in conformity with the Constitution.
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So, if the third section of the civil service act authorized
the Commission to employ a chief examiner with the approval
of the President, or of some head of Department, or of some.
court of the United States, and the Commission should exercise the authority thus conferred with such approval, this
would be in contemplation of the Constitution, as above interpreted, an appointment by the President or head of Department, or court, as the case might be.
In this connection I remark that the inspectors of hulls
and boilers provided for by the act of August 30, 1852 ( referred to in 1\ir. O'Connor's paper ), are designated subject to
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury ; they become
officers only " when the designation is approved by the Secretary." This is an appointment by the head of a Department
( Ha'rtwell v. Unitecl States, 6 Wall.), who is capable of exercising the appointing power.
Whether the chief examiner is an officer or not depends
therefore upon the nature of his employment, not upon the
terms used in conferring it. If the employment is one that
"embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and
duties," which latter are continuing and perman~nt, not occasional or temporary, it contains all the essential elemeuts
of an office.
On examination of the third section, it appears that certain duties are annexefi to the employment of the chief examiner which are continuing ami permanent in their character. Thus it is made "a part" of his duty, under the direction of the Commission," to act with the examining boards,
as far as practicable, whether at Washington or -elsewhere,
and to secure accuracy, uniformity, and justice in all their
proceedings," which are at all times to be open to him. He
is to secure'' accuracy, uniformity, and justice in all their proceedings," which involves tbe exercise of powers of supervision and control over all the examining boards. This duty
alone imports something more than an occasional or temporary employment; and yet it is made but a part of his duty;
the statute implying that other duties are contemphtted to be
devolved upon him. His tenure is less indefinite. He is (as
is the case with all inferior. officers to whose appointment the
consent of the Senate is not required) removable at the
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pleasure of the appointing power, but his tenure may survive the individual Commissioners by whom he is appointed .
• He is to'' receive a salary" at a prescribed rate per annum,
which corresponds in amount with the relative dignity of the
place. But one chief examiner can be employed at a time" authorized to employ a chief examiner" are the words of
the statute.
Local boards of examiners are provided for, to be designated and selected by the Commission from persons '' in the
official service of the United States," and the Commission is .
empowered at any time to substitute any other person "in
said service" in the place of any one so selected. Here, it
will be observed, only persons who already hold office under
the Government can be placed on these boards. The effect
of the statute is simply to devolve additional duties upon those
officm·s who may be designated and selected therefor.
Now, assuming the chief examiner to be an officer of the
United States, how does the case stand? Congress has
created an officer, but has not ''by law" vested his alJpointment in any one capable of exercising tl).e appointing power
under the Constitution. Is such a case provided for ~ The
Const.itution declares that the President shall, with the consent of the Senate, appoint all officers whose appointments
are not therein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by law. This would seem to cover the case.
The appointment of the officer might ha\~e been vested by
Congress in the President alone, or in a head of a Department, or in a court of the United States; but in the absence
of any statutory provision to this effect the constitutional
provision just adverted to would appear to come into play,
and vest the appointment in the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
The foregoing presents grounds which are deemed by me
sufficient to warrant _the suggestion of a doubt whether the
existing provision for the employment of the chief examiner
does not come in conflict with the constitutional rule on the
subject of appointments. The question thus presented, however, is one which can not be settled by executive action.
Whether the functions or duties and powers of the chief examiner constitute him an officer of the United States in the •
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sense of the Constitution, is one that can only be authoritatively determined by the courts. But should the doubt appear well founded, it may be worthy of your consideration
whether it is expedient to call the attention of Congress
thereto.
I have the honor to be, sir, veryre.spectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

SITE FOR A PUBLIC BUILDING AT MINNEAPOLIS.
The authority given by the act of Aprilll, 1882, chapter 75, "to purchase
a site" for a public building to be erected at Minneapolis, Minn., does
not include authority to acquire such site by condemnation under the
eminent domain power of the United States.
DEPARTMEN'r OF JUSTICE,

February 1, 1883.
SIR: Referring to your letter of the 23d instant, relative
to the site selected for a public building to be erected at
Minneapolis, Minn., I have considered the inquiry there suggested, whether the authority "to purchase a site" given by
the act of April 11, 1882, chapter 75, includes power to condemn land therefor, and the conclusion arrived at by me is
that the authority mentioned does not carry with it such
power.
Although the word " purchase," taken in its technical
sense, comprehends all modes of acquiring land other than
by descent, yet in the legislation of Congress providing for
the acquisition of private property for public purposes it appears to be used not in its technical, but in its popular or
vernacular sense. In Kohl v. United States (91 IT. S., p. 374)
it is remarked by the court that'' generally in statutes, as
in common use, the word is employed in a sense not technical,
only as meaning acquisition by contract between the parties
without governmental inte:rference." And where Congress
has intended to confer authority to acquire land through the
exercise of the ·eminent 'domain power of the Government
other terms, clearly indicative of that intent, are made use
of. See, for instance, the acts of December 21,1871, chapter
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5; March 27, 1872, chapter 65; March 3, 1873, chapter 311;
and June 18, 187!l, chapter 26.
Attorney-General Devens, in the opinion to which you refer (16 Opin., p. 327), held that the authority given to the
Secretary of the Treasury by the act of March 3, 1879,
chapter 182, to" purchase" certain laud at Fan River, Mass.,
did not include authority to acquire it by condemnation; and
the correctness of this view has been impliedly recognized
by Congress in the act of August 7, 1882, chapter 433, by
which the provision of the act of 1879, ab0\7 e adverted to, was
amended so as to enable the Secretary to acquire the land " by
private purchase or by condemnation." I may also mention
the act of l\iarch 9, 1882, chapter 28, as confirmatory of the
same view.
The various acts above cited (to which others might be
added) sustain the conclusion already intimated touching the
inquiry suggested by your letter. I accordingly return the
papers which were received therewith, deeming the institution of proceedings for condemnation in the case to which
they relate unauthorized.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
BENJAl\1IN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

PENSIONS-DECLARATIONS.
Declarations of pension claimants must be made before a court of record,
or before some officer thereof having custody of its seal.
The power to fine and imprison is not in this country a distinguishing
mark of a court of record, but the enrolling or recording of their acts
and proceedings is; and such court must have a seal by which its acts
and proceedings are authenticated and proved.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 2, 1883.
SIR: By section 4718 of the Revised Statutes declarations
of pension claimants must be made before a court of record,
or before some officer of a court of record having Cl(,Stody of
its seal, said officer being fully authorized and empowered to
administer and certify any oath or affirmation relating to any
pension or application therefor.
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In the case submitted Thomas S. Ewing made his application for a pension before David H. Lane, "recorder of the
city of Philadelphia," and the question is whether the r~
corder of the city of Philadelphia holds a court of record, or
is an officer of a court of record.
Wharton, in his Law Lexicon, Title" Court," page 250, defines a court of record thus:
"A court of record is one whereof the acts and judicial
proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memory and testimony, and which has power to fine and imprison for contempt
()f its authority.''
He adds: "Courts not of record are courts of inferior dignity, which are not intrusted by law with any power to fine
and imprison subjects of the realm, unless by express provision of some act of Parliament. Their proceedings are not
e nrolled or recorded; but, as well their existence as the truth
()f the matters therein contained, shall, if disputed, be tried
by a jury."
The power to fine and imprison is not, I think, in tliis country regarded as a distinguishing mark of a court of record,
but the enrolling or recording their acts and proceedings is;
and a court of record must have a seal by which its acts and
proceedings are held to be authenticated and proved in all
courts.
If a recorder of the city of Philadelphia has an official seal
which, in the higher courts and elsewhere, proves his judicial acts; if b,y statute or usage and custom he is a judicial
officer who keeps a record book in which his official acts and
proceedings are regularly enrolled for a perpetual testimony
of them, I think he holds a court, and his court is a court of
record.
The papers submitted. do not show whether these qualities
inhere in the office of the said recorder, and I am not able to
lay my hands upon any authorities as to these points. Furthermore, this question as practically propounded is answered
as far as I can answer it; but the subject belongs to the
courts of Pennsylvania.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.
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RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION.
Under sections 5260 and a261, Revised Statutes, it is sufficient if, previous
to the payment of claims for freight and transportation over the railroads of companies to which the United States have issued bonds, the
Jaw applicable thereto has been ascertained by a judgment of the Court
of Claims, or, upon appeal, of the Supreme Court. Where the law is
thus ascertained in one case, it may be acted upon in all similar cases
without further litigation.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 6, 1883.
SIR: After considering the papers inclosed in yours of
the 3d instant, I understand them to present the question,
whether sections 5260 and 5261 of the Revised Statutes mean
that, previous to any payment of the accounts therein mentioned, they must be sanctioned by judgments in the Court
of Claims, etc., toties quoties they arise, or only that previous to such payment the rule of right thereabouts must have
been ascertained by such judgment.
The claim which the above legislation instructed the officers
of the United States to assert and invited the companies to
resist by suit, was, that money due by the United States for
freight and transportation over the railroads of companies to
which they had issued bonds should be withheld and applied
to the satisfaction of interest~ etc., instead of being paid over.
What the courts could do under the Circumstances was to
ascertain the law arising under such facts as tnight be submitted to them for consideration. When that law should be
once ascertained, it would, in the usual course of things, become the rule for all such facts, whenever they might arise;
meaning by " such facts," facts of the same character-facts
essentially the same. In ordinary cases litigants acquiesce
in one such solemn decision. In exceptional cases, however,.
they litigate the question again. But it is exceedingly improbable that the legislature intended by the words of this
provision to convey a doubt whether the courts and the
Treasury Department respectively could in this matter sufficiently perform their ordinary functions-the former in laying down, and the latter in applying, a working rule for the
adjustment and satisfaction of these accounts.
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Upon the contrary, it is to be presumed that they intended
to direct litigation under the ordinary conditions and with
the ordinary results; so that when the law should be made
plain by a solemn judgment, it should for all facts identical in
character become a rule of action for the United States to the
same extent that it would have been for a private citizen.
The direction, therefore, to the Secretary is to pay no such
money until he shall have ascertained the mind of the Couri
of Claims and Supreme Court in the way that other prudent
litigants do. There is no appearance of an intention to substitute the courts for the Treasury as a machinery for ascertaining and paying debts, the law about which shall have
already been established by judgment obtained, in the way
directed, since the passage of the statute.
If the Secretary of the Treasury was dissatisfied with the
rule laid down by the court upon one trial, he might, no
doubt, have another case made up and reargued, but it is
not intended that money shall never be paid except the courts
shall again have laid down the law upon a certain statement
of facts, no matter how often they may have done so before.
Whether in a new case the circumstances are essentially
the same as in one already satisfactorily determined will be
for the Secretary to say. If he find that they are, he will
proceed to execute the previous adjudication ; if he is not satisfied as to this, he will be governed by the direction in the
statute, and require the matter to be determined.
I thocefore understand the expression '' is directed to withhold all payments" in section 5260 to refer, in the first place,
to the payments due to such companies at the time of the
passage of the act, but no doubt to include also, equitably,
all payments thereafter of like sort, the principles governing
which shall not previously have been ascertained by the
Court of Claims or upon appeal by the Supreme Court.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
I concur in the above opinion.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
272-voL xvn-33
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MAIL CONTRACTS.
Tile first proviso in the act of May 4, 1882, chapter 116, empowering the
Postmaster-General to annul the contract of any contractor or subcontractor who shall sublet his contract for a less sum than that for
which he contracted to perform the service, is prospective in ~ts operation.
All subletting of contracts after the date of that act is governed thereby,
whether such contracts were made before that date or not.
The fourth proviso in the same act, giving any person employed by a
contractor or subcontractor a lien fur his compensation, or any money
due such contractor or subcontractor, properly extends to contracts
and subcontracts existing at the date of the act.
The fifth proviso applies to contracts thereafter made, and has no effect
upon those existing prior to the passage of the act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Februa1·y 7, 1883.
SIR: In reply to your communication asking my opinion

upon" the effect of the act of May 4, 1882, upon contracts
and subcontracts for carrying the mails on star routes and
steamboat routes executed prior to its enactment," I have
the honor to submit the following as my conclusions :
The act of the 4th of May, 1882, entitled "An act making
appropriations for the service of the Post-Office Department
for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred
and eighty-three, and for other purposes," contains certain
provisos qualifying and controlling the appropriation of
$7,250,000 "for inland transportation by star routes," as follows: (1} "That whenever any contractor or subcontractor
shall sublet his contract for the transportation of the mail
on any route for a less sum than that for which he contracted
to perform the service, the Postmaster-General may, whenever he shall deem it for the good of the service, declare tbe
original contract at an end, and enter into a contract with
the last subcontractor, without advertising, to perform tbe
service on the terms at which the last subcontractor agreed
with the original contractor or former subcontractor to perform the same"; (2) that such last subcontractor shall give
good security, but that the original contractor shall not be
released from his contract until such bond shall have been
given; (3) that thereafter, when a contract shall be declared
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void on account of having been sublet, the contractor shall
not be entitled to one month's extra pay; (4) the next proviso
secures any person performing service for a contractor or subcontractor in carrying the mail out of any money due such
contractor or subcontractor; (5) the last proviso is to the
effect that where any person, corporation, or partnership
shall have contracts for the performance of mail service on
more than one route, and shall fail to perform his contract as
to one or more routes, "no payment shall be made for service
on any of the routes under contract with such person, corpo·
ration, or partnership until such failure bas been removed
and all penalties therefor fully satisfied."
We will consider these provisos in their order in c0nnection
with the question submitted.
Tbe first proviso, empowering the Postmaster-General, if
jn his opinion the good of the service requires it, to annul the
contract of any contractor or subcontractor who "shall sublet" his contract for a less sum than that for which he contracted to perform the service, was intended clearly to be
prospective in its operation. Indeed, in the absence of the
most explicit language to the contrary, it can not be supposed
that Congress purposed to give this proviso a retroactive
operation regardless of rights that had vested under previous
legislation.
By the second section of the act of 17th May, 1878 (20
Stat., 62), it is provided that a mail contractor may transfer
or sublet his contract with the consent in writing of the
Postmaster-General. This right is given without imposing
any limitation or restriction as to the terms of such subcontracts. If, therefore, it was stipulated in any subcontract
in operation at the time the act of May 4, 1882, went into
effect, as it might have been lawfully, to transport the mail
- for a less sum than that contained in the original contract,
one of the results of giving retrospective force to that act
would be to put it in the power of the Postmaster-General to
declare at an end the contracts of all contractors who had
sublet them at a rate of compensation less than that agreed
upon in the original contracts. :Manifestly, there is nothing
in the act of May 4, 1882, to compel a reading that leads to
such injustice.

•
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But all subletting of contracts after the act of l\fay, 1882,
went into effect is governed by that act, whether such contracts were made before or afterwards. As, by the act of
May, 1878, the subletting of contracts was dependent entirely upon the consent of the Postmaster-General, it is not
perceived that this view of the law is prejudicial to rights in
that behalf vested under contracts entered into before the
act of May, 1882, took effect, as it might have been had the
right to sublet contracts been absolute.
The second and third proYisos do not call for any comment.
The fourth proviso, giving any person employed by a con·
tractor or subcontractor a lien for his compensation on any
money due such contractor or subcontractor, can be applied
undoubtedly to contracts and subcontracts existing at the
time the act of .1\-Iay, 1882, was approved, without impairing
the obligation of such contracts and subcontracts. Indeed,
this proviso is but an extension of the third section of the
act of May, 1878, to persons employed by subcontractors, and
merely gives a new sanction to certain obligations already
existing or thereafter to exist.
The fifth proviso, to the effect that where any person, corpo.
ration, or partnership shall have con_tracts for the performance of mail service upon more than one route, and shall fail
to perform their contracts for one or more of such routes, no
payment shall be made for service on any of the routes under
contracts until such failure has been removed and all
penalties therefor fully satisfied, was obviously intended to
apply to contracts thereafter to be made, and consequently
has no effect upon contracts existing when the proviso be·
came law.
After what bas been said, it is hardly necessary to add
that the view of the Assistant Attorney-General for the PostOffice Department as to the effect of the act of .1\-Iay, 1882,
upon contracts and subcontracts existing at the time that
act went into operation, expressed in the opinion accompanying your communication, meet with my concurrence.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PosTMASTER-GENERAL.

------·~~--------·--
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POST TRADERSHIP AT FORT LEWIS, COLO.
Under section 3 of the act of July 24, 1876, chapter 226, a post-trader
can not be appointed by the Secretary of War excepting on the recommendation of a council of administration appointed by the commanding officer of the post, yet he may be removed by the Secretary
without the concurrence of the council of administration and commanding officer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 16, 1883.
I have re-examined the question involved in the matter of the post tradership at Fort Lewis, Colo., to which my
.attention was called by your letter of the 6th of July last,
and have also considered, in connection therewith, the re-quest contained in your subsequent letter of the 9th of
August, returning the papers in the case.
It appears by these papers that sometime during the year
1878 a military camp or post was located near Pagosa
Springs, Colo., and known as "Camp near Pagosa Springs."
By a general order from the headquarters of the military
Division of the Missouri, dated December 30,1878, the name
of this post was ("in accordance with the provisions of General Orders, No. 79, current series, from the Headquarters of
the Army") changed to "Fort Lewis." In January, 1879, a
council of administration was convened at "Fort Lewis,
Colo." (the post located near Pagosa Springs just mentioned.)
This council recommended the appointment of W. S. Peabody as post trader, and its proceedings, having received
the approval of the officer commanding the post, were forwarded for submission to the Secretary of War through the
proper official channel. By an indorsement thereon, dated
at the Adjutant-General's Office, February 17,1879, the proceedings were submitted to the Secretary with the remark
that "Fort Lewis is a regularly established military post; "
and on February 21, 1879, Mr. Peabody was appointed "post
trader at Fort Lewis, Colo."
It thus appears that at this period Fort Lewis (near Pagosa
Springs, Colo.) was regarded by the military authorities as a
regularly established military post, and that Mr. Peabody
was duly appointed trader thereat. The appointment was
SIR :
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accepted, and the business of trader at the post entered upon
by him.
Subsequently, by the sundry civil act of March 3, 1879, an
appropriation was made "to enable the Secretary of War to
establish a military post in the vicinity of Pagosa Springs,
on the left bank of the San Juan River, in the State of
Colorado, for the protection of the San Juan country."
Later the military authorities, in furtherance of the object
of this provision, selected a new site for the post, situated
on the Rio de la Plata and distant ahout 75 miles from Pagosa Springs, which was located with a view to the better
protection of the San Juan country, and intended to taketh~
place of the site already occupied near said springs; and in
August, 1880, the latter was abandoned as a site for the post
and the garrison removed to the new site.
Previous to the removal a change had been made in the
command at the post; the detachment of troops originally
stationed there was ordered away on other service, and was
succeeded by another detachment, by which the removal was
effected. The officer commanding the latter, soon after the
occupancy of the new site, ordered a council of administration to assemble, which met there on the 31st of August, 1880,
and recommended Mr. John G. Price for appointment as posttrader at the post. In the order convening the council, and
also in the proceedings thereof, the post is styled "Cantonment on Rio de la P1ata, Colo.," and appears to be regarded
as a new post. The proceedings of the council were approved
by the post-commander and forwarded to the Adjutant-General for submission to the Secretary of War. In submitting
the same to the Secretary the Adjutant-General, by an indorsement dated September 11, 1880, states that'' this post
is to be a permanent one, and is to take the place of Fort
Lewis, Colo., of which Mr. W. S. Peabody is trader."
Mr. Peabody having claimed the right to be recognized as
post-trader at the post established on the new site, under his
appointment hereinbefore mentioned, had in the mean time
removed his stock of goods there. The papers in support of
his claim, together with the proceedings of the council of
administration recommending the appointment of Mr. Price,
were, on the 23d of November, 1880, referred by the Secretary
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of War to the Judge Advocate-General for a report upon the
merits of the case thus presented. The Judge AdvocateGeneral submitted his report on the 22d of December, 1880,
by which, as it seems, the post on the new site was then
designated and known as Fort Lewis. The conclusion reached
by him is " that the present post of Fort Lewis is entirely
distinct from the post of the same name for which W. S.
Peabody was appointed trader, and that he is not therefore
entitled under his appointment of February 21, 1879, to be
recognized as the trader for the post as now established."
On tbe following day (December 23, 1880) John G. Price
was by the Secretary of War appointed "post-trader at Fort
Lewis (new), Colo.," and subsequently accepted the appointment and entered upon the business of trader there. And in
General Orders No. 10, dated'' Headquarters of the Army,
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, January 21, 1881," it
was announced that by direction of the Secretary of War" the
new post on the Rio de la Plata, Colorado, will be known and
designated as' Fort Lewis,' and . the name of the temporary
camp at Pagosa Springs, Colo., will be changed from 'Fort
Lewis' to 'Pagosa Springs.'"
It would seem that the Secretary of War in appointing
Mr. Price acted upon the view that the post then lately
established on the Rio de la Plata was a new post, and not
identical with the one previously existing near Pagosa Springs,
and tbatMr. Peabody, under his appointment of February 21,
1879, derived no right to the post-tradership there. In conformity with this view General Orders No. 10, subsequently
issued, describes the former as a " new post."
By your letter of the 9th of August last my attention is
specially directed to that point, and an expression of my
opinion thereon requested. But I sub.tnit that the question
whether the present military post of Fort Lewis, on the Rio
de la Plata, is or is not the same post as that formerly known
as Fort Lewis, near Pagosa Springs, is simply one of identity.
It is therefore a question of fact only, and for that reason
does not properly fall within the province of the AttorneyGeneral to determine.
I conceive that the answer to the inquiry proposed in your
letter of the 6th of Jnly, viz, "Who is legally the post-trader
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at Fort Lewis, Colo.~" (situated on the Rlo de la Plata) must
be the same, however the question of fact just adverted to
mig-ht be determined. If the post of Fort Lewis, on the Rio
de la Plata, and the post of Fort Lewis, near Pag-osa Springs,
were separate and distinct military posts, the appointment of
.Mr. Price merely filled an original vacancy in the post-tradership at the former of these posts. If, on the other hand, the
two posts here referred to were in fact the same military post,
the appointment of l\fr. Price (having been made in conformity with the requirements of the statute) operated to revoke,
by. implication, the previous appointment ofl\fr. Peabody. In
either case, 1\fr. Price became legally invested with the posttradership at the present Fort Lewis, Colo.
While under the statute (section 3 of act of July 24, 1876,
chapter 226) a trader can not be appointed by the Secretary of
War except ''on the recommendation of a council of administration, approved by the commanding officer," yet he is
rmnovable without the concurrence of the council of administration and commanding officer of the post, simply at the
pleasure of the Secretary, in whom alone is the power toremove vested (15 Opin., 278; Army Reg. of 1881, par. 587); and
since but one trader is allowed for each military post, where
a person has, in conformity with the requirements of the
statute, been appointed trader at a post at which the tradership is still held by another person under a previous appointment, the second appointment must be deemed to work a
revocation of the first.
It will be observed that the result now reached by me,
after a re-examination of the subject submitted by your Jetter
of the 6th of July last, does not differ from the conclusion
which I had the honor to communicate to you in my opinion
of the 26th of the same month.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.
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APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE.
An office which has become vacant during a session of the Senate may
be filled during the next ensuing recess of the Senate by a temporary
appointment by the President; but by section 1761, Revised Statutes.
payment of the salary of the appointee, in such cases, is postponed
until he has been confirmed by the Senate.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1883.
SIR: The office of United States attorney for the northern district of Georgia, which has become vacant during the
present session of the Senate, may be filled during the next
ensuing recess of the Senate by a temporary appointment by
the President. See opinion of Attorney-General Evarts,
dated August 17, 1868, in the case of the col1 ectorship of New
Orleans, where the office became vacant while the Senate was
in session. It was there held that the President, in the reeess of the Senate following, might fill the vacancy by granting a commission to expire at the end of the next session of
the Senate. (12 Opin., 449. Also see 15 Opin., 207.)
So where the office of collector of customs for the port of
Philadelphia became vacant while the Senate was in session,
and the President thereupon, during the same session of that
body, sent to the Senate for confirmation the nomination of
Mr. Hartranft for the office, but the Senate having subsequently adjourned without acting on the nomination, the
President, duriJ}g the recess thereof immediately following,
appointed Mr. Hartranft to fill the vacancy in said office by
granting him a commission to expire at the end of the next
ensuing session of the Senate, it was held by AttorneyGeneral Devens, in an opinion dated June 18, 1880, that it
was competent to the President thus to fill the vacancy by
a temporary appointment. (16 Opin. 523. See further ibid.,
539.)

It is, however, to be observed in this connection that payment of the salary of the appointee, in such case, is by section 1761, Revised Statutes, postponed until be has been
confirmed by the Senate. That section provides : '' No
money shall be paid from the Treasury as salary to any per-
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son appointed during the recess of the Senate, to fill a
vacancy in any existing office, if the vacancy existed while
the Senate was in session and was by law required to be
:filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, until
such appointee has been confirmed by the Senate."
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HAR-RIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

APPOINTMENT TO CIVIL OFFICE.
Semble that the nomination and confirmation of a person who, at the time,.
is ineligible for the office by force of section· 6, article 1 of the Constitution, can not be made the basis of his appoint'ntent to such office
after his ineligibility ceases.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 21, 1883.
SIR : Section 6, article 1 of the Constitution declares
that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time
for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office
under the authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been inincreased, during such time."
By the terms of this provision a Senator or Representative,
in the case there mentioned, is made ineligible for appointttnent to the office during the time for which he was elected.
Does it not impliedly render him also ineligible for nomination and confirmation thereto-these acts being necessary
and incipient steps to an appointment~ Can the "Fresident
appoint a person to an office which, at the time of his nomination and confirmation, be was disqualified to fill~ It is
submitted that section 2, article 2 of the Constitution, which
provides that the President '' shall nominate, ctnd by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint,"
etc., contemplates that only such persons as are qualified to
bold office shall be nominated, as well as appointed. Agreeably to this view, the nomination and confirmation of an in-
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eligible person must be treated as null, ant.l not as acts upon
which an appointment of the person may be afterwards made
when his disqualification ceases.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
. BENJAl\IIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDEN1'.
BRIDGE ACROSS NIAGARA RIVER.
In the absence of any act of Congress or constitutional provision conferring npon him authority so to do, the President can not officially consent to and approve the erection of the proposed bridge across the
Niagara River.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

11Iarch 10, 1883.
SIR: I have considered the memorial of the Niagara
Bridge Company, which you were pleased to refer to me on
the 24th ultimo, asking your consent to the erection of a
bridge across the Niagara River.
It appears that by an act of the Canadian Parliament, incorporating the ''Niagara Peninsula Bridge Company," it is
provided that "the company shall not. commence the actual
erection of the said bridge until an act of the Congress of
the United States of America has been passed, consenting
to or approving the bridging of the said river, or until the
Executive of the United States of America has consented to
and thereof approved," etc. And the application for your
consent to the erection of the bridge is made in consequence
of that provision.
Enterprises of this kind, connecting the United States
with a foreign country and facilitating commercial intercourse therewith, are matters of national concern and properly fall within the regulating power of Congress. But Con·
gress not having legislated upon the subject, either generally
or specially, and there being no constitutional provision
which devolves any power or duty upon. the President in
reference thereto, it would seem that he can not entertain or
grant the present application in the exercise of his official
functions. The President can perform no act officially except it be authorized by the Constitution and laws. His con-
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sent in the present case, not being thus authorized, would be
· an extra official act.
I beg to refer, in this connection, to an opinion of Attorney-General Cushing, in a case in which a similar question
arose. A legislative act of a British colony provided forcertain proceedings for the arrest and punishment of deserting
seamen of any foreign nation, where the go\"ernment of such
nation or state had by its proper officer signified its desire
that the act might be enforced against the crews or ships
belonging to such nation or state. Thl3 inquiry was, whether
the President of the United States, as such, had authority,
by so signifying his desire, to give general effect to that act.
It was held that he had not. "Neither the Constitution of
the United States, nor the treaties between this Government
and that of the United Kingdom, nor any acts of Congress
(observes Mr. Cushing) empower the President to communicate to the law of a foreign state authority or effect, which
it does not possess proprio 1.1igore as a law of such foreign
state. * * * Suffice it now to say, that, in my judgment,
the Government of the United States can give express sanction to the law before me in no other way, in the first instance, save through a treaty or an actof Congress." (60pin.
209.)

On grounds already intimated, I am of opinion that the
President can not with propriety grant the application of
the Bridge Company.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
DEPOSITORY OF MAIL MATTER.
The top or outside of a letter-box, attached to a lamp-post, is not an authorized depository for mail matter, the taking of which therefrom is
punishable under section 5469, Revised Statutes.

DEP.A.RTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

March 15, 1883.

SIR: Th~ question presented for my consideration in yours
of the 16th ultimo appears to be this : Is the top or outside
of a letter box, for the deposit of mail matter, put in a place
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designated according to law, an authorized depository for
such matter; so that the taking of stamped papers or packets, left on the top of such boxes, is an offense punishable
under section 5469 of the Revised Statutes~ I think a negative answer must be returned.
The outside of a letter-box can not be called a receptacle
or place of deposit. Section 3868, Revised Statutes, which
authorizes the Postmaster-General to establish receiving
boxes for the deposit of mail matter, says: "He shall cause
the mail matter deposited therein to be collected," etc. That
is, to be in the authorized depository the matter must be
within the box.
·
Letter-boxes are attached to lamp-posts in the streets and
to buildings at the corners of streets, and to make them secure and protect them as receptacles for mail matter they
are made , of iron, provided with locks; and :tlxed firmly to
the iron post or building. It is apparent that the inside of
the box is intended as the depository, not the outside. The
top or outside is not secured or in any way protected. It
can not therefore be a depository, which word carries with
it the idea of protection and security.
The taking of papers or packets from such a place is like
picking them up in the street or on the sidewalk. They are
left open and free to the public. The statute does not make
the outside of a box placed in the street a depository for anything, nor has Congress made the taking of papers and packets left so exposed a punishable offense.
If Congress has not done this, no head of a Department
can do it by the force of a regulation. Section 161, Revised
Statutes, which gives authority to the heads of Departments
to prescribe regulations, is careful to provide that they must
not be inconsistent with law, and when made they are only
for the government of the Department and the conduct of
its officers and the preservation of the papers and property
belonging to the Department.
No authority is here given to make rules for the conduct
of persons not connected with the Departments; and papers
and packets put on the tops of letter-boxes have not become
the property of the Post-Office Department, nor have they
been placed in its custody.
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I am not able to say, therefore, that the Postmaster-General, when in an order to letter-carriers he directs them what
to do with papers which they may find upon the outside of
letter-boxes, makes that an authorized depository for mail
matter.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. T. 0. HowE,
Postmaster- General.
LIABILITY FOR MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE.
Where a person placed money in tha hands of an assistant postmaster for
the purchase of "special request envelopes," but the latter gave no
receipt therefor, did not order the envelopes, and appropriated the
money to his own use-the postmaster having no knowledge of thereceipt of the money at the time, and not being chargeable with any negligence in the matter: Held that the person who paid the money to the
assistant postmaster has no claim upon the Government for the envelopes, and that the postmaster is under no liability for the money so
paid to his assistant.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 23, 1883.
The facts briefly recited from your letter of the 6th
instant are these:
A party gave into the hands of an assistant postmaster
money for the purchase of" special request envelopes." The
assistant gave no receipt for the money, did not order the
envelopes, made no entry ou the books of the post-office, but
appropriated the money to his own use. The postmaster had
no knowledge of the receipt of the money by the assistant
until after the discharge of the latter from the service of the
Government. It does not appear that the postmaster is
chargeable with any negligence in the matter.
Upon these facts you inquire, first, whether the person who
paid the money to the assistant postmaster is entitled tore·
ceive from the Government the envelopes; and, second,
whether the postmaster is liable for the money paid to the
assistant.
Both these questions must be answered in the negative.
And, first, the Government is not bound, for it has received
SIR :
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no consideration for the envelopes. The money was not
placed in any depository of the Government. It ne~er came
into its possession. But, it will be said, the assistant postmaster took the money, and he was a subordinate officer of
the Government. This is admitted. But the Government
is not answerable for the wrong-ful act of its ag-ent. "The
Government," says Judg-e Story in his work on Ag-ency, "is
not responsible for the misfeasances or wrongs or omissions
of duty of its subordinate officers or agents employed in the
public service." He adds, "the Government does not undertake to guaranty to any person the fidelity of any of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve
it in all its operations in endless embarrassments and difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interests." (Story on Agency, section 319.)
Neither, secondly, is the postmaster liable for the money
taken and appropriated by the assistant. For the latter, as
has been judicially determined, is not the ag-ent of the postmaster, but an officer of the Government. (Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barbour (N.Y.) Reports, 632; Schroyler v. Lynch, 8
Watts (Pa.) Reports, 456.)
And it has been held upon great authority that neither the
Postmaster-General nor postmasters under him " are liable
for any default, negligence, or misfeasance of any deputies or
clerks employed by them, unless indeed they are guilty of
ordinary neglig-ence at least in not selecting persons of suitable skill, or in not exercising a reasonable superintendence
and vigilance over their acts and doings. In this respect
their responsibility does not seem to differ from that of private
ag-ents who employ subagents at the request of their principals. Indeed, the deputy postmasters are treated as independent officers of the Government."
These are the conclusions of Judge Story, after reviewing
and commenting upon the leading cases. (Story on Agency,
section 319 a.)
These leading cases are referred to and quoted from by Mr.
Freeman, Assistant Attorney-General for the Post-Office Department, in his opinion, to which you allude, and it is unnecessary to cite them here. I agree with him that they are
decisive of this case.
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Accordingly, I am of opinion, as indicated above, that the
postmasier is not liable for the· money appropriated by the
assistant, either to the party who placed it in the hands of
the latter, or to the Government.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAl\fiN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. T. 0. HowE,
Postmaster- General.

CUSTOMS LAWS.
Where a quantity of wool was imported at Boston from Liverpool, and
two days later was withdrawn for exportation to St. John, New
Brunswick, whence (having been carried thither) it was immediately
brought back to Boston: Held that if the purpose of the above withdrawal, etc., was to create a second port of importation with the
object of reducing the duty, the transa:Jtion was fictitious, and that
Liverpool remains the last port or place of exportation within the
meaning of the statute.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

11-larch 24, 1883.
SIR: Referring to yours of the 9th instant, it seems that
upon the 29th of January last, at Boston, some 30,000 pounds
of wool were imported from Liverpool, and that two days
later it was withdrawn for exportation to St. John, New
Brunswick, and having been carried thither, was at once
brought back, reaching Boston for the second time on the
20th of February.
The duty upon imported wool is imposed upon the value
thereof at the last port or place whence exported. At the first
of the above importations Liverpool was such port, and the
valuation above 12 cents per pound, requiring therefor a
duty of 6 cents per pound; at the second (¥) importation .the
port is claimed to be St. John, and the corresponding valuation precisely 12 cents, the consequent duty being 3 cents
per pound.
Upon the above state of facts my opinion is that if such
goods were taken from Boston and placed upon a route the
real end of which was intended to be this same Boston,
the purpose of those interested being to create a second
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point of exportation with the object of re-ducing the duty,
such transaction was plainly fictitious and of no effect to the
purpose in view. It would, of course, be the same if the
second place of importation had been any other port of the
United States. In either case Liverpool remains the last
port or place of exportation within the meaning of the statute.
In this connection I have read the opinion of Attorney·
General Williams (14 Opin., 574), referred to by you, and so
far as that may be thought to include the case above supposed, after due consideration, I respectfully dissent from
its conclusions.
Whether such wool is forfeitable under section 3008 is a
more difficult question.
However, it is not necessary that I shall take decided
ground upon this question, the more as it may become my
duty to represent in court whatever position may be suggested to you by your greater familiarity with the practical
working of such provisions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETA:U,Y OF THE TREASURY.

PENALTY ENVELOPE.
A marshal, upon the expiration of his term, ceases to be an officer of the
United States, and is not entitled to use the " penalty envelope" in
executing process (under section 790, Revised Statutes) then in his
hands.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 27, 1883.
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your
letter of the 22d instant and the inclosure therewith, to wit,
a letter of the 17th instant addressed to the PostmasterGeneral by R. M. Douglas, late marshal of the western district of North Carolina.
He raises the question (which you submit to me) whether
he is entitled to the use of'' penalty envelopes" in executing
the process which was in his hands . at the time his term of
office expired Y
272-VOL XVII--34
SIR:
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Officers of the United States Go'\?ernment only are authorized to use the penalty envelope. (See section 29 of the act
of March 3, 1879, 20 Stats., 362.)
At the expiration of his term of office, a marshal ceases to
be an officer of the United States. He is not authorized to
hold over for any purpose.
True, by section 790 of the Revised Statutes, power is
given him to execute such precepts as may be in his hands
at the expiration of his office, but this does not continue him
in office. Mark the words, ''expiration of office." The office
had gone from him, though he may by virtue of the statute
execute certain duties pertaining to the office after his term
has expired. The mere power to execute process as given by
section 790 does not make a man a marshal of the United
States.
Mr. Douglas, then, being no longer an officer of the United
States Government, is not, in my opinion, entitled to use the.
penalty envelope for any purpose.
·
I return herewith Mr. Douglas's letter.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
Hon. FRANK HATTON,
Acting Postmaster- General.

APPOINTMENTS AD INTERIM.
Sections 177, 178, 179, and 180, Revised Statutes, considered with reference to the power of the President to make ad interirn appointments,
and opinion of Attorney-General Devens (16 Opin., 596-7) concurred in.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Mat·ch 31, 1883.
SIR: In answer to your request that I would construe sections 177, 178, 179, and 180 of the Revised Statutes, witb
reference to the nec.essity of appointing a successor to the
late Postmaster-General, I have the honor to say that those
sections have received an interpretation by Mr. AttorneyGeneral Devens, as appears on reference to volume 16 of
Attorney-Generals' Opinions, pages 596 and 597.

'
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It was there held by that officer that ~he President has
power to temporarily fill by an appointment ad interim, as
therein prescribed, a vacancy occasioned by the .death or
the resignation of the head of a Department or the chief of
a bureau therein, for a period of ten days only. When the
vacancy is thus temporarily filled once for that period, the
power conferred by the statute is exhausted; it is not competent to the President to appoint either the same or another officer to thereafter perform the duties of the vacant
office for an additional period of ten days.
After carefully reading those sections and examining the
history of their enactment, I concur in that opinion. '
I am, with great respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BHEWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

INDIAN MANUAL AND TRAINING SCHOOLS.
The proceeds of sales of articles manufac'tured in Indian manual and
training schools should not be turned into the Treasury, but be
received by tbe Indian Bureau and used for the benefit of the Indian
children in the schools.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,
April 20. 1883.

STR: The question submitted for my opinion in your letter
()f the 14th instant is whether the proceeds of sales of
articles manufactured in Indian manual and training schools
should be turned into the Treasury, or be held by the Indian
Bureau for the use and benefit of the schools.
I am clearly of the opinion that the latter is the proper
and legal disposition to be made of these funds.
Section 1, part 1, of the act of May 11, 1880 (Richardson's
Supplement, 525) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
purchase for the Indian service articles manufactured in the
schools, and provides that accounts of such transactions shall
be kept in the Indian Bureau and in the training schools, and
reports thereof made from time to time. This seems to dispose of the subject. It shows that the Government does not
propose to profit by the labor of these Indian boys and girls,
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but that the proceeds of it are to be devoted to their own
benefit and encouragement. This act, as respects the earnings of these schools, supersedes section 3618 of the Revised
Statutes.
There can be no doubt, I think, that Congress intended by
this act to provide that the proceeds of the labor of the
school~ should be received by the Indian Bureau and used
for the benefit and advancement of the Indian children
trained in those schools.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ.Al\1IN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the Interior.

APPOINTMENTS IN REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
Under the law at present in force, assistant engineers in the revenuecutter service should be appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Senate.
It is a general rule that, where there is no express enactment to the contrary, the appointment of any officer of the United ~tates belongs to
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senat6.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 23, 1883.
SIR: In a letter dated the 14th ultimo, the Hon. H. F.
French, then .Acting Secretary of the Treasury, requested an
opinion from me upon the question whether under the law at
present in force assistant engineers in the revenue-cutter
service Rhould be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I have now the honor to
submit my views upon this question.
By section 7 of the act of March 3, 1845, chapter 77, provision was made for the employment of six engineers and six
assistant engineers in that service, the former to be appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and the latter to be appointed by the Secretary of the
Treasury. The restriction as to the number of these officers
was subsequently modified by the sixth section of the act of
July 25, 1861, chapter 20, and the appointment of such num-
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ber, both of engineers and assistant engineers, as might be
required by the steamers then or thereafter in the service,
was authorized. By the first section of the act of February
4, 1863, chapter 20, it was provided tha~ the commissioned
officers of the revenue-cutter service should be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The object of this last provision was to change the mode of
appointing the captains and lieutenants in the service, which
officers were theretofore (in pursuance of section 99 of the
act of March 2, 1879, chapter 22) appointed by the President
alone.
Under the above legislation, while the appointment of
captains, lieutenants, and engineers was vested in the Pre~i
dent with the advice and .consent of the Senate, the appointment of assistant engineers was (by express provision of the
act of 1845) vested in the Secretary of the Treasury. And
thus the law stood at the time of the revision of the statutes.
The Revised Statutes, however, have omitted, and thereby
repealed (see section 5596), the provision of the act of 1845
which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to appoint assistant engineers. Section 27 49, Revised Statutes, enumerates the various officers of the revenue-cutter service as now
established, including among them the assistant engineer;
and the general rule is that, where there is no express enactment to the contrary, the appointment of any officer of
the United States belongs to the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate (6 Opin. 1; 15 Opin. 449.)
In the absen~e, then, of any enactment otherwise providing,
the appointment of the assistant engineer as well as the
other officers enumerated in that section would devolve upon
the President and Senate without the aid of further legislation. But by section 2751, Revised Statutes, it is declared
that " the commissioned officers of the revenue-cutter service
shall be appointed by the President~ by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate." This provision, which is a reenactment of a similar one contained in the act of 1863 above
referred to, was probably intended to em brace all the officers
of the revenue-cutter service described in section 2749, other
than those there classified as petty officers ; and, thus con-

534

HON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
Navigation Laws.

strued, it obviously leads to the same result, namely, that
tha appointment of the assistant engineer, equally with that
of any of the other officers described as above, devolves upon
the President and Senate.
I am accordingly of the opinion that, under the law at
predent in force, assistant engineers in the revenue-cutter
service should be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. I may add that the repeal of the
former law relating to the appointment of these officers,
which was made by the Revised Statutes, does not·afl'ect the
right or tenure of any incumbent who bad been previously
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury. (See section
5597, Revised Statutes.)
· I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

NAVIGATION LAWS.
An alien seaman, though he has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and has served three years ~n vessels of the
United States, is ineligible to the position of an office::.- of an American
vessel. For that, full citizenship is required.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 4, 1883.
SIR: I have the honor to submit, in reply to the question
put to me in your letter of the 19th ultimo, the following
opinion:
The facts stated by you are these : An alien seaman has
declared his intention to become a citizen of the United
States, and has served three years on vessels of the United
States.
The question is, can such a seaman exercise the functions
of an officer 9f a vessel of the United States under the provisions of sections 2165, 217 4, and 4131 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 4131 requires that officers of vessels of the United
States shall in all cases be citizens of the United States.
By which language I understand that such officers must be
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citizens having all the rights, privileges, arid prerogatives of
full American citizenship.
It is very plain that an alien seaman having only declared
his intention, etc., and served three years, etc., can not be
admitted as a citizen under section 2165, which requires five
years' residence in the United States.
But by section 217 4, Revised Statutes, a seaman, being a
foreigner, after declaring his intention to become a citizen of
the United States, and after serving three years on board
merchant vessels of the United States (which is this case),
shall be deemed a citizen of the United States for certain
purposet;, to wit, for the purpose of manning and serving
on board any merchant vessel of the United States and for
all purposes of protection as an American citizen.
This, however, is far from being full citizenship. For all
other rights and privileges of United States citizenship, including th~t of being eligible to the position of an officer of a
United States vessel, this alien seaman must wait until he
has complied with the conditions prescribed by the laws to
make him a citizen generally and for all purposes.
I return, therefore, a negative answer to your inquiry.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. H. F. FRENCH,
.Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
FILLING VACANCIES IN OFFICE TEMPORARILY.
Section 180, Revised Statutes, applies to vacancies in office oc'c asioned
by death or resignation, as well where they are filled (under sections
177 or 178, Revised Statutes) without action by the President, as where
they are filled (under section 179, Revised Statutes) by his authority
and direction.
'
The discretionary power given the President by section 179, Revised
Statutes, may be exercised after the vacancy has already been supplied
under the operation of either of the two preceding sections; and in
that case the ten days' limitation is to be computed from the date of
the President's action.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 5,1883.
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the note of the
Secretary of the Treasury, <lated the 3d instant, which was
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yesterday referred to me by your direction, and to state that,
upon examination of the statutory provisions for filling vacancies temporarily (sections 177, 178, 179, and 180, Revised
Statutes), I concur in his view that the vacancy in the office
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue caused by the resignation of Mr. Raum can not thus be filled by the Deputy Commissioner, upon whom the duties of the office have been cast
by section 178, for a longer period than ten days.
Section 180 declares that " a vacancy occasioned hy death
or resignation must not be temporarily filled under the three
preceding sections for a longer period than ten days." This
applies to cases of vacancies so occasioned, as well where
they are filled (under sections 177 or 178) without action by
the President, as where they are filled (under section 179)
by his authority and direction. The officer upon whom, in
such cases, the performance of the duties of the vacant office
is devolved by section 177 or 178 can not thus temporarily
fill the vacancy beyond ten days; and the same limitation is
applicable to an officer designated by the President under
section 179 to perform such duties.
But the discretionary power conferred upon the President
by the last mentioned section may well be exercised even
after the vacancy has already been supplied under the operation of either of the two preceding sections. He may then
"authorize and direct the head of any other Department
or any other officer in either Department, whose appointment
is vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," to perform the duties of the office. The
exercise of thil:i power by the President determines the
authority previously derived under those sections. And the
ten days' limitation, where vacancies are so filled, is to be
computed from the date of the President's action. (See 15
Opinions, 451.)
While, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner, upon whom
the duties of the office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue
have temporarily devolved by virtue of section 178, can not
thus fill the office for a longer period than ten days under the
authority imparted by that section, I am of opinion that it is
competent to the President, under the provisions of section
179, to designate the same or another dt·partm<>ntal officer
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whose appointment is vested in the President and Senate,
to perfor.m the duties of such office, and that the officer so
designated may thereafter lawfully perform those duties for
.a period not exceeding ten days.
I am, sir, your obediAnt servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
'T he PRESIDENT.

PAYMENT OF AWARD TO SURVIVING PARTNER.
Where an award was made to M., as surviving partner of the firm of M.
& G., and on the subsequent death of M. the representatives c-f G.
demand~d to share iii the distribution of the award: Advised that the
.a dministrator of M., the surviving partner in whose name the claim
was presentod and to whom the award thereon was made, should alone
-receive payment.

DEPARTMENT OF ~fUSTICE,

May 14, 1883.
Sr&: In yours of February 26, a claim before the Department of State, originating in an award by the American
and Mexicaa Mixed Commission (convention of July 4, 186S)
to one Mather as surviving partner of the late firm of Mather
& Glover, is presented ; and, under the circumstances of the
subsequent death of Mather and a demand by the representatives of Glover to share in any future installments to be
paid by you, the following questions are asked:
" A. Should the administrator of Mather, the surviving
partner in whose name the claim was presen~ed and the
award recommended, continue to receive payment of the installments ~
''B. Have the heirs of Glover any just legal grounds for
daiming to share in the distribution made in this Department~"

These questions, as I suppose, are based upon the principles referred to in the case of Johnson v. Towsley (13 Wall.,
72), in virtue of which the Executive Departments of the
United States generally deal with the party who is legally
ent1tled to make a demand upon them and who therefore can
give them a voucher, and leave all equitieJ:J to be settled be-
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tween him and others subsequently in the proper courts.
The general propriety of remitting the latter class of questions to the ordinary tribunals of justice must be apparent
upon bare inspection.
It is plain that the legal right to redress for damage done
to the firm vested in Mather as survivor; and if possible it
is still more plain that as against the United States, and yourself as their representative, the claim of Glover has never had
any legal quality whatever, such claim having arisen since
Glover's death, and having been by the Commission expressly
vested in Mather alone, although as quasi trustee, etc.
(Smith v. Barrow, 2 T. R., 476.) That upon the death of a
surviving partner the right at law to recover the partnership
choses in action vests in his executors or administrators,
seems likewise to be plain. (8 Wheaton, 642.)
Nor can a court of law listen to surmises as to the state of
the firm accounts, or of admissions by the survivor, etc., as
ground for holding that the legal title to partnership choses,
which remain in his hands, has been really distributed, as it
were, betwixt him and the representatives of his former coP.artners. (Peters v, Davis, 7 Mass., 256.) The most that can
be said of such surmises is that they indicate a right to have
a legal title conferred by such tribunal as has jurisdiction so
to do. But in case of differences as to the results of the connection, between the representatives of the respective
partners, neither courts of law nor Executive Departments
accept of any substitute for actual legal title.
Under the circumstances now existing, I therefore answer
question A above in the affirmative; and question Bin the
negative.
The decree in the equity suit, which is mentioned in the
papers as having upon some ground or other been given in
favor of Mather, is therefore a matter of no consequence here.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
I concur in the above opinion.

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
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INTERNAL REVENUE.
By operation of the repeal provision in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, the taxes on capital and deposits of banks. bankers, and national
banking associations, imposed by the internal-revenue law in force at
the time of the pass age of that act, are not assessable and collectible on
the capital and deposits of banks and bankers for the interval between
December 1, 1882, and March 3, 1883, nor on the capital and deposits of
national banking associations for the interval between January 1 and
March 3, 1883.
The words .,, any right accruing," etc., used in section 13 of the said act,
do not include such taxes accruing at the date of the repeal, there
being, as to them, no right in esse. It is the accruing right, not the accruing tax, that is saved.
The provisions of section 13, Revised Statutes, saving " any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred" under the statute repealed, do not extend
to the taxes referred to; since, as to them, there are no "liabilities incurred" at the date of the act of March 3, 1883.
DEP AR1.1MENT OF JUSTICE,

May 18, 1883.
By a letter dated the 22d of March last, the then
Acting Secretary of the Treasury, at the suggestion of the
Treasurer of the United States, requested an opinion from
me upon the question ~'-whether, in view of the passage of
the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1883, entitled 'An act
to reduce internal-revenue taxation, and for other purposes/
any taxes are due and payable on capital and deposits of
banks, bankers, and national banking associations, as having
accrued since January 1, 1~83." And by a subsequent letter,.
dated the 26th of 1\larch, the same officer, at the suggestion
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,. submitted for my
consideration the question of "the liability of banks and
bankers to taxation (on capital and deposits) from December
1, 1882, to 1\Iarch 3, 1883," in view of the provisions of the
same act.
These questions involve the inquiry, whether the taxes on
capital and deposits of banks, bankers, and national banking
associations, imposed by the law in force at the time of the
passage of the act of March 3, 1883, may be assessed and collected on the capital and deposits of banks and bankers for
the interval between the date of that act and December 1,
SIR~
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1832, and on the capital and deposits of national banking
associations for the interval between the date of the same
act and January 1, 1883. ·
At the period referred to, taxes upon the capital and deposits of national banking associations were imposed by and
collected under the provisions of sections 5214, 5215, 5216,
and 5217, Revised Statutes, and those upon the capital and
deposits of other banks and bankers under the provisions of
sections 3408, 3409, 3414, and 3415, Revised Statutes.
I shall first consider in connection with the act of March 3,
1883, the sections of the Revised Statutes above mentioned
which relate to national banking associations.
Section 5214 provides: ''In lieu of all existing taxes, every
association shall pay to the Treasurer of the United States,
in the months of January and July, * * * a duty of onequarter of one per centum each half-year upon the average
amount of its deposits, and a duty of one-quarter of one percentum each half-year on the average amount of its capital
stock, beyond the amount invested in United States bonds."
By section 5215 it is provided : " In order to enable the
Treasurer to assess the duties imposed by the preceding section, each association shall, within ten days of the first days
of January and July of each year, rriake a return, under the
oath of its president or cashier, to the Treasurer of the United
States, in such form as the Treasurer may prescribe, * *
* of the average amount of its deposits, and of the average
amount of its capital stock, beyond the amount invested in
United States bonds, for the six months next pfeceding the
most recent first day of January or ,July." The remainder
of this section imposes a penalty for failure'' so to make such
return," and pr£lvidPs for the collection thereof.
Section 5216 provides for assessing the duties where an association fails to make the half-yearly return required by
section 5215, and section 5217 provides for the collection of
the sums due where an association fails to pay the duties imposed by the three preceding sections.
Thus, by the foregoing provisions, each national banking
association is made liable to pay, in January and July, certain
duties on its deposits and capital stock. The amount so
payable is to be determined by the average of the deposits
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and by the average of the capital stock beyond the amount
invested in United States bonds, for each half-year ending
December 31 and June 30, respectively. Accordingly, with
a view to the assessment of the duties, the association is required, within ten days from January 1 and Ju.Iy 1 of each
year, to make a return of the average amount of its deposits
and of its capital stock beyond the amount so invested, "for
the six months next preceding the most recent first day of
Jannaryor July." The duties on theaverageofdepositsand
capital stock of the association for each half year as above
ca.n not be assessed or the amount thereof ascertained nntH
the expiration of such half-year; hence no part thereof can
be regarded as becoming due prior to that time. The act of March 3, 1883, section 1, declares : ~' That the
taxes herein specified imposed by the laws now in force be,
and the same are hereby, repealed, as hereinafter provided,
namely : on capital and deposits of banks, bankers, and national banking associations, except such taxes as are now
due and payable," etc. And the same act, section 13, further
declares: "That the repeal of existing laws or modifications
thereof embraced in this act shall not affect any act done, or
any right accruing or accrued, oF any snit or proceeding had
or commenced in any civil cause, before the said repeal or
modification; but all rights and liabilities under said laws
shall continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if
said repeal or modifications had not been made," etc.
Here, by the terms of section 1, is an immediate repeal of
the duties in question, "except such as are now (March 3,
1883) due and payable." Standing upon that section alone,
such repeal must be deemed to do away entirely with the collection of the duties referred to, excepting those then ''due
and payable." Were duties upon the deposits and capital
stock of national banking associations due and payable on
the 3d of March, 1883, for the period subsequent to December
31, 1882 t The answer to this i& indicated by what has been
already stated. Under the laws imposing them, such duties
were not assessable, much less due and payable, before the
expiration of the half year for which they were to be levied,
and which ended either on the 31st of December or on the
30th of June. Obviously, then, they were not due and pay#
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able on the 3d of 1\farch, 1883, for the period intervening be.
tween that date and December 31, 1882.
Does the provision in section 13, quoted above, qualify the
repeal by section 1, so as to warrant the assessment and collection thereof for that period~ By the former section therepeal of existing laws embraced in the act is not to affect" any
right accruing or accrued" before such repeal; but all rights
and liabilities under the then existing laws are to continue
and be enforeed in the same manner as if the repeal had not
been made. The qualification of the repeal in question,' if
any, rests upon the words" right accruing," etc., used in that
section. I do not think these words carr properly be taken
to inJlude the duties referred to (i.
on the average of deposits and capital stock for the half-year beginning January
1, 1883) accruing at the date of the repeal, there being then,
as to them, no right in esse. It is the accruing 'right, not the
accruing tax, that is saved. The right to the duties here
does not come into existence during the half-year, but only
on the expiration thereof; it then accrues, although the duties
are not yet assessed, and it may be said to be thenceforth accruing until the assessment of the duties and ascertainment
of the amount thereof, that is to say, until payment of the
duties is demandable. Thus, "debt accruing" has been held
to be an existing debt solvend'lon in fut'lwo (Hall v. Pritchett,
3 Q. B. Div., 215; Jones v. Thompson, E. B. & E., 63.)
Besides, it may fairly be inferred, from the express exception in the repealing clause of section 1, of H such taxes as are
now due and payable," that this was the only qualification
contemplated, and that no other taxes on the deposits an<l
capital stock of banks, etc., not even those accruing on the
then current half-year, were meant by Congress to be sa\ed
from the repeal. To repel this inferbnce, there must be
found in section 13 or elsewhere in the statute language clearly
indicative of a contrary intent. I discoyer nothing therein
showing such intent.
I pass now to the consideration of the hereinbefore mentioned sections of the Revised Statutes relative to other banks
and bankers.
By section 3408, it is provided: " There shall be levied,
collected, and paid, as hereinafter provide<l : first, a tax of

e.,
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one-twenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the
.average amount of the deposits of money; • • • with
any person, bank, a~sociation, company, or corporation, engaged in the business of banking; second, a tax of onetwenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the capital
of any bank, association, company, corporation, and on the
capital employed by any person in the business of banking
beyond the average amount in·vested in United States bonds,"
etc.
Section 34.09 declares : " The taxes provided in the preceding section shall be paid semi-annually, on the first day
of January and the first day of ,July; but the same shall be
calculated at the rate per month as prescribed by said section, so that the tax for six months shaH not be less than the
.aggregate would be if such taxes were collected monthly.''
Section 3414: "..A. true and complete return of the monthly
amount * * * of deposits, and of capital, as aforesaid,
* • * for the previous six months, shall be made and rendered in duplicate on tbe first day of December and the first
day of June, by each of such banks, associations, corpora·
tions, companies, or persons," etc.
Section 3415 makes provision for estimating tte amount of
deposits, capital, etc., in case of default in making and rendering tbe return required by the preceding section, and also
imposes a penalty for any refusal or neglect to make return
and payment.
The duties imposed ·by these sections, like those imposed
by the sections which relate to national banking associations,
.are assessed semi-annually, upon return required to be made
semi-annually, and become due and payable semi-annually, at
stated times; but they are estimated by monthly, not by halt
yearly, periods. The tax on deposits is calculated upon the
monthly average, and that upon capital upon the amount
thereof employed monthly; whereas in the case of national
banking associations the duty upon both deposits and capital
stock is levied upon the average amount for the half-year.
However, I do not think this difference in t.he mode of assessing and ascertaining the duties is material in connection with
the subject in hand. The reasons adduced in support of the
~onstruction above placed upon the provisions of the act of
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March 3, 1883, considered with reference to duties on the
deposits and capital stock of national banking associations,.
seem to me to be equally applicable to the same provisions
when considered with reference to duties on the capital and
deposits of other banks and bankers. There is no ground for
assuming that Congress intended to discriminate between the
two descriptions of banks as regards the scope and effect of
the repeal. Viewed as above, it operates to relieve not only
national banking associations, but other baJiks and bankers,.
from the duties mentioned, excepting such as were " due and
payable" at the date of the repealing act.
I may observe here that section 13, Revised Statutes, has
not been overlooked by me. The provisions of that section
(which with respect to the act of March 3, 1883, seem to be
superseded by those of section 13 of that act) include" any
penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred" under the statute
repealed. But on the 3d of March, 1883, banks, bankers,
and national banking associations were not liable for the
duties in question and would not be liable therefor until the
end of the then current half-year. Hence as to such duties
there were at that time no " liabilities incurred "-nothing
for the said provisions to save from the operation of therepeal in the act of 1883, even if they are applicable to that
act. (Railroad Company v. United States, 100 U.S., pp. 549,
550.)
I am accordingly of the opinion that duties are not assessable and collectible on the deposits and capital stock of
national banking associations for the period between the
date of the act of March 3, 1883, and January 1, 1883, nor
on the deposits and capital of other banks and bankers for
the period between the date of the same act and December
1, 1882.
This, it is presumed, affords a sufficient answer to the
questions submitted.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasurv.
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CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The provisions of section 3477, Revised Statutes, touching transfers and
assignments of claims against the United States, and powers of attorney, etc., for receiving payment thereof, do not apply to undisputed
claims, or any claim about which no question is made as to its validity
or extent.
,
Where a contract was made for roofing a court-house at a fixed price,
and a power of attorney given to receive a part of such price as security for material purchased by the contractor: .Advised that the
power was not affected by section 3477, as no doubt existed concerning
the right of the contractor to receive the amount so secured.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 28, 1883.
SIR: Yours of the 3d of February last asks whether the
word "claim" in section 3477 of the Hevised Statutes includes claims against the United States that are liquidated
as well ~s those that are unliquidated, and in this connection
three cases are stated as illustrating the question pending
before you.
The provision in section 3477 to which you refer'is as follows: ''All transfers and assignments made of any claim
upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or
interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, and what.
ever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of
attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment.
of any such claim or of any part or share thereof, shall be
absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and
executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses,
after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of
the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the pa:yment
thereof."
The expression "claim," as is well known, is one of the
most comprehensive in the vocabulary of the law. The only
question here, therefore, is how far the purview or the history of the above statute indicates that this word is employed
therein in some, and if so what, more narrow seuse.
The above passage comes originally from the act of 1853,
chapter 81, and it remains in the words in which it was first
272· -VOL xvu--35
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introduced by Mr. Badger, in April, 1852, at the Congress
preceding that in which it became a law. (Globe, Vol. XXIV,
part 2, pp. 984, 1128.) Its author was well known as an
eminent lawyer, and an especially skillful draughtsman.
Originally the bill which contained it was entitled "An amendment of the act of 1846, chapter 66." When taken up at the
next Congress its scope was somewhat enlarged, and the title
changed. How~ver, its connection with the act of 1846 re·
mained apparent in the body thereof.
The act of 1846 regulated assignments, etc., of such claims
as are allowed by Congress. Upon its passage through the
House of Representatives it seems to have been under the
charge of ~Ir. Thurman, but there is no report of debate in
either house, so far as I have found. It is a part of extensive legislation upon matters of finance, which disting ishes
that year, and its promiseofbenefit was probably universally
admitted.
When first introduced 1\Ir. Badger's bill made void not
only all assignments and powers of attorney affecting claims,
but 1ikewise all contracts 'lt7hatever for compensation to claim
agents. At its second appearance this latter provision was
omitted (Globe, Vol. 4XVI, pp. 242, 288.) The legislature
therefore delib(Jrately refused to interfere in the matter of compensation as between claimants and their agents, excepting
.so far as the compensation operated in rem. It is in conformity with this principle that the act of 18.'>3 specifies protect·ion of t~e United States against fraud as its sole purpose.
It should be added that such -second appearance was because
of its adoption by a special committee of the House, theretofore raised to inquire about and report upon the Gardiner
()laim, at that time so notorious.
By its connection with the act of 1846, therefore, as well as
by that with the Gardiner claim, and by its significant
omission above mentioned, the act of 1853 reminds the reader
of the common law policy against maintenance anrl ch.ampe1·ty ;
and this suggestion is strengthened by the title at length
adopted, which in turn finds an analogy in the circumstance
that the offenders just named are rated at common law with
that class which affects public just·lce, irrespective of any in-
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jury to such private persons as are incidentally oppressed
thereby.
Another circumstance to the same effect is to be found in
the clause (above) "whatever may be the consideration
therefor,." which probably originated in the fact that this
doctrine as to the "consideration" necessary to constitute
common law champerty, i. e., maintenance of the suit, was regarded as too narrow for public exigencies in 1852-'53. I
submit that this clause is an ear-mark, indicating that the
legislature nssumed the common law as to champerty as a
point of departure, and so was under an impression, and intended that, except as expressly otherwise provided, that
department of the common law would give the rule for interpreting the statute in parts analogous.
To the same general effect is the exact enumeration by the
statute of the circumstances under which alone assignments
and powers of attorney are therein authorized; viz, "allowance,"" ascertainme~•t," and "warrant for the payment." I
submit that the former words are emphatic. If they are not
emphatic they are superfluous, for all "warrants for payment"
are necessarily preceded by either or both ; and where not
by both, the above enumeration is of course to be taken
distributively. But in any case if the specification of allow-·
ance and ascertainment is not ex industria, it is surplusage;
a conclusion which, of course, is not to be drawn if reasonably. to be avoided. If they are emphatic, this· feature
coincides with the others just mentioned in showing that
a general atrnm~phere or color derived from the doctrines of
champerty affects the topics before us. I mean that some
sort of litigation of the "claim," either in Congress or before an Executive Department, is taken for granted. There
may be no technical difference between the respective methods
for the payment of the salary of a United States judge, and
for that of a claim which in the event undergoes a course of
several years" ligitation in the Treasury Department. But
for some purposes there is an important difference, and
that not only as to the means of success employed by
such as are attorneys to c\,Uect them. In point of fact
where the United States are clearly debtors as claimed,
the matters preliminary to warrant for payment amount to

•
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no more than a presentment of a promissory note to the
debtor himself; but when doubt arises upon the claim, the
officers of the Treasury assume consciously judicial functions;
the affair loses its pro forma ex parte character, sides are
taken by the creditor and debtor, and the auditor , comptrollers, etc., act as if inquiring into a question inter alios.
Such also as this latter kind of proceeding is that where no
law exists to authorize payment, and an application to Congress for private legislation becomes necessary. It is not
singular, therefore, or merely casual, that section 3477, which
is ~om pounded of the acts of 1846 and 1853, should in accordance with a marked trait in Anglo-Saxon legislation show
upon its face that it deals with a specific evil, to which the
attention of Congress had actually at the time been drawn;
and is not meant as an abstract and universal statutory provision shaped by square and compass, or as broad, say, as
the word "clameum," spoken of by Coke as the most comprehensive in the law.
Comprehensiveness in meaning is not infrequently akin to
vagueness, and consequently to obscurity; so that it is not
unusual for interpreters of legal documents to color or
restrain general terms occurring therein by specific words
associated therewith, or by matters connec.ted with their
history. In the present instance, as has been shown, we
may bring both of these influences to bear.
In this connection it is significant that a subsequent clause
in section 3477 expressly excludes conclusion that the phrase
"all transfers" therein means less than "all," whilst there is
no such pains taken with the adjoining phrase, "any claim."
Apparently, then, the .latter is left of purpose to such color
as the context, etc., may suggest.
It is also pertinent to the general question to observe that
the second section of the act of 1853 made it indictable for
officers of the United States to ''prosecute any claim~' as
agent or attorney. I take it that "prosecution-'; in this place
denotes any method by which " a claim" may be recovered;
and therefore that it varies secundum subjectatn materiam
of the class of claims to which it may be actually applied.
If the word claim here is to have the meaning assigned by
Coke, then for one class presentation thereof is prosecution,.

~
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and a public officer would become indictable if in behalf of
an absent friend he were to present to the Treasury, even
without compensation, any account against the United States,
no matter how plainly due. But I apprehend that the P.Xpression prosecute gives the same color to the word claim in
_this second section that in the :first is reflected from the
matters above suggested, and so that it aids in showing that
Congress was thinking of, and except as actually therein
otherwise expressed was guided by, the ancient policy as to
champerty.
It is therefore pertinent to observe here that at common
law it is not champerty to stipulate for a share in collecting
a debt (from, ex. gra., some distant debtor) by a mere presentation thereof. For that effect it is necessary that there
should be, as the books say, a quarrel or taking of sides about
the debt by the parties thereto. If no such dispute exists,
either in pais or in court, compensation to a proposed collector
is allowable. And even in case of suit in court it is "certain
that the assignee of a bond or other chose in action, being
made over to him for good consideration in satisfaction of a
precedent debt, and not merely in consideration of the intended maintenance," is not champerty. Hawkins (Book 1,
chapter 83, sec. 17), and others. That is even where there is
litigation, unless there is also a particular sort of consideration,
assignments of the kind just mentioned are not invalid at
common law. We have seen that section3477, following the
statute of 1853, has expressly changed this rule so far as regards considerat-ion. And, as already submitted, that exception concurring with other indications to the same effect
'proves the rule in other respects, and consequently that section· still contemplates the existence of litigation (i. e.• some
virtual quarrel or sides-taking betwixt the supposed original
creditor and the United States) in order to constitute such a
claim as is within its provisions.
Considerations arising from the history of a statute are of
course most apt to occur to those who may be called to administer its provisions contemporaneously. In the present
case, therefore, it is interesting to observe that contemporaneously the First Comptroller issued a circular in which he
announced, as a rule of action in settling demands against
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the Government, that the act of 1853 did not include undisputed claims.
I have carefully read the cases in the Supreme Court of
the United States reported in 95 U.S. 407,97 ib. 392,484, and
102 ib. 556, and understand that the views above expressed do
not conflict with anything there decided"
I have also attentively considered the opimon in Spaid:s
case (16 Opin., 161) to which you refer. There a questionable power of attorney had been revoked, and, as no interest
was connected with the power, there was little difficulty in
holding that the latter was at an end-and so AttorneyGeneral Devens said; but he added, by the way, that the
power itself (to collect installments from time to time upon a
contract to dredge a river) was in violation of section 3477,
and so had never been valid. It is important to say that no
question upon that point had been asked of him, and from the
passage quoted by you (16 Opin., page 263) in regard to" concurrence," as well upon the whole face of the opinion, it is
doubtful whether that learned and able lawyer had thoroughly considered either the foundation or the effect of this
dictum.
I hope to be understood upon the whole as ad vising that
section 3477 does not apply to any claim against the United
States about wllich no question is made as to its authority or
extent. By "question," I mean, of course, question by some
officer !awfully authorized in that behalf.
It seems, therefore, that the policy of the above section
forbids that au assignee or attorney as to the proceeds of an executory contract (ex gra., for building, dredging, etc.) shall
have more than an uncertain interest therein, i.
one con·
tingent upon the absence ot' any subsequent question by the
United States as regards any matter which at the time of
the question is in the future-such as the amount or quality
of the articYe to be paid for.
It is hardly necessary to add that nothing in this discussion, or in section 3477, touches those claims· against the
United States that arise upon instruments, such as bonds,
etc., the transfer, commercial character, etc., of which have
been provided for by special legislation.

e.,
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To apply the above conclusion to the particular cases which
you mention as pending before you :
(1) In Jones's case a c~Jntract has been made for roofing a
court-house at a fixed price, and a power of attorney to receive
a part of such price has been given as security for material
purchased by the contractor.
Inasmuch as no doubt has arisen as to the title of the contractor to receive the amount so secured, I am of opinion that
the power is not affected by section 3477.
(2) In Snyder's case the circumstances are substantially
the same except that the power covers the whole price, and
therefore the same result follows.
(3) Marshbank's case differs from those above, in that the
contract is still executory. As I have said, it seems that
nothing can be done at present upon the part of the United
States which shall conflict with th.e operation of section 3477
at any time hereafter that a demand is made for payment
upon this contract, either in whole or by installment.
If at any such time the contract is, in either of the ways
suggested above, disputed by public officers authorized so to
do, an application for payment thereunder will become a
claim within section 3477, and the power consequently void.
No "acceptance" can obviate this liability.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Having examined this case and considered the above
opinion, I concur with the Solicitor-General in his answer to
the questions propounded and in his interpretation of section 3477 and all of the conclusions he has arrived at and
presents, and I answer as he has answered.
BENJAMIN HAHRIS BREWSTER.
JUNE 7, 1883.
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CASE OF THE BRIG MARY C. COMERY.
On application of the master, the American brig Ma1'1J C. Oomery, while
lying at a Colombian port, was surveyed and condemned as unseaworthy by the port officers. Meanwhile the United States consul
summoned a committee, which also surveyed the vessel, and, finding
her unseaworthy, recommended a sale for the benefit of all concerned.
But prior to the last survey the master notified the consul that he
abandoned the vessel, and thereupon left the port : Advised that, in
the case stated, the consul is without authority to sell the vessel, but
should notify the owners of the condition of their property, and in the
mean time take care of it.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
J'l(llte 7, 1883.
Sm: Yours of thA 29th ultimo presents the following case
for an opinion by the Attorney-General:
The American brig 11-fary 0. Oomery during this year became unseaworthy whilst at the Colombian port of Colon,
and thereupon its master applied to the " port officers" for a
survey and condemnation, which was accorded. This proceeding was without the participation of our consular officer,
but it is said to conform to the legal requirements of the
Government there. Meanwhile the United States consul
summoned a committee, which also surveyed the vessel, and,
finding her unseaworthy, advised a condemnation and sale
for the benefit of all concerned. Prior to this latter survey
the master had notified the United States consul that he
abandoned the brig, and thereupon he secretly left Colon as
a passenger of the American schooner I. Taylor, bound for
:Baltimore.
The Oomery is now held by the United States consul, who
asks immediate instruction as to the disposition he is to make
of her; but before advising him in the matter I have to request that you favor me with an official opinion upon the
following questions ~
First. In the case stated can the consul be invested with
Jegal authority to sell f
Second. Should the first survey and condemnation under
the Colombian proceedings be respected and the consul be
directed to execute it¥ ('r,
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Third. Should the Department approve the second survey
and condemnation and instruct our consul to proceed with
the sale as founded upon the same~
.Attention is directed to an alleged partial ownership of a
Mr. Butler, of New York, and advice is requested as to
• whether such fact should modify the Department's instructions in any manner.
First. Upon consideration I am unable to find any authority
for the projected sale by the consul. The Omnery seems to
be lying at Colon abandoned by its master and crew. In
such case it is the duty of the consul there, as soon as practi-cable, to notify the owners of the condition of their property,
and, in the mean while, to take care of it. But he has no
power to sell, nor do the terms in the Consular Regulations
Df 1874 (referred to, as I suppose, in the letter inclosed by
yo-q) purport to provide for such a sale. The sales there
mentioned are sales under the authority of the master, the
• intervention by the consul being for the purpose of ascertai~ing the existence of that state of things (i. e., necessity,
etc.) which under general law confers such authority. The
law upon the point here involved seems to be substantially
unchanged since the time (July 24, 1854) when .AttorneyGeneral Cushing discussed the general topic, in an opinion
given to Secretary Marcy, in the case of the Serene (6 Opin.,
617.)

Second. I am not sufficiently informed as regards the circums1,ances which attend your second question to say whether
the ordinary presumption in favor of the validity of the proc~edings before the Colombian tribunals has here been rebutted. The presumption, of course, is a strong one. Nothing
appears to render it the duty of the consul to do more than
to see that the Colombian law as to jurisdiction, etc., is
being observed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
I concur with the above opinion.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
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CIVIL SERVICE.
Whether there are already two or more members of a family in the pnblio
service, etc., as provided in section 9 of the civil service act of January
16, 1883, chap. 27, is not a question to be considered by the Civil Serv,
ice Commission, but by the appointing power.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 12, 1883.
SIR: The communication addressed to you upon the 5th instant by the Civil Service Commission asks for an interpretation of the word "family" in section 9 of the civil service
act of January 16, 1883, and, in the same connection, whether
that Commission should proceed with the examinations provided for by that act, irrespective of the provision in section
9, leaving the administration of that provision to the appointing power alone.
Upon consideration it seems to me that the question
whether there are already two or more members of ~ family •
in the public service, etc., as provided in section 9 of the
civil service act of January 16, 1883, is not to be considered
by the Commission, but by whatever power may be called
upon subsequently to pass upon eligibility to appointment.
The disability in question is a fluctuating one, material
only as regards H appointment." The state of things which
creates it may exist at examination and disappear before
appointment, or, vice versa, be non-existent at examination
and yet have arisen at appointment.
The statute makes provision for examinations· not only
where vacancies exist and appointments are sought, but also
for prospective vacancies; i. e., as it were, for a fund upon
which in future exigencies the appointing power may draw.
Probably the latter will come to be a considerable, if not the
more considerable, part of this function. Contingencies,
therefore, like that in question, which do not continue in one
stay, and the status of which at one time affords no presumption even (at least none that is legal) as to its status at
another, are intended to await the event in connection with
which they are mentioned, viz, the appointment.
The circumstance that the formal provision madt> by the
statute as regards the residence di.c?ability created therein
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differs so much from that under consideration, both in expressly assigning to the commission an incidental duty, and
in requiring information thereabouts to be given to it under
oath, points in the same direction.
This view, of course, renders it unnecessary to consider
the meaning of the word "family."
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN. HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
CASE OF BOATSWAIN McDONALD.
The provisions of the Navy appropriation acts of August 5, 1882, chapter
391, and March 3, 1883, chapter 97, requiring all officers of the Navy to
be credited with the actual time they may have served as officers or
enlisted men in the regular or volunteer Navy, etc., do not entitle
such officers to any increased pay for services rendered by them prior
to March 3, 1883.
DEPARTMEN1' OF JUS1'ICE,

June 22, 1883.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the
4th ultimo requesting my opinion upon the question presented in a letter of the Second Comptroller (transmitted
with explanatory papers), namely, whether by reason of
either of the acts of Congress mentioned Boatswain Joseph
:McDonald, making claim under them, is entitled to an increased rate of pay for services rendered prior to March 3,
1883, and, if such was the effect of either of said acts, during
what portion of the service rendered by him prior to March
3, 1883, was hi~:~ rate of pay so increased.
The enactments in question are certain clauses of the
Navy appropriation acts of August 5, 1882, and March 3,
1883 (22 Stat., 287, 473), and the latter is as follows, being,
except as to the portions italicized, identical in terms with
the former:
"And all officers of the Navy shall be credited with the
actual time tpey may have served as officers or enlisted men
in the regular or volunteer Army or Navy, or both, and shall
receive all the benefits of such actual service in all respects
in the same manner as if all said service bad been continuous and in the regular Navy in the lowest nrade having gradu-
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ated pay held by such officer since last entering the se'rvice :
Provided, That nothing in this clause shall be so construed
as to authorize any change in the dates of commission or in
the relative rank of such officers: Provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to give any
additional pay to any such officer during the tirne of his service
in the volunteer .Arrny or Navy."
The claim is stated to be Tepresentative of a class consid..
erable in number and involving in the aggregate a large
amount, and the facts in the case, I understand, are substantially that McDonald first served in the regular Navy for
about five years (from 1857 to 1862) as seaman and coxswain,
d~awing pay at the rate or, say, $250 per annum; that he
afterwards served in the volunteer Navy for about four years
(from 1863 to 1867) as ensign, and received therefor the pay
provided by law, which varied froin $768 to $1,200 per annum, according to the nature of the service ; that in March,
1870, he again entered the regular Navy as mate, and served
as such with pay at the rate of about $900 per annum until
February 11, 1871, when he was appointed a boatswain, in
which position he has served continuously to the present
time. Soon after this appointment he made application to
be credited with his sea service as a volunteer officer, and
for the benefits of such duty as provided by section 3, act
March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 516; Rev. Stat., sec. 1412), and was
credited with four years and six days' prior service on his
warrant, so that he was found at the date thereof to be in
his second three years of service, and has been paid from
that date accordingly, as provided by section 3, act July 15,
1870 (16 Stat., 332; Rev. Stat., sec. 1556).
I do not understand that any further benefit is claimed by
McDonald from the time of service so credited by reason of
the statutes here in question, but that he claims to be credited with the residue of his prior service, a period of, say,
five or six years, and to receive the benefit thereof in areadjustment of his settled pay accounts since February 11,
1871, with pay graduated. on the basis of, say, ten instead of
four years' prior service at that date and payment to him of
the difference, which the Fourth Auditor has computed
would amount to $2,280.68.
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The question propounded is broad enough to include the
discussion of other possible constructions of the said enactments, but as the legal position taken by McDonald practically raises all the material issues it will be alone considered.
The first and vital point is to determine whether Congress
intended these clauses to have the retroactive effect which is
claimed and so to give McDonald, and others in like case,
additional pay for services rendered long before and fully
paid for at the time according to existing law.
If there is one canon of construction more firmly established than another, it is that statutes shall be construed as
prospective. In the Federal, and most if not all of the State
constitutions, the legislative authority is .restricted in this
direction; and even where the power is undiEputed its exercise is so far discountenanced "that the courts refuse to give
statutes a retroactive.construction unless the intention is so
clear and positive as by no possibility to admit of any other
construction." (Sedgwick on Construction, etc, 166.) If
authority for this were needed the only difficulty would be
that of selection. It is enough to refer to the doctrine as
laid down by the Supreme Court in Murray v. Gibson, 15
Howard 423, as follows :
"As a general rule for the interpretation of statutes, it
may be laid down that they never should be allowed a retroactive operation where this is not required by express command or by necessary and unavoidable implication. Without such command or implication they speak and operate on
the future only."
There can be no pretence that either enactment contains
an" express command" to give the officers mentioned additional pay for past service by revision of their long-settled
accounts. The -only question is, if that is required by necessary and unavoidable implication.
Looking first at the text of the clause above quoted, it
will be observed that there is no reference to giving pay
in the enacting clause, and that where referred to in the
second proviso it is by way of prohibition. That the effect
of it is to give pay in any case is matter of inference merely
from the fact generally known that " pay" is one of the
benefits of service and may justly be assumed to be in-
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eluded in the terms "all the benefits of such actual service."
There is no warrant, therefore, for treating the act as if
it had to do solely or particularly with the matter of "pay."
It is a necessary presumption, from the frame and language
of the clause, that it does not regard ''pay" otherwise
than as one among various benefits contemplated, and this
must be taken into account in reasoning as to the legislative intent.
Such giving of pay, then, as may have been intended by
this act- (in common with o.ther benefits) must be assumed
to be prospective, unless something within it can be sho"Wn
relating to pay to which no possible effect can be given except as construed retroactively. That this would be at least
difficult is apparant on the face of the provision, and yet the
rule of construction will not admit of doubt. It will not do
to refer to language capable of either construction, or indeed
to language admitting of any construction but the retroactive
one asserted.
It will hardl)' be pretended that this act does not operate
prospectively as respects all the benefits intended. It can
only be argued that it was intended to be retroactive also;
but can it be maintained that language which must have
prospective effect carries also what, in the eye of the law,
is an incompatible intent Y It may be urged that the exclusion of back pay as expressed in the second proviso would
indicate its inclusion in the enacting clause; but this by no
means follows, for though provisos are used to take out something otherwise plainly embraced in the enacting clause, they
are also used by way of special precaution to prevent the inclusion by implication from general terms of some matter
particularly obnoxious. to the legislative intent, and this, as
will be shown, is the more reasonable explanation of the proviso in question.
It is evident, therefore, that no such necessary an(l unavoidable implication is borne on the face of this provision
as is requisite, and this might well be regarded as conclusive,
but it is proper to consider whether by reference to other
sources of construction such an implication can be made out.
It is of the first importance in such case to regard the nature of the thing which it is said Congress intended by this

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
-

559

Case of Boatswain AlcDonald.

act to do; and in no aspect of it, that I can conceive, is it to
Congress no doubt has power to so dispose of the public money
entrusted to its control, but it is surely not to be presumed
that it intended to give :McDonald, for instance, $2,280.68 in
addition to the pay he baH received since February 11,1871,
for previously compensated service, unless it has so declared
in clear language. The abuses to which a loose construction
of such legislation might lead are apparent, and prove that
the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court as above cited
is particularly applicable to it.
If reference is made to legislath·e policy as bearing on this
subject, it will be found that the last statute generally regulating the pay of the Navy is that of July 15, 1870 (16 Stats.,
330; Rev. Stat., sec. 1556), which, after fixing the compensation of officers in the several grades, provides (sec. 4; Rev.
Stat., sec. 1558) that the pay so prescribed" shall be the full
and entire compensation of the seve-ral officers therein named,
and no additional allowance shall be 'made in favor of any of
said officers on any account whatever except as herein provided."
There is no pretense that McDonald and the other claimants
have not been paid all the compensation to which they were
entitled under this or any other existing law (unless by virtue of the clauses in question). The intent to confine them
to this, so explicitly declared in the section cited, is not to be
ignored nor overcome by any less clear expression of the
legislative will.
If light is sought from similar provisions to those in controversy, the earliest enactment resembling them I have observed is found in the act of March 2, 1867, sec. 3 (14 Stat.
516), as follows:
''That the officers of the Volunteer Naval Service who are
or may be transferred to the regular Navy or Marine Corps
shall be credited with the sea service performed by them as
volunteer officers, and shall receive all the benefits of such
duty in the same manner as if they had been during such service in the regular Navy or Marine Corps; and all marine
officers shall be credited with the length of time they may
have been employed as officers or enlisted men in the volunteer service of the United States."
be viewed otherwise than as the giving of a gratuity.
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The volunteer officers referred to are apparently those mentioned in section 2, act July 25, 1866 (14 Stat. 222), the transfer of whom to certain grades of the line was authorized, but
as these grades did not receive graduated longevity pay until
the passage of the act of 1870, it would seem that the "benefits" conferred in this case could then have had no relation
to pay, but must have been such as were available under provisions of the law concerning_relative rank in the respective
grades, retirement, and the like, in connection with which
time of service was reckoned. I find at all events nothing in
it which necessarily and unavoidably requires back pay to be
given in addition to the prospective advantages conferred~
and am at a loss to know on what ground it could be claimed
or conceded.
The next legislation of this kind appears in the Army appropriation act of June 18, 1878, section 7 (20 Stat., 146; see,
also,21 Stat.,346). The time credit is thereto be given on and
after the passage of the act to officers "in computing their
service for longevity pay and retirement." That this would
operate prospectively alone can hardly be questioned.
It is with no color of precedent then in antecedent legislation, for the retroactive intent alleged, that the act of August
5, 1882, is to be viewed The ordinary presumption of law is
even strengthened with regard to it by such a review, and it
has been shown that there is nothing on the face of it or of
its successor to indicate a different intent.
The papers transmitted show that the Second Comptroller
rejected McDonald's original claim upon · the ground that
giving him the benefit of all his service as if continuous in
the regular Navy would not entitle him to increased pay as
boatswain, because the prior service had not been in that
grade, and the provision of 1882 did not affect section 1556,
Revised Statutes, which makes increased pay depend on length
of service in the grade.
The foregoing discussion shows that this is narrower ground
than in my opinion may be taken. Section 1558, Revised
Statutes, is a manda.tory provision, and to set that, as well as
the fundamental rule that statutes are to be construed prospectively, aside by inferring back pay merely from such gen~
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eral indefinite terms as ''all the benefits," '' in all respects in
the same manner," and so on, seems to me not tenable.
This conclusion is not affected, I think, by the amendments
of 1883. Though peculiar in expression, it is impossible to
say that they are incompatible with the prospective operation
which the clause shortld have according to the established
rules of law. It is perhaps unn6cessary therefore to consider
at length the exact or presumable intent of Congress in such
additions, but it may be well to call attention to some points
which are actually suggested.
If the course of previous legislation as to the Navy and
Army above cited was prospective, or not clearly retrospective, it would require very different language to show
that the legislative intent had undergone a radical change.
If Congress really intended to give back pay to any officers, there was no difficulty in saying so in plain words. It
certainly would not have used language tending rather to
conceal than to express such an intent.
It may be that to credit McDonald now with his prior service would not prospe~tively benefit him, because he has
reached the maximum compensation of his grade, but it does
not follow that there are no officers who would be so benefited. It may be also that under existing legislation respecting the grades and pay of the Navy there would arise
difficulties of interpretation as to giving prospective pay
benefit under this clause to officers who have passed out of
the lowest grade having graduated pay, but if the intent of
Congress is to be determined b,y such possibilities, what is
to be said of the possibility that a considerable number of
officers who have not served in grades '~having graduated
pay" are deprived of any benefit of their prior services by
this amendment' Is it harder to believe that Congress has
not a clear apprehension of the effect of the first amendment
than to believe that it intended to cut the officers in question
off altogether! Where the enactment presents such anomalies a close adherence to settled rnles of construction is
the safest guide, and so long as no part of it is left imperative the rectification of errors or omissions, if any, is for the
legislature.
272-VOL xvn--36
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It is possible or even probable that the amendment (which
· was inserted in the House) was framed to obviate some actual
or supposed defect of the clause of 1882, and the papers show
that a member of the Appropriation Committee of the House
was informed of the construction given by the accounting
officers to that act; but the only evidence of the actual views
expressed thereon in debate that I have found is in the Congressional Record of February 23, 1883, where the matter
was warmly discussed by the Senate and the second proviso
proposed. The inserted , words were stricken out, but restored with the proviso by the conference committee and so
passed.
No one, I think, can read the debate in the Senate without
being convinced that whatever else may have been intended,
that body at least did not understand or intend that the
clause should give back pay under any circumstances, and
that the second proviso was framed and supposed to prevent
the application of any sucll construction.
While such discussions are not as a rule referred to in judicial interpretation of a statute, they are entitled to consideration in doubtful cases where they may throw light on
peculiarities of form or expression. This one, I think, explains the form and purpose of the second proviso, and so
far as it goes tends to confirm the view herein expressed, and
to break the force of any argument based on the views or
action of the accounting officers as knuwn to the House.
The gist of the matter lies after all in a narrow space. Officers who had, at the date of a given act, been paid all that
was due them, and who therefore bad no right in law or
equity to more for their past service, claim that the statute '
give~ them back pay. The law says as to all statutes tliat
they shall operate prospectively, unless the contrary intent
is expressed with irresistible clearness, and the doctrine
would seem to be peculiarly applicable to the acts in question. Examination of the text shows that the intent alleged
is not expressed at an, but has to be inferred from expressions more or less general and indefinite which do not relate
to pay alone, and which it can not be denied operate to some
extent prospectively. The intent claimed is so far from clear
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· that there is no agreement as to the meaning of the language
employed if given retroactive effect.
Under such circumstances I must answer so much of the
question as asks if McDonald is entitled to an increased rate
of pay for services rendered prior to March 3, 1883, in the
negative, which makes an answer to the rest of the question
unnecessary. I am led to this conclusion the more readily
as the claimants can either test its correctness in the courts
<>r present the matter to Congress for further legislation, if
so advised, and thus relieve the accounting officers from the
responsibility of action which I think they can not safely
take without such judicial or legislative direction.
I am, respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

FOREIGN MINISTER.
The issuance of a writ of execution against the person or chattels of a
foreign minister is a "suing out" within the meaning of section 4064,
Revised Statutes, and l:."enders the party obtaining such writ liable to
the penalty prescribed.
Cases within that section should be prosecuted by the United States
attorney of the proper district, as other misdemeanors are prosecuted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 23, 1883.
SIR: In the matter of the Haytien minister, already referred to by you upon the 18th instant, you further inquire,
under date of the 21st, and in anticipation of what may occur
in the sequel" First. Whether the is.~uanoe of a writ of execution by
the judge against the person or chattels of a foreign public
minister is a complete ' suing out' within the terms of section 4064, so as to render the parties to the suit liable to the
prescribed penal ties.
'' Second. Whether the marshal in whose hands the writ
was placed for execution is an ' officer concerned in executing it' under the statute, when in fact it was not executed,
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but only an attempt made to execute it, by the marshal
serving l'lotice upon the minister.
''Third. If the present case is one calling for the prosecution of the offenders, is process to be instituted on complaint
of the aggrieved minister, or by the United States attorney
in the minister's behalf."
Section 4064 makes the '~suing out," and also the being
" concerned in executing," certain writs or process a criminal
offense; and therefore probably it will be held that to establish the charge in any given case the participation must be
actual, and not merely by intendment of law.
This, however, will be for the courts to decide, and in the
mean time it may be proper, out of respect to any minister
who may come to be concerned therein, that in giving the
"aid" which Attorney-General Black recommends (9 Opin., 7)
any case of this sort that looks 'reasonable shall upon its occurrence be duly presented for such determination.
Premising this, I will answer the first question above affirmatively; the second, in the negative.
Third. Cases within section 4064, in my opinion, involve
breaches of tpe peace that are to be prosecuted by the United
States attorney of the proper district, by the same formal
methods which attend other breaches of the peace.
Whilst the ~ircumstance that the Secretary of State, to
quote from Mr. Black again, is required to" take a deep interest" in such cases may show their importance in certain
respects, nevertheless they are not distinguished in point of
principle from other misdemeanors, and therefore are to be
prosecuted in due cou~se by the proper district attorney,
after his attention shall have been called to them.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
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TESTIMONY OF PRISONERS.
The President has no power, in the· absence of a treaty provision, to
extend to a foreign government the privilege of taking the testimony
of prisoners, excepting when they a.re confiued in prisons of such of
the Territories as are not invested with authority to regulate the
prisons within their limit, and in the prisons of the District of Columbia; and then only, as to the former prisons, with the concurrence of
the Attorney-General, and as to the latter prisons, with the concurrence of the supreme court of the District.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 25, 1883.
SIR: ln reply to your communication of the 7th of June,

current, asking my opinion as to the power of the Executive to
extend to the German Government the privilege of taking the
testimony of prisoners confined in Federal and State prisons,
without exercising the treaty-making power, I have the honor
to submit that, in my opinion, the privilege in question can
only be so extended as to prisoners confined in Federal
prisons in such of the Territories as are not invested by law
with authority to regulate the prisons within their limits, and
in this District, these being the only prisons under Federal
control, and then only, ag to the Territorial prisons, with the
concurrence of the A.ttorney:General, who is specially charged
by law with the duty of making rules and regulations for the
government of said prisons (Rev. Stat., 1893), and as to the
jail of this District, with the concurrence of the supreme
court of the District, in which is lodged by law the power to
make rules for the government and discipline of prisoners
confined in that jail. (Rev. Stat. D. C., 1090.)
But as to prisoners confined in State prisons, whether under
sentence of Federal or State courts, they are subject exclusively to the government of rules and regulations prescribed
by the several States as well in respect of Federal as
State prisoners (Rfw. Stat., 5539) ; and I am of opinion that
the Executive has no power to give the German Government
the privilege of access to such prisoners for the purpose
named without the instrumentality of a treaty, supposing the
subject to be, to its f9ll extent, within the treaty-making
power. And as to prisoners confined in those prisons which
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Congress bas placed under the control of certain Territorial
governments, the Executive can not extend the privilege
asked for by the German 9:overnment without legislation
authorizing him to do so.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

The

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CRIMES COMMITTED BY INDIANS.
Where an Indian belonging to one tribe murdered an Indian belonging
to another tribe within the reservation of a third tribe which has no
law covering the case, semble that the "bad men" clause in a treaty
with the tribe to which the murdered Indian belonged does not operate
to bring the case within section 2145, Revised Statutes, and so give the
United States courts jurisdiction over the offense.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 21, 1883.
Sm: Yours of the 15th instant calls attention again to the
case of Foster, a Oree~ Indian, who is in custody at Fort
Reno under the charge of murder of one Poisal, an Arrapahoe, at a place within the Pottawatomie -Reservation in the
Indian Territory, the same matter having been the subject of
correspondence between the Attorney-General and the Secretary of the Interior during November last.
Oalling my attention to the difficulties of the case, as
regards jurisdiction by an Indian triue, as well as the outrageous character of the homicide, you ask that in connection
with the case of Orow Dog, in the courts of Dakota Territory, I will reconsider the question of jurisdiction by the
United States, and also that if I adhere to the intimations
heretofore given, I will advise you as to the proper disposition to be made of Foster.
(1) I have reconsidered the matter as you request, and am
still of opinion that there is but little ground to hope that
the courts of the United States have jurisdiction of the
offense in question.
That offense is the murder of one tribal Indian by another,
their tribes being different, and the murder having been
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· committed within the reservation of a third tribe, which is
said to have no law covering the case.
Before going further I may here, apropos of a suggestion
in your note, call attention that in Rogers' case (4 How, 567)
Ohief-Justice Taney says that the act of 1834 "does not
speak of members of a tribe but of the race generally, of the
family of Indians, and it intended to leave them, both as
regards their own tribe and other tribes also, to be governed
by Indian usages and customs."
It is admitted that the United States have no jurisdiction
over crimes committed by one Indian against the person of
another Indian. (Act of 1834, as reproduced in Revised
Statutes, section 2146.) But whilst ~t is also admitted that
in the present case the place in which the crime was committed is Indian country, and that the prisoner and the deceased are, in general, tribal Indians. yet it is suggested that
inasmuch as the deceased belonged to a tribe with which the
United States have expressly stipulated that Hif bad men
among the whites or among other people subject to the authority of the United States shall commit any wrong upon
the person or property of the Indians, the United States
will, etc., cause the offenders to be arrested and punished
according to the laws of the United States, etc." (15 Stat.,
593), that this provision excludes Arrapahoe Indians from
that class which by the above statute is out of the protection
of the criminal laws of the United States, and so brings
crimes against them within section 2145.
The argument seems to he that Indians committing crimes
within the Indian country generally are subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal laws of the United States; that their
exemption therefrom in certain specified cases is not their
privilege, but a privilege of the United States, depending
upon the unwillingness of the latter to guarttnty the peace
in favor of certain persons described as Indians; but that in
the present case, by reading the statute and treaty together
as contexts, it is plain that the United State~ intend to
guaranty the peace in favor of the Arrapahoes, and therefore
that those are no longer included within the word" Indians"
in section 2146.

No doubt there is some ground for this contention, in the
general intent of the ''bad men" clause in the above and
other Indian treaties; i.
the intent to prevent the atrocities and expensiveness of Indian wars, by providing that
instead of an application of Indian law, or rather avenging
outrage, to ~he redress of offenses committed by members of
other tribes, the United States depart from their general
pt)iicy, and assume such redress themselves.
There is great difficulty, however, in holding that the
t~aty enlarges the scope of the criminal laws of' the United
States as such scope might have been defined immediately
preceding the ratification of the treaty. Admit~ing, as it
seems fair to do; that the status of the criminals referred to
in the bracketed clause of section 2146 depends upon an
exceptional reason-he, himself, a8 well as the locus in quo,
being subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of the United
States, and his exemption depending solely upon the char~
acter of the party injured-and admitting also that thd reason of that exemption is one that does not appear to apply
to the deceased, yet I do not see how a court can vary the
meaning of the statutory word ''Indian" by an implication,
so as to say that it excludes members of tribes who are parties to treaties containing what may be termed the "bad
men" provision, as above illustrated. For reasons not expressed Congress has chosen to. exclude persons termed
"Indians" from certain forms of protection. This positive
enactment may extend beyond the original reason therefor.
That is often the case with statutes. In these cases they
operate according to the force of th~ words, and not according to their original reason of existence.• Positive statutes
are not repealed by the mere cessation of what may be concluded to have been the purpose for which they were enacted.
Congress has chosen to define the persons against whom
crime by an Indian in the Indian country shall not be taken
cognizance of by the courts of the United States, by the
word "Indians," and it seems that no change of status which
occurs to one who notwithstanding remains an Indian will
prevent the application to him of that definition.
The case seems the stronger because the very treaty which
is cited itself denotes the persons wiJo Hhall be entitled to

e.,
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its privileges as "Indians." If in establishing their title to
these privileges they show themselves entitled to the above
appellation, do they not tate it cum onere throughout that
legislation and all other connected with it~
This case appears to be governed by Perryman's (100 U.
'S. 235), where the question was whether the great changes
made by constitutional amendments, etc., in the condition of
negro~s rendered. them liable umler section 2154 and 2155
(Rev. Stat.) to make restitution for property stolen from Indians. The word used by the section (also originally a part
<>f the act of 1834) to denote a party thus to be liable is,
"white person." The reason for making such distinction
between whites and blacks in 1834 is obvious, and as obviously had ceased at the time (1875) when the suit in queshad been brought. Still the court held that the force of the
terms originally used by the legislature in giving form to its
will could not be avoided; and that until it chose to accommodate that form to the general effe_c t of subsequent legislat.ion, constitutional and other, none but one who is white,
in the usual sense of the word, can be liable to make restitution.
The case here is vice versa; i.e., whether one who was originally within the scope of a statutory term, for all purposes,
and who, in the ordinary use of words, remains so still, can
by the indirect effect of certain legislation, which has removed
reasons that were of great weight in molding the statute in
question, be now excluded from such term~
I therefore greatly doubt whether the treaty in question
can be regarded as going beyond its direct terms; i. e., as not
only affording the protection of laws otherwise existing, but
also enlarging the protective operation of those laws.
Having thus expressed myself, I will add that notwithstanding the above doubts, if it occurs to you as in point of
administration a matter of importance that the opinion of the
courts shall be taken upon this matter in the course of a vigorous prosecution of the ''crime," I recognize the embarrassments of the case as so considerable that I will cheerfully
execute whatever suggestions you may be pleased to make.
Such prosecution, whatever be its issue, might more effectively call the attention of Congress to the general subject,
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which indeed seems to require further legislative consideration.
It may indeed be no more than proper deference to the
opinion of Judge Moody in the case of Crow Dog (cited by
you) to take this step, particularly in view of the peculiar
circumstance now stated by you, viz: that the Pottawatomie Indians have no law 'that covers a crime of this sort,.
although committed within their boundaries.
(2) If no demand for Foster's surrender shall be made by
one or other of the tribes concerned, founded fairly upon
a violation of some law of one or other of them having jurisdiction of the offense in question according to general principles, and by forms substantially conformable to natural
justice, it seems that nothing remains except to discharge
him.
A fruitless prosecution in the courts may be the best warrant for that, in view of the great outrage committed by the
prisoner; one so well calculated to rouse and to render discontented the communities concerned therein.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General~

The

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

During my absence this case was sent to the Solicitor-Gen- •
eral. The opinion he has here given I have examined and
considered, and I unite with him in all of the conclusions
he has arrived at, and so approve this opinion.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWS'rER.
JuLY 2, 1883.
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PROMOTION IN THE ENGINEER CORPS.
An officer who has unsuccessfully undergone examination for promotion
under section 1206, Revised Statutes, and in consequence has been
suspended from promotion for one year as provided by that section,
is uot, during the period of such suspension, qualified for promotion on
account of continuous service under section 1207, Revised Statutes.
DEP A.RTMENT OF ~JUSTICE,

June 29, 1883.
SIR: You state that you have under consideration your
own action in the following case, and ask the opinion of the
Attorney-General thereupon:
"A vacancy in the grade of captain in the Engineer Corps
occurred January 10, 18.S3, inconsequence of the promotion of
Captain Allen. Lieutenant Bergland, being the senior :first
lieutenant, was examined for promotion, as required by section 1206 of the Revised Statutes, and failed on that examination. He has since applied to be again examined for promotion to the grade of captain after the 15th of June, 1883,
on the ground that he will be then entitled to promotion to
the rank of captain as having served fourteen years' continuous service as lieutenant; and this Department has.
advised him that in consequence of his failure to pass the
examination above mentioned he was, under section 120G of
the Revised St::ttutes, suspended from promotion for one year,
and that this suspension included all right of promotion
however derived.''
Upon consid~ration I submit that this case has been properly decided.
Since the year 1814 promotion in the line has existed in the
Engineer Corps of the Army, and since 1853, in addition
thereto, promotion from the rank of lieutenant to that of captain on aceount of jo'l~;rteen years' continuous service in the
former rank.
The acts of 1814 and of 1853 gave this eligibility to promotion irrespective of other conditions.
However, in 1863 (13 Stat., 743), it was enacted that" no
officer of the Corps of Engineers below the rank of a :field
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officer shall hereafter be promoted to a high-er grade before
having passed a satisfactory examination," etc., according
to what are now the provisions of section 1206, Revised
Statutes.
By the generality of the terms of this provision, as well as
by its polic.1J, which apparently covers all persons who for any
reason aspire to be promoted to the duties and responsibilities of capt~in of engineers, it seems evident that after 1863
no one who had unsuccessfully undergone an examination for
promotion in the line, and was suffering suspen8ion therefor,
was during that time qualified for promotion on account of
continuous service, and vice versa. The act of 1863 consolidates both kinds of promotion under one head. For its purpose both are units of the same degree.
A question remains whether this operation has been
changed in the Revised Statutes.
Here, in substance, the act of 1814 is section 1204; that of
1853, section 1207; and that of 1863, section 1206.
In section 1207 the act of 1853 is changed so far as to refer
to H the examination" required by the act of 1863, now section 1206, and to render the continuous service promotions expressly subject thereto. It refers to "examination," but says
nothing as to ~' suspension."
The question is whether in the word "examination" are
included ali the consequences thereto attached in 1206, or
whether there is an exolusio alterius under the well-known
maxim.
I submit that "examination" includes all the incidents
specified in 1206 ; and for these reasons :
(1) Professional fitness for a captaincy, as regards physique, attainments, etc., is, in the nature of things, as requisite
for one promotion as another. There is no magic in the continuous service qualification. Attended by fitness otherwise,
and only so, it makes a reasonable case. No reason occurs
why the continuous service applicant should not be subjected
to the same consequences for failure that attend any other
applicant. These consequences are not so much a penalty
to the officer as a reasonable guaranty to the public against
future disaster. The words which provide them, therefore,
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are to bear a reasonable construction. Continuous service
implies continuous and advancing merit.
The former is
respected and valuable on account of this presumption. .Apparently, therefore, it is a presumption liable to ordinary tests,
and, in view of some of the highest and most exigent interests
of soeiety, one whose rebuttal for promotion in the line is a
rebuttal for all promotion; and, for all promotion, is also
attended with the ordinary express statutory incidents.
(2) If the doubt were greater than it seems to be, the circumstances that the statutory law appears plainly to have
been so from 1863 up to December, 1873, together with the
general intent of the Revised Statutes merely to declare that
law, is to the same purpose.
(3) The previous state of the law being ascertained, it
would be singular that Congress should leave the public to
ascertain such intended alteration by haphazard resort to the
above cited maxim, the probability in the mean time being
that readers would conclude that, in the bare allusion thereto
in 1207, the word " examination" is taken generally, viz, as
the examination of 1206, carrying all incidents, and that the
revisers inserted that reference only ex abundanti, apprehending that what was clear so long as the matter of 1206 was
known to be subsequent in point of enactment to that of 1207
might be thought doubtful after this matter (as contained in
the Revised Statutes) appeared to be cotemporary, especially
when in point of location it was to precede.
I repeat, therefore, that I concur in the conclusion to which
you have already come.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,

Solicitor· General.
The SEORETARY OF WAR.
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. COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Section 4 of the act of June 11, 1878, chapter 180, requires the Commissioners of the Distlict of Columbia to render accounts for their disbursements thereunder to the accounting officers of the Treasury for
adjustment and settlement, which, by implication, may be in accordance with the laws and regulations and usages by which these officers
are governed so far as the same are applicable to such accounts.
The provisions of sections 3623 and 3678, Revised Statutes, are applicable
to the Commissioners, and they and their bondsmen are liable to suit
on their bond for the recovery of balances found due from them on
settlement of their accounts.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

June 29, 1883.
SIR. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
communication addressed to you by S. L. Phel~p Josiah
Dent, and William J. Twining (by John A. Baker his administrator),late Commissioners of the District of lumbia, '
appealing to you for protection from the effects of alleged
misconstruction of laws of Congress by the First Comptroller
of the Treasury on certain stated points, and as to which you
require my advice and opinion.
On my representation to the petitioners that a more specific
statement of the official action of the First Comptroller was
desirable, this communication was supplemented by another,
to which was annexed three letters addressed by the First
Comptroller to Ex-commissioner Phelps, dated, respectively,
February 26, February 28, and March 6, 1883, extracts from
which were quoted, as is understood, in order to point out the
particular misconstruction of the laws by the First ComptrollAr, of which the petitioners complain; also a letter dated
December 19, 1879, addressed on behalf of the Board by its
president, J. Dent, to First Comptroller A. G. Porter, in
answer to a communication from him. as to its duties, and set·
ting forth its views of the matter in controversy; and a letter
dated April9, 1883,ofthe Acting First Comptroller, addressed
to Commissioner Thomas P. Morgan, transmitting a statement of differences in settlement of a certain account of Commissioners.
I do not deem it necessary to recite these extracts or to
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refer in detail to the matters contained i~ the several communications and exhibits. It will suffice to state briefly the
essential question at issue, wh~ch turns on the effect of the
following clause of the fourth section of the act approved June
11,1878, entitled'' An act providing a permanent form of government for the District of Columbia" (20 Stat. 102), namely:
"'All taxes collected shall be paid into the Treasury of the
United States, and the same, as well as the appropriations to
be made by Congress as aforesaid, shall be disbursed for the
expenses of said District, on itemized vouchers, which shall
have been audited and approved by the auditor of the District of Columbia, certified by said Commissioners, or a majority of them; and the accounts of said Commissioners, and the
tax collectors, and all other officers required to account, shall
be settled and adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury Dep~tment of the United States."
·
Since t e enactment of this provision it has been construed
the Tre sury Department as requiring the Commissioners
to render accounts of all their disbursements of the funds
mentioned in the said section of the act to the accounting
officers there for settlement and adjustment in the same manner as the accounts of disbursing officers are there settled and
adjusted.
It is not perfectly ... clear from the petitioners' statement
whether they deny the right to exact any accounting from
them, or whether they merely claim to be exempt from the
<>peration of statutes relating to disbursing officers of the
United States and their accounts.
The former proposition could not well be maintained in
view of the explicit language above cited. The certificate of
.at least two Commissioners is requisite to authorize each disbcrsement of District funds, and this surely must constitute
them disbursing officers, so far at least as that, under the
law, they control and are therefore responsible for the expenditure. The statute accordingly directs how their ac·c ounts shall be settled and adjusted, and is conclusive.
Whether the effect of this is to impair the dignity of the
office of Commissioner, or in anywise to reduce its supposed
or actual power and authority as conferred by other provisions of law, it is needless to consider. Congress has spoken

in

4

576

HON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER

-

-----

--

Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

so clearly on this subject that there is no room for the use of
such arguments in construction. That it acted advisedly in
view of past experience with other forms of the District government might, however, easily be shown.
The other question leaves more room for discussion. The
direction that the accounts of certain District officers H shall
be settled and adjusted by the accounting officers of the
United States" necessarily implies that the settlement and
adjustment shall be in accordance with the laws and regula·
tions and usages by which those officers are governed and
guided so far as the same may be applicable to the case thus
brought under their jurisdiction, and that in the absence of
suitable existing provisions those officers should make and
enforce such as should be reasonable and necessary.
The petitioners are very likely right in asserting that they
are municipal officers, and that the funds they disburse are
funds of the District; but it is none the less competent for
Congress to subject them to such obligations as are imposed
on disbursing officers of the United States, and that it bas
done so to some extent is manifest. It may be conceded
that it has not done so in terms, and that the extent to which
it has done so by necessary inference is open to question ;
but in order to obtain any practical benefit from such a discussion the petitioners should point out the particular provisions of law which, as they claim, are and should not be
applied to them, for in this way only can a definite issue be
presented.
The only reference made in the papers submitted to particular provisions of law deemed inapplicable are as follows:
First. In the letter of J. Dent, president, to the First
Comptroller, dated December 19, 1879, occurs the following
statement: " The Commissioners acknowledge the receipt
of your letter of the lOth iustant, and in reply have the
honor to state that they do not understand sections 3623
and 3678, and kindred srctions of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, as having any application whatever to
them, but as applicable only to officers of the Unite States
who disburse the moneys of the United States."
The two sections mentioned merel~ express the prop and
necessary obligations of every officer disbursing pubUc.
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money under and in accordance with a legislative appropriation, obligations which the courts would enforce on occasion even in the absence of such enactments. They are
manifestly applicable to the Commissioners' accounts, and it
is not perceived, therefore, that there is any good ground for
the objection taken.
Second. The petitioners call attention to statements in
the Comptroller's letters mentioned, to the effect that a cer·
tain sum was found by the accounting officers to be due from
them on settlement of their accounts, and should be paid
into the Treasury, in default of wh~ch it would become his
duty under section 3624 of the Revised Statutes to institute
suit against the Commissioners and their bondsmen for the
recovery of the same; and they evidently consider that such
a suit would be unwarranted.
So far as that opinion rests on the ground that nothing is
due, it raises a question of fact, or at all events of administrative detail, which it is no part of my duty to determine or
consider. So far as it touches the legal sufficiency of the
action proposed, it may be ·q uestioned whether an opinion
should be rendered on a mere contingency of action such as
is above indicated. But waiving that, I must assume tha,t th~
objection is one of substance, denying the right of suit on a
Commissioner's bond for recovery of a balance alleged to be
clue, rather than excepting to action under the particular
section cited.
I am unable, however, to perceive how such exemptivn can
be claimed in view of the fact that each civil Commissioner
is required by statute to give bond in the sum of $50,000,
with surety for the faithful discharge of his duty, and has
given such bond to the United States. Can it be doubted ,
that a failure to account for money chargeable to a Commissioner as a disbursing officer would be a breach of the condition of his bond and render him liable to a suit thereon by
the obligee in the usual mode of procedure upon such a cause
of action~ If the petitioners can be so prosecuted at the instance of the accounting officers (and they have suggested
no other remedy), it seems immaterial to consider whether
the particular section referred ~o by the First Comptroller
may or may not be the basis of such action.
272-VOL xvn--37
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It is evident, moreover, from the petitioners' statement,
that their contention is not directed to the inapplicability of
any special provisions to their accounts, but rather to show
by reference to various statutory provisions relating to the
office and powers of Commissioners that Congress could not
have intended by the legislation of 1878 respecting their accounts to limit the authority exercised by them in respect of
expenditures under prior statutes cited.
The decisive answer to this line of argument has already
·been stated, it being in substance that reference to such considerations is admissilJle only where the legislative intent is
so doubtful as to need construction. It seems to me that
when Congress directs that the Commissioners' accounts shall
be settled and adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury, it is too plain for argument that it intends them to
be settled and adjusted in accordance with the laws and
usages governing those accounting officers, and I find nothing in the statutory prov.isions cited by the petitioners which
is incompatible with this intent.
That this enactment made a radical change in the system
theretofore prevailing is quite true, but that only demonstrates more strongly that Congress acted with full consideration. It must not be forgotten that fiscal mismanagement
was the chief ground of complaint against preceding forms
()f the municipal government, as the reports of the several investigations instituted by Uongress into the District affairs
abundantly prove, and no one familiar with the history of
the transactions of the municipal authorities and the legislation connected therewith during the decade preceding the
act of 1878 can fail to perceive that the intent of Congress to
hold the local authorities to closer and stricter responsibility
in fiscal affairs is continually manifest.
It is not to be presumed that this has been carried so far
tn the present instance as to embarrass the operations of the
municipality or to unduly limit the just authority of any of
its officers, but if such evils are felt or apprehended the
remedy is with Congress.
There is nothing, of course, in these views derogatory to
the petitioners, whose character and sincerity are beyond
question. It was not unnatural that they should not readily
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assent to what they evidently regarded as a sulfordination of
their proper function to other authority. The questions
raised are of very considerable importance to them and are
earnestly urged, but I have not been able to concur in their
views of the law.
I have rtot considered some matters to which attention is
called in the papers submitted, such as the requirement of
the First Comptroller that the accounts of the Vommissioners
shall be settled anu adjusted at each change in the membership of the Board, the nature of his statements of difference,
and the like, because, in my judgment, they relate to matters
of administrative detail within the lawful jurisdiction of the
accounting officers, and do not properly present any question of law for my opinion.
Very respectfully, your obedient serv~nt,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDEN1\

•

INTERNAL REVENUE.
'Vhere it was proposed to withdraw a quantity of whisky from bonded
warehouse, under section 3330, Revised Statutes, and acts of Juno 9,
1874, chap. 259, and March 1, 1879, chap. 125, in order to ship it to Bermuda, with the purpose, after landing it there, of transporting it back
to this country and entering it either for warehousing or for consumption under section 2500, Revised Statutes: Advised, that such shipment,
with the purpose mentioned, would not be an exportation within the
meaning of section 3330, Revised Statutes, and the act of 1874; nor
would such shipment and the landing abroad fnlfil the condition of
the exportation bond, and discharge the whisky from the internalrevenue tax thereon; nor would such whisky, upon return to this
~ountry, be entitled to the rights and privileges of imported merchandise under the warehouse laws.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTrc_g,

July 2, 1883.
SIR: Yours of May 21st states that large quantities of
domestic distilled spirits now remain in distillery bonded
warehouses, subject to a tax payable within three years from
the date of their entry for deposit under the act of May 28,
1880, and that the time during which payment of the tax is
suspended upon 12,000~000 gallons there.of expires within the
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present calendar year; that you are informed that the owner::;
of a large quantity of such spirits propose to withdraw it
(under section 3330, Revised Statutes, and acts of June 9,
1874, and March 1, 1879), in order to ship it to Hamilton,
Bermuda, with the purpose, after landing there, of shipping
it back to this country and entering it either for warehousing or for consumption under section :?500, Re;vised Statutes,
claiming at the same time that under the warehouse laws such
spirits may remain in warehouse without payment of duties
for a period not exceeding three years from tile date of their
importation. (Sec. 2970, Rev. Stat.)
In pursuance of this plan several thousands of barrels of
spirits are now at Newport News, Va., for the purpose of
shipment.
Thereupon you askFirst. Is such shipment of whisky, with such purpose
and intention, to Bermuda, and landing it there, an exportation witbin the intent of section 3330, Revised Statutes, and
the act of 1874 (18 Stat. 64), and does such shipment and
landing there fulfill the condition of the exportation bond
and discharge the whisky from the internal-revenue tax
thereon~

Second. Is such whisky, upon return to this country, entitled to the rights and privileges of imported merchandise,
under the warehouse laws, Chapter 7, Title 34, Revised
Statutes'
To the above statement you have, J nne 23, added as a
variation the following, which is also to be considered and
made an additional subject of discussion.
''(1) The exporters p!'opose to comply with all the requirements of the law in respect to the exportation of their
whisky, so that the transportation and export bonds shall
be canceled and the whisky exported legally discharged
from the lien the Government has upon it for an internalrevenue tax.
'' (2) Arrangements have been made for the ·s torage of the
whisky in Bermuda for a period of twelve months, and
longer, at the option of the owners, at advantageous rates of
storage, in a climate which in a remarkable degree facilitates
the aging of whisky.
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"(3) No arrangements have been made for the return of
said spirits, and that the s~me, or any part thereof, will not
ue returned to this country except in response to the demand
of trade, and that the exportations are being made for the
purpose of relieving an overloaded home market, with the
intention in due course of business of making sale of all that
can possibly be placed upon the British and continental
markets.
'' (4) It is the intention of the exporters to preserve the
identity of the spirits exported, so tf.tat if a market is found
in the United States for any portion of it it can be entered
as domestic distilled spirits reimported, upon which a duty
equal to the internal-revenue tax will be leviell and collected."
Inasmuch as the statutes which are cited by you describe
the transaction, in the course of which occur the details as to
which the above questions arise, by one or other form of the
word "export," it is important to ascertain what that word
means.
Its dictionary signification is to carry out of a country. By
the very force of language this denotes only such an act as
when completed results in a carrying out; i. e., that no act can
be so denoted if at its completion the thing carried has been
returned within the country. It is no more true in common
parlance than in Jaw that a transportation of goods from San
Francisco toNew York is an exportation of them, even although
between their departure and arrival they lie for some time in
the ports of Callao and Rio Janeiro, and although the conversation about them occurs whilst they so lie. Furthermore, it is
not because by statute coastwise transportation can only take
place in American bottoms that such goods have not at any
period of the transit been exported. It would be equally
true of goods in the course of transportation under section
4347, Revised Statutes, in British bottoms from Ogdensburg,
via Toronto, to Ohicago, even if spoken of whilst lying at
at Toronto.
It is therefore only when the executed act results in carrying the goods out of the country that it is even an exportation.
It is hardly necessary to go further upon this matter and
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say that in speaking of an act I include any transaction done.
in accordance with original intention, no matter how complex
or how much broken into bits. Unity of intention unites all
such details into one whole.
The American citizen who goes abroad for an indefinite
period intending to educate his children in GermH.ny, and
in the interval or subsequently to locate himself for one advantage or another in Italy and in other countries, intending
after all to return to live in America, does not lose his citizenship at any moment oft his absence. The whole affair was
only one visit. And so if a cask of 1\fadeira is carried to
Calcutta for the benefit of the voyage-such benefit to be
enjoyed after it returns-this is not an exportation; nor, in
the absence of a special context giving to such additional
incident that effect, can it make any difference if jn the
meantime it be temporarily landed at one foreign port or
at several.
In general, then, neither the lapse of long time nor the
incidence of numerous details affects the unity of an act.
I find nothing in the context of the statutes under consideration to disturb this usual signification of the word
export. Although it may be noticed that the context in the
present case goes to confirm the above conclusion as to the
meaning of export-as one to which the legislature was
actually advertent,-for the transaction by which domestic
liquors are allowed to be shipped abroad is one which such
context recognizes as making them objects fit for importation,
i. e. , foreign goods.
There may be instances in the statutes where the word export is shown, directly or by the context, to have been used
irregularly-as for instance in section 1955, where the ''exportation" to Alaska from any port i'n the United States is
spoken of-but these are exceptional, their effect being, of
course, limited to what is in the same connection expressly
provided, and therefore' without influence upon what ordinarily is the statutory use of the word.
In the case put by you in your first note, in which an
intention exists to carry spirits now at Newport News, Va.,
to Hamilton, Bermuda, with the purpose, after landing it
there, of shipping it back to this country, I am of opinion
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that there will be no exportation, or consequently importation, so far at all events as to entitle the owners to any privileges
connected with exportation or intportation.
Whether they may subject themselves to another class of
the provisions of the custom laws is obviously a different
matter, and will best be decided when a specific case arises.
(1) The landing specified in the bond referred to in your first
question is, by its own words and by those of the statute
which requires it, a landing in the course of an exportation.
No landing at Hamilton, therefore, in the case put by you is
such landing. Neither landing nor any other detail, statutory or other, can obviate the necessity of that intention,
which is of the essence of exportation. I therefore answer
your first question in the negative.
(2) I must add, of course, that the case in view is not
within section 2500 for the purpose of your second question.
(3) Equally such spirits will not be entitled to the rights
and pri\ileges referred to in question three.
I now ask your attention to the effect of the variations of
which you speak in your second note.
I premise that I understand these statements to affect
cases in which nothing else appears as to the intention of the
owners in shipping the goods out of the country. For if they
accompany cases in which the intention is ascertained to be
what you have already stated, I am of opinion that the
main support of the theory of the owners fails them, there
being no exportation. So if the only intention in shipping
them abroad is for a twelve months' storage in Bermuda,
that also is inconsistent with exportation.
As the legal notion of emigration is a going abroad with
an intention of not returning, so that of exportation is a
severance of goods from the mass of things belonging to
this country with an intention of uniting them to the mass
of things belonging to some foreign country or other. All
emigration as above defined is attended with a chance that
the intention may afterwards (i.
after actual removal) be
changed. This chance does not affect the character of the act.
Nor does the circumstance of an original speculation that such
chance may occur, or even a resolution that upon a certain
contemplated contingency the party about to emigrate will
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return-e.g., upon a change of government or upon the loss of
his health-affect the validity of an emigration otherwise
bona fide. I suppose that the case may often be the same
with exportations as above defined, viz, a contingent change
in the state of the market, by which it may be profitable to
bring them back, the immediate bona fide purpose as well as
act, however, being to seek a foreign market. This would
nevertheless be an exportat,ion, and upon return of course
an importation. Nor would such exportation be defeated by
the incident of " preserving the identity" of the goods.
But if the only purpose were to obtain for a time the advantage which some foreign port gives for improving spirits, and
mean while to escape some borne revenue regulation upon
domestic spirits, and acquire, after return, some home revenue
privilege appropriate to foreign spirits, I submit that the
statutory requisites for such effect would be wanting. I say
the statutory requisites, for I admit that if those requisites are
duly complied with they must haYe their due statutory effect,
and there would in such case be no ground for suggesting
fraud.
I cannot say that the variations above amount to more
than . evidence of exportation or of the contrary The mere
carrying goods abroad is of course strong evidence that they
are being exporte<l. Whether proof or not is another matter.
I suppose that you do not wish a mere discussion of the
weight or direction of the testimony contained in the variations. If questions shall be made hereafter in the courts
upon the matters under consideration neither party will take
any advantage from what may be said upon them here.
And in closing it may be well to express what no doubt is
now understood, but may be forgotten, -viz, that the Government will not be bound hereafter by any part of this discussion that may be seen to be ill-founded. There is nothing in
this opinion, or I suppose in any other part of the transaction, which the owner in question can rely upon as having
the force of an estoppel, or contract, in case the Government shall then be better advised as to its rights. This opinion has no force whatever, except as advice by one Department to another in a fnture contingency, as to which the
latter Dt>part men t H'l',\' propPrly wi"ll~·~ to W<ll'll d tizens
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whose interests therein are very large. With every disposition to treat the owners of these spirits with perfect candor, it
must be recollected that definiteness under the circumstances
is unattainable, and that it is not in the power of officers of
the Government to trammel the discretion with which, in
the interests of the public, these transactions will otherwise
have to be considered, or the freedom with which accordingly they must otherwise be treated when the proposed
44 exportation" and ''importation" shall have happened.
The present stat~ments and discussion will of course go to
show a disposition to deal fairly, upon the part of these
owners, and for that they must always have credit; but no
engagement or embarrassment will come of what is said
upon the part of the Government.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
During my absence these questions were left to the Solicitor-General, and he has passed upon them and submitted the
above information and answers. Having examined the subject myself, l agree with him, and approve of his information and answers to the questions propounded.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

CUSTOMS LAWS.
The term "examiner," as used in sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act of March
2, 1883, chapter 64, signifies any officer authorized by the fifth section
to act in that capacity, and nothing more.
It was not t.he intention of the act to create a new officer to meet its requirements regarding the examination of imported teas.
The term "appraisers" in the act does not embrace "assistant appraisers."
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

•

July 5, 1883.
SIR: Your communication of the 30th June ultimo has
received my consideration, and I am of opinion that it was
not the intention of the act of 2d March, 1883, entitled "An
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act to prevent the importation of adulterated and spurious
teas," to create a new officer to meet the requirement of the
act that all teas entered for importation shall be examined
before passing from the control of t.he customs authorities.
The fifth section, it seems to me, refers to appraisers and
revenue officers as already provided by law. Whether at
the time of approval of the act some or all of the officers
mentioned in the fifth section were qualified for the duty imposed by the act can have no efl'ect, in my opinion, on its
construction, it being the duty of the appointing power to
so order it as that the offices in question shall be filled by
persons " duly qualified."
I do not think it admissible to deduce the power to appoint
a new class of officers from the power given the SecrPtary
of the Treasury, in case he should not deem it proper or expedient that the officers named in the fifth section should act
as examiners of teas, to direct " otherwise." It appears to
me that what Congress meant by the words "unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise direct" was that the
Secretary should have power to devolve the duty of examining teas on other officers of the revenue than those designated by the act. The power to create offices and fix the
emoluments thereof is not to be implied where the law can
have due effect without it.
I am of opinion that by the term " examine," used in sections 2, 3, and 4, Congress meant any officer authorized by
the fifth section to act in that character, and nothing more.
lam, furthermore, of opinion, that tbe term ''appraisers,"
used in the act, does not em brace " assistant appraise~s,"
there being nothing in the context of the law calling for this
enlarged sense of the former term.
I have the honor to be, ~:;ir, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT.

Construction of the act of July 15, 1882, chap. 294, "to increase the
water supply of the City of Washington," etc.
DEP.A.R'l'MENT OF JUS'l'IOE,

July 6, 1883.
SIR: I have the honor to, acknowledge receipt of sour
communication of the 18th of April ultimo, requesting my
opinion upon certain questions relating to the extension of
the Washington Aqueduct, specifically presented by Major
Lydecker in his letter ot the 11th of April, and repeated in
the letter of the Chief of Engineers.
The act of July 15, 1882, entitled, ''An act to increase the
water supply of the city of Washington and for other purposes," is operative as well in the State of Maryland as in the .
District of Columbia; it may also affect riparian rights and
the title to soil in the State of Virginia.
Of t.h e right of Congress to appropriate private property
for public use within the District of Columbia no qu·~stion
has ever been raised.
·
Its power within the States to appropriate for Federal purposes has been declared and announced by the Supreme
Court in Kohl et al. v. United States (91 U. S. 367), where the
case of Twombly v. Humphrey (23 Mich. 471) is cited with approval.
The courts of Maryland have been explicit that a proper
supply of water for the seat of Government is a public use
(Reddell v.Bryan, 14 Md., 444; S.C., 24 How., 420), but independent of this it is well settled that the legislature is the
proper and only judge of what is, and what is not, a public
use.
It remains, therefore, only to inquire what is the method
pointed out by Congress for this taking; for, as is said
by Davis, J., in Secombe v. Railroad Company (23 Wall. 108),
"It is no longer an open question in this country that
the mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, in the
absence of any provision in the organic law prescribing a
contrary course, is within the discretion of the legislature."
The first step to be taken is the preparation of the neces~
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sary survey and maps for the extension of the aqueduct, for
the reservoir, for the land necessary for the dam, including the
land now occupied by the dam, and for the land on which
the gate-house at Great Falls stands.
When these have been completed it becomes the duty of
the Secretary of War and the Attorney-General to acquire
whatever outstandtng title exist.s to said .land and water
. rights, and to the land on which the gate-house at Great
Falls stands, by condemnation. There is a seeming confusion ·
in the statute at tllis point arising from the expression in the
second paragraph "if it shall be necessary to resort to condemnation"; but I do not find anywhere in the statute a
grant of authority to acquire in any other manner. If the
Secretary of War and the Attorney-General are to purchase,
they must in some way ascertain the value of the proper~y
and rights taken, and it seems to have been the intention of
Congress that they should learn this from the appraisers or
from the Court of Claims.
The authority over the appropriations in the statute is conferred upon them sub modo, and in causing compensation to
be offered to the owners the only grant is to offer " the
amount fixed by the appraisers as the Yalue thereof."
As soon as resort to condemnation becomes necessary the
Attorney-General must proceed to ascertain the owners or
claimants of the premises embraced in the survey by making
a publication describing the land embraced in the survey,
with a notice that the same has been taken.
The effect of this is clearly stated later in the statute:
"Upon the publication of the notice as abmTe directed, the
Secretary of War may take possession of tlle premises em ·
braced in the survey and map and proceed with the constructions herein authorized;" that is to say, the taking for
public use becomes with the publication a completed act.
It is not necessary at present to enumerate the detailed
provisions relating to ascertainment of the value; for it must
be plain to any one that while the fifth amendment to the
Constitution says that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation, the taking and the
compensation are distinct acts. They are certainly distinguished in this statute, for it is made lawful for the Secretary
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of War to take possession a year before title vests by reason
of failure to file a petition in the Court of Claims, and entirely
independent of the time that may be occupied by the appraisers and the Court of Claims in ascertaining what the
compensation of those who have appeared shall be. As iR
said in Kramier v. Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Com pany, (5 Ohio St., 140, 146), "It requires no judicial condemnation to subject private property to public use. Like
the power to tax, it resides in the legislative department to
whom the delegation is made. It may be exercised directly
or indirectly by that body.'' Denio, J., in People v. Smith (21
N.Y., 595), says: "The power resides in the legislature. It
may be exercised by means of a statute which shall at once
designate the property to be appropriated and the purpose of
the apvropriation, or it may be delegated to public officers."
As to the separation in point of time between the taking
and payment. Cooley says (p. 560) : "When the property is
taken directly by the State, or by any municipal corporation
by State authority, it has been repeatedly held not to beessential to the validity of a law for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain that it should provide for compensation
before the actual appropriation. It is sufficient if provision
is made by the law by which the party can obtain compensation and that an impartial tribunal is provided for assessing
it. The decisions on this point assume that when the State
has provided a remedy by resort to which the party can have
his compensation assessed adequate means are afforded for
its satisfaction, since the property of the municipality or of
the State is a fund t6 which he can resort without risk of
~~p

\

I think I have said enough to answer the first question of
Major Lydecker, which is, in substance, ''whether work on a
certain portion must be delayed until Congress shall appropriate a sum equal to the assessed value of the land needed!"
The second question is: " Can proceedings looking to the
condemnation of land for the reservoir be commenced in advance to those looking to the condemnation of lands required
for the aqueduct extension and the dam at Great Falls~"
In the preliminary stages I think not. It seems to me the
statute contemplates but one survey and map, but one pub-
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lication by the Attorney-General, and but one day which
shall bar the right of petition in the Court of Claims.
The work along the whole line need not be contemporaneous,
and the Attorney-General may hand to the appraisers from
time to time descriptions of separate tracts, but the notice of
the Attorney-General must contain a description of the entire
tract or tracts of land in the survey.
Compliance with tne requirements of the statute seem to
require that a single map or survey of the entire land to be
occupied by the improvements should be furnished to the
.Attorney-General with a description of the premises sufficiently definite to inform owners or claimants along the line
of improvements of the land desired. And this survey and
description will define the bounds within which the Secretary
of War by his officers are by law permitted and directed to
enter.
Whether the appraisers will be called upon to assess the
value of water rights, or whether compensation for the direct
injury to property rights by reason of the United States taking
water from the stream is to be ascertained solely by the
Court of Claims, is a question to be considered when it arises.
The inquiries presented relate only to the Secretary of War
to enter upon construction of improvements. This right becoming absolute, as I have pointed out, upon publication of
the statutory notice, I have confined my discussion of the
statute to the steps antecedent to the publication.
The papers inclosed are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY o:F W .A.R.
BRIG GENERAL ARMSTRONG.
Upon the case stated: Advised that Samuel C. Reid, jr., is not entitled
to receive the unpaid balance lying in the Treasury for the benefit of
the owners and crew of the brig General Armstrong.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
July 7, 1883.
SIR: I have considered the question submitted by your
communication of the 15th June ultimo, namely, whether
OF

•
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Mr. :Samuel C. Reid, jr., is entitled to receive the unpaid
balance lying in the Treasury at your credit for the benefit
of the "captain, owners and crew" of thP brig General Arm.strong, and am of opinion that Mr. Reid is not entitled to
receive this money. I wil~ consider the question first as to
the owners of the brig and next as to the officers and
<~rew.

As to the owners : I am of opinion that the assignment by
them to Samuel C. Reid, sr., dated the 12th of September,
1835, created, in legar effect, a personal trust in the assignee
for the benefit of the owners as to one-half the claim. The
instrument contains no grant of power to the assignee to
transfer this trust to another, and therefore the assignment
of Reid, senior, to Reid, junior, was wholly without effect
in so far as it attempted to devolve the trust from the one
to the other. "The office and duties of a trustee being matters of confidence," says Mr. Hill, " can not be delegated by
• him to another, unless an express authority for that purpose
be conferred on him by tlte instrument creating the trust"
{Hill on Trustees, 175). We look in vain for any such authorit.y in the assignment of September 12, 1835. Certainly
it can not be deduced from the power to Reid, senior, ''to
make such compromises and agreements as he might deem
proper "-the only language in the instrument granting undefined powers.
As to the officers and crew : with the exception of the
captain of the brig (Reid, senior, as to whom there is no
question), Reid, junior, does not hold any express grant of
authority to receive their shares of the money, and I do not
think any authority in that behalf can be implied from their
conduct, which is entirely consistent with an intention on
their part to stand aloof and profit by the exertions of others,
without contributing anything to the common object themselves.
The utmost that Reid, junior, can cla,im as to them is to
be compensated out of their part of the fund, on the principle
that no man shall enrich himself at the cost of another-the
principle on which courts of equity proceed in charging a
fund in which a number are interested with a reasonable
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allowance for the counsel of the energetic few who have produced the funds.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient .servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. FREDERIOK T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State.

TIMBER DEPREDATIONS.
The provisions in section 2 of the act of April 30, 1878, chapter 76,
requiring moneys collectQd for depredations upon the public lands to
be covered into the Treasury, in effect modifies section 4751, Revised
Statutes, only as to that vart of the penalties, etc., recovered which
was payable under the latter section to the Secretary of the Navy; it
does not affect the part payable thereunder to informers.
Section 5 of the act of June 3, 1878, chapter 151, applies to the Pacific
States and Washington Territory, and repeals section 4751, Revised
Statutes, only so far as concerns such States and Territory.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 19, 1883.
SIR: Yours of the 16th instant incloses a note addressed

to yourself from the United States attorney for eastern
Michigan, which informs J'OU that certain fines under section 2461, Revised Statutes, are now in the registry of the
district court for his district, and that he supposes them to
be distributable under your direction (to the informer, etc.)
under section 4 751.
You also inclose certain letters upon the same subject
from the files of your Department (dated September 12, l 879,
September 3, 1880, and October 14, 1880), in the course of
which the Solicitor of the Treasury intimates a doubt whether
section 4751 has not been in effect repealed by the act of
April 30, 1878 (chap. 76, sec. 2), such doubt being, as he
says, somewhat affected by the circumstance that this section
was subsequently (act of June 3, 1878, chap. 151, sec. 5)
expressly repealed as to certain States only.
Upon the whole matter you ask how far your powers
under section 4751 have been modified by subsequent legislation, the practical question being that as to distribution
presented above, in eastern Michigan.
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As my attep.tion has not been called to any subsequent legislation other than the acts of 1878 cited in your letter, I
will confine what I have to say to their operation only.
Section 4751 makes a three-fold provision as to its subjectmatter, i. e., depredations upon timber standing upon the
public lands: (1) suits therefor shall be under the direction
of the Secretary of the Navy; (2) one-half of any penalties,
etc., recovered shall be paid to informers, and the other half
to the Secretary of the N·tvy; and (3) the Secretary is authorized to mitigate penalties, etc., so incurred.
Thereupon the act of April, 1878, provided " that all
moneys heretofore, and that shall hereafter be, collected for
depredations upon the public lands shall be covered into the
Treasury of the United States as other moneys received from
the sale of public lands" (Sup. ,Rev. Stat., 316), and the
act of June 3, 1878 (Sup. Rev. Stat., 328)-the main purport of which was to provide for the sale of the public timber
lands in the Pacific States and Washington Territory-after
repeating the provision just quoted for all sales so to be
made, goes on immediately thereafter to expressly repeal
section 4751 so far as concerns such States and Territory.
Referring to the three-fold operation of section 4751 above
mentioned, it is plain that it is not repealed by the act of
April, 1878. For instance, this latter enactment does not
touch the powers of the Secretary as regards the superintendence of suits, or the mitigation of penalties. The opinion
of the Attorney-General of February 17,1882, referred to by
you, goes upon this view, although it is one only incidental
to the point which he there discusses.
I am now asked in effect how far this act modifies the provision designated above as '' (2) "·
In my judgment it applies only to that part of the penalty
which is payable to the Secretary.
·
Since the year 1831, when the provisions of section 4751
were first enacted, it has become the general policy of the
United States to require that all _moneys collected in behalf
of the United States shall be paid into'tbe Treasury (Rev.
Stats. sec. 3617.) Some exceptions thereto, not depending
upon any special reason, which here and there had escaped
attention, are gradually disappearing. I regard the provis272-VOL xvn--38
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ion of the above act of 1878 merely as putting an end to one
of these exceptions .
. This is the more evident from the circumstance that it operates expressly upon all collections theretofore, as well as
upon those thereafter. As the legislature could not have
meant to disturb the informer's rights in the former cases-at
all events in many of them-it appears that they were not
advertent, or therefore referring, to such rights in any case.
So that what is meant is, that so much of such moneys as
is collected/or the United States shall be paid into the Treasury, and not, as theretofore, to the Secretary. The emphasis
is upon the disposal-not the proportion-of certain moneyed
interests of the United States.
That this is the true interpretation appears also from a
corresponding passage in the act of June, 1878, where, although section 4751 is expressly repealed, yet express provision (ex abundanti) is added as to the payment into the Treasury of the proceeds of the sales therein ordered: as if it had
not been enough to repeal the provision which gave what
had been, to a certain extent, the equivalents of such proceeds to the Sem·etary, but were necessary also to direct expressly that the proceeds themselves shall follow the general
direction of public moneys.
The two acts of 1878, therefore, have their distinct operatio.us; that of April applying to the whole country, and
merely directing that whatever moneys vest in the United
States under section 4751 shall thereafter Le paid into the
Treasury; that of June applying to certain localities only,
and for them entirely annulling section 475l adding also a
proviso that any moneys which might arise from the methods
therein devised as substitutes for those referred to in section
4751 should (in like manner) be paid into the Treasury.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
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CLAIM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
The claim of the State of New York for reimbursement of the interest
paid by that State on money borrowed and expended in enrolling,
subsisting, clothing, etc., its troops employed to aid in the suppression
of the rebellion is not allowable under the provisions of the act of July
27, 1861, chapter 21.
To construe the 4)rovisions of that act so as to include a claim for interest thus paid would be giving t.hem a meaning much broader than tha,t
which has in practice been given other legislation of like character,
or than seems to be warranted by any sound rule of interpretation.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 23, 1883.
'SIR: Your letter of the 7th of J nne, 1882, and the papers

which accompanied it, present for my consideration the following question: Whether the claim of the State of New
York for interest paid by that State on money borrowed and
-expended in enrolling, subsisting, clothing, etc., its troops
employed to aid in the suppression of the rebellion is within
the provisions of the act of July 27, 1861, entitled "An act
to indemnify the States for expenses incurred by them in
defense of the United States." Delay in answering this
question has been occasioned mainly by the demands, from
time to time, of other business that seemed to require imme<liate attention. I have now the honor to submit my views
thereon.
The act of July 27, 1861, provides.: "That the Secretary
of the Treasury be and he is hereby directed, out of any
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay
to the Governor of any State, or to his duly-authorized
agents, the costs, charges, and expen~es properly incurred
by such State for enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying,
_arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against
the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers, to be
filed and passed upon by the proper accounting officers of
the Treasury." By a resolution passed ..\larch 8, 1862, the
above provision is to be construed to apply to expenses incurred as well after as before the date of the approval thereof.
Under this legislation the State of New York has already
been reimbursed the amount of money which was expended
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by it for the objects specified in the act of 1861, exclusive of
interest paid on the money so expended, all of which the
State was compelled to borrow. Such interest formed an
item in the account rendered by the State, but was not allowed in the adjustment thereof made at the Treasury, the
accounting officers not regarding it as admissible under the
statute. On the part of the State, however, it is urged that
the interest mentioned properly constitutes a part of the
''costs, charges, and expenses"incurred for the objects above
referred to, within the meaning of said act.
According to the construction originally adopted, and thus
far uniformly acted upon, in settling the claims of States
under the act of July 27, 1861, the provisions thereof extend
only to such outlays by the State as were made directly Ct;nd
specifically on account of "enrolling, subsisting, clothing,
supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its
troops;" and as payments made by the State on account of
interest upon a loan to it of the money thus expended, though
the expenses incurred for those objects were indirectly and
in a general way augmented thereby, are not strictly outlays
of the above character, such payments do not come within
the scope of the act.
This interpretation accords with that which prevailed in
the execution of similar provisions under which States were
re-imbursed for advances made by them during the war of
1812 and other subsequent wars.
By the act of April 29, 1816, chapter 160, an appropriation
was made ''for defraying the expenses incurred by calling
out the militia during the late war," in addition to the sums
theretofore appropriated to that object, which was applied
to the re-imbursement of States for advances to meet such
expenses. By the act ofMarch3, 1817, chapter 86, an appropriation was made'' for the payment of balances due to cer-·
tain States on acount of disbursements for militia employed in
the service of the United States during the late war." And
by the act of April 20, 1818, chapter 109, an appropriation
was made ''for the payment of balances due several States,.
on an adjustment of their accounts, for expenses incurred by
calling out the mil tia during the late war." Although in
each of these provisions very general and comprehensive
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terms are employed, yet they were not construed to authorize the re-imbursement of expenditures made by the States
on account of interest, and no claims for such expenditures
were allowed thereunder. Congress subsequently provided
for these claims by special legislation (thus impliedly recognizing the construction given the general provisions as
above), and prescribed certain rules for their adjustment (see
act of March 3, 1825, chapter 106; May13, 1826, chapter 39;
May 20, 1826, chapter 77; May 22, 1826, chapter 151 ; March
3, 1827, chapter 79; March 22, 1832, chapter 51).
So by the act of August 11, 1842, chapter 1!:!7, an amount
was appropriated "to the payment and indemnity of the
. State of Georgia, for any money actually paid by said State
on account of necessary and proper expenses incurred by
said State in calling out her militia," during the Seminole,
Cherokee, and Creek campaigns, in the years 1835 to 1838;
and by the act of August 16, 1842, chapter 178, the Secretary
of War was directed to audit and adjust the claims of the
State of Alabama'' for moneys advanced and paid by said
State for subsistence, ~upplies, and services of local troops
called into service by and under the authorities of said State,"
etc., during the Creek and Seminole hostilities. Under
neither of these acts were allowances made for advances on
account of interest. But by the act of January 26, 1849,
chapter 25, in the case of Alabama, and by the act of March
3, 1851, chapter 35, in the case of Georgia, Congress made
special provision for such allowances under rules and according to rates there prescribed.
.
By a resolution of Congress passed March 3, 1847, a provision was made for refunding to the several States, etc., the
amount of expenses incurred by them in organizing, sub.sisting, and transporting volunteers previous to their being
mustered and received into the service of the United States"
for the Mexican war. This provision, it would seem, was
not regarded-as autl.wrizing re-imbursement for interest paid
upon moneys expended for those purposes ; since it was apparently deemed necessary, in order to authorize such re-imbnrsement, to provide therefor by further legislation, which
is found in the amendatory' act of June 2, 1848~ chapter 60.
Undoubtedly the interest paid by the State of New York

•
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on money borrowed and applied to the object specified iu
the act of July 27, 1861, forms a part of the burden borne by
that State for the general public defense, and constitutes a
just charge against the United States; and the obligation to
re-imburse for payments of that kind, made under similar circumstances, has frequently been recognized by Congress, as
appears by statutes above cited. But to construe tlle provisions of that act so as to include such expenditures would
be giving them a meaning much broader than that which
has, in practice, been given other legislation of like character
and purpose or than seems to be warranted by any sound
rule of interpretation. Where a payment from the Treasury
is claimed under a statute, the payment, in order to be allowed, should appear to be authorized either expressly or by
very clear implication (9 Opin., 59). The language of the act.
under consideration, viewed with reference to claims based
upon expenditure for interest, does not satisfy that requirement; for while no authority to re-imburse the States for interest paid by them is expressly conferred thereby, such authority is not clearly to be implied therefrom. Indeed. the
absence of any provision in the act expressly authorizing reimbursement for interest rather gives rise to the itnplwation
that such re-imbursement was not meant to be allowed thereunder, as in other similar cases re-imbursement for interest
has generally been made the subject of express authorization
where Congress intended its allowance.
I am accordingly of the opinion that the claim of the State
of New York, referred to in the question submitted, does not
come within the provisions of the act of July 27, 1861.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

I
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PASSENGER VESSEL.
A tug-boat, used for the purpose and in the manner stated in the opinion,
can not be called a " passenger vessel" or " a vesAel carrying passengers," within the provisions of sections 4464 to 4469, Revised Statutes.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 26, 1883.
SIR: Yours of the 24th has been received and considered.
It states the following case and questions:
"A steam-vessel used in the harbor of New York City for
the purpose of towing other vessels to and fro has taken on
board from time to time the masters of the vessels thus
towed, and sometimes one or more members of the crew of
such vessels, and has conveyed them from the shore to the
vessels, or vice ·versa. No special compensation has been received for so doing. It has been a gratuity or favor to the
persons thus carried. Is such a tug within the provisions of
the United States Revised Statutes relating to the carriage
of passengers on steam-vessels (sees. 4464 to 4469 inclusiv~) ~
Can she be called a passenger vessel or a vessel carrying
passengers ~"
I have also in this connection read the opinion of a former
Solicitor of the Treasury (December 19, 1874), transmitted
by you.
I entirely agree with the view intimated by you, that the
tug-boat in question c-a.n not be called a "passenger vessel"
or "a vessel carrying passengers," within the statutory provisions to which you refer.
I believe that I need not detain you by any discussion of
this matter.
With great respect,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

I
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BRIG. GENERAL ARMSTRONG.
Reconsideration of opinion of July 7, 1883 (ante, p. 590), and conclusion
there reached, respecting the claim of Mr. S. C. Reid, jr., reaffirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 31, 1883.
I have carefully reconsidered my opinion on the case
presented by your communication of the 15th June ultimo
in the light of the arguments submitted by Mr. S. C. Reid,
dated the 18th of July current, and see no reason to change
my opinion.
The claim of Mr. Reid to receive the money in question as
the assignee or attorney of the owners of the brig General
Armstrong must fail, unless it can be shown that Capt. S.
C. Reid had power under the assignment to him by the
owners of the brigade, dated the 12th of September, 1835, to
devolve upon another the trusts and confidences reposed
in him by that instrument.
It may be observed, before discussing the terms of the
assignment, that., as its effect was to give Captain Reid unreserv·ed control over the interest~ assigned, binding the
assignors to accept any adjustment he might see fit to make,
it would seem to be reasonable in expounding the writing to
require that the asserted intention to give the trustee named
the power to transfer the delicate and important trusts confided to him should be plainly manifested.
Mr. Reid's pretension to r.eceive this money as assignee of
Captain Reid is based entirely on the fact that the assignment
of September, 1835, to Captain Reid is to him," his heirs anc:t
assigns, forever." The presence ot these words "heirs and
assigns" he considers sufficient to have warranted Capt~in
Reid in devolving upon him the trusts and powers of the
assignment.
It is clear to my mind, however, that the terms ~'heirs and
assigns" were used for no such purpose in that instrument,
but were employed· merely as words of limitation, to denote
the measure of the interest assigned, and to manifest an intention to transfer all the rights the assignors had in the
premises.
SIR :
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An examination of the whole instrument leaves no room
for doubt, in my opinion, that this view is correct.
In the first place, the real consideration of the assignment
is ''the undertaking of Samuel C. Reid, of New York, to bear
.all the expenses and charges and to perform all necessary
.services for the collection of the demands hereafter mentioned," and it was to induce the performance of that consid-eration b;y Reid alone that the assignment was made to him,
"' his heirs and assigns, forever."
But the assignment to Captain Reid, "his heirs and as:Signs," is made expressly subject to the payment to the parties interested of the one-half of any money" that he may
receive for or on account of said vessel;" which is a somewhat remarkable provision if Mr. Reid's theory is correct,
-seeing that it was to be expected, in that case, that the assignment would be made subject to the payment not only of
one-half of the money to be received by Captain Reid him.s elf but of the money that might possibly be received by his
heirs or assigns. The absence of any such reference to the
heirs or assigns of Captain Reid is full of significance.
But the omission of
mention of the heirs or assigns of
Captain Reid in the concluding paragraph of the assignment
is conclusive. . It 's in these words: "We further authorize
the said Samuel C. Reid, irrevocably as our attorney and
agent, to take such legal proceedings in the premises and to
receive such moneys and make compromises and agreements
.as to him may seem meet and proper." It is much more
than improbable that the grant of these enumerated powers
would have been restricted to Captain Reid alone, if the
grantors had contemplated the possibility that his heirs or
assigns might be called on to exercise them.
But there is still another view that seems to be absolutely
fatal to Mr. Reid's claim. Admittmg his pretension that it
is within the purview of the assignment that the heirs or as.s igns of Captain Reid might be requir~d to execute its powers and trusts, it is manifest that the possibility of their
being called on for that purpose is entirely dependent on Captain Reid's dying without having accomplished the object of
the assignment; for it is impossible to suppose that the parties interested could have intended that Captain Reid should

all
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have power to transfer these delicate personal trusts to any
body in his life-time. It would be strange, in the absence of
very explicit language, to impute to the parties interested in
these delicate trusts the intention to empower their trustee~
especially chosen for his personal character and q nalifi.cations, to abdicate the trusts in his life-time at his option and
turn them over to any person he might see fit. As was said
by Lord Langdale in the case of Titley v. Wolstenholme (7 Beavan, 435), it is not reasonable to suppose that the author of
t}J.e trust intended it should be transferred to a trustee not
especially trusted and chosen until after the death of the
trustee who was especially tru~ted and chosen.
But the argument of Mr. Reid proves too much, for if it is
sound as to the assigns of Captain Reid, it follows by parity
of reason that it must have been in the contemplation of the
authors of the trust in question that, in case Captain Reid
should die without making an assignment of the trust, the
persons at the time of his death answering to the description
of his heirs, whoever they might be, feme coverts, infants,
idiots, or lunatics, should assume the important and delicate
responsibility of negotiating a settlement of the claim. Surely
an interpretation which leads to such a result can not be
sound.
It may be questioned whether the books furnish an instance
where trusts of the character of those committed to Captain
Reid have been made assignable by the trustee. I am inclined to think that it will be found that the cases in which
such a power bas been given the trustee involve trusts of a
character largely ministerial.
As to the arguments founded on the language of the act
of Congress touching the claim growing out of the destruction of the General Armstrong, it is sufficient to say that Mr.
Reid's rights and powers as assignee of Captain Reid derive
no increase from that source, it being entirely foreign to the
purpose of that act to interfere with the contract relations
of the claimants, their agents and assigns.
Passing now to the question of Mr. Reid's authority to
receive the money coming to the officers and crew of the vessel. Mr. Reid insists that he has express authority from
them to receive this money. In your communication of the
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15th of June, ultimo, presenting the case on whicb my opinion
was asked, you say, "Mr. Reid, jr., held no power of attorney or assignment or anything in the nature of such a document from the officers and crew of the vessel." Assuming
this to be correct, as I must, I see no occasion for modifying
my opinion on this bead.
As to the question of Mr. Reid's right to be reimbursed
for certain expenses incurred for the benefit of the claimants,
my opinion on this point is given in my reply to your communication of the 11th of July current, which for the first
time presented that question to me.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
ARMY PAYMASTERS' ACCOUNTS.
Opinion of July 27, 1882 (ante, p. 246), on certain questions conceruing
paymasters' accounts, reconsidered.
A pay account of Lieutenant M., for the month of August, 1877 (be
being on dut.y within the limits of the New York pay district), was
paid by thP- chief paymaster at New York, and soon afterwards a
second pay account of Lieutenant M. for the same month was paid by
another paymaster there, who had no knowledge of the previous payment, nor was it practicable for him to obtain such knowledge: Hela
that the last-mentioned paymaster is not chargeable with the amount
so paid by him, but that, by virtue of the Army Regulations (paragraph
1006, Regulations of 1863; paragraph 1652, Regulations of 1881) he is
entitled to have the same passed to his credit.
A third account of Lieutenant M. for the same month was paid to an assignee by a paymaster at Charleston, S. C., the latter knowing th-at
Lieutenant M. was not then serving within the Charleston pay district. Viewing this case in connection with paragraph 1348, Regula
tions of 1863, aud certain circulars from the Paymaster-General's Offic&
mentioned: Held that the payment of this account was wholly unauthorized, and that the paymaster is properly chargeable therewith.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 11, 1883.
SIR: In compliance with your request of the 3d of March
last, accompanying which was a letter of Maj. E. D. Judge
(retired), and other papers, I have reconsidered, in connec
tion with the additional information thereby furnished, cer-
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tain questions upon whi~h I had the honor to communicate
to you an opinion on the 27th of July, 1882.
It appears that funds for the payment of Army officers
for services within the fiscal year commencing July 17 1877,
did not become available until some time in November, 1877 7
on the 24th of which month an account of Lieutenant 1\1.
(then on duty within the limits of the New York pay district)
for the month of August, 1877, was paid to an assignee by
the chief paymaster at New York; that on December 4, 1877,
another account of Lieutenant 1\L, for August, 1877, was
paid to an assignee by another disbursing officer ther~, ·
namels·, Paymaster A., who had no knowledge of the previous
payment of the account, nor was it practicable for him at
that time to obtain such knowledge through official sources
of information; that Lieutenant M. was not then under stoppage or other disability as to pay, but that subsequently,
iu March, 1878, he deserted the service, indebted to the
United States for overpayment, etc., between$500 and $600,
and that Paymaster A., having been charged with the amount
paid by him as aforesaid, asks that the charge be remove(l.
And the question hereupon presented is, whether he is
-chargeable with the amount so paid.
By the Regulations of the Army (paragraph 1343, Regulations of 18o3; paragraph 2378, Regulations of 1881 ), officers
.are paid on accouu~ certified by themselves; and the same
Regulations provide that "if any account paid on the certificate of an officer to the facts is afterwards disallowed for
error of fact in the certificates, it shall pass to the credit of
the disbursing officer, and be charged to the officer who gave
the certificate." (Paragraph 1006, Regulations of 1863; paragraph 1652, Regulations of 1881.) Those provisions, which
were not brought to my attention when the before-mentioned
opinion was given, have an important bearing upon the above
question.
The assignment by an Army officer of his pay account is
not prohibited by law (10 Opin., 271 ). The Regulations of the
Army, however, forbid him to transfer it before it is due.
(Paragraph 1349, Regulations of 1863 ; paragraph 2380,
.Regulations of 1881).
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that, under the circum-
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stances above stated, Paymaster A. is not chargeable with
the amount paid by him as aforesaid, but that, by virtue of
the before-mentioned provision of the Army Regulations,
(paragraph 1006, Regulations of 1863), he is entitled to hav-e
the same passed to his credit.
It is true, at the time of such payment there was nothing
due Lieutenant M. in respect of his service for August (the
same having already been paid for), and under the application of general rules of law, Paymaster A. would be liable
for the overpayment. But the provision referred to renders
those rules inapplicable here. It operates to protect'adisbursing officer from liability where payment is made, as in the case
of an officer's pay account, on the faith of the officer's certificate alone, the correctness of which the disbursing officer
bas no reason to question, and where the officer whose
account is presented is not under stoppage.
A second question is presented upon the following facts:
Paymasters A. and B., at New York, paid accounts of Lieutenant M. for November, 1877, B. on the 30th of November 1
1877, and A. on the 4th of December, 1877. Each payment
was made to an assignee. It is assumed that the account
paid by B. had been transferred before it became due, and
that he must have known this. It is also assumed that the
account paid A. had been transferred before it became due.
A. has been charged ·with the amount of the payment made
by him; B. has not been charged. The question is whether
A. is liable for the overpayment for November.
The provision in the Army Regulations forbidding an officer to transfer his pay account before it is due does not
have the e:fl'ect to render void a transfer made before the
account is due; so that the payment to an assignee by B.
in the above case was valid, for which he has properly
received credit. The subsequent payment by A. of Lieutenant M.'s account for November was therefore an overpayment; but the circumstances under which it was made
appear to have been no di:fierent from those under which the
overpayment of the same officer's account for August' took
place. Accordingly, on considerations already stated in
connection with the latter~ I answer the question of A.'s
liability for the overpayment.for November in the negative.
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A third account of Lieutenant 1\L for November, 1877,
was paid to an assignee by Paymaster C., at Charleston, S.
C., December 6, 1877"' C. knowing that Lieutenant M. was
not then serving within the Charleston pay district. C. has
been charged with the amount paid by him, and the question here presented is, whether he is chargeable with the
overpayment so made.
In connection with this case reference is made to paragraph 1348, Army Regulations of 1863, and to Circular No.
15 from the Paymaster General's Office, dated June 18, 1864;
Circular No. 49 from the same office, dated August, 9 1865;
Circular No. 53, from the same office, dated January 29,
1867, reissued March 5, 1869.
Paragraph 1348 of the Regulations of 1863 provided : "As
far as practicable officers are to draw their pay from the
paymaster of the district where they may be on duty.'' The
circulars cited were intended to enforce a strict compliance
with that regulation, in order the · better to guard against
double payments and frauds.
Viewed in connection with paragraph 1348 and the circulars referred to, I think the payment by C., as above, was
wholly unauthorized, and that he is properly chargeable
therewith. The assignee of an officer's pay account must be
deemed to take it subject to the~ same restrictions respecting
the place of payment to which the officer himself is subject,
and a disbursing officer who, disregarding such restrictions,
pays the assignee, does so at his own risk.
Paymasters A. rmd B., at New York, each paid to an assignee an account of Lieutenant M. for December, 1877, on
the last day of that month. A third account of Lietitenant
M. for that month was presented at a later date to B., but
payment was declined. The circumstances under which the
above pa;yments were m~cle appear to be similar to those
under which the overpayments at New York of Lieutenant
M.'s accounts for August and November were made. Hereupon )t is inquired: Shall A. or B., or both A. and B., be
charged with the double payment for December?
In answer to this, I submit that the same considerations
which negative the liability of A. for overpayments for
August and November, as aforesaid, also negative the liabil-
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ity of either A. or B. for the overpayment for December, and
t uat in my opinion neither should be charged therewith.
Some cases and questions, other than tliose stated in the
foregoing, were passed upon in my opinion of the 27th of
July, 1882. On reexamination of these cases and questions I
feel entirely satisfied with the views then expressed thereon.
For convenience I here repeat so much of that opinion as
relates to them:
"Two accounts of Lieutenant Mast for January, 1878, which
had been received at the New York office from assignees,
were forwarded by the chief paymaster to the PaymasterGeneral indorsed as follows: 'Payment refused, both ac-counts being for January, 1878, and received before the expiration of the month.' On the 1st of March, 1878, said
Paymaster B., 'after inquiring in all the offices if his (Mast's)
a ccounts for February had been either presented or paid,'
paid an account of Mast for February, 1878, to an assignee.
Said account had evidently been transferred before matu~ity,
and as l\'Iast's post. was Fort McHenry, and the assignee re~ided in Wheeling, W. Va., B. was chargeable with notice
()f the fact. Besides, B. knew that at least t.wo accounts had
been presented for December, and he was chargeable with
notice as to the condition of Mast's account with the Government, at least so far as t.h e same was affected by payments
made to him or to his assignees through the New York ofnee; and proper inquiry would ha\e developed the fact that,
by reason of duplication of payments, Mast was in arrears
to the United States (see section 1766, Rev. Stat.) Is B.
chargeable with 1'he account so paid by him for February,
1878~

"If the aggregate of the charges against paymasters on
account of payments made to Mast be in the end found to
exceed the loss actually sustained by th.e United States, how
will the amount of that loss be apportioned~"
To the former of these questions I reply, tllat if B. was
chargeable with notice, when he paid the account for February, that Mast was then in arrears to the United States,
he incurred liability for the payment so made; and the result
would be the same, I think, if the facts then in possession
of B. were such as to put him upon inquiry as to the state
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of M.'s account with the Government, otherwise B. would
not be liable for the payment, and could not properly be·
charged therewith.
To the other question I reply, that the apportionment of
foss should be pro rata. Thus, if the amount of overpayments.
chargeable to A. be $200 and the amount chargeable to B.
$300, and the Government should receive from M. a portion
of the loss sustained, say $100, the balance of the loss should
be borne by A. and B. in proportion to the amounts with
which they are charged respectively, that is to say, $160 -by
A. and $240 by B.
Another case is presented, as follows: "Paymaster :EJ. paid
an account of James H. Whitten, second lieutenant Fifth
United States Infantry, for April, 1877, on the 9th of May,
1877, to an assignee, and another for the same month on the
31st of May, 1877, to Whitten himself. 1!}. has been charged
with the amount of the overpayment. Whitten left the service May 31, 1877., He never drew his pay for January, 1877.
He is charged with the sum of $98.25 on the Third Auditor's.
books, and with the sum of $673.96 on the Second Auditor's books, the latter charge being on account of ordnance
and ordnance stores for which he was responsible. E. asks.
that said January pay be so applied as to relieve him from
responsibility for said overpayment.
"It is the practice of the accounting officers to follow the
order prescribed in paragraph 1363 of th~ Army Regulations
of 1863, and where an officer is in arrears to reimburse the
United States out of his undrawn pay for public property
unaccounted for, to the exclusion, if necessary, of a paymaster who has made an overpayment.
" Ought the charge against E. to be- removed as he requests, or ought the practice hitherto obtaining to be adhered
to~"

In reply to this question I submit that E. has no right, as.
against the United States, to have the said January pay of
W. applied for his own relief. At the time E. incurred lia ·
bility for t,he overpayment toW. (May 31, 1877), the latter, as.
it would seem, already 8tood indebted to the United States;
and on general principles, irrespective of the practice referred to, the pay mentio,ned should first be applied in satis-
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faction of such indebtedness. I accordingly answer the first
branch of the question in the negative and the alternative or
last branch in the affirmative.
The following case js also presented: ''An account of E·
W. Maxwell, second lieutenant Twentieth United States Infantry, for March, 1878, was paid on the 30th of that month
at New York Oit:'f\, by Paymaster D. Said Maxwell was on
duty at that place from March 2 to April 8, 1878. The propriety of the payment so made is not doubted. Paymaster
E., at Washington, D. 0., paid a second account of Maxwell's ·
for March on the 31st of March, and au account for April on
the 30th of April, 1878. Maxwell was not serving within the
limits of the Washington office on either of the dates last
mentioned. Each of the accounts paid by E. was held by
an assignee, and had been transferred before maturity. E.
has been charged with the entire amount paid by him. A
second account for April was paid by Paymaster F. at San
Antonio, Tex. Maxwell was on duty within the limits of the
Satt Antonio office from April 26 to May 31, 1878. He was
dismissed from the service by sentence of court-martial in
August, 1878. It appears from the record of the court that
the account paid by F. was paid before the end of the
month (seP. sec. 364.8, Rev. Stats.) to an assignee, to whom
it had been assigned before it was due. F. has been charged
with the amount paid by him.
''Maxwell being credited. with all undrawn pay, it was
found by a se~tlement, confirmed February 21, 1879, that his
pay was overdrawn in the sum of $15.55. He is indebted
to the United Statf>s in the further sums of $138.57 a11d
$295.48 for public property received by him April 7 and 15,
1878, for which he failed to account, as appears by a settlement confirmed February 20, 1880, since which date he has
stood charged with the total sum of $44.9.60.
"In May, 1881, the assignee to whom Paymaster E. h~d
paid Maxwell's account for April presented certain claims
to Paymaster F. for payment. From the amount of claims
so presented F. withheld a sum equivalent to Maxwell's pay
·for April, 1878, proposing to deposit the same in the Treasury to make good the duplicate payment made to said
assignee by Paymaster E. for that month. Said assignee
272- VOL XVTI--~10
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having presented the case to the Paymaster-General, that
officer, on the 9th of June, 1881, asked of the Second Auditor
that he be "furnished with a copy of any settlement made in
your (the Second Auditor's) office of the pay of Lieut. E. W.
Maxwell, Twentieth Infantry, showing his present indebtedness to the United States on accountofpay." The Paymaster-General's letter was returned by the Second Auditor's
office with an indorsement stating that copy of statement in
the case of Maxwell was inclosed. The paper inclosed was
a copy of the statement of account, with the settlement confirmed February 27, 1879, indicating a balance of pay overdrawn $15.55, and no reference was made to the settlement
of February 20, 1880, nor to the balance, $449.60. Thereupon the Paymaster-General, in July, 1881, directed F. to refund to said assigne~ the difference between the sum withheld by him as aforesaid and the sum of $15.55, the latter
sum being the balance found due in said settlement of February 27, 1879. F. did as he was directed. It is claimed
that no charge should be enforced against either E. or F. on
account of payments for April, 1878.
'' Shall E. be relieved from responsibility on account of
his payment to Maxwell for March, and shall E. and F., or
either of them, be relieved from responsibility on account of
said payments to Maxwell for April, 1878 ~ ''
I answer: The facts abo\e set forth fLunish no ground
whatever for relieving E. from his liability for the payment
of M.'s second account for March. But in regard to the
overpayment for April, the claim for relief therefrom seems
to be well founded. The assignee of M.'s account for that
month, to whom E. made payment, had at the time of such
paym6nt no claim against the United States by reason of the
assignment; an account of M. for the same month having
then already been paid by F., and thus nothing being then
due to 1\L for that period. When, therefore, the assignee
subsequently presented claims for payment, au amount due
on such claims sufficient to offset the overpayment for April
might properly be retained, as it in fact was retained for
that purpose by F. The relinquishment of this amount by
the latter, which was available for the extinguishment of the
liability incurred for the overpayment for April, can not, un-
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der the circumstances stated, justly operate to the disadvantage of either F. or E. They shoul~ not be made to suffer for the error or inadvertence of other officials. In my
opinion they are entitled to be relieved from liability for
that overpayment.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Ron.

ROBERT

T.

LINCOLN,

Secretary of War.

CASE OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GIBSON.
Lieutenant-Colonel G., though his commission is junior in date to that of
Lieutenant-Colonel B., claims that he is entitled to the next colonelcy
over the latter, by reason of errors committed in his promotion in 1847
and 1867: Advised that such errors, if any, can not now be rectified by
disregarding the fact that B., in virtue of his present commission, is
senior to G. in the 1ine of promotion, and that the claim of the latter
is therefore inadmissible.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

October ~6, 1883.
Agreeably to your request of the 12th instant, I have
~onsidered the claim of Lieut. Col. H. G. Gibson, Second
Artillery, to promotion to the rank of colonel, and now have
the honor to submit my opinion thereon.
By the law regulating the military service, vacancies in
established regiments and corps to the rank of colonel are
to be filled by promotion according to seniority, except in
case of disability or other incompetency; and promotions to
that rank in the line of the Army are to be made according
to the arm, as infantry, artillery, etc., and in the ~aff departments, and in the engineers and ordnance, according ·to the
corps (Rev. Stat., sec. 1204; Army Regulations of 1881, paragraphs 36 and 37). Thus a vacancy in the grade of colonel
occurring in the artillery must be filled by appointing thereto
the senior lieutenant-colonel in that arm (where no "disability or other incompetency" exists), he ,standing, with reference to such vacancy, first in the line of promotion.
According to their present commissions Lieut. Col. C. L.
Best. Fourth Artillery, is senior in rank to Lieutenant-ColSIR:
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onel Gibson in the grade (that of lieutenant-colonel) to
which they both now belong, the commission of the former
being da.ted March 15, 1881, while the commission of the latter bears date April 19, 1882. As between these officers,
therefore, under the law of promotion above adverted to, the
right to the next vacant colonelcy happening in the artillery
arm of the service is prima facie in Lieutenant-Colonel Best.
But the claim of Lieutenant-Colonel Gibson is, that he is
entitled to such vacancy over and above Lieutenant-Colonel
Best. The grounds of his claim are thus stated by him in
one of the papers referred to me (all of which are herewith
returned) under date of September 22, 1883: "I claim that
the fact of the present precedence of Lieutenant-Colonel Best
as lieutenant-colonel is based on errors made by the War
Department: first, in my promotion as second-lieutenant in
1847 (admitted as an error by the Adjutant-General in 1848
by letter to me); second, by improper and incorrect order of
relative rank as majors in February, 1867; and third, because
the Senate Military Committee, by its action in 1881, simply
accepted the dicta of the War Department, without any
decision as to thejustice of my claim."
The errors alleged in support of this claim, if any there are't
can not, in my judgment, now be rectified in the manner proposed by Lieutenant-Colonel G., that is to say, by the President disregarding the fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Best, in
virtue of his commission, stands senior to Lieutenant-Colonel
Q-. in the g-rade of lieutenant-colonel, and, when a vacancy
occurs in the next higher grade in the artillery, appointing
the latter above the former to fill it. This view coincides
with that taken by one of my predecessors in the case of
Lieutenant-Colonel Saxton, of the Quartermaster's Department, which was similar to the present case.
There Lieutenant-Colonel S., who stood number four in the
grade of lieutenant-colonel, claimed that he had been overslaughed by the promotion, in 1866, of the three officers
standing above him in the same grade under an erroneous
execution of the aQt of July 28, 1886, chapter 299, and he
asked that the error be then (in December, 1880) rectified by
the President by appointing him to fill the next vacancy
occurring in the grade of colonel in the same corps over the
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three officers referred to. The President was, however, advised by the Attorney-General that he should treat the commissions signed by his predeeessors as conclusive evidence
()f the right of those officers to the rank and authority given
thereby; that while their commissions stand he should respect them, and, in making promotions in said corps, have
regard to them; and that if Lieutenant-Colonel S. had sustained a wrong in the manner alleged, Congress could alone
remedy it. (16 Opin. 583.)
"
I adopt these views as applicable to the present case, and
am accordingly of opinion that the claim of Lieutenant-Col<mel Gibson, as above, is inadmissible.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

CUSTOMS LAWS.
The effect of the proviso in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, declaring
"that there shall be no allowance for break.age, leakage, or damage
on wines, liquors, cordials, or distilled spirits," was to repeal all the
provisions previously in force which authorized such allowance; but it
nevertheless permits the duties to b€' assessed on the actual quantity
of merchandise imported, whether in casks or bottles.
Where the quantity which actually arrives is found by the customs officers to be less than the invoiced quantit.y, a deduction of th~ excess of
the latter over the former, in adjusting the duties, is not an allowance
within the meaning of the proviso mentioned.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 26, 1883.
SIR : In your letter of the 16th instant you direct my
attention to the proviso in Schedule H of the customs law of
March 3, 1883, chapter 121, which declares " that there shall
be no allowance for breakage, leakage, or damage on wines,
liquors~ cordials, or distilled spirits," and after referring; in
~onnection therewith, to section 59 of the act of March 2,
1799. chapter 22; section 21 of the act of July 14, 1870, chapter 255; and section 2 of the act of February 8, 1875, chaptt>r 36, which provided for allowance~ of that character, you
submit for my consideration the inquiry, " Whether the said
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proviso merely does away with the arbitrary allowance in
lieu of leakage and breakage, and allows the duties to be
assessed on the actual quantity of merchandise imported
whether in casks or bottles, or whether, if it does absolutely
prohibit allowances for loss of quantity occurring on the
voyage of importation, such prohibition extends to liquors
in casks as well as those in bottles."
Having given this subject careful examination, I have now
the honor to reply :
The act of 1799 authorized "an allowance of 2 per cent.
for leakage on the quantity which shall appear by the gauge
to be contained in any cask of liquors subject to duty by
the gallon; and 10 per cent. on all beer, ale, aml porter in
bottles, and 5 per cent. on all other liquors in bottles, to be
deducted from the invoice quantity in lieu of breakage, or
it shall be lawful to compute the duties on the actual q uantity, to be ascertained by tale, at the option of the importer,
to be made at time of entry." This provision was applicable only to liquors, etc., subj,·ct to a specific duty. So much
thereof as pro·\ ided for allowance for leakage and breakage
was expressly repeated by the act of 1870, by which a new
provision was enacted namely, that " no allowance shall be
made for breakage unless such breakage is actually ascertained by couut and certified by a custom house appraiser."
The latt~r provision was re-enacted in the Revised Statutes
(sec. 2504, Schedule D), and thereafter remained the only
provision on the subject in force until the passage of the act
of 1875. This act provided "That there shall be an allowance of 5 per centum and no more, on all effervescing wines,
liquors, cordials, and distilled spirits in bottles, to be deducted from the invoice quantity in lieu of breakage."
Such was the state of the law in regard to allowances on
the importation of wines, liquors, etc., when the act of 1883
was passed; and the effect of the proviso in this act undoubtedly is to repeal all the provisions previously in force
authorizing these allowances.
However, the prohibition of these allowances made by
that proviso is not to be understood as otherwise introducing any new rule for the collection of duties. According to
the principles settled by the cases of Marriott \ Brune (9
7
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How., 619); Un·ited States v. Southmayd (ibid., 637); and Lawrence v. Caswell (13 How., 488), the duty is chargeable, not
upon the quantity which may have been purchased and shipped abroad, but upon the quantity which actually arrives in
the country.
In tbe first of those cases it is remarked by th8 court that
"a deduction must be made from the quantity shipped
abroad whenever it does not all reach the United States, or
we shall in truth assess here what does not exist here. The
collection of revenue on an article not existing would be an
anomaly, a mere fiction of law, and is not to be countenanced
where not expressed in acts of Congress, nor required to enforce just rights."
Accordingly, where the quantity which actually arrives at
the port of entry is found by the customs officers to be less than
the invoiced quantity, a deduction of the excess so appearing
in the latter over the former, in adjusting the duties, would not
in my view be an allowance within the meaning of the proviso
above mentioned. It is only a mode of stating the quantity
which is dutiable, in o't her words, the quantity of the mer~han
<lise imported and upon which alone the duty is imposed.
I am, therefore, of opinion that while that proviso does
away with allowances of the character therein describ~d formerly authorized by law, it nevertheless permits "the duties
to be assessed on the actual quantity of merchandise imported, whether in casks or bottles."
I am, sir, very r('spectfully,
.BENJAMIN HARL{IS BREWSTER.
Ron. CHARLES J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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COURT-MAR l'IAL.
H. was tried by a court-martial and found guilty of the offense charged.
At the trial a witness objected to answering a question on the ground
of self-crimination; but the court required him to answer, the JudgeAdvocate reading in support of this l'equirement section 860, Revised
Statutes: l!Celd that if the court committed an error in compelling the
witness to answer, th error is not such as to require a disapproval of
the proceedings.
Whether the effect of that section is to take away from a witness the
common-law privilege of declining to answer a question which tends
to criminate him, when it is manifest that he could only be tried in the
courts of the United States, qurere.
DEPARTMENT OF tfUSTICE 1

October 27, 1883.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication
of the 24th instant, inclosing proceedings of the general courtmartial convened at West Point, N. Y., before which was
tried Cadet James Hugh Hackett, fourth-class, Corps of
Cadets, together with the report of the tTudge-Advocate-General of the ArJDY thereon.
It appears from the papers that Mr. Hackett was found
guilty of the offense charged, that Michael Harrington, a witness, objected to answering a question propounded at the
trial on the ground of self-crimination, and that the court
compelled him to answer, the Judge Advocate reading to him
"the section of the Revised Statutes under which the requirement was made."
You request my opinion whether the witness was improperly compelled to answer the question, and if so, whether the
error is such as to require a disapproval of the proceedings.
The section read by the Judge Advocate was doubtless
section 860, RevisPd Statutes (act 25th February, 1868),
which in substance provides that no pleading, discovery, or
evidence obtained from a party or witness in this or any
foreign country· by means of a judicial proceeding shall be
used against him in any court of the United States in any
criminal proceedings, etc.
This statute does not in terms take away from a witness
the common-law privilege of declining to answer a question
which tends to criminate him. Wlletber such would be its
effect in this or in a foreign country, when it became manifest

TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

G17

Court-Martial.

·that only iu the courts of the United States could the wi~ness
be tried, is another question, and one not entirely free from
doubt. Deady, J., in United States v. Brown (1 Sawyer, 536),
is of opinion that this is the purpose of the act.
The act may have been passed merely for purposes of inducement, so that the witnes~, secure from adverse use of his
testimony, would be willing to waive the privilege accorded
• by courts of foreign countries as well as of our own, or it
may have been declaratory of the generaJ rule "that evidence given or statements made by a party under compulsion
-or order of court tending to criminate himself cannot be put
in evidence on a criminal proceeding against him." (Per
Miller, J., 2 Dillon, 405.)
The act of 25th February, 1868, seems to have received
very little discussion in either House of Congress, aud while
the debates are not authoritative in the interpretation of
statutes, it is not unworthy of note that Mr. Frelinghuysen,
the mover of the bill, said that it would not take away from
a party the privilege of remaining silent and refusing to
answer. (Congressional Globe, second session 40th Congress, 951.)
I prefer to leave the question of the effect of this statute
to the courts, by whom alone it can be definitely decided,
-e specially as it does not seem to me that the error in the
present case, if one bas been committed, is one of which the
-defendant can complain.
In The Cormnonwealth v. Kimball (24 Pick., 369) Shaw, C.
J., expresses the opinion that the defendant could take
advantage of an error of this kind, because, "if the evidence
was incompetent and the objection reasonably taken by the
proper party and by law ought to have been sustained, it
·c ould not be held that the verdict was supported by legal
-evidence." This expression was obiter dictum, and moreover
is erroneous, in assuming that the evidence delivered under .
compulsion was "incompetent.''
In the analogous case of an attorney testifying to the contents of a deed belonging to his client not a party to the
cause, Lord Denman, C. J., held that, the evidence having
actually gone before the jury, the defendants were not a
privileged party, and bad no right of objection even on the
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supposition that the judge below had done wrong. (Marston
v. Downes, 1 Adolp. & Ellis, 31.)
It is decided by an abundance of authority that the privilege of refusing to testify is a purely personal one; that the
witness may waive it,; that no objection from the parties on
the scorP. of crimination of the witness can be entertained;
and that the counsel for. the witness can only be heard in
defense of his right.
It would seem to follow that where this right has been
violated it is for' him to complain and not the defendant~
Having no rights in the first instance, the defendant cannot,
either on a motion for a new trial or on a writ of error, allege
that he has been wronged. The question was squarely presented in Oloyes v. Thayer (3 Hill, 564) upon a motion for a
new trial. The language of Nelson, C. J. (subsequently
adopted in Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal., 89), is so clear, that Ireproduce it:
''The court erred, also, in compel1ing the payee of the
note to answer questions tending to criminate himself. It
was expressly held in Burns v. Kimpshall (24 Wend., 360}
that the answer in a like case might tend to subject him
either to a penalty or to an indictment for a misdemeanor.
But the error is not available to the plaintiff. The privilege
belongs exclusively to the witness, who may take advantage
of it or not at his pleasure. The party to the suit cannot
object. He has no right to insist upon the privilege andrequire the court to exclude the evidence on that ground. The
witness may waive it and testify, in spite of any objection
coming from the party or his counsel. (Thomas v. Newton,
1 Moody & Malk., 48, note (b); Treat v. Browning, 4 Conn.,
408; Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cowen, ~59; Cowen & ].\fills's
Notes to Phil. Ev ., 748, (b). If ordered to testify in a case
where he is privileged, it is a matter exclusively between the
court and the witness. The latter may stand out and be
commited for contempt or he may submit; but the party
has no right to interfere or complain of the error. It would
be otherwise if the court allowed the privilege in a case
where the witness had not brought himself within the rule,
as the party would then be improperly deprived of his testimony.'"
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:Mr. Hackett is in no worse predicament than if Mr. Harrington had come forward voluntarily to testify, or, being compelled to attend, had failed to avail himself of his privilege.
Should the findings be disapproved and a new trial ordered,.
it would depend, supposing the court-martial to have erred,.
upon Mr. Harrington's willingness to testify, whether the new
trial would not result exactly as this one has.
I would therefore answer your second inquiry by saying
that if the court-martial committed an error in requiring Mr.
Harrington to answer, the error is not such as to require a
disapproval of the proceedings.
The papers transu1itted are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SE.CRETARY oF WAR.
CHANGE OF TIME AT WASHINGTON.
A change of time at Washington, D. C., by adoptmg the seventy-fifth
meridian in lieu of the true meridian at that place (being a change of
eight minutes and twelve seconds), 'can not be effected by mere executive authority. It' can only be done by appropriate legislation.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
October 31, 1883.
SIR: In your communication of the 24th of October instant, you ask if there is "any objection to adopting, on and
after the 18th of Novetpber, the time of the seventy-fifth meridian as the local time in Washington, being a change of
eight minutes and tu·elve su·onds in the present city time."
In my opinion there is a grave difficulty in the way of
effecting the change of time mentioned by mere executive
authority.
When Congress bas legislated with regard to time iu this
District, as for example in making it the duty of the beads of
the several Executive Departments and heads of Bureaus to
prescribe the number of hours emplo~·es shall labor, it must
be presumed to have had in view the time of the meridian
of the city of Washington, and it is not perceived how the
time of any other meridian could be adopted without the
authority of an act of Congress.
I am also of opinion that no substitution of the time of anOF
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other meridian for that of the meridian of W' ashington can
be made operative generally in this District without appropriate legislation. In no other way can such a change be
effective. To attempt to make it by executive act would be
likely to introduce con fusion and conflict; for some, regard.
ing the executive order as having the force of law, would be
governed by it accordingly, while others would treat it as
merely recommendatory, and thm•, from this want of uniformity, great prejudice might occasionally ensue to persons
interested in tram:actions that must be carried on within
certain hours or on or before given hours. The possibility,
not to say probability, of such result is, in my judgment,
a sufficient reason for not making the proposed change of
time by an executive act.
In Great Britain the subject of establishing standards of
time has been regarded as one for legislative action, and consequently, when it was sought to render definite references
to time in acts of Parliament, deeds, and other legal iustruments, a statute was passed for the purpose. (43 and 44
Viet., chap. 9.)
•
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,
BENJA:\IIN HARRIS BREWSTER,
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
POSTAL NOTES.
Postal notes, under the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 123, are required to
be drawn payable only at the office selected by the remitter.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
November 8, 1883.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of )'our communication of the 7th instant, requesting my opinion as to
whether ''postal notes'' may be drawn payable at.any moneyorder office, or must be drawn payable only at. the office selected by the remitter.
The act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 526), provides:
"That for the transmission of small sums under five dollars through the mails the Postmaster-General may authorize postmasters at money-order offices to issue money orders,
without corresponding advices, on an engraved form to be
prescribed and furnished by him; and a money order issued
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on such new form shall be designated and known as a "postal note," and a fee of three cents shall be charged for the
issue thereof. Every postmaster who shall issue a postal
note under the authority of the Postmaster-General shall
make the same payable to bearer, when duly receipted, at
any money-order office which the remitter thereof may select, and a postal note shall in likemanner be payable to
bearer when presented at the office of issue."
The words" which the remitter may select" are substantially the ones used in section 4028, Revised Statutes, which
authorizes the issue of the ordinary postal money-orders;
and while many reasons may exist why the designation of place
of payment need not be contemporaneous with the issue where
no letter of advice is sent, they do not seem to have been
accepted by Congress, and the intention of the law is express that the remitte1' and not the payee should select the
place of payment.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
CIVIL SERVICE.
Departmental clerks whose salaries are $900 or $1,000 per annum, although not belonging to either of the classes in section 163, Revised
Statutes, come within the scope of the act of January 16, 1883, chapter
27, and may be classified thereunder, for the purpose of examination,
into one or more classes, as may be deemed expedient.
Under section 1753, Revised Statutes, the President may prescribe regulations for admission into the civil service, and thereby restrict original entry therein to one or more of the classes that may exist, or perm iii
such entry to all of them as in his judgment will best promote the efficiency of the service.
If the $900 or $1,000 clerkships are constituted a distinct class, a promotion from such class to another class without examination, excepting
where, in conformity to the act, the person to be promoted is specially
exempted, would be forbidden by the act of January 16, 18t:l3. To
be eligible for appointment to any class (whether by promotion or
otherwise) the applicant must have passed an examination to test his
fitness for the place.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 9, 1883.
·SIR: The questions proposed hy the Civil Service Commission, and by you referred to me for examination, are: (1)
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As to the classification of departmental clerks whose salaries
are $1,000 or $900 per annum; (2) whether original entry to
the classified departmental service is to be made at one or
both of those grades only, or is also to be made at the grade
of the first class, the salary of which is $1,200 pel' annum;
and (3) whether promotions are to be made from the $900 or
the $1,000 clerkships to the $1,200 clerkships without examination.
By the acts of March 3, 1853, chapter 97, and March 3,
1855, chapter 175, the permanent clerical force in e~ch of the
Executive Departments was required to be arranged into
four classes (designated class 1, class 2, etc.), for each of
which classes a different rate of compensation was prescribed.
The annual salaries originally established (by the act of 1853)
were $900, $1,200, $1,500, and $1,800 for clerks of the first,
second, third,. and fourth classes respectively; but by the act
of April 22, 185~, the salaries of the clerks of the first, second, and third classes were fixed at $1,200, $1,400, and
$1,600, the compensation of clerks of the fourth class remaining unchanged. This classification, with the salaries
for each class respectively as above, has been reproduced in
the Revised Statutes. (Sees. 163 and 167.)
Yet since the adoption of that classification, which at first
embraced the entire clerical force of the several Departments, excepting the chief clerks of the Departments and of
Bureaus or offices therein and clerks temporarily employed,
Congress has from time to time, as the exigencies of the
public service required, not only increased that force bs providing for additional clerkships of the several classes above
named, but by provirling for the employment of clerks who
can not (according to the terms of the statutes authorizing
their appointment) be deemed to fall within either of the
classes mentioned-some at salaries above the highest, others
at salaries below the lowest, compensation allowed f6r any of
those classes. These clerks, so to speak, are unclassified,
and in this category are the $1,000 and $900 clerkships under consideration.
Although the clerkships just adverted to do not belong to
either of the classes enumerated in section 163, Revised
Statutes, they nevertheless come within the scope of the act
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of January 16, 1883, entitled "An act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States," and may be
classified thereunder, for the purpose of the examination of
applicants contemplated thereby, into one or more classes
distinct from those enumerated as aforesaid, should this be
thought expedient.
The classification called for by tha.t act, as a correlative of
the requirement that the fitness of applicants for positions
in the civil service shall be tested .by examination, is notrestricted to that prescribed by section 163, Revised Statutes,
but one commensurate with the purposes of the act is authorized. Thus the second section of the act declares that
among the things to be provided for in the rules to be
adopted by the Commissioners are "open competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the public
service now classified or to be classified hereunder," mani. testly referring not only to classifications already existing
under section 163, Rev_ised Statutes, but to classifications
that might become necessary in order to carry out the purposes of the act.
In regard to original entry in the service, there is nothing
in the act ot 1883 that confines this to any particular class
or grade. Authority is given the President by section 1753,
Hevised Statutes (which is not inconsistent with any of the
provisions of said act,) to prescribe regulations for the admission of persons into the civil serviCL~; and under the au. thority so conferred original entry into such service may, in
my opinion, be restricted to one or more of the classes or
grades which may at the time exist, or be allowed to all of
them, as in the judgment of the President will best promote
the efficiency of the service.
The remaining inquiry is whether promotions from the
$900 or $1,000 clerkships to the $1,200 clerkships are to be
made without examination. When, in 1853, the clerical
force in the Departments was classified, it was provided
that no clerk should be appointed in either of the four classes
then established until after he was examined and found
qualified by a Loard of three examiners. This requirement
twhich was re-enacted in section 1864, Revised Statutes), applied as well to cases of promotion as to cases of original ap-
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pointment in the service. WhilRt the provision referred tQo
has become superseded by the civil service act of 1883, the
latter preserves the requirement of an examination (to be
made under its provisions) in order to be promoted to any
class as well as to enter therein by an original appointment.
Thus section 7 provides that "after the expiration of six
months from the passage of this act no officer or clerk shall
be appointed and no person shall be employed to enter or be
promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or that
may be arranged hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he
has passed an examination, or is shown to be specially exempted from such examination in conformity herewith."
Assuming, then, that the $900 or $l,OOD clerkships are
constituted a distinct class, it is plain that this provision
forbids a promotion from such class to another class (e. g., t()
the class of $1,200 clerkships) without examination, unless
the person to be promoted is, in conformity with the act,
specially exempted from such examination. The general
rule to be deduced from the provision I take to be this:
that to be eligible for appointment to any class (whether by
way of promotion or otherwise) the applicant must have
passed an examination for the purpose of testing his fi.tneos
for the place.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
UNMAILABLE MATTER.
A circular of the World's Dispensary Medical Association, contemplating the sale of 100,000 copies of a certain book at $1.50 per copy, and
proposing to distribute among the purchasers a large amount out of
the proceeds of such sale in sums ranging from 25 cents to $6,000 per
each purchaser: Held to be unmailable matter, it being manifestly a
device to deceive and defraud the public.
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE,

November 23, 1883.
I have the honor to return herewith a circular of the
World's Dispensary Medical Association, submitted by you
on the 22d instant, with a request for my opinion as to its
mailability.
SIR :
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The circular contemplates the sale of 100,000 copies of a
book called "The Peoples' Common Sense Medical Adviser,''
at $1.50 per copy, and in substance assures the purchasers
that of the $150,000 thus resulting $50,000 shall be set aside
and returned to them in unequal sums varying from 25 cents
to $6,000. Each and every purchaser is to have at least 25
cents returned, but, as one purchaser is to have a property
conveyed to him worth $6,000, another is to have $5,000 in
cash, another $3,000 in cash, it is manife~t that a vast majority must be contented with 25 cents each in order to enrich the minority who are to receive the larger sums. Since
no one is offered the opportunity to purchase at $1, the net
price to the vendors, the whole scheme is addressed to the
cupidity of the public, and the desire of purchasers to participate in the opportunity of getting $6,000 for an investment of $1.50. If the distribution is made by lot or chance,
the scheme in no wise differs from an ordinary lottery, and
the thin disguise of calling the returns "presents" instead of
H prizes" does not affect the matter at all.
·
A paragraph in the circular entitled ~'Plan ot distribution" says that the company has decided not to make dis·
tribution by lot, but to leave the plan tu a committee, without
stating by whom it is to be selected, where it is to meet, or
when to act. What this plan shall be is not stated, but if
it is not to be the plan condemned by Congress, that is to
say by lot, it must be some plan which is a still greater fraud
upon the purchasers. A simple statement is the best; a
committee not yet nawed is to take by a process not divulged
25 cents each from twenty-four thousand purchasers and give
the aggregate $6,000 to one purchaser. It would be difficult
to conceive of a more transparent effort to deceive and defraud the public.
A disclaimer somewhat similar was urged in .Commonwealth
v. The Sheriff (10 Phila. Rep., 203). To this Paxton, J., said :
"In Oommonu·ealth v. Mander.field (27 Legal Intelligencer,
1870, p. 86), we had occasion to define an illegal lottery.
Briefly stated, it may be said to be the distribution of prizes
by chance. Whatever amounts to this, no matter bow ingeniously the object of it may be concealed, is a lottery. This
relator evidently regarded his occupation as at least ques272- VOL XVII--40
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tionable by placing the words 'No lottery' upon his premises. An honest man has no occasion to place the words
'Not a thief' upon his hat."
In my opinion the circular should not be carried in the
mails.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

BRIG GENERAL ARMSTRONG.
Under the power conferred by the act of May 1, 1882, chapter 115, the
Secretary of State has no authority to pass upon the claim of Mr.
Reid to be reimbursed expenses incurred by him as agent in the prosecution of the claims of the ''captain, owners, officers, and crew" of
the brig General Armstrong.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 19, 1883.
I have considered your communication of the 29th
of October, 1883, and am of opinion that inasmuch as the
power conferred on you by the act of Congress of 1st May,
1882, concerning the brig General A:rmstrong, is expressly restricted to the claims of the "captain, owners. officers, and
crew" of that vessel, I do not think you have any authority
to pass upon the claim of Mr. Reid to be reimbursed forcertain expenses incurred by him as agent in the prosecution of
such claims.
.Again, the range of your power under the act is expressly
confined to ''the evidence established before the Court of
Claims." As this evidence has no bearing on the claim of
Mr. Reid for expenses, and as you have no authority to entertain other evidence, there would seem to be no possible
way of bringing this matter before you.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF Sl'ATE.
SIR:
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MONEY-ORDER BUSINESH.
To entitle a postmaster to receive compensation for issuing and paying
money-orders under the provisions of section 4047, Revised Statutes,
be must earn it by performing the service himself or having it performed by a clerk or agent employed and paid by him for that purpose.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 20, 1883.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of' the 13th instant, citing section 4047 of the Revised
Statutes, and stating that "this section is understood by
the Post-Office Department as requiring a postmaster, in
-order to entitle him to receive the compensation therein provided for issuing and paying money-orders, to personally
perform the services requi1 ed in the money-order business
at his office, in the sense that if the work is not physically
executed by his hands, it must be executed under his immedi1tte supervision by a clerk employed by him for that purpose,
and who is in no way employed by the Post-Office Department proper, or paid from postal funds, as distinguished
from money-order funds."
You state further that this view of the matter has not
been accepted by many' postmasters as a proper construction, and that it is deemed ad " isab1e to ask my opinion upon
the subject.
It seems very clear to me that the section cited gives compensation to postmasters for issuing and paying moneyorders only in consideration of their having earned it by
their personal services (including that of their own paid
agents, in case any part of that duty may be lawfully delegated). This rests on the plain doctrine that in such a contract of hiring the engagement of one party is to pay and
the other to serve. The statute cited must be presumed to
require this mutuality, and the postmasters who consider
themselves to be entitled to pay under it without rendering
or furnishing the service should produce some legislative
declaration of their right.
Whether in any prurticu1ar case there is foundation for
.such a claim will depend on the facts, and in the absence of
these I can express no opinion further than tq concur, as
7
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above, in your construction of section 404 7 of the Revised
Statutes.
As you state no special cases for me to pass upon, of
course I must answer this on the abstract proposition which
is the point and purpose of your letter.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. W. Q. GRESHAM,

Postmaster· General.

INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS.
The inconve:r;lience contemplated by section 4409, Revised Statutes, is
such as grows out of the situation of the boat, or of the parties, viewed
with reference to the location of the local board, whereby access to
the latter is rendered difficult or expensive.
Where such inconvenience exists, the authority of the supervising inspector is, by virtue of that section, concurrent with that of the local
board; and in cases acted upon by him under that authority there is
no appeal.
But where the supervising inspector resides in the same city with the
members of the local board, and they are not unable to act, and access
to them is as easy and unimpeded as to any like board in the same locality, such inconvenience does not exist, and the sqpervising inspector
would not be warranted in discharging the duties of the local board.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 4, 1884.
SIR: By your letter of the 14th of No,ember last my attention is called to the provisions in section 4409, Revised
Statutes, authorizing a supervising inspector of steam-vessels, "in any district where, from distance or other cause, it
is inconvenient to resort to the local board, to inspect any
steam-vessel and the boilers of such steamer, and to grant
certificates of approval, and to do and perform all the duties
imposed upon local boards," and in connection with this provision the following questions are proposed for my consideration:
"Shall the power given by that section authorize the supervising inspector to initiate and take charge of an investi-
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gation under section 4450 of the Revised Statutes and conduct it to the exclusion of the local board and to finally revoke
a license'
''If he can, what becomes of the right of appeal under section 4452 and the review there provided for~
"Suppose that the supervising inspector resides in the
same city with the members of the local board, that the;y are
not permanently nor temporarily unable to act, that access
to them is as easy and unimpeded as to any like board in
the same locality, can it be held that there is such an inconvenience in resort to the local board as warrants the supervising inspector in assuming the power of investigation and
Qusting the local board of jurisdictiou of a case' To put the
same inquiry in auother form, bas the supervising iuspector
.such warrant for the reason that he deems it for the public
interest and conducive to a more thorough and impartial investigation for him to investigate rather than for the local
board, when that board is as accessible as he is~"
The provisions of section 4409, Revised Statutes, were in
.substance originally enacted in section 22 of the act of
August 30, 1852, chapter 106, and afterwards re-enacted in
section 27 of the act of February 28, 1871, chapter 100, from
which last section they are directly taken. Under the law
as it existed previous to the act of 1852 steam boat owners
experienced much inconvenience in obtaining inspections, by
reason of yhe fact that inspectors were appointed only at
ports of. entry or of delivery, thus making it necessary to
take .boats, that were brought or put in repair at other
places, to some port of entry or delivery in order to be in·
.spected, which oftentimes required a trip of several hundred
miles (especially on the Western rivers) and involved consid·
.erable expense. To remedy this and provide greater facilities for inspections was tbe main object of the twenty-second
section of that. act. It provided that the supervising inspectors should "visit collection districts in which there are no
boards o£ inspectors, if there be any where steamers are
.owned or employed," and that each should have "full pi>wer
to inspect any such steamer or boilers of each st!3amer in any
such district, or in any other district where, from· distance
<>r other cause, it is inconvenient to resort to the local board,
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and to grant certificates of approval according to the pro·
visions of this act, and to do and perform in such districts
all the duties imposed upon boards in the districts where
they exist." Here the supervising inspector was authorized
to perform the duty of inspecting steamboats, and also all
other duties imposed upon the board of inspectors: first,
in collection districts in which no such boards existed; second,
in other collection districts where, from dist~nce or other
cause, it was inconvenient to resort to the local board.
Section 4409, Revised Statutes, in vests the supervising
inspector with the same authority. As regards districts
wherein local boards exist, this authority is not meant to be
concurrent with that of such boards under any and all circumstances. It is intended to be exercised only in cases.
where the local board can not be resorted to without inconvenience; and the sort of inconvenience contemplated is incHeated by the express mention of "distance" as a cause
thereof. It is incon,enience growing out of the situation of
the boat or of the parties, viewed with reference to the location ofthe board, whereby access to the latter is rendered
difficult or expensive. Where such inconvenience exists the
authority of the supervising inspector to perform the duties.
imposed upon the local boards by section 4450. Revised Statutes, is. by virtue of section 4409, concurrent with that of
those boards. And in cases acted upon by him under and
pursuant Lo that authority there is no appeal or review pro·
vided for 1 the provisions of sections 4:4:52, Revised Statutes,.
not applying thereto.
But in the case supposed by you, namely, "that the super·
vising inspector resides in the same city with the members
of the local board, that they are not permanently nor temporarily unable to act, and that access to them is as easy
and unimpeded as to any like board in the same locality,',.
I am of opinion that there exists no inconvenience within the
intent of the statute, and that the supervising inspector
would not be warranted in discharging the duties referred
to. Mere considerations of expediency in such case, or that
the supervising inspector deems it for the public interest
and conducive to a more thorough and impartial investiga-
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tion for him to investigate rather than for the local board,
do not in my opinion supply tbe conditions required by the
statutes to empower him thus to act.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHAS. J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

•
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PENALTY ENVELOPE.
Section 29 of the act of March 31, 1879, chapter 180, so far as it relates
to the indorsement to be plac~d on the penalty envelope, is a substitute for the corresponding provision in the fifth section of the act of
March 3, 1877, chapter 103. Such envelope must be indorsed with a·
proper designation of the office from which the same is transmitted,
and a statement of the penalty provided by the fifth section of the
latter act.
·
)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January ll, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 9th instant, calling my attention to certain provisions of the statutes in relation to penalty envelopes.
Yon say: "This Department having become coguizant of
tbe fact that a portion of the provisions of sections 5, 6, and
29, Twentieth Statutes, pages 335 and 362, are not being
complied with by some of the Departments~ inasmucll as the
proviso in section 5 (which reads: 'That every such letter
or package, to entitle it to pass free, shall bear over the
words •Official business' an indorsetuent showing also the
name of the Department, and, if from a bureau, or office, the
names of the Department and bureau, or office, as the case
may be, whence transmitted'), and which requirement is repeated in each of the succeeding sentions, is not properly observed, it is deemed advisable to call your attention to the
watter, and suggest such action as in your opinion may be
warranted under the statute named."
·
The citations to the provisions of law is somewhat obscure,
as you will perceive. I understand you to refer, however, to
the fifth and sixth sections of the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 103 (19 Stat., 335), and to the twenty-ninth section of the
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act of March 31, 1879, chapter 180 (20 Stat., 362), amendatory
thereof. The former sections are as follows:
''SEC. 5. That it shall be lawful to transmit through the
mail, free of postage, any .l~tters, packages, or other matters
relating exclusively to the business of the Government of
the United States: Provided, That every such letter or package to entitle it to pass free shall bear over the words ' Official
buM,ness' an endorsement showing also the name of the Department, and, if from a b'ureau or office, the names of the Department and bureau or office, as the case may be, whence transmitted.
And if any person shall make use of any such official envelope to avoid the payment of postltge on his private letter,
package, or other matter in the mail, the person so offending
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to a
fine of three hundred dollars, to be prosecuted in any court
of competent jurisdiction.
"SEc. 6. That for the purpose of carrying this act into
effect it shall be the duty of each of the Executive Departments of the United States to provide for itself and its subordinate offices the necessary ernTelopes, and in addition to
the endorsement designating the Department in which they
are to be used the penalty for the unlawful use of these envelopes shall be stated thereon."
Tile latter section is as follows:
'' SEC. 29. The provisions of the fifth and sixth sections
of the act entitled 'Au act establishing post-routes, and for
other purposes,' approved March third, eigilteen hundred and
seventy-seven, for the transmission of official mail-matter,
be, and tl;ley are herebj', extended to all officers of the United
States Government, and made applicable to all official mailmatter transmitted between any of the officers of the United
States, or between any such officer and either of the Executive Departments or officers of the Government, the envelopes
of such 'matter in all cases to bem· appropriate indOt·sements
containing the proper designation of the office from which the
same is transmitted, with a statement of the penalty for their
misuse. And tile provisious of said fifth and sixth sections
are hereby likewise extended and made applicable to all
official mail-matter sent from the Smithsonian Institution:
Provided, Tilat tllis act shall not extend or apply to pension-
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.agents or other officers who receive a fixed allowance as compensatiOn for their Rervices, including expenses for postage."
I have placed in italics tile portio:as relating to the particular matter to which you call attention.
I am of opinion that the provision in the act of 1879 was
intended as a substitute for the provision of the act of 1877,
so far as it relates to the description of the indorsement to
be placed upon the envelope. The penalty envelope must
be indorsed with a '"proper designation of the office from
which the same is transmitted" and with a ''statement of the
penalty" provided by the fifth section of the act of 1877. I do
not find any further requirement in the law as it now stands.
I shall be happy to co.operate with you in any way you
may suggest in enforcing the law. The suggestion contained
in the latter part of your letter will be complied with so far
.as this Department is concerned.
Y ery respectfully,

B-ENJAMIN HAHRIS BREWSTER.
The POS1'M.A.STER-GENER.A.L.
DUTIABLE VALUE OF MERCHANDISE.
Review of legislation fixing the basis for estimating ad valorem duties,
passed prior to the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
'The only change effected by section 7 of that act is to exclude from such
basis all costs and charges which, under the law as it previously stood,
were required to be added to the current or actual market value or
wholesale price of the merchandise in the principal markets of the
-couutcy whence the same was imported, or of the country of production or manufacture, as the case might be, thus making such current
or actual market value, etc., the sole basis for estimating such duties.
By current or actual market value or wholesale price, as used iu the
statute, is to be understood the amount of money the article commanded in the foreign market in the condition in which it is there
customarily sold and purchased.
The cost of boxes or coverings with which goods are ordinarily prepared
for sale in the foreign market, and in which they are usually sold and
purchased there, is an element of the actual market value of the goods.
What becomes of the box or covering, in the course of trade, after the
importation, does not affect the question of dutiable yalue.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
January 11, 1884.
SIR: I have carefully examined the following questions,
which are ~resented for my consideration in your communication of the 26tlJ of N o,•~m her last.
.
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" First. Whether section 7 of the tariff' act of 1\Iarch 3 1
1883, does more than repeal duties upon the charges imposed
by the sections of law named in said section 7, and which are
thereby repealed, and other provisions of law, if any, of the
same character.
"Second. Whether that section prohibits the inclusion
in the dutiable value of merchandise of the value of the
boxes and coverings which are part of its preparation for
sale in the markets of tb'e country of exportation.
" Third. Is the dutiable value of merchandise its actual
market value or wholesale price in such markets as enhanced
by its preparation for sale in such markets by the placing in,
or about, or, upon such merchandise, such boxes and other
coverings as are named in question No.2'
" Fourth. Whether there is any distinction to be made in
the asses;sment of duties as to the boxes and coverings which
are part of such preparation, between the boxes and coverings
which dt> and those which do not go to the consumer." In illm; .
tration of this question you remark: "I may say that in the
case of shoe-blacking, matches, and cigars, the merchandise
is inclosed in packages which go to the ultimate consumer,
and to a large extent serve as receptacles for the article
until entirely consumed. In other instances the boxes and
other coverings do not usually reach the ultimate consumer~
as in the case of stockings and handkerchiefs put np in small
boxes and sold through the manufacturer by the dozen or
other specified quantity, and at a value which includes that
of the small boxes in which the dozens are contained. The
retailer sells from the boxes in many instances in quantities
less than a box, and where a whole box is sold no additioual
charge is made for the value of the box."
"Fifth. Whether the value of paper and trade-markst
ribbons, and ornamental devices, which form part of the
preparation of each piece of silk or vel vet, for such markets,
is to be included in the general market value or wholesale
price." In connection with this question you observe:" Silks
and velvets are put up for the foreign market with trademarks and tickets thereon, and are wound on a board and
covered with a piece of paper, or a piece of cloth sewn
around each piece, to protect it, and ribbons are wound ou
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wooden blocks. .Appeals ha"V~e been presented against the
insertion in the dutiable value of any of these elements of
expense." The question arises:
"Sixth. Whether the wooden blocks on which ribbons are
wound and the boards on which silk and velvets are wound,
in preparation for such markets, shall be deemed a covering _
of any kind within the intent of said section 7'" In this
connection you further observe: ".Appeals have also been
taken, in which it is claimed that there should be deducted
from the dutiable \alue the cost of h1bor in putting the
merchandise into boxes or coverings such as have been de·
scribed. The question therein arises:
"Seventh. Whether any cost or value of labor in putting
merchandise into boxes or coverings in preparation for such
markets can be in any view considered a part of the value of
such box or covering within the intent of said section 7'
".And, finally, what, if any, boxes or other coverings or
item of labor or preparation therein described should be
estimated or omitted in fixing the dutiable value of imported
merchandise under said act of 1883 ~"
A brief review of the previous legislation fixing the basis
for the estimation of ad valorem duties may aid in reaching
correct conclusions as regards the scope and effect of section
7 of the act of March 3, 1883, upon that subject, and lead to
a satisfactory solution of the questions submit,ted. This
legislation is contained in the following statutes: Section
17 of the act of July 31, 1789, cllapter 5; section 39, act of
.August 4, 1790, chapter 35; section 3, act of January 29r
1795, chapter 17; section 61, act of ·:\farch 2, 1799, chapter
22; section 1, act of April 27, 1816, chapter 107; act of
l\larch 3, 18l7, chapter 50; section 4, act of .April 20, 1818,
chapter 79; section 5, act of March 1, 1823, chapter 21;
section 8, act of May 19, 1828, chapter 55; section 15, act of
July 14, 1832, chapter 227; section 16, act of .August 30,
18±2, chapter 270; act of March 3, 1851, chapter 38; section
28, act of March 2, 1861, chapter 68; sections 23 and 24, act
of June 30,1864, chapter 171; section 7, act of March 3, 1865,
chapter 80; section 9, act of July 28, 1866, chapter 298, and
sections 2904 to 2908 inclusive of the Revised Statutes.
By the acts of 1789 and 1790 the actual cost of the mer-

•

636

RON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
Dutiable Value of llerchandise.

chandise at the place of importation, with the addition of a
percentage thereon (20 per cent. if imported from the Cape
of Good Hope or any place beyond the same, and 10 per
cent. if imported from elsewhere) was made the basis for
estimating ad valorem duties, and all charges were expressly
excluded therefrom.
The act of 17!>5 made '' the actual cost at the place of exP<?rtation, including all charges (commissions, outside packages, and insurance only excepted)," the basis for that pu.rpose.
The act of 1799 made'' the actual cost at the place of importation," with the addition of a percentage, as in the acts
of 1789 and 1790, together with all charges (commissiOns,
outside packages, and insurance only excepted), the basis.
The act of 1816 made " the net cost of the article at the
place whence imported (exclusive of packages, commissions,
and all charges),'' with the addition of a percentage, as
above, the basis.
The act of 1817 proYides the same basis as the act of 1816,
''exclusive of packages, commissions, charges of transportation, export duty, and all other charges."
By the act of 1818 the basis is the same as that prescribed
by the act of 1799. All charges are included " except commissions, outside packages, and insurance."
By the act of 18~3 the actual cost, if purchased, or the
actual value if otherwise procured, at the time and place
when and where purchased or otherwise procured, or the
.appraised value, if appraised, with all charges added thereto
except insurance, and a.Iso with the addition of a percentage
upon such cost or value and charges, as above, is made the
basis.
By the act of 1828 the actual value at the time of purchase and place whence imported, with the addition thereto
.of all charges except insurance, and also of a percentage, as
above, is made the basis.
The act of 1832 makes the basis the same as that of the act
of 1823, omitting the percentage. It includes all charges except insurance.
By the act of 184:2 the actual market value or wholesale
price, at the time when purchased in the principal markets
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of the country from whence imported, with the addition
thereto of " all costs and charges except insurance, and including, in every case, a charge for commissions at the usual
rates," is made the basis.
In the act of 1851 the basis is the same as it is in the act of
1842, the only material change being that the '' period of exportation" is made the time.
The act of 186lmade the'' dayofactualshipment" the time,
but introduced no other change.
By the act of 1864 the basis is the actual value of the goods
on shipboard at last place of shipment to United States, to
be ascertained by adding to the value at place of growth,
production, or manufacture the cost of transportation, shipment, and transshipment, with all the expenses included,
from such place, whether by land or water, to the vessel in
which shipment is made to United States; also" the value of
the sack, box, or covering of any kind in which such goods
are contained; commission at usual rate, in no case less than
2i per centum; brokerage, and all export duties, together
with all costs and charges paid or incurred for placing said
goods on shipboard, and all other proper charges specified by
law."
By the act of 1865 the actual market value or wholesale
price at the period of the exportation in the principal markets of the country from whence imported is made the basis.
This act repeals sections 23 and 24 of the act of 1864, and " all
acts and parts of acts requiring duties to be assessed upon
commissions, brokerage, costs of transportation, shipment,
transshipment, and other like costs and charges incurred in
placing any goods, wares, or merchandise on shipboard, and
all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provision of this
act."
The act of 1866 modifies the basis prescribed by the act of
1865, by adding thereto" the cost of transportation, shipment,
and transshipment, with all the expenses included from the
place of growth, production, or manufacture, whether by land
or water, to the vessel in which shipment is made to tbe
United States; the value of the sack, box, or covering of any
kind in which such goods are contained; commission at the
usual rates, but in no case less than 2i per centum ; broker-
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age, ex!X>rt duty, and all other actual or usual charges for
putting up, preparing, and packing for transportation or
shipment."
The provisions of the acts of 1865 and 1866, just adverted to,
are embodied in the Revised Statutes, those of the act of
1865 in section 2906 and those of the act of 1866 in section
2907, under which sections the basis for estimating ad valorem dutes remained as it was established by those acts until the passage of the act of March 3, 1883.
Section 7 of the last-mentioned act repeals said section
2907 leaving in full force, section 2906. This is virtually a
return to the basis prescribed by the act of 1865, before the
modification thereof by the act of 1866, namely, the actual
market value or wlwlesale price at the period of exportation
in the principal markets of the country from which the merchandise is imported , (or in the principal markets of the
count,r y of production or manufacture, when the importation
is from a country in which the merchandise has not been
manufactured or produced, see section 2905, Revised Statutes), without any addition for costs or charges of any kind
whatever. The above repeal, togethet with the repeal of section 2908 Revised Statutes, and of section 14 of the act of
June 22, 1874, also made by section 7 aforesaid, sweeps away
all the provisions in force at the date ofthe act of1883 which
required or contemplated additions of 'that character to the
market value or wholesale price of merchandise in determining its dutiable value. The clause in section 7, declaring that
'' hereafter none of the charges imposed by said sections or
any other provisions of existing law shall be estimated in
ascertaining the value of goods to be imported, nor shall the
value of the usual and necessary sacks, crates, boxes, or covering of any kind be estimated as part of their value in determining the amount of duties for which they are liable," adds
nothing to and takes nothing from the force and efi'ect of the
repeal of the statutory provisions mentioned. It only emphasizes the intent of Congress in making the repeal, namely,
that all charges theretofore required to be estimated as part
of the dutiable value of merchandise should thereafter be
excluded in ascertaining such value.
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It results from the foregoing that, as regards the basis on
which ad valorem duties a~e to be estimated, the only change
€ffected by section 7 of the act of 1883 is to exclude from
such basis all costs and charges which, under the law as it
previously stood, were required to be added to the current or
.actual market value or wholesale price of the merchandise
in the principal markets of the country whence .t he same
was imported or the country of production or manufacture,
.as the case might be. Thus the amount or actual market
value or wholesale price in those markets which is to be appraised is now made the sole basis for estimating such duties.
Recurring to the question presented, I submit that the
answer to the first of these questions is sufficiently indicated
by what has just been stated.
The second and third questions may be conveniently cons idered together. As already shown, the dutiable value of
merchandise since the modification of the customs law made
by the act of 1883 is the current or actual market value or
wholesale price thereof in the foreign market at the period of
{3Xportation, to be ascertained by appraisement (sees. 2905
.and 2906, Rev. Stat.). What, then, is to be understood by
~urrent or actual market value or wholesale price as used
in the statute¥ It is the amount of money or price which
the article commands in the foreign market in the condition
in which it is there customarily sold and purchased. As
observed by the court in Oobb v. Hamlin (3 Cliff., 191): "Some
descriptions of goods are purchased and sold in the foreign
market in bulk, and are, subsequently to the purchase and
saie, put into boxes, packages, or coverings by the purchaser
for the preservation of the merchandise and the convenience
of shipping. Other descriptions are put into boxes, packages, or coverings by the producer, manufacturer, or wholesale merchant. The actual market value in the former case
does not include the cost of the box, package, or covering
within the meaning of that act of Congress [the act of 1865
hereinbefore mentioned] as the boxes, packages, or coverings
in such cases are purchased by the shipper as the means of
preserving the goods and for the convenience of shipment.
But no doubt is entertained that the words' actual market

640

RON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
D u t i a b l e V a l u e o f ;u e r c h an d I s e.

value,' without more, would include the cost of the box,.
package, or covering in all cases where the mercha.ndise in
question was actually purchased in the box, package, or covering, and is usually so purchased and sold for shipment in
the foreign market, and where the price includes the box,
package, or covering, as well as the goods therein contained.'"
In that case the court held that where oranges and lemons
were, in conformity to the general custom in the foreign market, purchased in bulk, and were afterwards wrapped one by
one in paper and packed in boxes and transported to the place
of shipment, the expense of the boxes, etc., and the labor of
packing the fruit did not constitute an element of its actual
market value within the meaning of the act of 1865. And
in a subsequent case (Harding v. Whitney, 4 Cliff., 96) the
same court held that where wool was purchased and sold in
the bale in the foreign market, the words "actual market
value," in the act of 1842, include the cost of the covering
as well as the goods, as the whole are sold together, without
any additional charge for the covering-that such expense
enters into and forms a constituent part of the market value
and wholesale price of the merchandise at the place of exportation. In the first case, under the law as it existed
before the passage of the act of 1883, the cost of the boxest
etc., anu of the labor in packing the fruit would be charges
proper to be added to the actual market value of the fruit
in ascertaining its dutiable value, while in the other case
the addition of the cost of baling and covering to the actual
market value of the wool would not be proper, as such cost
enters into and is included in the actual market value of the
article.
According to the principle of these cases, which appear&
to me to be both sound and practicable, the cost of boxes or
coverings with which goods are ordinarily prepared for sale
in the foreign market and in which they are usually sold ~d
purchased there (the price paid for the goods including the
box or covering which goes therewith to the purchaser}
must be regarded as entering into or~ being an element of
the actual mal-ket value of the goods. Section 7 of the act
1883 does not forbid the inclusion in t~e dutiable value of
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merchandise of that which forms a constituent of its actual
market value. Hence the dutiable value of goods usually
prepared for sale as above, and thus usually sold in the foreign market, is their current or actual market value or wholesale price in such market, as enhanced by the preparation
thereof for sale in the manner referr~d to. In the language
of your circular of September 27, 1883, ''the dutiable value
of the goods is the actual market value or wholesale price
thereof in the condition of finish and preparation for sale
in which they are finally offered by the foreign merchants
to negotiating customers and for which they will and do sell
them, though that value or price be en banced because of thu,t
finish and preparation, and though a part of the preparation
consists in the placing in or upon or about the goods, boxes,
cartons, paper, cards, or other like things."
In answer to the fourth question, I submit that with respect to boxes and coverings, which are part of the preparation of goods for sale in the foreign market and are there
sold with the goods as above stated, no distinction is admissibie between those which do and those which do not go to
the ultimate consumer. What becomes of the box or covering in the course of trade, after the importation of the goods,
is unimportant and in no way afl'ects the question of dutiable
value.
The remaining questions seem to be covered by the re·
marks already made in answer to the second and third q uestions. The expense of the usual and customary preparation
of silks, velvets, and ribbons for sale in the foreign market,
to which the former questions refer, necessarily enters into
the actual market value of those articles in that market.
This being so, and the price paid for the goods in that market
· including such expense, the latter is not to be estimated separately for" insertion in the dutiable value," nor is any part
thereof to be estimated and deducted from the dutiable value.
The current or actual market value or wholesale price of the
goods in the ·condition in which they are usually sold and
purchased in the foreign market, and that alone, is requirecl
to be ascertained. Such value or price of the goods is now
their dutiable value, and to add to or deduct from the latter
272-VOL XVII--41

642

RON. S. F. PHILLIPS.
Refund of Duties Erroneously Exacted.

costs or expenses of any kind which necessarily enter into
and are incluc1ed in the former would be unwarranted by the
existing law.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. CHARLES J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
REFUND OF DUTIES ERRONEOUSLY EXACTED.
Opinion of April20, 1882 (ante p. 326), on the power of the Secretary of
the Treasury to refund duties erroneously exacted, reaffirmed.
Section 3012-!, Revised Statutes, confers upon him power to refund sub
modo only; i. e., upon appeals heard by him under section 2931, Revised
Statutes, when made in the form and within the time therein specified.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 16, 1884.
SIR: In reply to yours of the 11th of September last.
which refers to a claim before you by Moller, Sierck & Co.,
to have certain duties upon imported sugar refunded, allow
me to say:
Upon reconsideration I am still of the opinion expressed
to you April 20, 1882, viz, that section 3012~ of the Revised
Statutes is not a substantive grant of power to the Secretary
of the Treasury, but is to he read in connection with· section
2931; in other words, that it constitutes the legislative provision which empo~ers the Secretary to repay such duties as.
in appeals before him by virtue of section 2931, he has held
to be excessive. It confers no authority to reverse decisions
formerly made by him or his predecessors in appeals once
regularly pending and since ended, even if subsequently satisfied that such decisions wore erroneous. That is the case
here. The Secretary is satisfied by a decision of the Supreme
Court that former decisions in his Department as to the duty
upon sugars -~ere erroneouc, ::md that, com:equently, many
importers have jus~ claim'::. against the United States on account of excessive exaction::;. Tho serious question here is
not as to the debt, but as to tho method of satisfaction. The
Secretary, as will be admitted, has no general power to pay
debts due by the United States. In every case some legislative warrant for payment by him mnst be shown. As re-
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gardsexcessive exactions for duties, it is provided (sec. 2931)
that he may hear appeals when made in a certain form and
within a certain time therein specified, and section 3012~ confers upon him the power to repay moneys which upon such
appeals he may hold to have been exacted in excess. In the
present case, however, he had held the exactions in question
to be proper, and the appeal had subsequently been ended.
Whatever remedies the citizen may in such case have had
to redress the consequences of this erroneo'us (104 U. S. R.,
694) decision, section 3012~ confers none. For that, like all
<~xecutions and quasi executions, takes for granted a previous affirmative judgment in the same tribunal.
If section 30122- contains a substantive grant of power to
hear complaints of excessive exactions of duties, it is plain
that the limitations and restrictions upon the like grant in
.section 2931 are nugatory. So to conclude woul<l be destructive construction. It therefore seems plain that the showing referred to in the first line Qf 3012~ must be such a
.showing as is provided for in 2931. And it follows, in the ab::;ence of a legislative g,rant of power to rehear decisions, that
the phrase· "final and conclusive," which appears about the
middle of section 293J, applies, in the fullest sense thereof,
to decisions' upon appeals whicl+ have been ended; in other
\Vords, are conclusive even upon the Secretary himself.
In view of the serious contention upon the above point
made in behalf of the complainants in the papers upon file,
it seemed proper to restate my views thereupon.
In the present case, however, it also appears that in view
of an adverse opinion upon their appeat the complainants
have brought suit bona fide against the collector to recover
the amount claimed to be excessive, and that this suit is still
pending. But such suit was brought prematurely; i.e., before
the Secretary's decision had actually been made.
If this objection were duly brought to the attention of the
court no doubt the action would fail. If it were not so
brought, judgment would be duly rendered ag·ainst tlte collector, and such judgment would then authorize its own satisfaction out of the Treasury.
In a case of a debt so plainly due by the Government, it
seems that the objection of so trifling a prematureness of suit
should not he raised, and that it is advisable that the com-
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plainants be allowed to make out such a claim for judgment
by the court a~ in absence of such objection they may be able to
do; such judgment in the end to warrant official action by
yourself as in cases of like judgments generally.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SPANISH CLAIMS UNDER TREATY OF 1819.
The United States are under no obligation to allow inter~st on the
fl'Wards made by the Florida judges in cases of claims of Spanish
subjects under the ninth article of the treaty with Spain of 1819.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 24, 1884.
SIR: Your communication touching the accountability of
the Government of the United States for interest on the
awards of the Florida judges in cases of claims of Spanish
subjects under the ninth article of the treaty with Spain of
1819 has been received and duly considered.
By the provision of the ninth article of the treaty under
which the question submitted arises the United States
agreed " To cause satisfaction to be made for the injuries, if
any, which by process of law shall be established to have
been suffered by the Spanish offic~rs and individual Spanish
inhabitants by the late operations of the American Army
in Florida." (Public Treaties, p. 715.)
In furtherance of this provision of the treaty, Congress,
in 1823, passed a law authorizing and directing the judges
of the superior courts established in St. Augustine and Pensacola in the Territory of Florida, to receive, and adjust all
claims under the treaty that had arisen within their respective jurisdictions. It also required that in cases decided in
favor of the claimants the said judges should report the decisions, with the evidence on which they are founded, to the
Secretary of the Treasury, '"who, on being satisfied that .the
same is [are] just and equitable, within the provisions of the
said treaty, shall pay the amount thereof to the person or
persons in whose favor the same is [are] adjudged." (3 Stat...
768.)
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In 1834 Congress passed another act, enlarging the jurisdiction of the Territorial courts under the treaty (6 Stat., 569).
It is not necessary to make more special reference to this act.
After the admission of Florida into the Union Congress
passed an act transferring the unfinished business under the
treaty which was pending before the judge of the superior
court at St. Augustine to the judge of the district court of
Florida. (9 Stat., 130).
One of the results of adjudication by the tribunals established by Congress to carry out the treaty is that claimants
shall not recover interest on the sums awarded them:
The Government of Spain has been insisting for years
that this decision withholding interest was unjust and in
violation of the treaty.
It is difficult to see what locus standi the Government of
Spain has in this matter, or in what respect it has an international aspect.
It is not denied that this Government provided ~he "process of law," required by the treaty to determine the claims
in question.
It is not denied that all the claims have been adjudicated.
It is not denied that ali sums adjudicated have been paid
• to the parties entitled to them.
What, then, is the complaint that is made by Spain~ It
is that the adjudication disallowing interest is erroneous.
That is to say, Spain claims the right to review and reverse
the judgments of the tribunals established under the treaty.
In my opinion this Government has fully discharged her
obligations under the treaty. If Spain intended to give the
rules of decision to the tribunals contemplated by the treaty,
those rules should have been inserted in the treaty.
In my opinion Spain is concluded by the decision she now
seeks to reopen. She must be held to have trusted implicity to the tribunals to be established under the beaty.
In this view of the subject the question Spain now raises is
purely municipal, and has been closed long since by a series
()f commanding and uniform determinations.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
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DUTY ON SCRAP TOBACCO.
Imported scrap tobacco is dutiable as manufactured tobacco under the
act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

J an,uary 25, 1884.
SIR: Your communication touching the rates of duty on

imported scrap tobacco has received my consideration.
Schedule I, Title 33, of the Revised Statutes imposes a duty
of 50 cents a pound on manufactured tobacco and a duty of
30 cents a pound on unmanufactured 1obacco. By the act
of the 3d March, 1883, the same classification is preserved,
but the duty on manufactured tobacco is reduced to 40 cents
a pound. (22 Stat. 503.)
The question is: Under which classification does scrap
tobacco come~
By section 61 of the act 20th of July, 1868, entitled ''An
act imposing taxes on distilled spirits and tobacco, a:gd for
other purposes" (15 Stat., 125), "refuse scraps and scrapings
of tobacco" are classed as manufactured tobacco.
Taking these acts together, they being clearly in pa't i
materia, we must place scrap tobacco in the category of manufactured tobacco, irrespective of what its mercantile acceptation may be, f9r Congress has given it that classification,
and. I am informed that the Treasury Department has adopted
and been acting in accordance with that view.
It appears, however, that sin e the passage of the act of
March 1, 1879, exempting from the internal revenue tax imported scrap tobacco on which the proper customs duty has
been paid, a question has arisen whether the interpretation
of the provisions of the tariff now under consideration should
be controlled any longer by the internal revenue law.
I see no reason why the act of March, 1879, should produce
any such result. The classification in the internal revenue
law of scrap tobacco as manufactured tobacco still exists iu
respect of domestic tobacco of that kind. But even if there
was a total repeal oftbe tax on scrap tobacco, the repealed
law might still be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining
the intention of Congress, it being entirely well settled that
all statutes in pari materia, whether repealed or not, should
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be taken into view in resQlving a doubt as to the meaning of
any one of them.
My opinion is, therefore, that scrap tobacco is still dutiable
as manufactured tobacco.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
DUTY ON IRON TURNINGS.
Iron turnings are not dutiable as manufactured iron.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
January 28, 1884.
SIR: Your communication touching the rate of duty on
iron turnings has received my consideration.
I concur entirely in the sug-gestion in your letter that iron
turnings should not be dutiable as manufactured iron, being,
as they are, the waste of iron in course of being manufactured; and, accordingly, I so decide.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

INDIAN SCHOOLS.
The appropriation made by the act of May 17, 18R2, chapter 163, "for
the purpose of further instructing aud civilizing Indian children west
of the Mississipp River," etc., is not applicable to the establishment of
an industrial school and the erection of buildings therefor.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
28, 1884.
SIR: Your letter of the 17th instant directs my attention to
the provision in the act of May 17, 1882, chapter 163, appro·
priating $150,000 "for the purpose of further instructing an<l
civilizing Indian children dwelling west of the Mississippi
River, and in the States of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan," etc. (sec. 22, Stat., 8G), and you inquire whether the
money thus appropriated is applicable to the establishme11t
of an industrial school at Lawrence, Kans., for that purpose .
OF

Ja~nuary

.
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Upon consideration, I am of the opinion that the establishment of an industrial school, or the erection of buildings
therefor, is not within the scope of that appropriation.
Omitting what is not material to the inquiry, the appropriation is for "instructing and civilizing Indian children
* * * in industrial schools other than those at Carlisle,
etc., supported in whole or in part from treaty and other
funds appropriated by Congress, or such as may be established and supported wholly from treaty or other funds so
appropriated," etc. Here the statute provides for "instructing and civilizing" both in industrial schools already es,tablished which are supported from treaty or other funds appropriated therefor, and in ''such as may be established" and supported in the same way. But this falls short of authorizing
the establishment of schools for the instruction and civilization of Indian children. The terms "instructing and civiliz.
ing", restricted as they are in the statute, can not be taken
to impart such authority.
While, therefore, the appropriation is applicable to ''instructing and civilizing" the children in industrial schools
alreauy established or which may be established from other
funds, the language of the statute does not appear to me to
warrant its application to the establishment of such schools
or the erection of buildings therefor.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the I ntm·ior.
CHIEFS OF BUREAUS IN NAVY DEPARTMENT.
The chief of a bureau in t~e Navy Department can not lawfully hold
over after the expiration of the term for which he was appointed.
The general rule is that where Congress has not authorized the officer to
hold over, his incumbency must be deemed to cease at the end of his
term, though no appointment of a successor may then be made.
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

January 31, ~884.
SIR: In compliance with your verbal request I have con-

sidered the question whether the chief of a bureau in your
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Department may lawfully hold over after the expiration of
the term for which he was appointed.
Section 421, Revised Statutes, provides: "The chiefs of
the several bureaus in the Department·of the Navy shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the classes of officers mentioned in
the next five sections respectively, or from officers having
the relative rank of captain in the staff corps of the Navy
on the active list, and shall hold their offices for the term of
four years."
There is nothing in that section, nor in any other of which
I am aware, which confers authority upon the incumbent of
the office of chief of bureau to continue therein after the expii·ation of his term; and I am of opinion that, in the absence
of a statutory provision conferring it, such authority does
not exist.
Congress has in terms provided that certain officers whose
appointments are for a definite term shall hold until their
successors are appointed and qualified (see, for example,
.sees. 1841, 1843, 1875, 1876, and 4778, Rev. Stat.), from
which it is plainly to be inferred that officers not thus authorized can not lawfully hold over. Expressio unius est exdusio alterius. So that the general rule seems to be that
where Congress has not authorized the officer to hold over ,
his incumbency must be deemed to cease at the end of his
term, though no appointment of a successor may then be
made.
In support of the above view I beg to refer to a remark of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of United
.States v. Eckford's Executors (1 How., 250), viz: ''Under the
act of 1820 collectors can only be appointed for four years.
At the end of this term the office beco_mes vacant, and must be
filled by a new appointment." (See also 14 Opiu., 262, 263.)
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. WILLIAM E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.
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COLLECTION OF DUTIES.
Section 10 of' the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, extends only to goods
which had not been in bonded warehouse more than three years at the
date that act took effect~.
Sections 2971 and 2977, Revised Statutes, place a limitation upon the
privilege of exportation with refunu of duties, and require that it
shall be exercised within three years from the date of importation;
otherwise the privilege is lost.
The provision in section 2971, Revised Statutes, requiring merchandise
to be sold, is applicable to goods remaining in public store or bonded
warehouse beyond three years, as well where the duties thereon have
been paid as whe:t;e they have not been paid. At the end of that
period they are to be regarded as abandoned to the Government and
sold.
The object and requirement of that provision are, however, sufficiently
met by the practice of the Department, whereby, in lieu of a formal
sale of the goods, the owner, consiguee, or agent is permitted to pay
the duties, charges, etc., that have accrued thereon and take them
away.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Febntary 7, 1884.
SIR: I have considered the following questionf'j, proposed
in your letter to me of the 7th of November last:
''First. Whether section 10 of the tariff act of March 3,
1883, is necessarily limited to goods which had not been in
bonded warehouse more than three years at the date said
act went into operation!
'' Second. Whether the priVilege of exportation with refund of duties may still be allowed, notwithstanding more
than three years have elapsed since the date of importation Jt
and
"Third. Whether, under section 2971, Revised Statutes,
goods are to be sold at the expiration of three years from the
date of importation, notwithstanding the fact that duties
may have been already paid thereon f"
Section 10 of the act of ·March 3, 1883, to which reference
is above made, provides: " That all imported goods, wares,
and merchandise which may be in the I?ublic stores or bonded
warehouses on the day and year when this act shall go into
effect, except as otherwise provided in this act, shall be sub~
jected to no other duty upon the entry thereof for consumption than if the same were imported respectively after that
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day; and all goods, wares, and merchandise remammg in
bonded warehouses on the day and year this act shall take
effect, and upon which the duties shall have been paid, shall
be entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount
of duties paid and the amount of duties said goods, wares,
and merchandise would be subject to if the same were imported respectively after that date."
That the first clause of this section, which deals with imports whereon the duties have not been paid, applies only to
such merchandise remaining in the public stores or bonded
warehouses on the day the act takes effect as may then lawfully be entered for consumption, is indicated by the words
"upon entry thereof for consumption" used therein. These
words plainly show that the benefits of the provision were
meant tiJr merchandise in bond which, at the time mentioned,
the importer is entitled thus to enter, and for none other.
No change in the law respecting the withdrawal of dutiable
merchandise for consumption is made by the act of 1883.
This subject was at the period referred to, and is now, regulated by section 2970, Revised Statutes, which provides that
merchandise in bond" may be withdrawn for consumption
within one year from the date of original importation on payment of the du.ties and charges to which it may be subject by
law at the time of such withdrawal; and after the expiration
of one year from the date of original importation, and until
the expiration of three years from such date, any merchandise in bond may be withdrawn for consumption on payment
of the duties assessed on the original entry and charges and
an additional duty of ten per centum of the amount of such
duties and charges."
Thus, by the then and still existing law goods in bond can
be entered for consumption and withdrawn at any time during the period of three years from the date of original importation. Upon the expiration of this period, however, the.
privilege so to enter such goods ceases, and ~by section 2971,
Revised Statutes) they are to be "regarded as abandoned to
the Government, and sold under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe," e~c.
It follows that merchandise whereon the duties have not
been paid, which had been in the public stores or bonded
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warehouses more than three years on the day the act of 1883
took effect, does not come within the operation of section 10
of that act.
The other clause of that section deals with the merchandise
on which the duties had been paid, but which shall remain
in bonded warehouses on the day the act takes effect. And
though the language of this clause (viz: "all goods, wares,
and merchandise remaining in bonded warehouses on the day
and year this act shall take effect, and upon which the duties
shall have been paid, shall be entitled," etc.) is very general,
and according to a strictly literal interpretation would comprebend any imported merchandise actually in bonded warehouse on the day referred to, I am nevertheless, upon consideration of the whole section, inclined to the view that such an
interpretation does not accord with the intent of Congress·that this clause was not (any more than the first clause)
meant to apply to merchandise which on that day shall have
been in bonded warehouse more than three years.
Under section 2977, Revised Statutes, merchandise upon
which duties have been paid may thereafter remain in bonded
warehouse in custody of the customs officers at the expense
and risk of the owners. But the period during which it may
thus remain subject to withdrawal by him is limited; for
unless withdrawn for consumption or exportation within
three years from the date of original importation, it becomes
liable to be sold as abandoned to the Government. (Sec.
2971, Rev. Stat.)
With respect to merchandise remaining in bonded warehouse at the period mentioned, it does not seem probable that,
in enacting the act under consideration, Congress meant to
discriminate between goods upon which the duties were unpaid and goods upon which the duties were paid, by excluding from its provisions in the one case goods which bad
remained in bonded warehouse more than three years, and in
the other case including within its provisions goods in that
predicament. It is more reasonable to suppose that Congress
thereby intended to give the importer who had already paid
duties under the old law, and whose goods still remained in
bonded warehouse, the same benefits and advantages, but
no other or greater than are thereby given the importer
1
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whose goods stii1 remained in bonded warehouse and on
which the duties were unpaid; and as, in the latter ,case, the
goods must be entered for consumption within three years
from the date of original importation in order to bring them
under the operation of the section, so, in the former case, to
bring the goods under its operation, they must be withdrawn
for consumption within three years fro~ the date of original
importation.
I am thus led to the conclusion that the whole of the section is inapplicable to merchandise which, on the day the
act of 1883 took effect, had remained in bonded warehouse
more than three years from the date of original importation,
and were then, in contemplation of law, abandoned to thA
Government.
In direct answer to your first question I accordingly reply,
that in my opinion section 10 of the tariff act of March 3,
1883, extends only to goods which had not been in bonded
warehouse more than three years at the date that act went
into operation.
·
The next question involves an examination of the law relating to the withdrawal of goods for exportation. Under
section 2971, Revised Statutes, merchandise may be withdrawn for exportation to foreign countries at any time within
three years from the date of original importation, subject only
to the payment of such storage and charges as may be due
thereon. If duties have already been paid on the merchandise, and it still remains in warehouse in custody of the customs officers, it may, under section 2977, Revised Statutes,
be withdrawn and exported to a foreign country within the
same period ; in which event the owner will be entitled to a
refund of the duties. These sections, with which may also
be compared section 3017, Revised Statutes, place a limitation
upon the privilege of exportation with refund of duties, and
require that it shall be exercised within three years from the
date of importation. Unless this requirement is complied
with the privilege is lost. I therefore answer your second
question in the negative.
Section 2971, Revised Statutes, provides: "Any goods
remaining in public store or bonded warehouse beyond three
years shall be regarded as abandoned to the Government,
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and sold under such regulations as the Secretary of the
Treasury may prescribe, and the proceeds paicl into the
Treasury." But by section 2972, Revised Statutes, in
case of any sale of any merchandise remaining in public
store or bonded warehouse beyond three years the Secretary is authorized to "pay to the owner, consignee, or agent of
such merchandise the proceedg thereof, after deducting
duties, charges, and expenses, in conformity with the provision relating to the sale of merchandise remaining in a
warehouse for more than one year." The provision in sectiou 2971, quoted above, is in my view applicable to goods
remaining in public store or bonded warehouse beyond three
years, as well where the duties thereon have been paid as
where they have not been paid. That provision has, I think,
a double purpose : first, to enforce the collection of duties,
charges, etc., upon the goods; and, second, to relieve the
customs service from the care and custody thereof.
Formerly, under the warehousing acts of 1846 and 1849,
the Treasury Department, by regulation, authorized goods
upon which the duties were paid, either l)efore or after the
storing, to remain in public store for any period of time, so
long as the usual storage was paid. But in 1852 a circular
was issued by the Department containing (inter alia) the
following instructions: "On pa,yment of the legal duties
and charges the merchandise should at once be withdrawn
from warehouse, this Department being of opinion that officers of the customs have no legal authority, under existing
laws, to assume, even with the consent of the owners, the
custody of merchandise on which the claims of the United
States,.of whatever description, have been fully discharged.
Consequently, any existing regulations authorizing merchandise to remain in public warehouse after payment of the
duties are hereby suspended," etc. And again in 1854 the
Department issued another circular on the subject, which
directed that thereafter, in all cases "where goods, wares,
and merchandise shall be suffered by the importer, owner,
or agent thereof to remain in the custody of the officers of
the customs for the period of five days after the payment of
legal duties and charges thereon and the issuing of the permit for their delivery, they will be treated as unclaimed, and
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will, at the close of one month from th~ date of such permit,
be disposed of in the mode prescribed by law and regulations in the case of unclaimed goods." Subsequently, bowever, bythetwenty-firstsection oftheactofJuly 14,1862, chapter 163, it was provided "that merchandise upon which
duties have been paid may remain in warehouse in custody
of the officers of the cust9ms at the expense and risk of the
·o wners of said merchandise," and that provision has been
~mbodied in section 2977, Revised Statutes, to which reference is hereinbefore made. Yet, as already observed, the
privilege thereby conferred of letting- the goods remain in
warehouse in cv.stody of the customs officers after payment
of the duties thereon is subject to the limitation of three
years from the date of original importation under the operation of the above-mentioned provision in section 2971. At
the end of that period they are to be regarded as abandoned
to the Government and sold.
While I am of opinion that your third question should
b~ answered in the affirmative, and so answer it, I deem it
proper to add that I perceive no legal objection to the existing practice of your Department respecting the disposition
·Of goods which have remainEd in bonded warehouse beyond
three years. The objects and requirments of the provision
in section 2971, last above adverted to, are in my judgment
.sufficiently met by that practice, whereby, in lieu of a formal
.sale of goods, the owner, consignee, or agent is permitted to
pay- the duties, charges, etc., that have accrued thereon,
and take them away. In case of a sale, the owner, consignee, or agent of the merchandise would (under section
2972) become entitled to receive the proceeds, after deducting therefrom the duties, charges, and expenses. The practice referred to accomplishes the same end, and is, indeed,
a virtual sale of the goods under the power given the Secretary of the Treasury by the statute.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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PARDON.

In September, 1882, Lieutenant N. was sentenced by a court-martial to
reduction of rank in his grade, and the sentence was carried into effect.
In September, 1883, the department commander remitted the sentence
under U.e power to pardon conferred by art.icle 112 of the Articles of
War: H6ld that, the punishment imposed by the sentence being a.
continuing one, the sentence could be remitted by the pardoning power,.
and that the authority exercised by the department commander was
in conformity to law.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 11, 1884.
SIR: In your communication of the 17th of November
last yon request my opinion as . to the lawfulness of the
authority attempted to be exercised ~y the department commander in the case of Lieutenant Nordstrom, by General
Order, No. 45.
In September 1882, Lieutenant Nordstrom, of the Tenth
Oavalry, was sentenced "to be reduced in rank so that his name
shall hereafter be borne on the rolls of ~he Army next af~r
that of First Lieutenant Mason M. Maxon, Tenth· Oavalry."
His name was so placed on the rolls by the proper officer or
the War Department, and to that extent the sentence was
carried out. In September, 1883, the department commander
remitted the sentence.
Where, as in this case, an officer is sentenced to reduction
of rank (i.e., loss of steps or numbers) in his grade, the punishm~nt imposed is a continuing one ; since it is only by the
continual operation of the sentence itself that the officer is
thenceforth excluded from the place in his grade to which,
under the law of the service, he would otherwise be entitled
by the date of his commission, and made to occupy another
place therein. So long, then, as the officer is thus excluded
by operation of the sentence-in other words, whilst he is
still .undergoing the punishment thereby imposed-the sentence may be remitted by pardon, and a remission of it would
necessarily carry with it the restoration of the officer to his
pre-existing right to occupy the place in his grade corresponding with the date of his commission, he losing such
opportunities for promotion as may in the mean time have
occurred. (12 Opin., 547.)
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But you intimate that doubt is entertained whether the
power to pardon conferred by article 112 of the Articles of
War can be exercised after the proceedings of the court-martial have been completed by due confirmation by proper authority. There is no limitation in the article as to the time
at which the pardon or mitigation may be granted, and by
analogy it seems to me that completion or non-completion of
the punishment would be the only test. Pardons are most
usually granted after the finding of the jury has been reduced to judgment and the sentence pronounced-after the
punishment bas commenced or is about to be visited on the
ofl'ender. Pardons can issue before trial, but instances of
such are rare. Congress must have used the word pardon in
its ordinary sense, and if its ordinary exercise was to be circumscribed, apt language should have been used. If the
power was to operate only on the sentence before it was pronounced, Congress would have employed different language
than that found in article 112.
I am accordingly of opinion that in the case under consideration the autho ity attempted to be exercised by the
department commander was in conformity to law.
I am, sir, very resr)ectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. RoBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

REFUND OF DUTIES.
The Secretary of the Treasury has power to refund excess of duties
exacted in certain cases referred to.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 12, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 11th instant mentions cases in which

certain decisions have been made as to the ·duty upon azobenzole dye colors, which decisions were afterwards in other
cases modified so as to impose a smaller rate of duty, the
applicants in the earlier cases having in the mean time
brought suit to recover the excess in the amount of duty
paid by them, which suits are still penuing.
272-VOL XVII--42

•

658

RON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER

Readjustment ofPostmastcrs' Salaries.

•

Thereupon you inquire whether the excess of duties imposed in the earlier cases can be refunded by yon upon dismissal of the suits brought as above~
I answer this question in the atlhnathTe. Indeed, although
probably not needed in such a case, the proviso to section 1
of the act of 1875, chapter 136, seems to cover it and go
beyond it even and include redress for enoneous ·deu's of fact
by the Secretary himself, even where no suit has been brought,
so that there have been a protest and appeal.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAl\IIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

READJUSTMENT OF POSTMASTERS' SALARIES.
The act ofMarch 3, 1883, chapter 119, merely directs the readjustment of
the salaries of postmasters to be made in accordance with the pre·
existing law, leaving the meaning of the latter to be determined in
the usual and proper methods.
,
By that act the Postmaster-General is required to make, on beh:tlf of a<~
applicant thereunder, the adjustment or readjustment of salary which
he may claim and be found to have been 'entitled to, at any one or more
of t~1e biennial periods since the act of July 1, 1864, chap. 197, under
the latter act as amended by the proviso added thereto by the act of
June 12, 1866, chap. 114, crediting tbe applicant with any difference
in his favor between the amount of the salary so readjusted for the
prospective biennial period and the salary paid to him for the time of
his service in such period.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 13, 1884.
Your communication of August 25 ultimo submits for
my opinion certain matters which are substantially embraced
in the following questions:
First. Has Congress, by the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat.,
487), directed the Postmaster-General to readjust salaries, on
application under the act, otherwise than in accordance with
the provisions of the acts of 1864 and 1866 therein mentioned~
(13 Stat., 335; 14 Stat., 59.)
Second. If it bas not, what do those provisions require oi
him in making such readjustment~
SIR:

/
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In answering the first inquiry it must be determined whether
the act of 1883 merely directs the readjustments to be in accordance with the act of 1866 (which is in terms an amendment of the act of 1864), or whether it was intended to afl'ect
in any way the construction of those acts.
I agree with you in the opinion that it was not so intended,
and for the following reasons :
Tile construction of statutes is more especially the function
of the judiciary. Legislators may declare bow an act shall
in future be construed, but it will not be inferred that they
llave undertaken to control existing rig.hts of parties under
prior statutes.
Congress had evidently been led to belie\e that there were
~ases in which parties claiming to be entitled to readjustment C!f salary under the amended act of 1864 bad for some
reason failed to obtain the benefit of that legislation. The
act of 1883 gives these parties an opportunity to apply now
for such readjustment as might have been and was not obtained under the mandatory provisions of the amended act.
It does not indicate by whose fault those provisions failed to
he executed in these cases (and so far as chargeable to the
postmasters in effect condones the fault), but it specifies certain conditions precedent to the readjustment directed and
.then describes the mode of readjustment.
The title of its beneficiaries rests on three requisites:
(1) That their salaries have not theretofore been readjusted under the terms of the amendment of 1866.
(2) That the.r made sworn returns of receipts and business
for readjustment to the Postmaster-General or his First or
Tllird Assistant on quarterly returns, in conformity with the
then existing laws and regulations.
(3) That the sworn receipts or quarterly returns show
that the salary allowed was 10 per cent. less than their compensation would have been under the act of 1854.
On these conditions the readjustment must be made in ac·
cordance with the mode pYesented in the amendment of 1866 and
to date from the beginning of the quarter succeeding that in
which such sworn or quarterly returns were made.
This includes all that is essential in the act. Its structure,
.as will be seen, is simple and its purport clear.
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Congress was presumably advised that there had been
differences of opinion between the Postmaster-General and
some postmasters as to his duties under the said amended
act, yet it has (judiciously, no doubt) made no declaration
touching the construction of that act, but has merely directed the new readjustments to be in accordance with the
former law, referring also to tlte classification and returns
provided for by prior laws and regulations in such a way as
to indicate that no deviation from the course of proceeding
thereby established was intended, unless by possibility some
of the returns now admissible for readjustment were not considered to be so under such laws and regulations, a detail of
proceeding which does not affect the general result.
The act seems therefore to me to be in entire harmony
with the general policy of the law, and to exhibit by strong
internal evidence the disposition of Congress to simply carry
out the former law, leaving its meaning to be determined by
the usual and proper methods.
I proceed therefore to the second and principal inquiry, as
to which it should be premised that as you have not included
any statement of the action taken by your Departmt>nt in any
particular cases presented for readjustment before or since
the act of 188~, I shall treat the question as one simply of
construction, and without reference to any views or action of
your Department in the premises which have not been officially brought to my notice. My concurrence or disagreement
with the views expressed in your letter of June 9 ultimo, towhich my attention is called, will sufficiently appear without
undertaking to consider them in detail, as I presume it is my
opinion on the point involved that you in substance desire.
A more definite statement of the question would be this:
How did the act of 1864 require the salaries of postmasters
of the third, fourth, anu fifth classes to be readjusted, and
what change in such requirement was effected by the proviso
added to the second section of that act by the act of 1866¥
Prior to the act of 1864 the classification provided for in it
did not exist, and the compensation of postmasters was determined and awarded quarterly by the Sixth Auditor of the
Treasury on the basis of returns required to be made by them
to him quarterly of certain prescribed statistics of their busi-
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ness, the last preceding general regulation of the subject
having been made by the act of July 1, 1854. (10 Stat., 298.)
Congress may have found some serious objection to this
system of quarterly adjustments of compensation for past
service when it substituted the radically different method of
compensating postmasters by fixed prospective salaries, assigned by the Postmaster-General for a definite period with
provisions for periodical readjustments, a system which it
has ever since maintained.
So marked a change of policy is not to be ignored in determining the legislative intent in particular minor additions
to or amendments of the general scheme. The presumption
of a matured consistent purpose. in such legislation ought to
control whenever it is sought by dubious expressions to destroy or impair the integrity of the new order of things introduced by the act o( 1864.
No question is presented as to the meaning of the act of
'1864 standing alone, but it is important to note its .main provisions in order to understand the amendment of 1866.
It declares that the annual compensation of postmasters
.s hall be at a fixed salary in lieu of commissions, the postmasters to be divitled into five classes; the salaries in the first
class to be not more than $4,000 and not less than $3,000~ and
.so grading the salaries on downward in the other classes.
It further declares that the compensation of postmasters
()f the several classes aforesaid shall be established by the
Postmaster-General under the rules thereinafter provided,
which were in substance as follows:
First. To assign each office to its proper class by determining the avera,qe annual sum paid as compensation to its
postmaster for the two consecutive ·years next preceding July
1, 1864.
Where this sum amounted to less than $2,000 and not less
than $1,000, the office was to be assigned to the third class;
amounting to less than $1000 but not les:s than $100, to the
fourth; and when less than $100, to the fifth class.
Second. To assign eacb. office its salary within the limits
of its class for the ensuing biennial pe~iod by taking not the
·e xact "avera.ge annual sum" before d~termined, but for the
first, second, and tl.lird classes a sum "in even hundreds of
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dollars as nearly as practicable in amount the same as but not.
exceeding" the sum so determined; and for the fourth class
even tens, and the fifth even dollars in the same way.
The operation of these rules will be bettflr understood by
illustration. "If, for instance, the commissions of an office
for the eight quarters preceding•July 1, 1864, were $2,010
(and in the term ''commissions" I intend throughout this
opinion to include whatever was allowed as compensatiou by
the act of 1854), the average annual sum $1,005 would grade
it in the third class, and the salary in even hundreds assigned
would be $1,000 per annum for the ensuing two years. If
again the average annual sum for the two consecutive years
was $1,900, the office would fall in the third class, with a salary of $1,900 per annum for the ensuing two ~:ears.
The second section of the act then requires the PostmasterGeneral once in two years to review and readjust, "on the basis of the preceding section" (that is, in the manner above described), the salary assigned by him to any office and to record in writing his order thereon, "but any change made in
such salary shall not take effect until the first day of the
quarter next following such order)'
As compared with the system of quarterly adjustment for
past service on the basis of commissions which it superseded,
the new system assigning a fixed salary for future service for
two years on the basis of past earnings would have been open
to objection if it had not made provision for cases of unusual
variation from the adopted standard, as when from temporary
or permanent causes the business at a partinular office shoulrl
increase very rapidly within the biennial period; and so it
was provided that "in special cases, upon satisfactory representation," the review and readjustment should be as much
oftener than once in two years as the Postmaster·General
might deem expedient.
This relieves the salary plan from the imputation of permitting a possibly wide variation between the amount of
service and its just compensation, while the designation
''special cases" indicates that exact adjustments in accordance with the old system were not in general intended.
There are some features of the cited provisions of the act
that should be specially observed. One is that the biennial
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readjustment is mandatory in every case, and that the provision for additional or intermediate review in " special cases"
is discretionary, which indicates that in the legislative purpose at that time these provisions were re~arded relatively
as the rule and the exception.
Another is that the readjustment, whether biennial or
otherwise, is required to be "on the basis of the preceding
(first) section," which provides, as bas been shown, for a computation from the busi.nes~ of the two preceding years to fix
the compensation of the two years ensuing, which proves
that there was no idea of retrospective readjustment in any
case, or of any proceeding radically inconsistent with the
new s;ystem.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary it is to be presumed that the provisions of this act were observed by the
Postmaster-General; indeed, the whole controversy, as I understand it, arose after the second section of the act was
amended, by adding at the end of it a proviso which was enacted by the eighth section of the act of J nne 12, 1866, chapter 11, entitled, "an act to amend the postal laws." (14
Stat., 60.)
The section as so amended is as follows:
" Sec. 2. And be it .f1trther enacted, That the PostmasterGen eral shall review once in two years, and in special cases,
, upon satisfactory representation, as much oftener as be may
deem expedient, and readjust on the basis of the preceding
section the salary assigned by him to any office, but any
change made in such salary shall not take effect until the
first day of the quarter next following such order, and all
orders made assigning or changing salaries shall be made in
writing and recorded in his journal and notified to the Auditor for the Post-Office Department: Prov-ided, That when the
guarterly returns of any postmaster of the third, fo.ur~h, or fifth
class show that the salary all-owed is ten per centum less than it
1oould be on the basis of comm·issions under the act of eighteen
hundred and fifty-four, fixing compensation, then the Postmaster- General shall review and readjust under the provisions of
said section."
In considering the meaning of this proviso, it must be
borne in mind that it was annexed to a provision for biennial

I

664

RON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
R e a d J u s t m e n t o f P o s t m a s t e r s ' S a I a r 1e s.

readjustment before the expiration of the :first biennial period
therein provided for, and as the usual and proper function of
a proviso is to introduce some limitation consistent with or
at least not destructive of the general intent of the enacting
clause, it must be presumeJ that Congress in this case intended rather to perfect the salary system than to overturn
or unsettle it before it had been fairly inaugurated. If there
could be any doubt of this, the fact that Congress has continued that system ever since 1864 would demonstrate it. It
should require, therefore, very clear expression to justify a
construction of the proviso which would destroy or impair
the main purpose of the amended act.
Reading the amendment as directed by the enacting clause
of section eight of the act of ~866 in connection with section
two of the act of 1864 will exhibit more clearly its effect.
It is confined to three of the classes, as to which it directs
two things-first when, and second how, the PostmasterGeneral shall readjust.
Before the addition he was commanded to readjust in every
case once in two years. As to three classes, Congress then
adtls a provision that he shall readjust (only) when something is shown by something. The thing to be shown is
that the ';salary allowed" is ten per centum less than it
would be on the basis of commissions; and the phrase quoted
is the only one of possible doubtful meaning.
By the rules of construction it should have the meaning
belonging to it when used or referred to elsewhere in the section or-act unless good reason to the contrary can be shown.
'rheequivalentexpression "salary assigned'' occurs in the section, and the :first section is largely occupied with the mode
of allowance. The " salary" so described is nothing less
than a biennial allowance, and the phrase in question must
on its face, at least, be so understood.. If Congress is supposed to have meant anything else, the meaning must evidently be one that does not harmonize with the context, and
is therefore not to be presumed.
But this thing, whatever it is, must be shown by "the quarte;ly returns," and cannot therefore on the face of it be shown
by any single return. Looking again at the context, it is found
that the readjustment is to be made on th~ basis of the pre-
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ceding (first) section and that shows that it is to be on the
(eight) returns showing the average of annual compensation
for the two years next preceeding the adjustment (the Postmaster-General being authorized to estimate for any return
not received.) It must be presumed that these are the returns intended by "the quarterly returns:" unless some different meaning of the phrase can be clearly shown; for this
construction is not only entirely harmonious with the context, but I am unable to see how the comparison directed
can be properly made in any other way. The ~'salary
allowed" being determined by the annual average computed
from eight consecutive past quarterly returns as the established compensation of the office for the eight ensuing quarters, how can such an averaged biennial salary be shown to
be ten per centum less than it would be on the basis of commissions unless by comparison with the commissions of the
~ntire period for which the salary is allowed~
There is nothing, then, in this part of the amendment to
indicate that Congress intended to set aside the biennial
.s ystem. On the contrary, it is explicitly recognized, and the
modification is introduced with manifest reference to it, so
that thereafter the Postmaster-General should readjust at a
biennial period the salaries (in the three classes) only on the
.showing therein prescribed.
The final direction further demonstrates this. He is, on
such showing, to "review and readjust under the provisions
of said section." The section referred to is shown by the
enacting clause of section eight of the act of 1866 to be section two of the act of 1864, and this the Supreme Court also
has affirmed (McLean's case, 95 U. S., 753.) That section
provides principally for mandatory biennial readjustments, to
which the amendment, being mandatory, also must refer,
being equivalent therefore to a directiou to the PostmasterGeneral to readjust biennally as directed in 1864 under the
.said amendment.
This construction excludes of course any interference with
tge ne~ salary system by mandatory readjustments of more
than biennial frequency, and really strengthens and solidifies
that system, by dispensing in effect with the biennial readjustment (in three classes) when comparison, at the close of
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a hiennial period, of the salary allowed therefor to an office
witu its income for such period on the basis of commissions
shows that the salary differs from the commissions by les~
than ten per centmil.
The discussion might well be closed here, for it ought to
be enough to point out what the amendment declares according to the fair natural meaning of its terms and to show
that this harmonizes, as it ought, with the fundamental purpose and policy of Congress in the act so amended; but as.
the matter has been much in contro\""ersy it may be of advantage to consider further the probable object of this provision as above construed, since it may be fairly assumed
to have been intended to remedy some defect in the act
of 1864.
That act in June 1866 was about to be, or was being, put
into operation for the first time as respected readjustments;
and the Postmaster-General on the one band and the postmasters on the other were -concerned in its mandatory provisions; the former, because he was required to reacljust
(according to the first section) every postmaster's salary in a
schedule of (at that time) more than twenty· nine thousand
offices; a task manifestly of great magnitude, which had not
theretofore been assigned to the Post-Office Department and
which would of necessity add greatly to the labor and responsibility imposed upon it; the latter, because they were
for the first time graded in clas es under novel regulations.
affecting their relation toward one an other as well as to the
Government.
The amendment would evidently be a measure of relief to
the Postmaster-General and his Department, since it "-ould
save the labor of actual readjustment in many (probably a
large majority) of the cases; in which it could be determined
by mere inspection that it was not required.
This would be a sufficient legislative motive; but the amendruer.t affects the postmasters of the three classes severally
by removing an inequality which the act of 1864 bad created
and which can be better understood by i1lustration .
.A.s the salary (of the third class, for example) was to be assigned in even hundreds as nearly as practicable, the same
as but not exceeding the average annnal compensation for the
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preceding two years, it is plain that a postmaster whose
average annual compensation was $1,900 would have to show
an average increase of between 5 and 6 per centum of commissions only in order to get $100 added to his salary, while
a postmaster whose average annual compensation was $1,000
would have to show an average increase of 10 per centum to
get a salary of $1,100.
Here, then, was a clear discrimination created by the act
of 1864 (through inadvertence perhaps) in favor of the postmasters in each class having the higher rates of salary. The
intent and effect of the proviso was that in every case the
same percentage of difference should be found in order to
readjust, and so the apparent injustice to the lower-salaried
officers was removed.
That the amendment modifies the prior law so as to produce these two results, must, in my judgment, be conceded,
and as Congress must be presumed to have intended the legitimate consequences of its declaration, (and these are in
harmony with the ruling spirit and purpose of the new postal
le.g islation,) it would seem that full and reasonable effect is
given to the proviso by accepting these as its real and sufficient objeets, unless some additional purpose not inconsistent
therewith can be shown.
This I have not been able to disco,Ter, but it is due to the
ability and earnestness with which the views of the ·counsel
representing the postmasters have been urged upon my attention that I should briefly state my reasons for not concurring therein.
The substance of their contention is, as I understand it,
that the amendment required the Postmaster-General there- .
after to examine each quarterly return in the three classes,
to ascertain whether the proportionate part of tJ1e biennial
salary allowed which would be payable for the quarter in que::;tion was less by 10 per centum than the amount of cornmissiolls computable on the return under the act of 1854,.
and to readjust whenever that appeared.
This is certainly a radical change which it is supposed the
amendment was intended to effect. It would virtually annihilate the biennial salary system, for there were then only about
three hundred offices of the first and second classes and more
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than twenty.nine thousand of the other three. The intent to
do this can not be presumed. It must be shown by very
clear proof.
It is not enough to say, therefore, that the constructiou
proposed is not incompatible with the language of the proviso. It should appear to be the only meaning of which that
enactment is susceptible; whereas the fact is that no such
meaning can be extracted from its language without interpolating some parts of the text and disregarding others.
Thus the phrase ''when the quarterly returns" must be
changed to "whenever any quarterly returns;" the phrase
''the salary allowed" requires the addition of the explanation'' for such quarter;" and the direction to "readjust under
the provisions of said (secon.d) section" must be ignored.
Such liberties with the phraseology might possibly be tolerated if necessary to carry out tbe main intent of the act
amended, but they cannot be admitted for the purpose of
destroying it, so long, at least, as a more fa,-orable construction is possible. With even greater reason must a construction be rejected which gives no effect to the clause directing
the matter of readjustment to be under section 2, and therefoFe biennially.
To overcome these objections an alleged grievance of some
postmasters which it is assumed that Congress intended to
remedy seems to be relied on; and it amounts in substance
to this, that 'in some or in many cases the biennial salary
might or did, in a given quarter, fall short of the postmaster's
earnings on the old basis of commissions for that quarter;
that the old basis was the juster one to the officer, and Con. gress must be presumed to have intended in the proviso to
go back to it in substance in some way which, as it will be
seen, is not easily explained.
The fundamental objection to this construction is that it
rests on the assumption that Congress, while professedly
amending the act of 1864:, intended to substantially nullify
it; a position which is not only repugnant to settled legal
principles, but which, in view of the fact that the system
inaugurated in that act has been continued and enforced in
all essential particulars, appears to be especially visionary.
.Another unfounded assumption is, that such an amend-
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ment was needed to secure to postmasters just compensation in case the salary allowed should turn out to be far below their earnings on the basis of commissions. The act of
1864 makes ample provision for such cases by special readjustment in the Postmaster General's discretion. There is
nothing in the amendment to indicate that Congress intended
to repeal or in any way limit this discretion. On the contrary, it declares that the conditiona~ readjustments it prescribes (which have no apparent reference to the special
cases mentioned in section 2) are to be conducted under the
provisions of that section. To be so conducted, they must
be readjusted as special cases on satisfactory representation
at such times as the Postmaster~General may deem expedient under the exceptional authority given him, or biennially
under the general mandatory provisions of the act; and that
Congress could not have referred to the e.x ceptional, but
.must have intended the regular, mode of readjustment is
19anifest.
As to any suggestion that the amendment may have been
framed to protect postmasters by reason of some supposed
failure of the P6stmaster-General to properly exercise his
discretionary authority, there is no evidence of that in the act,
where it should be found, and if Congress had any such supposition (a thing which I have no right to presume) and intended to rebuke the administration of that department as
indicated, it has ta~en singular-pains to conceal' its purpose
by the use of language conveying a very different meaning.
Stripped of this special motive, there remains but the
claim of a general equity to justify the postmasters' construction, based apparently on the assumption that they are
somehow entitled to be compensated on the basis of commissions rather than by salary.
.
This cannot be so. The right to compensation in such
case can rise to no higher level than that of its statutory
source. No one is obliged to become or to remain a post-·
master against his wil1, but while such postmaster the existing
law is the measure of his compensation in every sense. Congress did not intend, in substituting the salary for the commission system, to givP- postmasters an exact equivalent of their
earnings under the latter plan. It deliberately provided a
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soheme by which the salary should never exceed the !COmmission standard, and would ordinarily be less by a difference extending to the limit often per centum. Thus, as before
shown, for commission earnings between $1,000 and $1,100
the prospective salary assigned would be $1,000. No post·
master, then, after the act or' 1864, could reasonably claim
that such a law invaded any of his rights, and the amendment of 1866 extended its scope by making the ten per centum
difference impartially applicable in the three classes, as we
have seen. When Oongre~s, as to one of the classes, saw :fit
to change the law, it did so; but tha~ does not affect the present condition.
A fair test of the merit of the proposed construction is to
consider the results which would follow from carrying it into
effect. We may suppose, for instance, the case of a postmaster with an allowed salary of $1,000 per annum, whose
first quarterly return thereafter shows that on the 'basis of
commissions he would have earned during the quarter $275.
By the construction in question the Postmaster-General
must have forthwith ascertained this, and must thereupon
proceed to readjust the salary. Bnt in wha\ manner!
One suggestion is that it should be retrospective, raising
the salary for the past quarter to equal the commissions; but
th.is would virtually wipe out the salary system, and is prohibited by the act of 1864, as construed in MeLean's case (85
U. S., 753) afld by the act of 1883.
The readjustment must, therefore, take effect prospectively,
and as there is no pro;ision for assigning a salary for less
than two years, the Postmaster-General must assign him a
salary for that period in advance, but he cannot determine
its amount under the act of 1864 from a single retlirn, for it
depen~s on the annual av·erage from eight consecutive quarterly returns. If he can escape that difficulty and can assign
a salary of $1,100 per annum for two years from that return,
what is be to do at the end of the next quarter if its return
shows commissions of but $225, except to make a new bienniel readjustment on the basis of that retur11, and so go on,
quarter by quar~er, maintaining the farce of a biennial system readjusted quarterly. Is it concdvable that Congress
intended such anomalous and absurd results as are begotten
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by such a construction of its amendment of the postal law of
1883¥
It is needless to further pursue the inquiry. There is no
phase of it in which that construction is not destructive of ,
the very essence of the act amended; and that intent can not
be admitted unless openly declared or by an infere\lce which
has no alternative. There is no such declaration, and that
there is no such necessary inference bas been shown.
The practical conclusion of this discussion is that in my
.opinion you are directed by the aet of 1883 to make now, on
behalf of any applicant thereunder who is founrl to be entitled under the conditions precedent prescribed in that act,
the readjm;tment or readjustments of salary which he may so
~laim and be found to have been entitled to at any one or
more of the biennial periods since the act of 1864, under that
act as amended by the proviso added thereto by the act of
1866 as above construed; crediting the applicant of course
with any difference in his favor between the amount (or proportional amount) of the salary so readjusted for the pro~"pective biennial period and the salary paid, to him for the
.t ime of his service in such period.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. W. Q. GRESHAM,
Postmaster- General.

DIRECT TAX.
The withholding the amount of the "2 and 3 per cent. funds" due the
State of Mississippi, and crediting the State therewith on account of
the direct tax, was unwarranted by law, as no liability rests upon the
State for the payment of such tax.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

F.ebruary 15, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the communication of Senators Lamar and George, of Mississippi, touching
the '~ 2 and 3 per cent. funds" alleg·eti to be due that State,
which by your direction was referred to me on the 1st ins taut.
Assuming the facts to be as set forth therein, I concur in
-their view that no liability rests upon the State for payment
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of the tax referred to, and consequently that the withholding of the amount of said funds and crediting the State therewith on account of said tax were unwarranted by law.
But without more definite and particular information than
is afforded by them respecting the accmmt as stated at the
Treasury,between the United States and the State of 1\fississippi, I am unable to form, and for that reason do not express, any opinion upon: the question whether or not it is
competent to the accounting officers now to readjust such
account, so as to allow payment to the State of the amount
of said funds which shall thus be found to be due thereto.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

CUSTOMS LAWS.
The words "not specially enumerated or provided for in this act," used
in schedule N of the act of March~. 188~, chapter, 121, in the clauses fixing a duty upon ''bonnets, hats and hoods for men, women, children,
composed of chip, grass," etc., and "upon braids, plaits, :fiats, laces.
etc., used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, hoods," etc., apply
to articles of the description mentioned, and not to the material out
of which such articles are made.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
February 15, 1884.
SIR: By your letter of the 19th of November last, my attention is called to certain provisions in the tariff act of
March 3, 1883, chapter 121, and an opinion is requested from
me as to the proper construction thereof. I have now the
honor to submit the following in c~mpliance with your request:
In Schedule N of that act it is provided'' Bonnets, hats and hoods for men, women and children,.
composed of chip, grass, palm leaf, willow or straw, or any
other vegetable substance, l1'air, whale bone, or other materialt
not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty
per centum ad valorem."
The question arising upon this provision I understand to
be whetller the words "not specially enumerated or provided for in tllis act" apply to the articles designated (i. e.,.
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bonnets, hats, and hoods for men, women, and children), or
to the material of which they are composed.
Upon consideration, I am of the opinion that the words
referred to were meant to apply to articles of the description
mentioned, and not to the material out of which such articles
are made. The aim of the provision is to classify, for revenue
purposes, certain articles oj manufacture and to suhject them
to the particular duty thereby imposed, and to signify that
it is intended to be a general one, covering all such articles, is
the object of the words in question. It is meant to comprehend bonnets, hats, etc., of whatever material composed,
which are not elsewhere in the act'' specially enumerated or
provided for.'' Thus, while hats of wool, being specially
provided for in Schedule K, are not within its scope, it must
be deemed to em brace bats of silk, these not being elsewhere
in the act specially enumerat~d or provided for.
A similar question is also understood by me to arise upon
the following provision in Schedule N of the same act:
"Hats, and so forth, materials for: Braids, plaits, flats,
laces, trimmings, tissues, willow sheets and squares, used for
making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, and hoods, composed
of straw, chip, grass, palm leaf, willow, hair, whalebone, or
auy other substance or material, not specially enumerated
or provided for in this act, twenty per centum ad valorem."
The words "not specially enumerated or provided for in
this act," as employed in this provision, apply in my opinion
to the articles (braids, plaitd, laces, trimmings, tissues, etc.)
used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, etc., and not to
the material of which those articles are composed. This view
is founded upon the same considerations upon which the construction given by me to the first-mentioned provision rests.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
272- VOL xvn-43
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Certain papers issued by the mayor of Savannah, Ga., and also by a
notary public at Cedar Keys, ~'la., containing the essentials of a passport, and intended to be used in traveling in a foreign country, are a
violation of section 4078, Revised Statutes.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 15, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 12th instant bring-s to my attention certain action by city mayors, pulllic notaries, etc., at Savannah, Cedar Keys, etc., in reg-ard to papers which are used to
answer the purpose of passports, and asks whether the statutes now in force providing- punishment for issuing passports
under certain circumstances apply thereto.
(1) Inoue of these cases it seems thai~ the mayor of Savannah is in the habit of issuing to persons traveling to Cuba
a paper under his hand and the seal of that city, and otherwise in official form, which certifies that the persou therein
named" is a citizen of the United 8tates," who desires to visit
Cuba, and is p'revented by want of time from obtaining a passport from the United States authorities. This is attested by
the clerk of the city council, and vised by the 8panish consul at that port, a fee being paid for each of these services.
(2) In the other case, a notary at Cedar Keys gives a formal certificate, headed" United States of America," with'' an
eagle" displayed, and making known to all concerned that
the notary certifies that the bearer,---, has produced before the notary in due form full and conclusive proofs of his
being a citizen of the United States, and has otherwise complied with the requirements of the Department of State to
entitle him to a passport, and also that the notary had forwarded such proofs to the Secretary of State for a passport,
which can only reach him after the citizen shall have departed for - - - , so that the latter cannot become its
bearer, but that the notary will transmit it to the citizen by
first opportunity after its receipt.
That sort of passport which is given by a government to
its citizens when proposing to pass into the territory of another government is in its essence only a certificate of nationality and identification. The United States for good reasons
have reserved to themselves, acting through certaiu of their
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officers, the right to grant to travelers in foreign countries
such certificates. They have also provided severe punishmentforthe issuing of such by any H persons acting or claiming to act under the United States or any of the States,"
other than such as are authorized.
Upon consideration thereof, I am of opinion that the papers
above described come within the policy and letter of the
statutes which forbid persons acting under a State from
issuing passports.
Both of these papers, as appears by inspection, contain the
essentials of a passport, viz, an identification of the party
named therein as a citizen of the United States for the purpose of travel in foreign countries. Both, however,expressly
state that they are not passports under the authority of the
United States, but are given-one, because time did not
allow of obtaining such pa.ssport; the other, as a preliminary
thereto.
The purpose of the legislation of the United States upon
this subject is, to forbid all certificates by certain officials,
as to the citizensh·ip, etc., of travelers into foreign countries,
whether purporting to be in the name of the United States or not.
I conclude therefore, as above, that notwithstanding what
appears therein in addition to such cm·tijicate, the above
papers are violations of section 4078 of the Revised Statutes.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SEORETARY OF STATE.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Payment to a judgment creditor of a claim against the Government in
favor of the judgment debtor, if made without the consent of the latter,
is unauthorized by law.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
February 23, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 7th instant inclosed a letter from A.
Sidney Biddle, esq., of Philadelphia, in which he asks that
a certain sum due from the United States to one Charles M.
Hilgert, being excess of deposits for unascertained duties on
certain sugars imported by the latter, be paid over to Mr.
. Charles C. Harrison, who is the assignee of a judgment ob-
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tained by Mr. Henry K. Kelly against said Hilgert in satisfaction of such judgment.
It appears that after the importations were made Hilgert
absconded and left the country, having (as is alleged) forged
commercial paper for a large amount; that there is little or no
probability of his return ; and that he bas left no agent authorized to receive the sum due him as above.
You inquire," Whether, under these circumstances, the
Department can legally authorize payment of the excess of
deposits to be made to Mr. Harrison."
Upon matl!re consideration, I am of opinion that the circumstances stated do not authorize payment to be made as
requested. In general, a claim upon the Government can
only be discharged by payment to the claimant himself, or
to his duly-constituted agent, or to those upon whom the title
to the claim or right to receive payment thereof is devolved
by operation of law. Payment to ajudgment creditor merely
of a claim in favor of his judgment debtor, if made Yoluntarily and without the consent of the latter, would be insufficient. The judgment creditor, simply as such, is invested
with no right or title to the claim; he is clothed with no power
to discharge it ; and therefore payment to him must be deemed
to be unauthorized.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. CHARLES J. FOLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
CUSTOMS LAWS.
Distinction between the expression in Schedule M (Rev. Stat., p. 473 ),.
"black of bone or ivory drop black," and the expession (Free List.
ibid., 433), "bones crude and not manufactured; burned, calcined,
ground, or steamed," pointed out; and held that burnt bones intended
and fitted for other uses in the arts than that of imparting color are
duty free, although in fact they are black.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Maroh 11, 1884.
SIR : I have considered your communication of the 7th
instant in relation to the late cases of De Wardener v. Robertson, collector, and Peter.~ v. same.
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These cases involve a question as to the proper duty upon
bones burned and reduced to a state required in the manufacture of sugar. The result in the former suit differs 'from
that in the latter. In De Wardener's case it has in effect
been decided that the duty exacted was improperly exacted; in Peters' case, however, a verdict has been found for
the collector.
In reply to the question which you put, I submit the ~pinion
that the expression in Schedule M (Rev. Stat., 473 ), "Black
of bone or ivory drop black," lays the entire emphasis upon
the color of the article, and means something used for imparting color; whilst the expression ( Free List, p. 433 ), '' Bones
crude and not manufactured ; burned, calcined, ground or
steamed," lays the emphasis upon some state of the article
other than color. In the former case the color is the principal matter, and the duty is levied because of the color. In
the latter case the color is a mere accident, a~d the duty imposed upon the article is due to some other consideration.
I am of opinion therefore that burnt bones, like the above,
intended and fitted for other uses in the arts than that of
imparting color, are free although in fact they be black, oo.d
that to render the paragraph in Sehedule M applicable the
bone must in a manner be merged in the black, no original
quality of the former remaining (or at least being regarded)
except such as conduces to the quality of the color.
Very respectfully, your obed,ient servant,
S. F. P BILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

•

SET-OFF.
Where money was paid by a United States marshal, under a mistake
of fact, to a person who subsequently became an officer in the postal
service: Held that, the latter being in arrears to the United States for
the amount so paid, it may be set off against his compensation as such
officer.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
March 31, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 27th inst. relative to withholding a portion of
the salary of J. H. Goff, a railroad post-office clerk, as arOF
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rears due to the United States on account of earnings paid
him by Marshal Longstreet. You say "it is not clear that
the overpayment is money due the United States from Goff
within the meaning of section 1766."
In reply to your letter and suggestion, I have to say that
there is no doubt that the sum ($74.74) referred to in your
letter as having been paid to Goff by the marshal as actual
expenses, being an excess of the amount due him for witness
fees, may and should be withheld under section I 766, Revised
Statutes. Mr. Goff is clearly a "person in arrears to tQ.e
United States" to this extent. He has received $74.74 more
from the United States than be is entitled to under the law.
This sum was paid to him by the marshal under a mistake
of fact, the latter believing that Goff was a Government officer,
and so entitled to actual expenses instead of wituess fees.
The principle is well settled that money paid under mistake of fact may be recovered back. This was Goff's case.
It is the right of the United States to set off this overpayment independenpy of the statute. But the prohibition in
section 1766 against payment of ''compensation" to "any
person who is in arrears to the United States" is explicit.
It does not admit of construction. But one exception, as I
am informed, has been made by the accounting officers to
the rule of setting off debts due from officers and employes
against their compensation accounts under this section.
, This was the case of Ron. Thomas P. Ochiltree, member of
Congress from Texas. But the reason for not following the
general rule in that case was rested upon the constitutional
provision requiring members of Congress to be paid a compensation for their services to be !tscertained by Jaw. And
in cases similar to that of Mr. Ochiltree, where the compensation of delegates from Territories was concerned, the rule
of set-off has been maintained, the Constitution not by its
terms applying to their salary.
In my opinion the amount of $74.74 should be deducted
and withheld from any amount now due Goff as compensation for his services as postal clerk.
Very respectfully,
BENJA~IN

The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

HARRIS BREWSTER.
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FREE LIST.
A bicycle taken abroad by a citizen for his use, and brought back with
him on his return to this country, is not subject to duty, being a "personal effect." (See Free List, Rev. Stat., p. 489).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 4, 1884.
SIR : Yours of the 1st instant mentions the case of a citizen who during the past month visited Bermuda, carrying
along for use there his bicycle; and asks whether upon his
return therewith that article is subject to duty.
I agree with you that it is not; being a "personal effect
(not merchandise)" within the language of the Free List(Rev.
Stat., p. 489, middle).
Allow me to add that upon reading the opinion of Attorney-General Taft, of June 30, 1876 (15 Opin., 125), to which
you refer, it seems that he did not there hold that a carriage
used abro:id was not a ''personal effect" within the above
phrase. The only question put to him, as appears, was
whether such a carriage was a "household effect," within the
meaning of another paragraph of that list. (Rev. Stat., p.
484, top).
I mention this in order to save any case in which such an
'' e:fl'ect" shall be involved in the present question. I may
add that I have not seen the decision of the Treasury Department, No. 2901, July 21, 1876, to which in this connection you refer.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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CLAIMS UNDER THE TREATY WITH SPAIN OF 1819.
Review of the legislation passed and proceedings bad thereunder in execution of the ninth article of the treaty with Spain of 1819 respecting
the claims of Spanish subjects growing out of the operations of the
American army in Florida.
The Government of the United States has done all that it was bound to
do under that article, and has fully executed the same; hence no
liability whatever arising under the treaty now rest~:~ upon it.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 11, 1884.

SIR : In a letter dated J nne 26, 1883, you proposed for my
consideration the question as to the liability of the United
States, under the treaty with Spain of 1819, for interest as
allowed by the Florida judges in their decisions upon the
claims of Spanish subjects presented under the ninth article
of that treaty.
Sub8equently, by a resolution of the Senate passed December 6, 1883, the President was requested to inform.that body,
if not incompatible with the public service: (1) whether or
not, in his opinion, the said article has been fully executed
by' the United States; (2) if not, then" whether the impediment to it& e~ecution arises out of unsettled questions of fact
or undetermined questions of law, and what, if any, are such
unsettled questions of fact. and undetermined questions of
law."
These inquiries involve an examination of said article and
of the provision made by Congress for executing the same,
and also of the result and effect of the proceedings had under such provision.
By the said article it is stipulated : "The United States
will cause satisfaction· to be made for the injuries, if any,
which, by process of law, shall be established to have been
suffered by the Spanish officers and individual Spanish inhabitants by the late operations of the '.American army in
Florida."
In execution of the same article the act of March 3, 1R23,
chapter 35, was enacted. By the first section of that act
the judges of the superior courts established at St. Augustine and Pensacola respectively are authorized to receive and
adjust all claims arising within their respective jurisdictions,
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agreeably to the provisions of said article; and by the second section it is provided: "That, in all cases in which said
judges shall decide in favor of the claimants, the decisions,
with the evidence on which they are founded, shall be, by
the said judges, reported to the Secretary of the Treasury,
who, on being satisfied that the same is just and equitable,
within the provisions of the said treaty, shall pay the amount
thereof to the person or persons in whose favor the same is
.adjudged," etc.
That act was construed by the Secretary of the Treasury
to not extend to injuries suffered in 1812 and 1813 from the
causes mentioned in the treaty, but to apply only to those
of a subsequent period. In consequence of this construction,
the act of June 26, 1834, chapter 87, was passed, enlarging the
authority of the judge of the superior court at St. Augustine and of the Secret_ary of the Treasury so as to include
,c laims for injuries suffered in 1812 and 1813, but li!niting the
time for presenting the claims to one year from the passage
.of the act.
Such was the provision made by Congress for executing
said article; and that the tribunals thereby created (viz, the
judges and the Secretary of the Treasury), for adjusting
claims for damages, were, in that regard, a sufficient compliance with the treaty, is affirmed in the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the case of The United States v. Ferreira (13 How.,
47, 48). "The tribunals established," remarks the court
there, "are substantially the same with those usually created
where one nation agrees by treaty to pay debts or damages
which may be found to be due to the citizens of another
.country. This treaty meant nothing more than the tribunal
and mode of proceeding ordinarily established on such occasions, and well known and well understood wben treaty obligations of this description are undertaken."
Under that provision the judgt>s were authorized to receive
and adjust claims which originated within their respective
jurisdictions, but a power of•revision over awards made by
them in favor of claimants was given the Secretary of the
Treasury. "No claim, therefore," says the court in the case
above cited, "is due from the United States until it is sanctioned by him ; and his decision against the claimant for the
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whole or a part of the claim as allowed by the judge is final
and conclusive." The court further observes in the same
case, "all that the judge is required to do is to receive the
claim when the party presents it, and to adjust it upon such
evidence as he may have before him or be able himself to
obtain. But neither the evidence, nor his award, are to be
filed in the court in which he presides, nor recorded there;
but he is required to transmit both the decision and the evidence upon which he decided to the Secretary of the Treasury; and the claim is to be paid if the Secretary thinks it
just and equitable, but not otherwise. It is to be a debt
from the United States upon the decision of the Secretary,.
but not upon that of the judge."
Pursuant to the authority thus conferred, the judges received and acted upon claims presented to them; and where
they decided in favor of claimants, their decisions, with the
evidence upon which the same rested, were reported to the
Secretary of the Treasury for his action. In nearly every case
in which they so decided they added to the amount of actual
damage found to have been sustained by the claimant interest thereon at a certain rate for a certain period; but the
interest so added was, on revision of the awards by the Secretary of the Treasury, uniformly rejected by him, and the
claimants paid without any allowance for interest being included in the payments.
All claims cognizable by the judges under the provision
above referred to have long since been passed upon by them,
and the amounts finally allowed thereon, upon revision by the
Secretary of the Treasury, have all been paid to the partif's
entitled.
Thus, as matter of fact, it appears(1) That adequate tribunals (composed of the judges auJ
the Secretary of the Treasury) for adjusting the claims were
created by Congress, and that, in this respect, all that is
contemplated or required by the treaty has been performed.
(2) That, in the adjustmen! of the claims, the mode of
proceeding prescribed by the taw creating such tribunals,
(viz, examination and decision in the first instance by the
judge, revision and final decision thereupon by the Secretary), has been follo'Yed throughout.
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(3) That the amounts thereby ascertained to be due from
the United States to claimants have all been paid, and
that there remain unadjudic1lted no claims cognizable by
such tribunals.
From the foregoing I deduce the following conclusion :
That the Government of the United States has already done
all that it was bound to do under the article of the treaty
hereinbefore mentioned-in other words, has fully executed
the said article; and consequently that no liability whatever
arising under the treaty now rests upon it.
In regard to the interest allowed by the judges in the first
instance, and afterwards, on revision, disallowed by the Secretary of the Treasury, that stands rejected by the ultimate
decision of the tribunal created in conformity with the
requirements of the treaty for the purpose of adjusting claims
preferred thereunder. And as no appeal from such decision
is provided for, it must be deemed to be conclusive upon the
claimants with respect to the subject-matter thereof. No
obligation on the part of the United States exists, by virtue of the treaty, to "cause satisfaction to be made" to
them for any damage over and above that which, according to the final decision of said tribunal, they have sustained.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Ron. F. T.

FRELINGHUYSEN,

Secretary of State.
ENTRY OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE.
Semble that section 2859, Revised ' Statutes, is not repealed by section 9'
of the act of J nne 2~, 1874, chapter 391, or by the act of May 1, 1876~
~~~

.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April14, 1884.
SIR: In reply to yours of the lOth instant, asking whether
the act of 1874, chapter 391, section 9, or that of1876, chapter 89, repeals section 2859, Revised Statutes, I have to say
that after much consideration I am unable to satisfy myself
that the latter is repealed by either of the acts before named.
There is no express repeal ; and I am unable to find such
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inconsistency between the re8pective provisions as in the
absence of an express repeal might argue a repeal by implication. It seems to me that for regulation of details of importation of goods worth one hundred dollm·s or less the act of
187 4 means to refer to what is to be found in previous legislation. Nor do I find it otherwise by the act of 1876, except
as to the particular provision therein expressly made.
I may add that upon its face the act of 1874, section 9,
only excepts goods worth $100 or less from the provisions as
to all other goods therein contained. And I do not find that
these new provisions make such a revolution in previous
regulations touching such other goods as carries with it an
inference that previous regulations as to the excepted goods
also must be thereby repealed.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS.
Where an inspector of customs, while holding that office, rendered service as a special deputy marshal under section 2031, Revised Statutes:
Held that he is prohibited by the third section of the act of June 20,
1874, chapter 328, from receiving any compensation for such service
beyond his salary as inspector of customs.

DEP AR1.'MENT

JUSTICE,
Ap,t il 19, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 28th ultimo, transmitting papers in relation to
the retention by the collector of customs at New Orleans of
$50 from the salary of E. J. Sherman, an inspector of customs,
on the ground that he has received that amount from the
United States for service as a special deputy marshal under
section 2031 of the Revised Statutes, and requesting my
opinion whether the inspector was prohibited by law from
receiving such compensation.
Section 3 of the act of June 20, 1874, chapter 328, contains
the following provision :
"That no civil officer of the Government shall hereafter re~eive any compensation or perquisites, directly or indirectly,
OF
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from the 'rreasury or property of the United States beyond
his salary or compensation allowed by law."
By section 2621 of the R-evised Statutes a collector may
employ, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,
proper persons as inspectors at the several ports within his
district.
In the case of Hartwell (6 Wall., 385) the Supreme Court
held, with regard to a substantially similar provision under
which a clerk in the office of an assistant treasurer was
appointed, that he was a public officer. The only difference
in the statute there considered from that last before mentioned is, that in section 2621 the word " em ploy" is used
instead of" appoint,'' which I do not think a material difference, especially as in sections 2576~ 2583, 2605, 2606, 2607 the
latter term is used as to inspectors.
In sections 2637, 2737, and in many others of the Revised
Statutes, inspectors are styled officers, and they are in practice required to take the oath of office.
There can be no doubt that they have alway~ been considered and treated as public officers, and they have a salary or
compensation allowed by law. (Rev. Stat., 2733, 2737; 20
Stat., 173, 414.)
As such inspector, Sherman was therefore a civil officer,
and within the restriction of the act of 187 4 above cited, and
was prohibited by it from receiving from the Treasury the
$50 for service as special deputy marshal. (Hedrick's Case,
16 U. Cis. H., 102.)
He was not, as such special deputy marshal, a public officer
within the constitutionallimitation as to appointment. (Const.,
Art. II, sec. 2), and so can claim nothing by reason of section
1763 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 1765 of the Revised Statutes might be considered
also as applicable to his case, but in view of the broader
language of the act of 1874 I have not deemed it necessary
to consider that provision. I return the papers inclosed, as
requested.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. CHARLES J. FoLGER,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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INDEX.
ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS.
1. The First Comptroller has no revisory power over the decisions of the
Secretary of the Treasury respecting the issue of warrants; such
decisions are binding upon the former officer. 233.
2. It is not within the province of the accounting: officers of the 'Treasury
to construe the pension laws and give instructions to pension agents
as to the payment of pensions. This properly belongs to the Commissioner of Pensions, whose duty it is, under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, to administer these laws. 339.
3. The Commissioner of Pensions is not invested with power to audit and
adiust accounts for the last sickness and burial of deceased pensioners arising under section 4718 Rev. Stat. This power belongs
solely to the proper accounting officer of the Treasury by virtue of
section 236 Rev. Stat. 440.
4. S., while a major-general of volunteers, was, in July, 1866, appointed
colonel of the Forty-fifth United States Infantry, and on September 10, 1866, accepted the appointment and took the oath of office.
From that time until August 31, 1867, when he was mustered out
of service as a major-general of volunteers, he continued to draw
the pay of a major-general: Held that the settlements made by the
accounting officers in the matter of his pay as major-general are
conclusive upon the executive department of the Government, and
can not be re-opened. 448.
See DISTRICT 01~ COLUMBIA, 6, 7; PAY ACCOUNTS OF ARMY OFFICERS, 1, 2.
AD INTERIM ' APPOINTMENT.
See APPOINTMENT, 6, 9, 11.
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE.
1. No rule of administrative practice is better settled than that when a
matter has once been passed upon and finally disposed ofhy the head
of a Department, it should not be disturbed or re-opened by his
successors, excepting under extraordinary circumstances, such as
the discovery of new facts, and the like. 315.
2. The fact that an application for re-examination had been made to and
had not been acted upon by the head of Department by whom the
decision was rendered, does not withdraw the case from the operation of the rule. Ibid.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 9; RES ADJUDICATA.
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ADVERTISEMENT.
See CONTRACT, 2, 3.
AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE LANDS.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 2.
AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES.
See NATIONAL BANKING AssociATIONS, 4, 5, 6, 7.
APPOINTMENT.
1. K. was elected and qualified as Senator from Iowa for a term which
would expire in March, 1883. He resigned in March, 1881, to accept
the position of Secretary of the Interior, which office he also resigned
in the latter part of the same year. Since then, by act of May 15'"
1882, chap. 145, the office of tariff commissioner was created;
Advised that the second clause of section 6 of the first article of th&
Constitution disqualifies K. for appointment to such office. 365.
2. Doubt suggested whether the provision in section 3 of the act "to regulate and improve the civil Bervice," etc. (22 Stat., 403), for the
employment of a" chief examiner," does not come in conflict with
the constitutional rule on the subject of appointments. 504.
3. The word'' employ" is sometimes used in our legislation in a sense
equivalent to " appoint." Ibid.
4. An office which hasbecomevacantduring a session of the Senate may
be filled during: the next ensuing recess of the Senate by a temporary
appointment by the President; but by section 1761 Rev. Stat.
payment of the salary of the appointee, in such case, is postponed
until he has been confirmed by the Senate. 5~1.
5. Semble that the nomination and conji1·mation of a person who at the time
is ineligible for the office by force of section 6, article 1 of the ConstitutiOn, can not be made the basis of his appointment to such office.
after his ineligibility ceases. 522.
6. Sections 177, 178, 179, and 180 Rev. Stat., considered wit.h reference to the power of the President to make ad interint appointments,
and opinion of Attorney·General Devens (16 Opin., 596-7) concurred
in. 530.
7. Under the law at present in force, assistant engineers in the revenuecutter service should be appointed by the President with the concurrence of the Senate. 532.
8. It is a general rule that, where there is no-express enactment to the
contrary, the appointment of any officer of the United States belongs
to the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Ibid.
9. Section 180 Rev. Stat. applies to vacancies in office occasioned by
death or resignation, as well where they are.filled (under section~
177 or 178 Rev. Stat.) without action by the President, as where
they are filled (unaer section 179 Revised Statutes) by his authority and direction. 535.
JO. The discretionary power given the President by section 179 Rev.
Stat. may be exercised after the vacancy has already been sup-
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plied under the operation of either of the two preceding sections:'
and in t.hat case the ten days' limitation is to be computed from the
date of the President's action. Ibid.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1, 3; PRESIDENT, 5.
APPRAISERS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 19.
ARMY.
1. Tbe act of December 12, 1 "'178, chap. 2, limits the nomination of brigadier-general in the Inspector- General's Department to the senior
officer thereof. Provisions of that act compared with those of section 1193 Rev. Stat., and distinction between them indicated. 2.
2. Where a judge-advocate, appointed in the volunteer service under
the act of July 17, 1862, chap. 201, with the rank of major, was
afterwards and prior to the act of July 28, 1866, chap. 299, as
amended by the act of February 25, 1867, chap. 79 (by operation
of which acts he became transferred from the volunteer to the regular service), brevetted a lieutenant-colonel and also a colonel of
volunteers: Held that the said acts of 1866 and 1867 produced no
effect upon the brevet commissions in the volunteer service previously conferred, and that snch brevets 9an not be treated as brevets in the regular service. 3.
3. Upon consideration of the facts in the case of the retirement of Col.
George Stoneman, U.S. Army: Held, that that officer was not entitled to be retired as a major-general on account of disability occasioned by wounds received in battle, under the provision!'! of section 3~ of the act of July 28, 1866, chap. 299 (it not appearing that
his disability was so occasioned), but that he was properly retired
on his rank of colonel. 7.
4. Opinion of November 28, 1874 (14 Opin., 506), upon tae claim of General Schuyler Hamilton to be borne on the retired list of the Army,
re-affirmed. 9.
5. Relative rank in the Paymaster's Department of the Army, as between officers having the same grade and date of appointment and
commission, was regulated by the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 150
(Rev. Stat., sees. 1219 and 1292), and was determined by length of
service as a commissioned officer, computed according to the provisions of that act. 10.
·6. Except as between such officers as have the same date of appointment and commission, the matter of relative rank was left by that
act to be governed by the dates of the commission~ under which
the officers are at the time serving. Ibid.
7. Y., B., and S. were second lieutenants in different infantry regiments,
ranking in the order named according to dates of their respective
appointments and commissions. They were all promoted to be
first lieutenants in their respective regiments as of the same date,
June 28, 1878. S., who was the junior second lieutenant, claimed
to be the senior first lieutenant under section 1219 Rev. Stat.,
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because of the greater length of service as a commissioned officer
prior to date of promotion: Held that the rule prescribed by
that section for determining relative rank as between officers of
the same grade and date of appointment and commission applies to
appointments on promotion as well as to original appoinments; and,
consequently, that S. ranked the other :first lieutenants referred
to. 34,
8. Where an Army officer is placed on duty according to his brevet rank
by special assignment of the President, he is, while thus assigned,
entitled to precedence and command according to his brevet commission, even over an officer holding a full commission of the same
rank as tbe brevet, but of junior date. Thus a colonel who holds a
brevet commission as major-general of the date of March 2, 1867,
and who is by the President specially assigned to duty according to
his brevet rank, takes precedence over an officer who holds a full
commission of major-general dated November 25, 1872. 3~.
9. On reconsideration, the opinion of January 13, 1881 (ante, p. 3), hold' ing that the brevets of Major Winthrop, judge-advocate, in the
volunteer force, could not be treated as brevets in the regular Army,
re-affirmed. 46.
10. Sections 1104 and 1108 Rev. Stat. prohibit, by implication, the enlistment of white men in the colored regiments therein mentioned and
provided for. 47.
11. In fixing the relative rank of officers of the same grade and date of
commission, under the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 159 (sec. 1219
Re\", Stat.), constructive service as a commissioned officer is not
to be considered. 52.
12. The terms of the statute, ''actually served," are used ex industria,
and are intended to prevent any service purely constructive in its
character from affecting the relation between officers of tbe same
date. Ibid.
13. The rule prescribed in paragraph 20, Army Regulations of 1863, by
which "promotions to the rank of captain shall be made regimentally," is not in conflict with the provisions of section 1204 Rev.
Stat., and remains in fnll force. 65.
14. The regulations and legislation concerning the promotion of subaltern company officers, from the year 1801 to the present time, reviewed, and the practice thereunder stated. 1 bid.
15. Officers and enlisted men of the Signal Corps (other than those who
are detailed for service therein) are a part of the Army only in this
sense, namely, that in general they are liable to such duties and
entitled to snch privileges, appertaining to the Army, as can be
performed and enjoyed without severancefrom the Signal Service.
146.
16. They belong to a special service in the Army, and are subject to
military government; but they are n<>tby law transferable to ordinary military duty, and are organically separate and distinct from
the Army proper. Ibid.
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17. The word "appointment," as used in section 1219 Rev. Stat. comprehends only the appointment of an officer on his original entry
into the regular service, and does not include his appointment on
promotion thereafter made. Opinion of Attorney-General Devens,
of February 21, 18R1 (ante, p. 34), dissented from. 196.
18. Previous to the act of March 2, 1867, chap. 159, rank in any grade
in the Army was determined by date of commission or appointment;
and where commissions were of the same date, then, as between
officers of the same regiment or corps, by the order of appointment.
362.
19. That act (sec. 1219 Rev. Stat.,) introduced a new rule, cumulative

:20.

:21.

:22.

·23.

24.

in its character, for determining relative rank as between officers
"having the same grade aud date of appeiintment and commission,"
which, as regards officers of the same regiment or corps, operates
only where such officers, being of the same grade and date of appointment and commisiiou, have (one or. more) "actually served,
whether continuously or at different periods, as a commissioned
officer of the United States," etc. Where none of them, when appointed, bad thus actually served, the former rule (i.e., order of
appointment) would ~till be applicable in fixing their relative
rank in the corps. Ihid.
Opinion of May 18, 1882, viz, that where certain assistant surgeons
had attained the rank of captain on the Rarne day, but whose appointments and commissions were not of the same date, their relative rank as between themselves was not determined by the provisions of section 1 of the act of March 2, 1tl67, chap. 159 (sec. 1219,
Rev. Stat.), but by the date and order of their appointmentreaffirmed. 402.
Under section 17 of the act of July 28, 1866, chap. 2!-19, an assistant
tmrgeon who served as such less than three years in the regular
Army, or less than three years in the volunteer forces, did not becom~ immediately entitled to the rank of captain, although his
volunteer and regular service, when combined, may have amounted
to three years. Ibid.
But by the second section of the act of March 2, 1867, the officer
would have a right to have his volunteer service computed, and if
at the date of that act this service, united with his service in the
regular Army, made three years, he would then be entitled to the
rank of captain. This provision, however, did not operate retrospectively, so as to affect or alter the previous relations of the officer
in the ~:~ervice. Ibid.
In determining whether the limit of four hundred, prescribed by the
act of June 18, 1878, chap. 263, has been reached or not, the num'ber retired under the act of June 30, 1882, chap. 254, must always
enter into the computation. 421.
No retirement can lawfully be made under the laws existing prior to
the act of June 30, 1882, when the number already on the retired list
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amounts to four hunilred; althoulb, by retirements under that act,
the list is subject to temporary augmentation beyond the limit of
four hundred. Ibid.
25. The vacancy existing in the office of assistant surgeon-general may be.
filled by appointing thereto any one of the surgeons with the rank
of colonel or the chief medical purveyor (all of whom hold offices of
the same grade in the medical corps as that of the vacant office), or
by promoting thereto the senior officer in the medical corps having
the rank of lieutenant-colonel, which is the next grade below. 465.
26. Where there are two or more offices of the same g1·ade in a corps, each requiring a separate commission, on a vacancy occurring in such grade
the rules of promotion do not preclude the appointing power from determining to which ot these offices the senior in the next grade below
shall be appointed. An mcumbent of one of them may be transferred by appointment to another which is vacant without prejudicing the rights of such senior, wJ:wse claim to promotion would be
fully met by appointing him to either. [bid.
27. An officer who has unsuccessfully undergone examination for promotion under section 1206 Rev. Stat., and in consequence has been
suspended from promotion for one year, as provided by that section,
is not, during the period of such suspension, qualified for promotion
on account of contmuous service under section 1207 Rev. Stat. 571.
~. Lieutenant-Colonel G., though his commission is junior in date to that
of Lieutenant-Colonel B., claims that he is entitled to the next colonelcy over the latter, by reason of errors committed in his promotion in 1847 and 1867: Advised that such errors, if any, can not now
be rectified by disregarding the fact that B., in virtue of his present
commission, is senior to G. in the line of promotion, and that the
claim of the latter is therefore inadmissible, 611.
See PAY AccouNTS OF ARMY OFFICERs, 1, 2; PRESIDENT, 1, 2, 3, 4;
QUARTERS, COMMUTATION FOR, 1, 2; ARMY REGULATIONS, 1, 2.
ARMY REGULATIONS.
1. Section 37 of the act of July 28, 1886 chap. 299 (i.f not already repealed by force of section 5596 Rev. Stat.), was superseded by
the act of March 1, 1875, chap. 115, which in effect conferred
authority to modify existing Army Regulations as well as to create
new ones. 461.
~ The codification of "The Regulations of the Army and General
Orders," under section 2 of the act of June 23, 1879, chap. 35,
which was approved and published February 17, 1881, superseded
the body of Army Regulations promulgated in 1863. Hence paragraph 1304, 1305, and 1306 of the latter regulations are not now in
force. Ibid.
See PAY ACCOUNTS OF ARMY OFFICERS, 7, 8.
ARTIFICIAL LIMBS.
The appropriation of $175,000 for artificial limbs, t>tc., made by the
act of March 3, 1881, chap. 133, should be expended under the
direction of the War Department. 233.
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ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS.
See CLAIMS, 10.
ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC RAILROAD.
The recommendations of the Secretary of the Interior as to the acceptance of certain sections of the railroad and telegraph lines of the
Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company should be approved by the
President. 251.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
1. In response to a resolution of the Senate directing the AttorneyGeneral to investigate and report to that body who are the owners
of the land and water-power at the Great Falls of the Potomac
River: Admsed that any information ou the subject found in the
records of the Department would be gladly furnished the Senate,
but that beyond this, it was submitted, such investigation is not
within the duties of the Attorney-General as· prescribed by law.
324.
~. The Attorney-General has no control over the action of the head of
Department at whose request and to w·h om an opinion Is given,
nor could he with propriety express any judgment concerning the
disposition of the matter to which the opinion relates, that being
something wholly within the administrative sphere of such head
of Department. :132.
3. Where a Senate bill was, at the request of a Senator, submitted to
the Attorney-General by the head of a Department for an opinion
thereon, in order that such opinion might be laid before the committee of the Senate in charge of the bill : Held that the AttorneyGeneral is not authorized to give an official opinion in this case,
it involving no question of Departmental administration. 347.
BANKS AND BANKERS.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 8, 9, 10; NATIONAL BANKING ASSOC:U.•
TIONS.
BIDS AND BIDDERS.
See CONTRACT, 1; POSTAL SERVICE, 8, 10, 11.
BOARD OF FIRE COMMISSIONERS.
SEE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA~ 5.
BOND.
See INDIAN INSPECTOR, 2; PAtENTED ARTICLES, PURCHASE OF.
BONDED WAREHOUSE.
8ee CUSTOMS LAWS, 31, 33•
.BONDS OF THE UNITED STATES.
In calling for redemption the new bonds issued by the Secretary of
the Treasury, known as "continued fives," those which have the
highest number, i. e. "the bonds of each class last dated and
numbered," as provided by the third section, of the act of July 14,
1870, chap. 256, should be called first. 349.
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BOND-SUBSIDIZED RAILROADS.
See TRANSPORTATION.
BOUNTY LAND WARRANTS.
See SoLDIERS' HoME, 1.
BREVET COMMISSION.
See ARMY, 2, 8.
BREVET RANK, ASSIGNMENT ACCORDING TO.
See ARMY, 8.
BRIG "GENERAL ARMSTRONG."
See CLAIMS, 12, 15, 16.
CADET.
See MILITARY ACADEMY.
CADET ENGINEER.
See CoMPENSATION, 9, 10.
CERTIFICATION OF CHECK.
See NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS, 12, 13.
CHARGES.
See CUSTOMS LAws, 11, 12, 13, 23.
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT.
See CHINESE LABORERS.
CHINESE LABORERS.
1. Chinese 1aborers coming from foreign lands can not be transported
across the territory of the United States without violating the act
of May 6, 1!:582, chap. 126, unless such laborers were in the United
States on the 17th day of November, 1880, or came here within
ninety days after the passage of said act. 416.
2. The pro-.isions of section 1 of the act of May 6, 1882, entitled "An
act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese," are
to be construed with the provisions of the treaty referred to,
wherein it is as immigrants into this country that Chinese laborers
are dealt with; and thus construed, a Chinese laborer who comes
to this country merely to pass through it is not within the prohibition of the statute. 483.
CHOCTAWS AND CHICKASAWS.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS.
CIVIL ENGINEERS' IN THE NAVY.
See NAVY, 7, 8.
CIVIL SERVICE.
1. The joint resolution of March 3, 1865 (section 1754 Rev. Stat.), considered in connection with the act of March 3, 1871, chap. 114,
and held that honorably discharged soldiers and sailors are not ex-
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CIVIL SERVICE-Continued.
empt from liability to examination for admission into the civil
service, but that they are entitled to a preference for appointment
as.against other persons of equal qualifications for the place. 194.
2. Whether there are already two or more members of a family in thepublic service, etc., as provided in section 9 of the civil service act
of January 16, 1883, chap. 27, is not a question to be considered
the Civil Service Commission, but by the appointing power. 554.
3. Departmental clerks whose salaries are · $900 or $1,000 per annum,
although not belonging to either of the classes in section 163
Rev. Stat., come within the scope of the act of January 16, 1883,
. chap. 27, and may be classified thereunder, for the purpose of examination, into one or more classes, as may be deemed expedient.
621.
. 4. Under section 1753 Rev. St~tt., the President may prescribe
regulations for admission into the civil service, and thereby restrict
original entry therein to one or more of the classes that may exist,
or permit such entry to all of them as in his judgment will· best
promote the efficiency of the service. Ibid.
5. If the $900 or $1,000 clerkships are constituted a distinct class, a promotion from snob class to another class without examination, excepting where, in conformity to the act, the person to be promoted
is specially exempted, would be forbidden by the act of January
16, 1883. To be eligible for appointment to any class (whether by
promotion or otherwise) the applicant must have pi;tssell an examination to test his fitness for the place. Ibid.
CLAIMS.
1. Upon consideration of the facts submitted in the case, in connection
with section 3483 Rev. Stat. : Held t,hat the st,eamer Joseph Pierce,
at the time of her destruction by fire, July 31, 1865, was not in
the military service of the United States either by contract or
impressment, and accordingly that the accounting officers of the
Treasury have no jurisdiction under that section to allow the value
thereof to the owners. 90.
2. An order may be made by the Secretary of the Interior directing payment of the certificates gh~en by the Superintendent of the Census
in eases where such certificates are assigned in strict conformity
to section 3477 Rev. Stat. 266.
3. The decision of the Secretary of the Interior of July 27, 1877, upon
the claim of Redick McKee, made under the act for the relief of the
latter approved March 3, H377, viz, that the claimant was entitled
to be re-imbursed the money paid out by him as interest on money
borrowed for the Government, is as far as the Secretary was authorized to go, and an allowance of interest on the amount so paid
out would have been unwarranted. 315.
4. It is a general rule that interest is not allowable on claims against
the · Government. The exceptions to this rule are found only in
cases where the demands are made under special contracts, or
special laws, expressly or by very clear implication providing for
the payment of interest. ibid.
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5. In view of the decision referred to, the claim should now be treated
as res judicata. lbid. -\
.
6. The award made by the Third Auditor on the lOth ofMay, 1861, under
the law of March 3, 1849, chap. 129, in favor of James and Richard
H. Porter, was binding upon all officers of the Government. 352.
7. The act of July 28, 1866, chap. 297, modifying the said act of 1849,
did not affect claims adjudicated by the Auditor before its passage.
Ibid.
8. Under the joint resolution of April 12, 1870, granting to General
Gabriel R. Paul (retired) ''the full pay and allowance of a brigadier-general in the Army of the United States," that officer is not
entitled to an allowance of forage. 390.
9. Upon the facts stated: Advised that Charles Ewing, esq., is entitled
to the compensation charged in his account for services rendered
the Osage Nation of Indians under a contract therewith, executed
in compliance with the law respecting contracts with Indians
dated February 14, 1877. 445.
10. The provisions of section 3477 Rev. Stat., touching transfers and
assignments of claims against the United States, and powers of
attorney, etc., for receiving payment thereof, do not apply to undisputed claims, or any claim about which no question is made as
to its validity or extent. 545.
11. Where a contract was made for roofing a court-house at a fixed
price, and a power of attorney given to receiYe a part of such price
as security for material purchased by the contractor: .Advised that
the power was not affected by section 3477, as no doubt existed concerning the right of the contractor to receive the amount so secured. Ibid.
12. Upon the case stated: Advised that Samuel C. Reid, jr., is not entitled to receive the unpaid balance lying in the Treasury for the
benefit of the owners and crew of the brig Gentrral..d.rrnstrong. 590.
13. The claim of the State of New York for re·im bursement of the interest
paid by that State on money burrowed and expended in enrolling,
subsisting, clothing, etc., its troops employed to aid in the suppression of the rebellion is not allowable under the provisions of
the act of July 27, 1861, chap. 21. 595.
14. To construe the provisions of that act so as to include a claim for iuterest thus paid would be giving them a meaning much broader
than that which has in practice been given other legislation of like
character, or than seems to be warranted by any sound rule of interprehtion. Ibid.
15. Reconsideration of opinion of July 7, 1883 (ante, p. 590), and conclusion there reached, respecting the claim of Mr. S. C. Reid, jr.,
reaffirmed. 600.
16. Under the power conferred by the the act of May 1, 188~, chap. 115,
the Secretary of State had no authority to pass upon the claim of
Mr. Reid to be re-imbursed expenses incurred by him as agent in
the prosecution of the claims of the "captain, owners, officers,
and crew 11 of the brig General Armstrong. Gl6.

•

INDEX.

697

CLAIMS-Continued.
17. The United States are under no obligation to allow interest on the
awards made by the Florida judges in cases of claims of Spanish
subjects under the ninth article of the treaty with Spain of 1819.
644.
18. Review of the legislation passed and procee<lings had thereunder
in execution of the ninth article of th~ treaty with Spain of 1819,
respecting the claims of Spanish subjects growing out of the operations of the American Army in Florida. 680.
:;_g. The Government of the United States has done all that it was bound
to do under that article, aud has fully executed the same ; hence
no liability whatever arising under the treaty now rests upon it.
Ibid.
1
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. Advised that the amount claimed to be due from the State of Kansas
to the United States on account of the direct tax be retained out of
the amount appropriated for payment to that State by the act
of March 3, lRSl, chapter 132. 228.
-2. Where it was proposed to submit to arbitration claims of the United
States against certain mail contractors: Advised that the right to
submit in the cases mentioned is doubtful; in view of which a dif·
ferent course is suggested. 486.
See DIRECT TAX.
CLEARANCE OF VESSELS.
See CusTOMS LAws, 1.
COLLECTION OF DUTIES.
See CUSTOMS LAWS.
COLONEL STONEMAN'S CASE.
See ARMY, 3.
COLORED REGIMENTS, ENLISTMENT IN.
See A~MY, 10.
COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 2, 3.
·C OMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; STATUTES, lNTERPlUCTATIONS OF, 4.
COMMUNICATIONS TO CONGRESS.
1. Requests made on heads of Departments by Congressional committee&,
or by either House of Congress, for information on matters relating
to ordinary and current legislation, may with propriety be answered
directly, without passing through the executive office; otherwise
as to communications which concern radical changes in existing
laws affecting public policy. 254.
~. Subordinate officers of the several Departments should communicate
with Congress through the heads of their Departments respectiYely.
Ibid.
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1. Where an officer in the ordnance department, in addition to his regular duties as ordnance store-keeper, acted as assistant commissary
at the Watervliet Arsenal by virtue of post orders: Held that under
section 1261 Rev. Stat. he was entitled to receive $100 per year in
addition to the pay of his rank during the time he performed services
as assistant commissary. 43.
2. In computing the longevity pay of officers of the Army, under the provision in the act of February 24, 1881, chap. 79, declaring that "theactual time of service in the Army or Navy, or both, shall be allowed
all officers," etc.: Held-(1) That the actual time of an officer's.
service as a cadet at the Military Academy should not be allowed.
(2) Tbat where an officer served in the Medical Corps of the Navy
the actual time of his service in that corps should be allowed.
(3) That where an officer served as a captain's clerk in theN avy, theactual time of his service as such clerk should be allowed. ( 4) That
where the officer served as an assistant civil engineer in the employ
of the War Department on the Florida coast and elsewhere, the
actual time of his service in that capacity should not be allowed. 93.
3. The amount drawn by Charles M. Blake for pay as chaplain in the
Army from May 14, 1878, to the date of his acceptance of appointment as post chaplain with advice and consent of the Senate (May
23, L581 ), may be charged against him and withheld from his pay
thereafter accruing. 152.
4. Semble, however, that he may be allowed the benefit of his actual service from June 21, 1878, to March 4, 1879, for longevity. Ibid.
5. In March, 1873, J., a postmaster, was appointed by the Secretary of
the Treasury an agent to disburse money appropriated for the erection of a public building. The compensation for such service was
then regulated by the act of March 3, 1869, chap. 123, which limited it to not exceeding one-eighth of 1 per centum, and by the
terms of his appointment J. was to receive the maximum compensation allowed by law. Subsequently, by the act of March 3, 1875,
chap. 131, it was declared that the provision in the act of March
3, 1869, above referred to, sho!!ld be held to limit the compensation
to be allowed for such services to three-eighths of 1 per centum.
Thereupon the Secretary of the Treasury increased J .'s compensation to one-fourth of 1 per centum; but the latter claims that he is
entitled, under the terms of his appointment, to three-eighths of 1
per centum from the date of the act of 1875: Held, that one-fourth
of one per centum, a3 allowed by the Secretary under the provision
of the act of 1875, is all that J. is entitled to for his services. 219.
6. The fees of witnesses subprenaed un~r section 184 Rev. Stat.,
on application of the Pension Bureau, to testify before a United
States commissioner, and also the fees of the commissioner by whom
their testimony i& taken, may properly be allowed out of the judiciary fund. The former should be paid by the United States marshal of the district on the certificate or order of the commissioner;
the latter, as in ordinary course, on settlement of the commissioner's accounts at the Treasnry. 247.
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7. Y. was advanced twenty-five numbers on the Navy list, under sec·
tion 1506 Rev. Stat., whereby be was promoted from the grade of
ensign to that of master, to which latter grade he was confirmed
March 3, 1879, to take rank from November 24, 1877: Held that his
increased pay commenced, not at the date from which he took rank
as master, but at the date of his appointment as master (March 3,
1879). 319.
8. Under a provision in the act of June 16, 1880, enabling the Secretary
of War "to cause to be constructed a fire-proof roof for the building at the corner of Seventeeth and F. streets,'' in Washington, D.
C., Mr. James Eveleth, a clerk in the office of the Chief of Engineers, was designated by the Secretary as his agent to take chargeof and superintend the work, and was allowed a compensation of
$300 per month from the date of such designation until the completion of the work. For the same period the sabry of E. as clerk
was suspended, and in effect his duties as stv~h also, these being
performed by another person who received the pay therefor: Held
that it was competent to the Secretary to employ E. as above, and
compensate him out of the fund appropriated for the service, and
that this case is not within section 1765 Rev. Stat., there being no
''additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation" received by
E. 321.
9. McF., a cadet engineer, having completed the prescribed course of
instruction at the Naval Academy and at sea June 10, 1881, and
successfully passed an examination, was confirmed by the Senateas an assistant engineer December 20, 1881, to take rank from theformer date: Held that he become entitled to the pay of assistant
engineer from the date he took rank as such, if that date is subsequent to the vacancy he was appointed to fill. 329.
10. Section 1, of the act of June 22, 1874, chap. 392, comprehends cadet
engineers, and fixes the commencement of their pay in the grade
of assistant engineer when promot~d thereto. Ibid.
11. As a general rule, a contract surgeon is entitled to pay only from the
time he enters upon duty under his contract. 461.
12. Semble that the maximum :fixed by paragraph 1305 of the Regulations
of 1863 for the compensation of contract surgeons continued up t()
February 17, 1881; but that thereafter compensation at a rate ex·
ceeuing such maximum was allowable. Ibid.
13. The provisions of the Navy appropriation acts of August 5, 1882, chap.
391, and March 3, 1883, chap. 97, requiring all officers of th6>
Navy to be credited with the actual time they may have served as
officers or enlisted m6n in the regular or volunteer Navy, etc., do
not entitle such officers to any increasAd pay for services rendered
by them prior to March 3, 1883. 555 •
.t4. To entitle a postmaster to receive compensation for issuing and paying money orders, under the provisions of section 4047 Rev.
Stat., he must earn it by performing the service himself or having
it performed by a clerk or agent employed and paid by him for
that purpose. 627.
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15. The act of March 3, 1883, chap.119, merely directs the readjustment
of the salaries of postmasters to be made in accordance with the
pre-existing law, leaving the meaning of the latter to be determined in the usual and proper methods. 658.
16. By that act the Postmaster-General is required to make, on behalf of
an applicant thereunder, the adjustment or readjustment of salary
which he may claim and be found to have been entitled to, at any
one or more of the biennial periods since the act of July 1, 1864,
chap. 197, under the latter act as amended by the proviso added
thereto by the act of June 12, 1866, chap. 114, crediting the applicant with any difference in his favor between the amount of the
salary so readjusted for the prospective biennial period and the
salary paid to him for the time of his service in such period. Ibid.
17. Where an inspector of customs, while holding that office, rendered
service as a special deputy marshal under section 2031 Rev. Stat.:
Held that he is prohibited by the third section of the act of June
20, 1874, chap. 328, from receiving any compensation for such
service beyond his salary as inspector of customs. 684.
COMPROMISE.
In passing upon cases submitted to him for compromise, under sections 3229 and 3469 Rev. Stat., the Secretary of the Treasury while
he is not at liberty to act from motives merely of compassion or
charity, may consider not only the pecuniary interests of the
Government, but take into view general considerations of justice
and equity ana. of public policy. 213.
•
CONDEMNATION OF LAND FOR PUBLIC USES.
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 6.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
See REVISED STATUTES, ETC. ; STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OIP.
CONTINUING PUNISHMENT.
See PARDON, 2, 3.
CONTRACT.
1. A proposal made by M. to carry the mail over a certain route during
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1882, for $1,140, that being the lowest
bid received, was accepted; but he subsequently asked to be released therefrom, on the ground that the bid which he intended to
make was$2,140: Held that the proposal and its acceptance constitute one agreement, of the same force and effect as if a formal contract had been written out and signed by the parties; that it is the
duty of the Postmaster-General to require the execution of such
agreement according to its terms ; and that he is not at liberty to
allow the contractor to withdraw from it upon the allegation th~t a
mistake was made in the proposal submitted. 70.
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2. A contract for furnishing the Post-Office Department with copies of
the Postal Guide, under the act of March 3, 1881, chap. 130, making
an appropriation for "publication of copies" thereof, does not come
within the provisions of section 3709 Rev. Stat., aud the Postmaster-General is not required to advertise for proposals previously
to making such a contra.ct. 84.
3. The object of that section, in requiring advertisement for proposals before making purchases and contracts for supplies, islto invite competition among bidders, and it contemplates only those purchases and
contracts where competition as to the article needed is possible,
which is not the case with the Postal Guide. Ibid.
4. A. and B. had each a separate contract for transporting the mails, and
the latter was also a surety for the former. A. incurred indebtedness to the Government by reason of fines, penalties, and forfeitures
beyond the amount due him ; and the pay of B., his surety, was withheld for the protection of the Government against loss. Prior to the
performance of the service by B., for which his pay was withheld,
he gave a pay draft to C., which was placed on file in the Auditor's
office "subject to fines, etc., in accordance with the act of Congress
approved May 17, 1871:l, and any claim or demand the Post-Office Department may have against the contractor:" Held, that the payment
of an amount due B. under his contract, sufficient to meet his liability as surety on the contract of A., might lawfully be withheld;
and that the draft given by the former on his pay conferred upon the
holder thereof no right which prevents such pay being thus withheld. 244.
5. It is competent to the Secretary of the Navy, underthe circumstances
stated, to release a certain mortgage given by Robert L. Stevens on
the 9th of September, 1848, as security for the performance of a
certain contract theretofore entered into by him for the construction of a war vessel sine~ known as the "Stevens Battery." 281.
6. The facts in the case held not to constitute sufficient grounds to justify the Secretary of War in releasing the Eastern Dredging Company from the performance of its contract with the United States
to do dredging in Charles River, Massachusetts, to the extent of
100,000 cubic yards at the price per cubic yard specified in the contract. 368.
7. Where a contract for the delivery of certain supplies at an Indian
agency provided for the acceptance of goods inferior in quality to
the sample where the emergency demanded it, held that the time
and place of delivery before the goods were distributed were eminently the time and place to determine their relative value. 384.
8. The first proviso in the act of May 4, 1882, chap. 116, empowering
the Postmaster-General to annul the contract of any contractor or
subcontractor who shall sublet his contract for a less sum than that
for which he contracted to perform the service, is prospective in its
operation. 514.
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8. Where the approval of the proceedings, findings, and sentence of a
court-martial by the President is attested by an entry on the record signed by the Secre,tary of War, this is sufficient evidence of
such approval. (But see NOTE on page 399.) Ibid.
9. The order of the President in the case of Charles D. Coleman, of
March 3,1869, which was rescinded March 13, 1869, being executory
and in its nature revocable, and having remained unexecuted at
the time of its rescission, was completely annulled thereby. 436.
10. A general officer, commanding a military department in July, 1865,
had no power to appoint a court-martial for the trial of an officer
under his command where he was himself the '' accuser or prosecutor;" nor could such power be imparted t.o him otherwise than
by a legislaLive act. Ibid~
11. H. was tried by a court-martial and found guilty of the offense
charged. At the trial a witness objected to answering a question
on the ground of self-crimination; but the court required him to
answer, the judge-advocate reading in support of this requirement
section 860 Rev. Stat. : Held that if t,h e court committed an
err&r in compelling the witness to answer, the error is not such as
to require a disapproval of the proceedings. 616.
12. Whether the effect of that section is to take away from a witness the
common-law privilege of declining to answer a question which
tends to criminate him, when it is manifest that he could only be
tried in the courts of the United States, qucm·e. Ibid.
COURT OF RECORD.
PENSION, 11, 12.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY INDIANS.
See JURISDICTION, 1, 2.
CUSTOMS LAWS.
1. A collector of customs may lawfully refuse a clearance to a vessel
whose master is alleged to be amenable to the penalty provided by
section 2809 Rev. Stat., for bringing into the United States merchandise not included in the manifest required and described in
the preceding sections. Such refusal is not a seizure, and the act
of February 8, 1881, chap. 34, is inapplicable. 82.
2. Shellac varnish, composed of a mixture, made in a Canadian bonded
warehouse, of the gum with alcohol distilled in this country and
exported without payment of auy internal-revenue tax here and no
exaction of duty upon it in Canada because in bond there, is
dutiable under Schedule D, of section 2504 Rev. Stat., which
declares that ''on all compounds or preparations of which distilled
spirits is a component part of chief value there shall be_levied a
duty not less than that imposed upon distilled spirits," namely, $2
per proof gallon. In determining which is the component of chief
value, the value of each ingredient in the domestic markets of the
United States should be the guide. 105.
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3. The remedy by suit against a collector, provided by section 3011
Rev. Stat., is given to an importer only who has paid the unties
to the collector whom he proposes to make defendant in the suit;
it does not apply to cases in which, by reason of the failure of
the importer to pay the collector, the payment is sought to be
enforced by suit against the former. 142.
4. There is no statute giving the Secretary of the Treasury any direct control over suits instituted for the collection of unpaid duties. Ibid.
5. Foreign magazines and newspapers transported by mail from Canada.
into the United States, addressed to dea.lers, for the purpose of sale
by them, or of being by them distributed among subscribers, are
dutiable. 159.
G. The postal convention with Canada and the act of March 3, 1879,
chap. 180, sec. 15, were not intended to affect existing tariff laws.
Ibid.
7. In the light of the information presented, Apollinaris mineral water isregarded as an artificial mineral water, and dutiable as such. 176.
I. By section 17 of the act of March 3, 1879, chap. 180, printed matter,
other than books, received by mail from foreign countries, under
the provisions of postal treaties or conventions, is declared free of
duty; and no distinction is there made between such as is mailed
to subscribers for their own use and such as is mailed to dealers forsale. 187.
9. Books which are admitted to the international mails, exchanged nuderthe provisions of the Universal Postal Union Convention, may be
delivered to addresses upon the payment of the duty thereon. Ibid~
10. The terms "quantity" and "whole quantity," as employed in
Schedule M (Rev. Stat., 2d ed., p. 476), are not to be understood as
covering all the fruit imported in any one vessel shipped to one
consignee, if coming from different consignors. Each consignment,
not only from one party, but of each separate kind of fruit specified in the statute, is to be considered as the "quantity," and as
the" whole quantity," therein specified. 203.
11. The additional duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem in section 290(}
Rev. Stat. can not be legally exacted on costs, charges, and
commissions, but s!:wuld be levied only on the "appraised value,,.
ofthe merchandise imported, exclusive ofsur.h charges. 268.
12. The additional duty of 20 per centum in section 290B Rev. Stat.
is a separate and distinct penalty, which can legally be exacted
on the charges as entered, and only on this element of the dutiable
value of the merchandise. Ibid.
13. The legislation on the subject reviewed, and those sections construed.
Ibid.
14. Where certain importers of sugar, having made due protest and
appeal but failing to bring suit afterwards, applied to the Secretary of the Treasury for a refund of duties illegally exacted, as indicated in the decision ofthe Supreme Court in the case of Merrittv.
Welsh ( 104 U. S., 694) : Advised that the Secretary can not grant
the application under section 30H~t Rev. Stat. 336.
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15. The word "chief," as used in the provision of the act of February 8,
1875, chapter 36, imposing a duty of 60 per c.ent. ad valorem ou all
goods, wares and merchandise made of silk or of which silk is a
component material, of chief value, etc., mea us greater thau either
of the other materials; not greater than their aggregate. 337.
16. Where a quantity of wool was imported at Boston from Liverpool,
and two days later was withdrawn for exportation to St. John,
New Brunswick, whence (having been carried thither) it was
immediately brought back to Boston: Held that if the purpose of
the above withdrawal, etc., was to create a second port of importation with the object of reducing the duty, the transaction was
fictitious, and that Liverpool remains the last port or place of
exportation within the meaning of the statute. 528.
17. The term "examiner," as used in sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act of
March 2, 1A83, chap. 64, signifies any officer authorized by the
fifth section to act in that capacity, and nothing more. 585.
18. It was not the intention of the act to create a new officer to meet its
requirements regarding the examination of imported teas. Ibid.
19. The term "appraisers" in the act does not embrace "assistant
appraisers." lbid.
20. The effect of the proviso in the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, declaring "that there shall be no allowance for breakage, leakage,
or damage on wines, liquors, CDrdials, or distilled spirits,'' was to
repeal all the provisions previously in force which authorized such
allowance; but it nevertheless permits the duties to be assessed on
the actual quantity of merchandise imported, whether in casks or
bottles. 613.
21. Where the quantity which actually arrive~ is found by the customs
officers to be less than the invoiced quantity, a deduction of the
excess of the latter over the former, in adjusting the duties, is not
an allowance within the meaning of the proviso mentioned. Ibid.
22. Review of legislation fixing the basis for estimating ad valorem
duties, passed prior to the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 633.
23. The only change effected by section 7 of that act is to exclude from
such basis all costs and charges which, under the law as it previously
stood, were required to be added to the current or actual market
value or wholesale price of the merchandise in the principal markets of the country whence the same was imported, or of the countryofproduction ormanufacture, as the case might be, thus making
such current or actual market value, etc., the sole basis for estimating such duties. Ibid.
24. By current or actual market value or wholesale price, as used in the
statute, is to be understood the amount of mouey the article commanded in the foreign market in the condition in which it is there
customarily sold and purchased. 1 bid.
25. The cost of boxes or coverings with which goods are ordinarily prepared for sale in the foreign market, and in.which they are usually
sold and purchased there, is an element of the actual market value.
of the goods. Ibid.
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26. What becomes of the box or coveting, in the course of trade, after
the importation, does not affect the question of dutiable value.
Ibid.
ZT. Opinion of April20, 1882 (ante p. 326), on the power of the Secretary
of the Treasury to refund duties erroneously exacted, reaffirmed.
6ll2•

. 28. Section 30121 Rev. Stat. confers upon him power to refund sub
modo only; i.e., upon appeals heard by him onder section 2931
Rev. Stat., when made in the form and wittin the time therein
specified. .I bid.
29. Imported scrap tobacco is dutiable as manufactured tobacco under
the act of March 3, 1893, chap. 121. 646.
30. Iron turnings are not dutiable as manufactured iron. 647.
31. Section 10 of the act of Maroh 3, 1883, chapter 121, extends only to
goods which had not been in bonded warehouse more than three
years at the date that act.took effect. 650.
32. Sections 2!>71 and 29i7 Rev. Stat. place a limitation upon the privilege of exportation with ref'und of duties, and require that it
shall be exercised within three years from the date of importation;
otherwise the privilege is lost. Ibid.
33. The provision in section 2971 Rev. Stat., requiring merchandise
to be sold, is applicable to goods remaining in public store or
bonded warehouse beyond three years, as well where the duties
thereon have been paid as where they have not been paid. At the
end of that period they are to be regarded as abandoned to the
Government and sold. Ibid.
34. The object and requirement of that provision are, however, sufficiently met by the practice of the Department, whereby, in lieu of
a formal sale of the goods, the owner, consignee, or agent is permitted to pay tbe duties, charges, etc., t.h at have accrued thereon and
take them away. Ibid.
•
35. The Secretary. of the Treasury bas power to refund excess of duties
exacted in certain cases referred to. 657.
36. The words ''not specially enumerated or provided for in this act," used
in Schedule N of the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, in the clauses
fixing a duty upon "bonnets, bats and hoods for men, women, children, composed of chip, grass," etc., and "upon braids, plaits, flats,
laces, etc., used for making or ornamenting hats, bonnets, hoods,"
etc., apply to articles of the description mentioned, and not to the
material out of which such articles are made. 672.
37. Distinction between the expression in Schedule M (Rev. Stat., p.
473), "black of bone or ivory drop black," and the expression (Free
List, ibid., 433), "bones crude and not manufactured; burned, calcined, ground, or steamed," pointed out; and held that burnt bones
intended and fitted for other uses in the arts than that of imparting
color are duty free, although in fact they are black. 676.
38. A bicycle taken ~broad by a citizen for his use, and brought back
with him on his retnrn to this country, is not subject to duty, being
a" personal effect." (See Free List, Rev. Stat., p, 489.) 679.

'
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39. Semble that section 2859 Rev. Stat., relating to entry of imported
merchandise, is not repealed by section 9 of the act of June 22,
1874, chap. 391, or by the act of May 1, 1876,. chap. 89. 683.
See TONNAGE DUES.
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS.
1. The issuance of a writ of execution against the person or chattels of
a foreign minister is a'' suing ·out" within the meaning of section
4064 Rev. Stat., and renders the party obtaining such writ liable
to the penalty prescribed. 563.
2. Cases within that section should be prosecuted by the United States
attorney of the proper district, as other misdemeanors are prosecuted. Ibid.
DIRECT TAX.
The withholding the amount of the" 2 and 3 per cent. funds" due the
State of Mississippi, and crediting the State therewith on account
of the direct tax, was ~::.uwarranted by law, as no liability rests upon
the State fvr the payment of such tax. 671.
See CJ,AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1.
DISBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC MONEY.
1. Where B., not holding any office under the United States requiring
him to give bond, was appointed an agent to disburse funds appropriated to build the custom-house and post-office building in the
city of Philadelphia, Pa. : Held that, in view of the provisions of
sections 36~>7, 3658, and 255 Rev. Stat., .t he appointment of B. was
improvidently made; that he was not lawfully empowered toreceive or disburse the public funds placed in his hands; and that,
under existing legislation, he is not entitled to any compensation
for his services as such disbursing agent. 124.
2. As bet ween two conflicting claims to a credit for a disbursement made
on the same day, which might then have been lawfully made by
either one of the claimants, but not by both, regard may be had to
the actual time of day when the payment by each was made in order
to determine which had priority. 425.
See COMPENSATION, 5.
DISCHARGE F_ROM MILITARY ACADEMY.
See MILITARY ACADEMY, 1.
DISMISSAL OF OFFICER.
See NAVY, 3 j PRESIDENT, 1, 2.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
Opinion of Attorney-General Devens, of May 18, 1877 (15 Opin., 277),
upon the subject of allowances to district attorneys under section
827 Rev. Stat., concurred in. 479.

708

INDEX.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. Under the act of June 11, 1878, chap: 180, with the exception of
the first two, all appointments to the office of Commissioner of the
District of Columbia are to be for the term of three years. 158.
2. No power is expressly conferred by statute upon any two of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to act without the third, and
it seems that the three Commissioners should be present and acting
when any business of importance pertaining to their office is to be
troo.sacted. 354.
3. The official term of each of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, appointed from ci villife (excepting the first two appointments), is three years; and in case of the death, resignation, or removal of the incumbent during such term, his successor should be
appointed, not for the full term of three years, but for the unexpired term of such incumbent, if any remains. 476.
4. Under the provisions of the act of July 11, 1878, chapter 180, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia have power, in their discretion, to remove members of the police force of the District of Columbia without such trial as js contemplated by section 356 of the Revised Statutes of said District. 489.
5. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have power, under
the act of June 11, 1878, chap. 180, to abolish a part or the whole
of the board of fire commissioners of said District. 4!:14.
6. Soction 4 of the act of June 11, 1878, chap. 180, requires the Commissioners of the District of Col urn bia to render acc~mnts for their
disbursements thereunder to the accounting officers of the Treasury
for adjustment and settlement, which, by implication, may be in ac·
cordance with the laws and regulations and usages by which these
officers are governed so far as the same are applicable to such accounts. 574.
7. The provisions of sections 3623 and 3678 Rev. Stat., are applicable to
the Commissioners, and they and their bondsmen are liable to suit
on their bond for the recovery of balances found due from them
on settlement of their accounts. Ibid.
DOUBLE PAYMENTS.
See PAY ACCOUNTS OF ARMY OFFICERS.
DRAWBACK.
See CUSTOMS LAWB, 32.
DUTIES ON IMPORTS.
See CusTOMS LAws.
EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
1. The opinions of former Attorneys-General construing the provisions
of the act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, known as the eight-hour law
(sec. 3738 Rev. Stat.), reviewed, and the following conclusions
deduced therefrom :

,
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(1) That the act prescribes the length of time which shall constitute a day's work, but it does not establish any rule by which the
compensation for day's work shall be determined.
(2) That it does not contemplate a reduction of wages simply
becau~e of the reduction thereby made in the length of the day's
work; but, on the other hand, it does not requi1·e that the same
wages shall be paid therefor as are received by those who in similar private employments work a greater length of time per day.
(3) That it does not forbid the making of contracts for labor,
fixing a, different length of time for the day's work than that prescribed in the law. 341.
2. This exposition of the act is in harmony .with the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Martin (94 U. S., 400).
-Ibid.

a

ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT.
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 5.
EVIDENCE.
See COURT-MARTIAL, 4, 5, 6.
EXAMINER.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 17.
EXTRADITION.
Under section 5272 Rev. Stat. the Secretary of State has power to
review the proceedings in an extradition case certified to him,
and his power extends to the review of every question therein
presented. 184.
EXTRA PAY.
See CoMPENSATION, 1, 8, 17.
FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.
1. Under section 4751 Rev. Stat. the Secretary of the Navy has power
to mitigate, before trial and conviction of the offender, any fine,
penalty, or forfeiture incurred under the provisions therein referred to. 282.
2. Where proceedings are already commenced, it is the duty of the prosecuting officer, upon receipt of the order of mitigation, and on the
terms and conditions thereof being complied with, to carry it into
effect by disnontinuing the proceedings. Ibid.
FIRST COMPTROLLER.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 1.
FOREIGN MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS.
See CusTOMS LAws, 5, 6.
FOREIGN MINISTER.
See DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS.
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FORFEITURE.
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.
FORT TAYLOR. FLA.
In the case of certain martello towers, outworks of Fort Taylor, Fla.~
which were erected during the rebellion on land then in the military
occupation of the United States: Advised that if the title to such
land has not been acquired by the Government, but is held by individuals, and it is deemed expedient to permanently retain possession thereoffor military purposes, application be made to Congress
by the War Department for authority to acquire the same, instead
of forcing the owners to go there for relief. 6.
FREE LIST.
See CusTOMS LAws, 8.
GENERAL SCHUYLER HAMILTON'S CASE.
See ARMY, 4.
HALF-PAY PENSIONS.
See PENSIONS, 3.
HOLDING OVER.
See OFFICER, 3, 4.
HOSPITAL FOR THE INSANE.
The provision in section 4851 Rev. Stat., that "if any person charged
with crime be found in the court before which he is charged
to be an insane person, such court shall certify the same to the Secretary of the Interior, who may order such person to be confined in
the hospital for the insane," etc., applies only to persons charged
with crime before the courts in the District of Columbia; it does not
extend to persons indicted in United States courts elsewhere. 211 .
HUNTER-BROOKS CIGAR STAMP.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1, ~.

I

IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS.
1. Under the authority of an act of Congress (river and harbor act of
March 3, 1881) making an appropriation for "improving James
River, Virginia," it was proposed to place wing-dams in the river
near Varina, Va., at which point the river is a tidal water. The
riparian owner forbade the construction of the dams in front of his
land above the line of low water: Advised that the United States,
with a view to the improvement ofnavigation, have a right to place
a wing-dam in th(l river in front of the land referred to without the
owner's consent, and that such right extends even to the limit
of high water-i.e., the line of the water at ordinary high tide. 109.
2. Upon consideration of the statutes relating to the improvement of
the South Pass of the Mississippi: Held (1) that a navigable depth of
26 feet is hereby required to be maintained through the shoal
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at the head of the Pass; (2) that a navigable depth of 26 feet is required to be maintained through the Pass itself; (3) that, in view
of the facts set forth by the engineer officer charged with the duty
ofascertaining th~ depth of the channel at these points from time
to time, Captain Eads is lawfully entitled to payment for maintenance of the required depth there during the quarter ending May 9,
1881. 137.
3. The United States may avail itself of the remedy by injunction to
protect from injury improvements in navigable waters made under
authority of Congress. 279.
4. The provision in the act of August 2, 1882, chap. 375; making it
"theduty of the Attorney-General to examine all claims of the title
to the premises to be improved under this appropriation," i. e.,
the appropriation "for improving the Potomac River in the vicinity
of Washington," etc., does not forbid the commencement of the
work until the Attorney-General shall have performed the said
duty. 453.
5. The $1,000 authorized by the act of March 3, 1881, chap. 136, to be
expended from the appropriation for improving-Savannah River,
Georgia, in the payment of damages for land taken for widening the
channel opposite Savannah, may be so expended without a transfer
of the title tu the land, the purpose of the provision being to indemnify for the loss of the land, not to acquire ownership thereof. 455.
INDIAN INSPECTOR.
1. Although the general functions and duties of Indian inspectors do not
include specifically the disbursement of public money, and these
officers are not required by statute to give bond, yet the Secretary
of the Interi01: may lawfully assign to them other duties relating to
business concerning the Indians in addition to those prescribed
whenever the exigencies of the public service require it. 391.
2. Where the particular duty thus assigned to an inspector involves the
receipt or disbursement of pn blic money, it is competent to the Secretary to take a bond for the protection of the Government against
loss, althC\ugh such bond may not be required by statute ; and the
bond would be valid and binding upon both principal and sureties
if voluntarily given by the officer. Ibid.
INDIANS AND INDIAN LA.NDS.
1. The Interior Department has power to remove intruders from lands
of the Choctaws and Chickasaws in the Indian Territory, and it is
its duty to do so under the provisions of the treaty of J nne 22, 1855
(11 Stats., 612, 613). 134.
2. All persons (other than Choctaws or Chickasaws by birth or adoption)
not comprised within some one of the excepted classes described
in article 7 of that treaty, or article 43 of the treaty of April 28, 1866
(14 Stats., 779), are intruders. Ibid.
3. The permit laws of the Choctaws and Chickasaws are valid; and
those persons who are permitted thereunder to reside within their

INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS-Continued.
territorytor to~ employed by their oi tizens aa teachers, meotianics,
or skilled agrioulturists, may enter and remain on the lands of these
tribeJ; but the right to remain there ceases when the permit ex·
pires. Ibid.
4. Teachers, mechanics, and skilled agriculturists, not in the employ of
tho Goverpment, and who are on anch lands without permits from
the Indian authorities, are intruders, and sh9nld be removed there-

trom. lln4.

,

5. Authority to i88Ue oe'rtiftoates of indebtedness under the treaty with
the Kansas Indians is to be considered as conferred upon the date of
the proclamotion of the treaty, March 16, 1863, and not before. 200.
6. Such certifi.cotes were of two classes, viz: First, those issued to persons who bad settled and improved lantls within the reservation to
an amount not exceeding 129,421 in the aggregate; second, those
issued to persons having claims against the Indians to an amount
not exceeding in the aggregate t:J6,394.47. Ibid.
7. The Secretary of the Interior is not at liberty to accept in payment
of lands any certificates of the first class iamed after the limitation
upou tbo.amount of such ~ertificates prescri~ed in the treaty had
been reached, nor any certificates of the second class iSBued in ad·
vando of thf) ratific:l.tion and proclamation of the treaty. Ibid.
8. The lnnds of tho Ute Indian Reservation in Utah Territory can not be
declared open for settlement a!Jd disposal, under the act of June
15, 1880, chap. 223, be(ore allotments provided for in that act are
mado. 262.
9. If, previous to such allotments, it is thought advisable that any land
witldn the reservation should be opened to eettlement and disposal,
additional legislation will be necessary to enable this to be done.
Ibid.
10. Opinion of Attorney-General Williams, of May 3, 1875 (14 Opin., 569),
as to the rights of William G. Langford in 640 acres of land within
)he Nez Perces Indian Reservation in Idaho Territory, re-affirmed;
and adrised that he has no such possessocy interest in such land as
wonld warrant the Interior Department in accepting the compromise proposed. 306.
11. Upon the facts presented : .A.dmsed that additional legislation is required to enable the Secretary of the Interior to treat the Uncompahgre Ute Indian neservation as public lands. 366.
12. The children of Thomas F. Richardville, a Miami Indian of Indiana,
are entitled to share with other persons upon the roll of the East·
em Miamis equally, and without deduction, in the distribution of
the fund ($221,257.86) appropriated by the act of March :1, 1881,
chap. 132, for the payment of the Miami Indians of Indiana. 381.
13. The lands which have been or are to be sold and the proceeds distributed by the act of May 15, 1~, cllap. 144, were set apart for the
sol~ benefit of the Miami tribe of Indians, meaning thereby those
wlio at the tune of the survey of the reservation had emigrated and
settled on the lands. 410.
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14. This class of Miamis only are entitled to the proceeds of the sales of
the residue mentioned in the second article of the treaty of June 5,
1854, being the ~arne lands referred to in section 3 of the act of May
15, 1882. Ibid.
15. Those individual Miamis or' persons of Miami blood who are named
in the corrected list referred to in the Senate amendment to the
fourth article of the treaty of June 5, 1854, and their descendants,
have no right to or interest in the said residue or the proceeds of
the sales thereof. Ibid.
INDIAN SCHOOLS.
1. The proceeds of sales of articles manufactured in Indian manual and
training schools should not be turned into the Treasury, but be
received by tho Indian Bureau and used for the benefit of the Indian children in the schools. 531.
2. The appropriation made by the act of May 17, 1882, chap. 163, "for
the purpose of further instructing and civilizing Indian children
west of tho Mississippi River,'' etc., i{i not applicable to the establishment of an indust,rial school and the erection of buildings
therefor. 647.
INDIAN TRUST FUNDS.
The Secretary of the Interior, as trustee for certain Indian tribes, has
authority, under the act of April 1, 1880, chap. 41, to sell United
States 5 per cent. called bonds, held in trust for such tribes, in
order that the fund may receive the benefit of the premium. 104.
INELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT.
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 5.
INJUNCTION.
See IMPROVEMENT

OF

NAVIGABLE W ATERS 1 3.

INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS.
1. The inconvenience contemplated by section 4409, Rev. Stat. is
such as grows out of the situation of the boat, or of the parties,
viewed with reference to the location of the local board. whereby
access to the latter is rendered difficult or expensive. 628.
2. Where such inconvenience exists, the authority of the supervising
inspector is, by virtue of that section, concurrent with that of the
local board; and in cases acted upon by him under that authority
there is no appeal. Ibid.
3. But where the supervising inspector resides in the same city with
the mem hers of the local board, and they are not unable to act, and
access to them is as easy and unimpeded as to any like board in
the same locality, such inconvenience does not exist, and the sup~r
vising inspector would not be warranted in discharging the duties
of the local board. Ibid.
INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.
See ARMY, 1.
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INTERESl'.
See CLAIMS, 4, 13, 14.
INTERNAL REVENUE.
1. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, may ·adopt the device known as the
Hunter-Brooks cigar stamp, and prescribe regulations for its use,
cancellation, anti destruction, in accordance with the design of its
inventor, if deemed expedient. 111.
2. Any failure to use, cancel, a.nd destroy such stamp, as directed by
such regulations, would make the party chargeable with the
failure amenable to the penalties existing March 1, 1879, as to the
stamps then in use. lbid.
3. The 50 per centum required by section 3176 Rev. Stat. to be added
to the tax upon taxable property owned by any peson who neglects
or refuses to make a list or return of such property, and to verify
the same as provided by law, is a penalty, not a tax. 433.
4. In the case stated, ~he facts bring it within the discretion of th~
Secretary of the Treasury, given by section 5293 Rev. Stat., t()
remit fines, penalties, etc. Ibid.
5: Section 3120 Rev. Stat. affords no relief to the party, the addition
to his tax having been legally made. Ibid.
6. The net profits of a railroad company earned in 1871, and which
during that year were used for construction, or were appropriated
to the payment of money borrowed for conetruction and actually
used therefor during that year, or in a subsequent year were appropriated to the payment of money so borrowed and used, are li:tble
to taxation under section 15 of the act of July 14, 1870, chap. 255.
469.

7. Where an application was made to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue for a refund of taxes paid in December, 1864, upon spirits
lost by leakage or evaporation while stored in a bonded warehouse between July 1 and December 31, 1864: Advised, that the
act of June 30, 1864, chap. 173, then in force, did not authorize
any allowance for leakage in such case. 500.
8. By operation of the repeal provision m the act of March 3, 1883,
chap. 121, the taxes on capital and deposits of banks, bankers,
and national banking associations, imposed by the internal-revenue law in force at the time of the passage of that act, are not
assessable and collectible on the capital and deposits of banks
and bankers for the interval between December 1, 1882, aud
March 3, 1883, nor on the capital and deposits of national banking
associations for the interval between January 1 and March 3, 18t>3.
5,39.

9. The words "any right accruing," etc., used in section 13 of the said
act, do not include such taxes accruing at the date of the repeal,
there being, as to them, no right in esse. It is the accruing right,
not the accruing tax, that iA saved. ibid.
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10. The provisions of section 13 Rev. Stat., saving "any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred" under the statute repealed, do not extend
to the taxes referred to; since, as to them, there are no" liabilities
incurred" at the date of the act of March 3, 1883. Ibid.
11. Where it was proposed to withdraw a quantity of whisky from
bonded warehouse, under section 3330 Rev. Stat., and acts of
June 9, 1874, chap. 259, and March 1, 1879, chap. 125, in order to
ship it to Bermuda, with the purpose, .after landing it there, of
transporting it back to this country and entering it elther for warehousing or for consumption under section 2500 Rev. Stat.: Ad·
vised that such shipment, with the purpose mentioned, would
not be an exportation within the meaning of section 3330 Rev.
Stat., and the act of 1874; nor would such shipment and the
landing abroad fulfill the condition of the exportation bond, and
discharge the whisky from the internal-revenue tax thereon; nor
would such whisky, upon return to this country, be entitled to the •
rights and privileges of imported merchandise under the warehouse laws. 579.
JUDICIARY FUND.
See CoMPENSATION, 6.
JURISDICTION.
1. The State of Oregon has jurisdiction over the case of a murder of one
Indian by another, committed upon an Indian reservation within
the limits of the State, unless the reservation was excepted out of
the State at the time of its admission, or unless its jurisdiction is restricted by the provisions of some treaty with the Indians still in
force. 460.
2. Where an Indian belonging to one tribe murdered an Indian belonging to another tribe within the reservation of a third tribe which
has no law covering the case, semble that the "bad men" clause in
a treaty with the tribe to which the murdered Indian belonged does
not operate to bring the case witl:.in section 2145 Rev. Stat., and
so give the United States courtsjunsdiction over the offense. 566.
KANSAS.
See CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES; LANDS 1 PUBLIC, 2.
KANSAS INDIANS.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS.
LAKE CHAMPLAIN, RIGHT OF FISHERY IN.
The waters of Lake Champlain, within the limits of the United States,
being partly in New York and partly in Vermont, therighttotake
fish from these waters depends solely upon the laws of the one or
of the other of those States, according as the locus is within the
boundaries of the one or of the other. The General Government
has nothing to do therewith. 74 .
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LAND-GRANT RAILROADS.
1. Semble that the la.st section of the Union Pacific Railroad Company,
Eastern Division (formerly the Leavenworth, ~awnee and Western Railroad Company), was in fact completed prior to the time
fixed by statute, but not accepted by the President until about four
months after that time. 295.
2. There is no legal objection to the issue of patents to the company for
lands lying along such section ; but delay in this matter suggested
in view of circumstances stated. Ibid.
3. The assent of Congress to the transfer made by the New Orleans, Baton
Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company to the New Orleans Pacific Rail way Company of all the interest of the former company
in the land grant contained in section 22 of the act of March 3, 1870,
chap.l22, was not necessary to entitle the latter company to the benefit of such grant in aid of the construction of the road projected by
it. The grant, by its terms, is in prresenti; the interest of the New
Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company therein,
. at the time of the transfer, was assignable ; and the New Orleans
Pacific Railway Company was such a successor or assignee as is contemplated by said act. 370.
4. For the 68 miles of the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas Railroad: if
constructed prior to said act, no benefit can be claimed by the New
Orleans Pacific Railway Company under said transfer from the
grant; nor, in case of such prior construction and the non-construe:
tion of al)y portion of the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg road, has the purpose of the grant failed and the grant lapsed.
Ibid •
.i. If the New Orleans, Mobile and Texas road was constructed subse-

quently to the date of said act, so much of its road as is now owned
by the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company is such a road as is
contemplated for acceptance by the President, and patents may
issue to the latter company for lands opposite to and conterminous
with such constructed portion of the road. 371.
6. Certain lauds within the 10-mile limits of the Central Pacific Railroad, being parts of odd-numbered sections granted thereto by the
act of July 1, 1862, chap. 120, were, under section 7 of that act,
ordered to be withdrawn, and this order was received at the land
office at ~an Francisco on the 30th of January, 1865. The map
showing defioite location of line of said road was filed in General
Land Offica February 13, 1873, und on May 12, 1874, said lands were
selected by the railroad company as inuring to it under said grant.
But tl1e same lands were selected by the State of California
June 13, 1865, as idemnity for deficiency of school lands granted
by acts of March 3, 1853, and February 26, 1859, and a list
thereof was certified and approved to the State September 8,
1870. The railroad company applies for patents for these lands:
.Advised that the Secretary of the Interior is not authorized by the
general law or the provisions of the act of July 1, 1862, to issue
such patents to the company. 406.
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LAND GRANT, TRANSFER OF.
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 3.
LANDS, PUBLIC.
1. Thodecis!on of the Secretary ofthelnterior, in November, 1855, that
those lands which had been reserved by the President under the
act of September 20, 1850, chap. 61, granting lands to the State of
lllinois to aid j n the construction of a railroad, did not pass to the
State by virtue of the swamp-land grant of September 28, 1850,
chap. 84, is to be treated as res adjudicata as to all the lands embraced within the belt of territory to which it specifically relates
and refers. 27.
2. Under the act of J~ne 2, 1862, chap. 130 (donating public lands to
establish agricultural colleges), the State of Kansas became entitled to a certain quantity (90,000 acres) of public lands lying within
her borders subject to private entry at the minimum price of $1.25
an acre; and by the same act it was declared that if such lands are
selected from those which have been raised to double minimum in
consequence of railroad grants, they shall be computed at the maximum price and the number of acres diminished proportionately.
Subsequently the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the provisions of the railroad land-grant act of July 1, 1862, chap. 120,
made a withdrawal oflands for 15 miles on each side of the general
route (as designated) of a certain railroad within the scope of the
act, part of which lands (the even-numbered sections) were afterwards restored to market and raised to double-minimum land~, in
accordance with the act of March 3, 1853, chap. 143. Thereafter,
in September, 1865, 7,682.92 acres of these double-minimum
lands at $2.50 an acre were certified to and accepted by the State of
Kansas, in lieu of 15,365.84 acres at the minimum price of $1.25 au
acre, which last completed the quantity to which the State was
originally entitled: Held that the claim of the State under the said
act of July 2, 1862, is fully satisfied, and that it is not en.titled to
a further allowauce thereunder(as claimed) of7,682.92acres. 129.
3. Where public land subject to homestead settlement has been duly entered under the homestead law, it thenceforth ceases to be at the
disposal of the Government so long as the en try of the settler subsists. Hence it can not, whilst such entry stands, be set apart by
the President for a military reservation. 160.
4. Where, however, a pre-emption filing has been made of public lands,
the land covered thereby may be set apart by the President for
such reservatiOn at any time previous to payment and entry by
the settler under the pre-emption law. Ibid.
5. Where a part of the public domain has been reserved by the President for military or other public purposes, and subsequently the
land so reserved becomes unnecessary for such purposes, it can not
be restored to the public domain without authority from Congress.
I
168,
6. Mineral lands belonging to the public domain, which are reserved
from sale under section 2318 Rev. Stat., may be reserved for military
or other public purposes by the President. 230.

,: ;l~!IU!I, :. PUBLIC~oatinued.
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the p•tent a olaaae exeepting from the grant all town-site rights
in the premiaee, where it appeM8 that the surface ground of any
8110h olaililliea wholly or partly w1thln the limits of a previously
located, entered, or patented town site. 248.
lO. s.il6 that the Preaiclent hal power to make a ~ation for occupation by lndiaa from pu\llio 4omain lying within the limits of a
State. 258.
11. The proviaiona il\ seotion 2 of tlle aot of April 30, 1878, chap. 76,
requiring ..-oneys coUeoted for depredations upon the public lands
to be covered into t~ Treasury,. in eft'ect modifies section 4751
Bev. S*at. only M to that part of the peJlaltiea, etc., recovered
w1deh waa paJ.fltle uud the latter seotion to the Secretary of the
,p
ble
to informers.
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:ta.ST SICKNES(t EXPENSES OF.
Bee A.OOOUMTS .u'D AOOOUNTDI~ 01'1'IOBB8, 3.
DaKAGE.
See CUSTOMS LAws; 10, 21; 1JrrB

.U. bVBNUB,

7._

LEASE OF BUILDING FOR GEOLOGICAL SURVEY.
See ST.A.TU'RS, lln'&BP:&BTATION 01', 2, 3.
\

LONGEVITY PAY.
See COIIPJilf8AftOJl, 9, 4.

ll.llL 'f¥NSPOBT~TION.

see Oo~~r 1, 8, 9, to-, 11;

PosTAL SBltVIOlll, 3, 4, 5.
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M.AJ. RODNEY SMITH'S CASE.
This case is controlled by the opinion in Major Terrell's case (ante,
p. 10). 12.
MAJOR TERRELL'S C.AAE.
See ARMY, 5, 6.
MARINE CORPS.
1. There is no law requiring an officer of the Marine Corps, before promotion, to be examined as to his physical qualification for duty at
sea. 117.
2. A board of naval surgeons, constituted under section 1493 Rev. Stat.,
is not by law investe\i with authority to examine and pronounce
upon any other cases than those of officers on the active list of the
Navy. Ibid .
.3. Semble that the examination, physical or other, of a retiring board,
constituted under section 1623 Rev. Stat., is the only one to
which an officer of the Marine Corps is by law subjected in order
to determine his :fitness for active duty; and unless the officer is
by this board found incapacitated for active service, and the :finding is approved by the President, he remains in the line of promotion on the active list as he previously was, and is entitled to all
the rights which belong to his position. Ibid.
MEDICAL CORPS OF THE ARMY.
See ARMY, Ul, 1~, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26.
MEDICAL CORPS OF THE N.AVY.
See NAVY, 4, 10.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS.
See OFFICER, 1, 2.
MIAMI INDIANS.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 12, 13, 14, 15.
MILITARY .ACADEMY.
1. Where a cadet was, by order of the Secretary of War, on the recommendation of the Academic Board, discharged from the Military
Academy for deficiency in studies: Held, (1) that the order, having
been completely executed, is beyond the power of revocation ; (2)
that section 1325 Rev. Stat. prohibits the returning or reappointing of the cadet to the Academy, excepting upon ·t he recommendation of said Board; (3) that Congress may thus limit or restrict the authority of the President to appoint cadets; ( 4) that
accordingly it is not competent to the President to revoke the said
order or to restore the cadet to the Academy, irrespective of the
recommendation of said Board. 67.
2. The professors of the Military .Academy at West Point are commis·
sioned officers of the Army, whose pay and allowances are assimilated to those of a lieutenant-colonel and a colonel; and in case of
ench disability as is described in section 4693 Rev. Stat. they are
entitled to pensions at the same rate with officers of the rank of
lieutenant-colonel. 359.

KILITARY FORCES, EMPLOYMENT OF.
Upon coneideration of the facte stated: .Atlftled that the military
forces of the United States may be employed under aeotion S':l98
Rev. Stat., after proclamation as required by aeotion 5300 Rev.
Stat., to aid in the execution of the laws and for the euppreuion
of combinations of outlaws and criminal& in the Territory of Arizona, without the need of further legi&lation. 333.

See. POMB COJIUII'.A.Tt18.
KD'ERAL LANDS.
See Lums, PUBLIC, 6, 7, 8, 9.
ltll'NING CLAIMR, PATENTS FOR.
&\e LANDS, PUBLIC, 9.
:MONEY ORDER.
See COMPENSATION, 14.
lriiSFEASANCE IN OFFICE, LIABILITY FOR.
Where a person placed money in the hands of an assistant postmaster
for the purchase of" special-request envelopes," bot the latter gave
no receipt therefoT, did not order the envelopes, and appropriated the
money to his own use-the postmaster having no knowledge of the
receipt of the money at the time, and not being chargeable with
any negligence in the matter: Held that the person who paid the
money to the aseistant postmaster has no claim upon the Government for the envelopes, and that the poatmaeteris under no liability
for- the money so paid to his aesista11t. 526.
MITIGATION OF FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FO.R.I'EITURES, 1, 2.
NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.
1. U~der section 4 of the act or June 20, 1874, chap. 343, a national
banking &880Ciation, desiring to withdraw its circulating notes and
_take np the bonds dt!posited with the United States Treasury as
Becnrity therefor, may do so by depositing with the Treasurer the
required amount in latD.ful mOMy, whether this conaists of coin or or
legal-tender notes. 121.
I. A national banking association may, onder aeotion 3 of the act of
June 20, 1874, chap. 343, deposit coin in the Treasury for theredemption of its circulation. 144.
3. The Treasury, while privil~ged under sections 3 and 4 of that act to
redeem snob ciroplation i'n United States notes, has also the rightto redeem the same ciTculation in coin. lbid.·
4. National bankin.r associations organized under the act of February25, 1863, may amend their aTtieles of association where this woultl
not be in eon1lict with the provisions of the statute. 28e.
5. Where such &IIOciations are so organized for a period of less than
twenty years from the date' of the· act they can not, by amending
their articles, extend the period to twenty years from snob date..
Ibid.
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NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS-Continued.
6. Where the articles provide for an increase of capital, and the maximum of such increase is once fixed by the determination of the
Comptroller of the Currency, both his power and that of the association over the subject are exhausted. A further increase and a.
new maximum can not be effected by an amendment of the articles. Ibid.
7. An amendment of the articles provi.ding for an increase of the number of directors would not be inconsistent with the provision of
section 5139 Rev. Stat. declaring that'' No change shall be made
in the articles of association by which the rights, remedies, or
security of the existing creditors of the association shall ·be
impaired." Ibid.
8. The stockholders of an expiring association may organize a new one,
and adopt for the latter the name of the former. Ibid.
9. An association may, upon the expiration of the period limited for its
duration, convert itself into a State bank under the laws of the
State, provided it has liquidated its affairs agreeably to the laws
of Congress.; and after it has thus become a State bank it may
reconvert itself into a national banking association, under section
5154 Rev. Stat. and adopt the name of the expired corporation
with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. Ibid.
10. Consideration of the facts, as gathered from the papers submitted,
concerning the indebtedness of the First National Bank of New
Orleans (an insolvent bank) to the United States, and of certain
questions propounded with reference thereto. 360.
11. A national bank whose charter is about to expire, but which has taken
no steps toward going into liquidation under sections 5220 to·
5224 Rev. Stat., can not withdr3w all of the bonds deposited to·
secure its circulation, upon depositing lawful money equal to the·
amount of its outstanding circulation, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 5159 and 5160 Rev. Stat., and section 4 of the act
of June 20, 1874, chap. 343. 409.
12. By section 5208 Rev. Stat., and section 13 of the act of July 12, 1882,
chap. 290, the certification of a check drawn upon a national
bank, where at the time of certification the drawer has not on
deposit with the bank, and regularly entered to his credit on its
books, an amount of money equal to the amount of the check, is
prohibited. 471.
13. Whether the check be marked by the bank "accepted," or simply
"good," can make no difference; either constitutes a certification
within the meaning of the statute. Ibid.
14. The acceptance of a check, where the drawer has no funds on deposit~
is a loan of the credit of the bank rather than a loan of money, and.
if otherwise unobjectionable, is not within the restriction provided
by section 5200 Rev. Stat. Ibid ..
15. Liabilities so incurred by a bank are within the limit imposed by Mection 5202 Rev. Stat. Ibid.
272-VOL XVII--46
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NAVAL ACADEMY.
1. The heads of the departments of ethics and Engli!th studies, of Spanish and other modern languages, and of drawing, should be commissioned as "professors of mathematics" (sec. ,1528 Rev. Stat.),
after passing the examinations required by the act of January 20,
1881, chap. 24. 10t:l.
2. Opinions of August 7, 1877 (15 Opin, 637), and March 31, 1879 (16
Opin., 296), referred to, ~nd suggested that copies thereof be sent
by the Secretary of the Navy to the Senate in response to a resolution of that body in regard to the subject of relative rank of graduates of the Naval Academy .. 193.
NAVIGABLE WATERS, LAND UNDER.
Semble that the proprietors ofland adjacent to Lake Huron, Michigan,
have no legal right to stone taken from the bed of that lake in
front of their property, by other persons, and delivered by the latter on the Government works-the ownership of such bed being
apparently in the State. Under the circumstances presented, the
claim of such proprietors for the stone so taken and delivered may
properly be resisted by the United States officer in charge of the
works. 59.
NAVIGATION.
See IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS.
NAVY.
1. Upon the facts of this case, as set forth in the opinion, it is held that
Paymaster Thomas T. Caswell is entitled to a position on the list
of paymasters in the Navy next above that of Paymaster John H.
Stevenson; the position of the latter officer, as borne on the Navy
Register, being affected by the restoration of the name of Paymaster Edward Bellows to said list, from which it had been illegally dropped. 21.
2. Section 1461 Rev. Stat. gives to naval officers on the retired list a
right to promotion on that list as their several dates on the active
list are promoted. 36.
3. Where a paymaster in the Navy was sentenced to dismissal by courtmartial, and it appeared by the order of the Secretary of the Navy
that the President approved the finding of the court and directed
the sentence to be carried into effect: Heli that the officer was
legally dismissed from the naval service. 43.
•· The custom and practice of the Navy Department requiring competitive examinations of assistant surgeons, and assigning them positions on the Navy Register in the order of relative merit as ascertained and reported by the board of examiners authorized by existing law and regulations, is not under the present law (sec. 1480
•
Rev. Stat., act of February 27, 1877) correct; the effectof such law
being to adopt the rule of seniority in regard to promotions from
()De grade to another in the Medical Corps of the Navy. 48.
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N.A VY-Continued.
5. Under the act of July 25, 1866, chap. 231, R., who had entered the
naval service October 5, 1850, and stood No. 77 on the list of lieutenant-commanders, was promoted to the grade of commander;
while L., who had entered the service February 17, 1841 1 and stood
at the date of saiu promotion No. 7 on the said list, was not among
those advanced under that act, and after the promotions thereunder were completed stood No.2 in his grade (lieutenant-commander).
Subsequently, by promotion in due course, both R. and L. attained
the rank of captain, the former being senior by date of commission.
In estimating length of service for the purpose of determining their
precedence with officers of the staff corps holding the relative rank
of captain: Held, that (under sec. 14~6, Rev. Stat.) R. should be
considered as having gained length of service according to his
promotion, but that L. should not be considered as having lost
anything in length of service-the effect of the promotion of the
former officer upon the latter being purely an incidental one. 56.
6. Where, unuer the provisions of section 1006, Revised Statutes, an
officer was advanced by the President in numbers, with the advice
anci cons~;~nt of the Senate, for eminent and conspicuous conduct in
battle or extraordinary heroism: Held that such action of the President and Senate is conclusive upon the executive department of
the Government, and that the grounds thereof are not subject toreexamination. 76.
7. Civil engineers in the naval service are officers in the Navy, possessing defined relative rank with other naval -officers. 126.
8. They may be retired from active service and placed on the retired list
under the statutory provisions (see sees. 1443 et seq., Rev. Stat.)
regulating the retirement of officers in the Navy. Ibid.
9. Where W., while holding a commission as captain in the Navy, was
appointed to the office of Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, with
the relative rank of commodore: Held that in case of his retirement
l•y reason of a disability incident to the service, or on his application, during his incumbency of that office, and whilst he is borne
on the Navy Register as a captain, he should be placed on the retired list with the rank of captain, and that, on bfling thus retired,
he would be entitled to 75 per centum of the sea-pay of officers of
that rank. 154
10. Surgeon T., having been examined by a board of medical officers, and
found totally disqualified for the performance of his duties, was retired under section 3 of the act of February 21, 1861, chapter 49.
Subsequently, in November, 1878, a board of medical officers was
convened, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, to examine and
report whether, in their opinion, Surgeon T.'s disability did or did
not originate in the line of duty; and the :finding of this board was
that his disability had its origin in the line of duty. Such :finding
was approved by the Secretary of the Navy January 1, 1879, who
directed that thereafter Surgeon T. be regarded on the records of
the Department as retired on account 9f disability occasioned while
in the line of duty: Held that the Secretary of the Navy was not
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NAVY-Continued.
authorized by law to submit the case of Surgeon T. to a medical
board for re-examination as to the origin of the disability for which
he was retired, and that the Secretary's action, based on the report
of such board, is without any legal effect as regards the cause for
retirement in the case of that officer or his right to pay. 178.
11. Construction of section 1412, Revised Statutes, as given in 14 Opiu.,
192, 358, and 15 Opin., 45, namely, that it gives to transferred
officers the full benefit of their former sea-service only in so far as
this may go to complete the period of such service required in their
respective grades previous to examination for promotion, and in so
far as it ought properly to be taken into account in the matter of
assignment to duty-reaffirmed. 189.
12. W. was appointed an acting third assistant engineer in the volunteer
Navy February8, 1R62, and performed sea service continuously until
May 20, 1864, when be was made a third assistant engineer in the
regular Navy, and completed two years of sea service as such January 1, 1867. He was promoted to the grade of second assistant engineer October 6, 1869, to take rank from January 1, 1868. On
July 1: 1~70, he completed two years' sea service in the latter grade
and on March 12, 1875, was promoted to the grade of passed assistant engineer, to take rank from October ~9, 1874: Held that
the credh of his volunteer service, under section 1412, Revised
Statutes, does not entitle him to the benefits claimed therefor as regards promotion to or pay in his present grade. 399.
13. An officer who wae retired as a commodore, and has since been promoted to the grade of rear-admiral on the retired list, under the
act of August 15,1876 (sec. 1460, Rev. Stat., as amended), is not
entiUed to any increase of pay by reason of his promotion. 495.
14. The first section of. the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 392, is in pari
materia with the provision touching the pay of promoted officers
contained in section 7 of the act of June 15, 1870, chapter 295, the
act of June 5, 1672, cbapter296, and section 1&16, Revised Statutes,
and was designed to fix the commencement of the increased pay of
promoted officers in active service only. Ibid.
15. Section 1591, Revised Statutes, which declares that an officer promoted on the retired list shall not, in consequence of such promotion, be entitled to increase of pay, is applicable alike to officers
promoted under section 1461, Revised Statutes, and to those promoted under section 1460, as amended. Ibid.
NAVY DEPARTMENT.
1. The chief of a bureau in the Navy Department can not lawfully hold
over after the expiration of the term for which he was appointed.
648.
2. The general rule is that where Congress has not authorized the
officer to hold over, his incumbency must be deemed to cease at the
end of his term, though no appointment of a successor may then b&
made. Ibid.
See SUPPLIES FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 1.
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NEW ORLEANS, BATON ROUGE .AND VICKSBURG R. R. CO.
See LAND GRANT R~ILROADS, 3.
NEWTON'S CASE.
See PRESIDENT, 1, 2.
NORTH CAROLINA CHEROKEES, REMOV.AL OF.
In the case of certain Cherokee Indians of North Carolina, who left
their homes in that State on the supposition that they would be
furnished by the United States with transportation to the lands
owned by their tribe in the Indian 'rerritory: Advised that there is
no authority under existing legislation to effect the removal of
these Indians in the manner supposed, as above. 72.
OFFICER.
1. .A member of Congress is not an "officer of the Government" within
the meaning of the provision in section 6 of the act of .August 15,
1876, chapter 287, whereby "all executive officers or employes of
the United States, not appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, are prohibited ftom requesting, giving
to, or receiving from any other officer or employe of the Government any money or property or other thing of value for political
purposes." 419.
2. That provision is intended to regulate the conduct of the inferior'
officers, etc., of the Government with respect to these and other
officers, etc., in its service, as ordinarily understood. To place a
construction thereon which would emb,race among the latter those
who are not "officers" in the common acceptation of the word, and
thus enlarge the penal effect of the provision, would not be warranted by any sound rule of interpretation. Ibid.
3. The chief of a bureau in the Navy Department can not lawfully hold
over after the expiration of the term for which he was appointed. 648.
4. The general rule is that where Congress has not authorized the officer to hold over, his incumbency must be deemed to cease at the
end of his term, though no appointment of a successor may then
be made. Ibid.
OFFICIAL ENVELOPE.
1. United States commissioners are "officers of the United States,"
within the meaning of section 29 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 180, and as such are entitled to use the penalty-envelope provided for by sections 5 and 6 of the act of March 3, 1877, chapter
103, in the transmission to the Departments at Washington of mail
matter relatmg to their accounts for fees payable by the Government and other official business. 183 .
.2. Indian agents and registers and receivers of land offices are (by virtue of section 29 of the act of March 3, 1879, chapter 180) entitled
to use the penalty-envelope for the transmission of official mail
matter between themselves and other officers of the United States
or between themselves and the Executive Departments, but not for
the transmission of such matter to private person~. 255.
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OFFICIAL ENVELOPE-Continued.
3. These officers are not "departmental in their character" within the
meaning of sections 5 and 6 of the act of .March 3, 1877, chapter
108. 1bid.
4. When supplied with official postage-stamps by the Departments, they
may use them for the transmission of official mail matter as well
to private persons as to other officers of the Government. Ibid.
5. Opinion of .May 25, 1880 (16 Opin., 501), as to the use of the penaltyenvelope, reaffirmed. 264.
I. A marshal, upon the expiration of his term, ceases to be an officer of
the United States, and is not entitled to use the" penalty-envelope"
in executing process (under section 790, Rev. Stat.) then in his
bands. 529.
7. Section 29 of the act of March 31, 1879, chapter 180, so far as it relates to the indorsement to be placed on the penalty-envelope, is a
substitute for the corresponding provision in the fifth section of
the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 103. Such envelope must be indorsed with a. proper designation of the office from which the same
is transmitted, and a statement of the penalty provided by the
fifth section ot' the latter act. 631.
OFFICIAL POSTAGE-STAMPS.
See, OFFICIAL ENVELOPE, 4,
PACIFIC RAILROADS.
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 1.
PARDON.
1. C., a. lieutenant-commander in the Navy, was sentenced by a courtmartial to suspension for one year, and to retain his then present
number on the list of lieutenant-commanders for that time. The
sentence having been executed, he applied to be restored to the
number on said list which he thereby lost: Held, that the restoration could not be effected by the President otherwise than by a
pardon. 31.
2. The punishment imposed (loss of numbers), being a continuing one,
is still subject to the pardoning power, which, when exercised,
would have the eft'ect to restore the officer to his former rank
according to the date of his commission. Ibid.
3. In September, 1882, Lieutenant N. was sentenced by a court-martial
to reduction of rank in his grade, and the sentence was carried int()
effect. In September, 1883, the department commander remitted
the sentence under the power to pardon conferred by article 112 of
the Articles of War: Held that, the punishment imposed by the
sentence being a continuing one, the sentence could be remitted
by t.he pardoning power, and that the authority exercised by the
department commander was in conformity to law. 656.
PASSENGER VESSEL.
See SHIPPING, 3.
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PASSPORT.
Certain papers issued by the mayor of Savannah, Ga., and also by a
notary public at Cedar Keys, Fla., containing the essential~;~ of a
passport, and intende,d to be used in traveling in a foreign country,
are a violation of section 4078, Revised Statutes. 674.
PATENTED ARTICLES, PURCHASE OF.
When articles are to be bought for the Government, and it is doubtful
whether officers of the United States in using them will or will not
be exposed to suits for the infringement of a patent: AdviBed that a
bond of indemnity to the Government be taken from parties who
offer to furnish such articles, for the protection of the officers. 33.
PATENT, LAND,
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 9.
PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS.
By virtue of the supervisory power conferred on him by section 441
/
Rev. Stat. over the public business relating to patents for inventions (see also section 481 Rev. Stat.), it is within the competency
of the Secretary of the Interior to review a decision of the Commissioner of Patents made in an interference case under Rule 110,
Rules and Practice of the Patent Office, upon a motion to amend a
preliminary statement. 205.
PAY ACCOUNTS OF ARMY OFFICERS.
1. Where an Army officer assigned his pay accounts in payment of certain indebtedness, which accounts the Paymaster-General declined
to pay, for the reason that on the maturity thereof the officer was
in arrears to the United States: Held that the refusal of the Paymaster-General was in accordance with section 1766 Rev. Stat. 30.
2. The statute does not require that, before payment is withheld, the
officer shall be adjudged in arrears in a suit brought against him.
Ibid.
3. Whflre an officer's account for the same month was paid twice by different paymasters-one payment being made in November and the
other in December: Held that the paymaster who made the last
payment is chargeable with the overpayment. 425.
4. In such case the Government may hold liable for the overpayment
both the officer who made and the officer who received .t he payment.
Ibid.
5. When the amount of overpayments to an officer are charged to the
paymasters making them, and the Government afterwards recovers
a part of the loss sustained by such overpayments, the balance of
the loss should be apportioned to all of these paymasters pro rata.
426.
6. Opinion of July 27, 1882 (ante, p. 426), on certain questions concerning pay masters' accounts, reconsidered. 603.
7. A pay accouut for Lieutenant M., for the month of Augush 1877 (he
being on duty within the limits of the New York pay district), was
paid by the chief paymaster at New York, and soon afterwards a
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second pay account of Lieutenant M. for the same month was paid
by another paymaster there, who had no knowledge of the previous
payment, nor was it practicable for him to obtain such knowledge:
Held that the last-mentioned paymaster is not chargeable with the
amount so paid by him, but that, by virtue of the Army Regulations
(paragraph 1006, Regulations of 1863; paragraph 1652, Regulations
of 1881) he is entitled to have the same passed to his credit. Ibid.
8. A third account of Lieutenant ·M. for the same month was paid to an
assignee by a paymaster at Charleston, S.C., the latter knowing
that Lieutenant M. was not then serving within the Charleston pay
district. Viewing this case in connection ~ith paragraph 1348,
Regulations of 1863, and certain circulars from the Paymaster-General's Office mentioned : Held that the payment of this account was
wholly unauthorized, and that the paymaster is properly chargeable
therewith. Ibid.
PAYMASTER CASWELL'S CASE.
See NAVY, 1.
PAYMASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.
See ARMY, 5.
PAYMENT.
1. Where an award was made toM., as surviving partner of the firm of
M. & G., and on the subsequent death ofM. the representatives of
G. demanded to share in the distribution of the award: Advised
that the administrators of :M., the surviving partner in whoEe name
the claim was pres en ted and tow hom the a ward thereon'was map.e,
should alone receive payment. 537.
·2. Payment to a judgment creditor of a claim against the Government
in favor of the judgment debtor, if made without the consent of
the latter, is unauthorized by law. 675.
See PAY ACCOUNTS OF ARMY OFFICERS.
PENALTY.
See FINES, PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
PENALTY-ENVELOPE.
See OFFICIAL ENVELOPE.
PENSION.
1. Consideration of legal principles applicable to the case of a claim for
pension, where the injury followed the use of abusive language of
the claimant towards his assailant. 172.
2. T. died while his application for pension was pending, leaving a
widow and a daughter under sixteen years of age; the mother died
after the daughter attained the age of sixteen years; and subsequently the pension was allowed and a certificate therefor issued:
Held that under section 4718 Rev. Stat. the daughter is entitled to
the pension which had accrued up to the death of the father. 190.
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3. The provision in section 4713 Rev. Stat., declaring that where
an application for pension should not have been filed " within
three years of the termination of a pension previously granted on
account of the service and death of the same person, the pension
shall commence from the date of filing, by the party prosecuting
the claim, the last paper requisite to establish the same," is applicable to half-pay pensions allowable under section 4725 Rev. Stat.
221.
4. In the case of General Burnett it is held that he is entitled to, and
should be allowed, the increase of pension granted by the act of
June 16, 1880, chapter 236, to a certain class of pensioners. 327.
5. Under section 4702 Rev. Stat., the surviving child (the widow
and other children being dead) is entitled to the whole of the pension to which the father would be entitled were he living. 339.
6. The pro1,iso in section 4i14 Rev. Stat. is to be construed as appli,
cable to the new limitation prescribed by section 2 of the act
of March 3, 1879, chapter 187, as to date of filing pension claimsj
and a declaration made in accordance therewith may be accepted,
to exempt a claim from such limitation. 355.
7. Rates of pension which should be allowed General Burnett under the
generallaws ofMarch3, 1873, June 18, 1879, and June 16, 1880, and
under the special act of March 3, 1879, stated ; and advised that two
pension certificates be issued-one under the general law of June
16, 1880, the other under the special act of March 3, 1879. 401.
8. Where a pensioner was entitled to, though not actually receiving, a
pension of$50 a month under a general law, and while so entitled
a special act was passed giving him another pension: Held that his
right under the general law did not cease or become merged in that
granted by the special act. 415.
:9. A contract surgeon, on entering the service, was ordered to duty in a
post hospital at a distant place, and in obedience to the order
went aboard a steamer to proceed thither, but before the departure of the boat became too sick to go on, and was removed to a
hospital, where he died in a few days of typhoid fever, leaving a
dependent mother, but no widow or child: Held tha,t, under the
prodsions of sections 4692, 4693, and 4707, Revised Statutes, the
dependent mother is entitled to be enrolled as a pensioner, on the
ground that the deceased, when taken down with sickness, was
"in transitu" under orders. 4f>7.
10. When an officer is ordered to go to a given point for duty and has
set about his rreparations to do so, his transitus has begun. Ibid.
11. Declarations of pension claimants must be made before a court of
record, or Lefore some officer thereof having custody ofi ts seal. 510.
12. The power to fine and imprison is not in this country a distinguishing mark. of a court record, but the enrolling or recording of their
acts and proceedings iH; and such court must have a seal by which
its acts and proceedings are authenticated and proved. Ibid.
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PERMIT LAWS.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS.
POLICE FORCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 4.
POSSE COMITATUS.
1. Troops of the United States can not, without violating the provisions of section 15 of the act J nne 18, 1878, chapter 263, be employed
as a posse comitatus, to aid the United States marshal or his
deputies in arresting certain persons in the State of Kentucky
charged with robbing an officer of the Government. 71.
2. Section 15 of the act of J nne 18, 1878, chapter 263, renders unavailable
the aid of the military forces of the United States for the suppression of unlawful organizations, unless the state of facts be such as
to enable these forces to be used under the provisions of section
5287 or of sections 5298 and 5300, Revised Statutes. 242.
POSTAL GUIDE.
See CoNTRACT, 2, 3.
POSTAL NOTES.
See POSTAL SERVICE, 15.

,

POSTAL SERVICE.
1. Where the Postmaster-General finds, upon evidence satisfactory t()
himself, that a person is engaged in conducLing a fraudulent lottery, he may and should forbid the delivery of registered letters
and the payment of money-orders to such person. It is not in
terms all fraudulent lotteries, etc., that are excluded from the use
of the registry and money-order systems; those only are denied
such use which are found to be fraudulent by the PortmasterGeneral. 77.
2. Where there is a letter-carrier office at the place of publication of a.
newspaper or periodical, and at another place, within another
postal di&trict, a news-dealer is employed by the publisher to mail
at the latter place copies of the newspaper or periodical intended
for distribution to subscribers at the former place, such copies are
not entitled to transmission through the mails at pound rates. 164.
3. The proviso in the second section of the act of April 7, 1880, chap. 78,
limits the power of the Postmaster-General to allow increased pay
for expedited service to fifty per centum of the conpensation expressed in the original contract. The original letting, and not any
subsequent increase of service and pay, under section 3960 Rev.
Stats., is made the standard of limitation. 166.
4. The case submitted being one "in which it is proposed not to expedite the service, but to reduce the speed thereof as fixed by the
now existing con,tract: Advised that the act of April 7, 1880, chap.
48, has no application thereto, and imposes no restriction upon
the Postmaster-General in dealing therewith. 240.
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5. When a reduction of speed is proposed, he is left at liberty to act as
in his judgement the good of the ~;ervice and the interests of the
public may demand, without any limitation upon the exercise of
his authority. Ibid.
6. Section 3962, Revised Statutes, makes it imperative upon the Postmaster-General to deduct from the pay of mail contractors the price
of the trip where, without fault on their part, the trip is not performed. 276.
7. And sernble that the section has the same effect as regards the pay of
companies performing '' recognized service" in the case of trips
not performed by such companies. Ibid.
8. The Postmaster-General may require from the bidder for a mail contract conformity to all proper and reasonable administrative regulations of the Post-Office Department; and if the bidder neglects.
to conform thereto, his bid may be rejected. 285.
9. Case of a material change by erasure and interlineation in the bidder's bond, where no attestation by a witness appears thereon that.
such change was made before execution of the bond, considered.
Ibid.
10. The statutory requirements relative to bids for mail contracts (by
which, inter alia, every proposal must be accompanied by bond
with sureties) are intended to protect the Government against imposition through worthless bids. 293.
11. Where such requirements are conformed to in point of form, but the
Postmaster-General is satisfied, from reliable information, that the·
bond is worthless and therefore unacceptable, he may and should
treat the bid as though it were unaccompanied by a bond. Ibid.
12. Removal of an assistant postmaster. 475.
13. Suspension of a postmaster= Ibid.
14. The top or outside of a letter-box, attached to a lamp-post, is not an
authorized depository for mail-matter, the taking of which therefrom is punishable under section 5469, Revised Statutes. 524.
15. Postal notes, under the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 123, are required
to be drawn payable only at the office selected by the remitter. 620.
16. A circular of the World's Dispensary Medical Association, contemplating the sale of 100,000 copies of a certain book at $1.50 per copy,.
and proposing to distribute among the purchasers a large amount.
out of the proceeds of such sale in sums ranging from 25 cents t()
$6,000 per each purchaser: Held to be unmailable matter, it being
manifestly a device to deceive and defraud the public. 624.
POSTMASTER.
See COMPENSATION, 14, 15, 16.
POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
See PosTAL SERVICE, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11.
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POST-TRA.D~R.

1. Where one person had been appointed post-trader for a certain military post, and subsequently, on a change in the location of the post,
another person was appointed post-trader for the same post: Held
that as the law allows but one post-trader to be appointed for a
military post, the second appointment must be deemed to work a
revocation of the first, and accordingly that the last appointee is
entitled to the place. 424.
2. Under section 3 of the act of July 24, 1876, chapter 226, a post-trader
can not be appointed by the Secretary of War excepting on the recommendation of a council of administration appointed by the commanding officer of the post, yet he may be removed by t.he Secretary
without the concurrence of the council of administration and commanding officer. 517.

POTOMAC RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
See IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS, 4.
POWER OF ATTORNEY.
See CLAIMS, 10, 11.
PRESIDENT.
1. Power of the President under the act of July 15, 1870, chapter 294,
to drop an officer from the rolls of the Army, considered. 13.
2. Neither the act of March 3, 1865, chapter 79, nor that of July 13,
1866, chapter 176, applies to cases expressly and specifically provided for by the act of July 15, 1870, section 17. Ibid.
3. The President has no power to retire Lieutenant-Colonel Freudenberg with the rank and pay of colonel of infantry from the date
of his first reliirement, December 15, 1870. 60.
4. Mistakes, if any, made in the execution of an act which is subsequently repealed, can not be rectified by executive action after
such repeal. Ibid.
5. It is not competent to the President, with the concurrence of the
Senate, now (in May, 1881) to reappoint Rev. Charles M. Blake a
post chaplain in the Army as of the 28th day of September, 1878,
so as to entitle him to pay from that date. 97.
6. The President has power to direct, by an executive order, the manner
in which shall be ascertained and determined the compensation
for property taken or destroyed in the construction of the Missouri,
Kansas and Texas Railway through the reservation of the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes of Indians. 265.
7. The President has power to designate one of his executive clerks to
sign for him, and in his name, all patents for land, etc.; and should
an exigency of the public service require it, he is authorized to
appoint an assistant to aid in performing that duty, so long as the
exigency exists. 305.
8. In the absence of any act of Congress or constitutional provision
conferring upon him authority so to do, the President can not officially consent to and approve the erection of the proposed bridge
across the Niagara River. 523.
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9. The President has no power, in the absence of a treaty provision, to
extend to a foreign government the privilege of taking the testimony of prisoners, excepting when they are confined in prisons of
such of the Territories as are not invested with authority to regulate the prisons within their limit, and in the prisons of the District of Columbia; and then only, as to the former prisons, with
the concurrence of the Attorney-General, and as to the latter
prisons, with the concurrence of the supreme court of the District. 565.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10; PAE.DON, 1, 2.
PROCESS.
Writs issued by the courts of Minnesota run into and upon the military reservation of Fort Snelling, in that State. 1.
PROMOTION.
See ARMY, 13, 14, 25, 26, 27,28; MARINE CORPS, 1, 2, 3; NAVY, 4,6, 13,
14, 15.
PROPERTY LOST IN THE MILITARY SERVICE.
See CLAIMS, 1, 6, 7.
PUBLIC LANDS.
See LANDS, PUBLIC.
QUARTERS, COMMUTATION FOR.
1. An officer in the enjoyment of quarters in kind at the commencement
ofleave (cumulative) taken under the act of July 29, 1876, chapter
239, does not become entitled to commutation upon the commencement of the leave. 41.
2. Nor does he become entitled to commutation if, during such leave, he
voluntarily abandons the use of the quarters in kind; nor if he
vacates his quarters in kind at the command of his superior; nor
if there are unoccupied quarters at the post or station that might
properly have been assigned to him had no leave been granted.
Ibid.
3. An officer of the Army placed on waiting orders is not entitled to commutation for quarters under the proviso in section 9 of the act of
June 18, 1878, chapter 263. 169.
4. The word "places," as used in that proviso, comprehends only military posts and stations. Ibid.
5. B. was in the military service as a surgeon, under contract dated
January 1, 1881, and on duty at the Washington Arsenal, District
of Columbia, from January 1 to April 30, 1881: Held that he was
entitled, for that period, to the commutation for quarters allowed
by Jaw to an assistant surgeon of t.he rank of first lieutenant, if no
public quarters were a-.ailable for his accommodation. 461.

See TRANSPORTATION.
REDEMPTION OF CIRCULATION.
See NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS, 2, 3, 11.
REFUND OF DUTY.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 14, 27, 28, 35; INTERNAL RBVBNUB, 7.
REGISTRY OF VESSELS.
1. A vessel built in the United States, and owned wholly by citizens
thereof, is entitled to be registered under the laws of the United
States, although she may have formerly belonged to citizens of a
foreign country. 2tJ6.
1". A registered vessel of the United States, wholly and continuously
owned by a eitizen of the United States, does not forfeit her pri vileges as such by having been employed under a foreign flag since the
rebellion. 443.
-1. An American-built vessel, wholly and continuously owned by a citizen of the United States, but as yet unregistered, may be admitted
to registry, although she has sailed under a foreign flag since the
rebellion. Ibid.
BEGULATIONS.•
See ARMY, 13, 14 ; A.BHY REGULATIONS ; CIVIL SBRVICB, 4.
BBLA.TIVE RANK.
SeeABHY, 6,. 6, 7, 11, 11, 18, 19,20, 21, 22; N.A.V.AL AOADBKY,2;
NAVY, 5.
REPRIEVE.
Upon examination of the papers accompanying an application made
to the President asking for the appointment of a commission to examine and consider the mental condition of Charles J. Guiteau, and
praying for h's reprieve pending the investigation: .Adril«l, for
reason a stated, that the application be not granted. 394.
RES A.DJUDIOA'l,A.
See CLAIMs, 5; LANDS, PUBLIC, 1.
RESERVATION.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10.
BETIRED LIST.
See .A.RMY, 2, 3, 24; NAVY, 2, 8, 9, 10, 15.
RETIRED OFFICERS OF THE ARMY.
SeQ...A.RMY, 3, 4, 28, 24.
RETIRED OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
See NAVY, 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15•
.REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
See APPOINTMENT, 7, 8.
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Section 2297 ••••••••••••••••••• 162
Section 2318 ..................... 231
See:tlon ~19.................... J~31
Seotiop ~--·· ................. 232
Section 3322 ••••••••••••••••••• 2.12
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Section 2733 ................... 6&
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SAVANNAH RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
See IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE W A.TERS, 5.
SCHOOL-FARM LANDS, PROCEEDS OF.
See TRUST FUNDS.
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SEAMEN.
See SHIPPING, 1.
SEA SERVICE.
See NAVY, 11, 12.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
See INDIAN INSPECTOR; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 1, 71 1 11; IN·
DIAN TRUST FUNDS; PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS.
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
See CoMPROMISE; CUSTOMS LAWS, 4, 14, 27, 28, 35; INTERNAL REV·
ENUE 1 4; TJtUST FUNDS.
SECRETARY OF WAR.
See COURT-MARTIAL, 1; POST TRADER, 2; SOLDIERS' HOME, 2.
SENTENCE OF COURT-MARTIAL.
See COURT-MARTIAL, 2, 3; NAVY, 3; PARDON, 1, 2.
SET-OFF.
Where money was paid by a United States marshal, under a mistake of fact, to a person who subsequently became an officer in the
postal service: Held that, the latter being i.n arrears to the United
States for the amount so paid, it may be set off against his compensation as such officer. 677.
SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNT.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 4.
SHIPPING.
1. An alien seaman, though he has declared his intention to become
a citizen of the United States, and has served three years on vessels
of the United States, is ineligible to the position of an officer of an
American vessel. For that, full citizenship is required. 534.
2. On application of the master, the American brig Ma1·y C. Comery,
while lying at a Colombian port, was surveyed and condemned as
unseaworthy by the port officers. Meanwhile the United States
consul summoned a committee, which also surveyed the vessel,
and, :finding her unseaworthy, recommended a sale for the benefit
of all concerned. But prior to the last survey the master notified
the consul that he abandoned the vessel, and thereupon left the
port: Advised that, in the case stated, the consul is without authority to sell the vessel, but should notify the owners of the condition of their property, and5n the mean time take care of it. 552.
3. A tug-boat, used for the purpose and in the manner stated in the
opinion, can not be called a "passenger vessel " or " vessel carrying
passengers," within the provisions of section 4464 to 4469 Rev.
Stat. 599.
SIGNAL CORPS.
See ARMY, 15, 1a

t~~ 8PQJ~IEJtS' BO~.
Soldierr Home is not entitled to bounty land-warrama ~ng
to the estates of d~ soldiers which remain unclaimed for the
~riod of three yean after their deoeaee. 157.
2. In passing upon reoommendatiou made by tho Board of Commiuloners ofthe Soldien' Home under section 4816 Rev. Stat., the SecretarJ
of War ja, invested with a ~isoretionary poJVer to approve or diaappMve the same. 449.

OTB PASS 01!, THE MISSISSIPP1.
See IXPROVBMBNT 0.1' NAVIGABLB W A.TBRS, 2.
SPANISH CLAIMS UNDER TREATY OF 1819.
See 0LA.IMS,17, 18, 19.
See

PBOCBSS.

STATE TAX.
See TAX LIBN.
STA.TUT~S,

INTERPRETATION OF.

L The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1881, chap. 133, "for

the purohaee of a suitable site tn the city of Washington for the
ereotion of• brick bullclbts to~ uaed an4 GO$ ·eel b' ij,le Penawn

r.•1·

.
2.

3.

4.

lJUMaUJ" eta' Is to h~.....
· - ·
of a site. The l&nguage of'ili6 Glaae8 ooniiabla no imb gnity ne&.
eeearily giving rise to the inference that CongreSB intended it to
embrace more than it.s terms express. 63.
The appropriation made by the IW't of June 16, 1880, chap. 235, "for
the expenses' of the Geological Snrvey, and the classification
of the public lands, and examination of the geological structures,
mineral resources, and products of the national domain, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior," is not
applicable to the paymentofrent of the building in Washington,
D. C., leased from Dr. J. W.Bulkley, July9, 1880, and used as offices
for the Geological Survey. f!l.
That appropriation not being " in terms " made for the rent of any
building or part of any building in the District of Columbia to be
used by the Geological Survey, and no provision therefor being
made elaewhere, the lease of July 9, 1880, was forbidden by the act
of Karch 3, 1877, chap. 106, and is void. Ibid.
The power given the Commissioners of the District of Columbia by
the sixth seotion of the aot of:Mareh 3, 1881, chap. 134, "to sell to the
highest bidder at public auction" all the right, title, and interest
of the United States in and to a certain lot of ground situated in
the city of Washington, carries with it au.thority to make a COD•
veyancetosnch bidder, as an incident to the execution of the power.
100.

1
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STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF-Continued.
5. The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1881, chap. 135, in the
provision authorizing the creation of a board of Army officers to
make examinations of improvements of heavy ordnance and projectiles, is applicable to expensesnecessarily incurred by the board
in performing the duties devolved thereon, among which the actual and necessary expenses of its members for board and lodging
and for traveHng while so engaged can be fairly included. 252.
6. The authority given by the act of Aprilll, 1882, chap. 75, "to purchaae a site" f~r a public building to be erected at Minneapolis,
Minn., does not include authority to acquire such site by condemnation under the eminent domain power of the United States. 509.
7. Construction of the act of July 15, H!82, chap. 294, "to increase the
water supply of the city of Washington," etc. 587.
See APPOINTMENT ; ARMY; ARMY REGULATIONS; CHINESE LABORERS; CIVIL SERVICE; CLAIMS i COMPENSATION i CONTRACT;
CUSTOMS LAWS ; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ; EIGHT-HOUR LAW;
IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS; INDIANS AND INDIAN
LANDS ; INDIAN SCHOOLS i INDIAN TRUST FUNDS ; INTERNAL
REVENUE; LAND·GBANT RAILROADS i LANDS, PUBLIC; NATIONAL
BANKING ASSOCIATIONS; NAVY; OFFICER; OFFICIAL ENVELOPE;
PENSION; POSSE COMITATUS; POSTAL SERVICE; POST TRADERS;
PRESIDENT; QUARTERS, COMMUTATION FOR; REVISED STATUTES,
ETC.; TERl.ITORIES_j TRUST FUNDS.
SUBLETTING CONTRACT.
See CoNTRACT, 8, 9.
SUITS IN REVENUE CASES.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 3, 4.
SUPERVISING INSPECTOR.
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS.
SUPPLIES FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE.
1. No legal obstacle exists to re-imbursing · the appropriation for the
Na.vy Department from the appropriation for the Revenue Marine
Service with the cost of such heavy ordnance and ordnance stores
as may be furnished by that Department to be used in said service. 480.
2. Where one Department receives from another Department supplies
which are within the scope of appropriations belonging to each a
re-imbursement of the appropriation of the one from the appropriation of the other, of the cost of such supplies, is not a violation of
section 3678 Rev. Stat. ; nor do the provisions of section 3618 Rev.
Stat. apply to such case. Ibid.
SWAMP-LAND GRANT.
See LA~Ds, PuBLIC, 1.

INDEX.
TAX LIEN.
Where the title to land in Cincinnati, Ohio, was acquired by the United
States by condemnation, and jurisdiction over the land so acquired
was ceded to the United States by the State: Held that taxes theretofore assessed upon the land by the city authorities, and remaining unpaid, ceased thereafter to be a lien upon the land, and did
not become a proper charge agaiast the United States. 44.
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT.
See APPOINTMENT, 4.

TERRITORIES.
Persons appointed under the bigam;r act of March 22, 1882, chap. 47,
section 9, to perform the duties ot' the registration and election offices, thereby declared vacant, have authority to administe1· all oaths
which the former incumbents of thes offices were authorized to
administer in the performance ofthe duties thereof. 314.
TESTIMONY OF PRISONERS.
See PRESIDENT, 9.
TIMBER DEPREDATIONS.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 11, 12, 1!').

TDIE, CHANGE OF.
A change of time at Washington, D. C., by adopting theaeventy fifth
meridian in lieu of the true meridian at that place (being a change
of eight minutes and twelve seconds), can not be effected by mere
executive autY,ority. It can only be done by appropriate legislation. 619.
TONNAGE DUES.
1. The "tax of .fifty cents per ton" imposed by section 4219 Rev. Stat., as
amended by the act of February Z'l, 1877, chap . .69, is not a penalty
capable of being remitted by the Secretary of the Treasury under
sections 5292 and 5293 Rev. Stat. 120.
2. A foreign vessel, i.e., one belonging wholly or in part to a subject of
a foreign power, is not liable to the penal tax prescribed in section
4371 Rev. Stat. This tax applies exclusively to vessels belonging
to citizens of the United States which are capable of being and
should be .enrolled and licensed. 388.
TRANSPORTATION.
Under sections 5260 and 5261 Rev. Stat., it i~ sufficient if, previous to
the payment of claims for freight and transportation over the railroads of companies to which the United States have i88ued bonds,
the law applicable thereto has been ascertained by ajudgmentofthe
Court of Claims, or, upon appeal, of the Supreme Court. Where the
law is thus ascertained in one case; it may be acted upou in all similar
cases without further litigation. 512.
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TRANSPORTATION OF THE MAIL.
See CONTRACT, 1, 8, 9, 10, 11 ; POSTAL SERVICE, 3, 4, 5.
TRAVELING ALLOWANCES.
Traveling allowances, as authorized by paragraph 2280, Regulations
of 1881, can be lawfully paid a contract surgeon where they constitute part of the contract. 461.
TREASURY WARRANT.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 1.
TREATIES WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
1. The tariff on statuary and other works of art considered in connection with the treaty of 1871 between the United States and Italy.
223.
2. The treaty makes no provision, in letter or spirit, as regards the importation, exportation, or prohibition of articles, the produce or
manufacture of Italy, where dealt in by Italian citizens residing in
Italy, excepting that such importations, etc., shall be upon as
favorable a footing as like commerce by English, French, German,
or other foreign citizens whatsoever. Ibid.
3. In the administration of the tariff there has been due observance of
the legal rights of Italian citizens, arising either under said treaty
or under statute provisions of Congress. Ibid.
TREATIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 1, 2, 5, 7, 14, 15.
TRUST FUNDS.
The investment of trust funds (money derived from the sale of schoolfarm lands) made by the Secretary of the Treasury, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1873, chap. 260, and section 3 of the act
of May 7, 1878, chap. 96, in 5 per cent. bonds of the United States,
which have since been called for payment, may be continued by him
in the same bonds at 3! per centum, in accordance with the circular of the Treasury Department of May 12, 1881, or he is at liberty to pay off such bonds and invest the proceeds in any other
bonds of the United States for the benefit of the trusts ruentioned
in the provisions aforesaid. 217.
See INDIAN TRUST FUNDS.
UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
The allowance made to the Union Pacific Railway Company for special
service, to be paid out of the so-called " special-facilities" appropriation, can not lawfully be paid to the company in cash, but
must be retained and applied as directed by section 2 of the act of
May 7, 1878, chap. 90. 393.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, EASTERN DIVISION.
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 1, 2.
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U. S. ATTORNEY.
See DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
U. S. COMMISSIONER.
See COMPENSATION, 6; OFFICIAL ENVELOPE, 1.
UNMAILABLE MATTER.
See POSTAL SERVICE, 16.
UTAH.
See TERRITORIES.
UTE INDIANS.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 8, 9, 11.
VACANCY IN OFFICE.
See APPOINTMENT, 4, 9, 10.
VESSEL.
See REGISTRY OF VESSELS ; SHIPPING.
VESSEL OF THE UNITE'D STATES.
~ee SHIPPING.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 7,
TIME, CHANGE OF.
WITHDRAWAL FOR EXPORTATION.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 16; INTERNAL REVENUE, 11.
WITHDRAWAL OF CIRCULATION.
See NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS, 1.
WITHHOLDING PAY. .
See COl'tlPENSATION, 3; CONTRACT, 4.
WITNESS.
See COMPENSATION, 6 i COURT-MARTIAL, 11, 12.
WORKS Ol., ART.
See TREATIES WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, 1,2.
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